ellsworthpc
Private
- Joined
- Jul 2, 2018
--snipping--
Then again, you may be right in terms of practicality, that is, "could enough artillery have been moved and maintained in that new position, early enough to support the PPT charge from this new battlefield angle? We will never know.
Disagreement with the first, total agreement with the second. Part of my disagreement comes from Alexander's own assessment when he visited Gettysburg -- IIRC around 15 years later. Basically, he pointed out that for the 3rd day, the superior point of fire would have been basically "down the shank of the fishhook", because even a miss would have still done a heck of a lot more damage down the entire Corps lines of the Union forces. He might have even been able to keep Pendleton from removing a lot of the artillery from overall control. One point that I haven't seen addressed very much is that Alexander's desired point of attack would have also required much of the AotP artillery placed on the Union's left flank to fire OVER the entire line of battle, and rendered those same units increasingly useless (cause too much friendly fire) if an infantry charge comes from closer to that same angle.I somewhat disagree. The Confederates were limited in where they could deploy their guns and their placement was about as well as could be expected.
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The real problem is that Lee's expectations for the artillery were not particularly realistic. Not to mention that even if they Union batteries were driven off, reserve artillery was available to fill in any gaps created.Ryan
Then again, you may be right in terms of practicality, that is, "could enough artillery have been moved and maintained in that new position, early enough to support the PPT charge from this new battlefield angle? We will never know.