Indescribably grand... a mere waste of ammunition: the Confederate artillery at Picket's Charge

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I somewhat disagree. The Confederates were limited in where they could deploy their guns and their placement was about as well as could be expected.
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The real problem is that Lee's expectations for the artillery were not particularly realistic. Not to mention that even if they Union batteries were driven off, reserve artillery was available to fill in any gaps created.Ryan
Disagreement with the first, total agreement with the second. Part of my disagreement comes from Alexander's own assessment when he visited Gettysburg -- IIRC around 15 years later. Basically, he pointed out that for the 3rd day, the superior point of fire would have been basically "down the shank of the fishhook", because even a miss would have still done a heck of a lot more damage down the entire Corps lines of the Union forces. He might have even been able to keep Pendleton from removing a lot of the artillery from overall control. One point that I haven't seen addressed very much is that Alexander's desired point of attack would have also required much of the AotP artillery placed on the Union's left flank to fire OVER the entire line of battle, and rendered those same units increasingly useless (cause too much friendly fire) if an infantry charge comes from closer to that same angle.

Then again, you may be right in terms of practicality, that is, "could enough artillery have been moved and maintained in that new position, early enough to support the PPT charge from this new battlefield angle? We will never know.
 
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Disagreement with the first, total agreement with the second. Part of my disagreement comes from Alexander's own assessment when he visited Gettysburg -- IIRC around 15 years later. Basically, he pointed out that for the 3rd day, the superior point of fire would have been basically "down the shank of the fishhook", because even a miss would have still done a heck of a lot more damage down the entire Corps lines of the Union forces. He might have even been able to keep Pendleton from removing a lot of the artillery from overall control. One point that I haven't seen addressed very much is that Alexander's desired point of attack would have also required much of the AotP artillery placed on the Union's left flank to fire OVER the entire line of battle, and rendered those same units increasingly useless (cause too much friendly fire) if an infantry charge comes from closer to that same angle.

Then again, you may be right in terms of practicality, that is, "could enough artillery have been moved and maintained in that new position, early enough to support the PPT charge from this new battlefield angle? We will never know.

The problem with Alexander's contention is that the geography did not allow it. Ideally, yes, he is correct but the ground that the Confederates controlled simply did not give them a position to fire along the Union line. The closest that they came was from the Peach Orchard firing to the northeast.

South of the Union lines were behind Union cavalry lines and any line of fire would be blocked by the Round Tops. To the north, the plains north of town offered no place to deploy guns that wasn't blocked by the town and Benner's Hill was an inferno when Major Joseph Latimer's Battalion unlimbered on the bare hill.

As I said, the Confederate guns deployed as well as they could given the circumstances.

Ryan
 
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My understanding from J.F.C. Fuller is that both sides were pre-modern. They did not adjust the angle of artillery fire with the angle of infantry advance in order to allow the artillery to continue to bombard the enemy during the advance. None of them had enough combat experience to know how to do it and there was a war going on, so the opportunity to see how it should have been done was extremely limited. Not a lot of library time available.
True -- plus I'd neglected to consider the fact that the Napoleons, etc. bucked and moved after every shot, compared to a modern howitzer, for example, where the recoil is absorbed but the base of the gun stays steady. Plus I imagine that the "ticks" in the machining for the angle of fire were probably way less than would have been needed or even rugged enough. In my head, I picture a system of "iron chocks under the tail" as being the only way they could have quickly changed the firing angle quickly enough anyway.

That said, one of the things that lets us "play" at Gettysburg, etc. is the fact that the artillery is not as precise. Picture what a single well-supplied modern infantry (M252) mortar company (8-16 RPM, HE warheads with a kill radius of about 35m) would do -- given effective spotters -- to either side of the conflict in a relatively short period of time, from beyond the 12-pounder's ability to respond.
 
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Disagreement with the first, total agreement with the second. Part of my disagreement comes from Alexander's own assessment when he visited Gettysburg -- IIRC around 15 years later. Basically, he pointed out that for the 3rd day, the superior point of fire would have been basically "down the shank of the fishhook", because even a miss would have still done a heck of a lot more damage down the entire Corps lines of the Union forces. He might have even been able to keep Pendleton from removing a lot of the artillery from overall control. One point that I haven't seen addressed very much is that Alexander's desired point of attack would have also required much of the AotP artillery placed on the Union's left flank to fire OVER the entire line of battle, and rendered those same units increasingly useless (cause too much friendly fire) if an infantry charge comes from closer to that same angle.

Then again, you may be right in terms of practicality, that is, "could enough artillery have been moved and maintained in that new position, early enough to support the PPT charge from this new battlefield angle? We will never know.
The artillery had to be deployed to shoot at angle on the enemy, hopefully to achieve the execution desired by Alexander. Consistent with that the infantry had to advance on the point of concentration by a different angle, so that the artillery would not be firing over the head of their own infantry.
While doing this, someone has to be organizing an additional effort to keep the enemy artillery occupied. Its a lot to ask of an army that was challenged in artillery munitions and transport.
 
I agree. Fine article. IMHO it substantiates the earlier thread on the Company of Military Historians articlle on Lee's operational incompetence at Gettysburg:

HomeForums>War of the Rebellion Forums>Civil War History - Battle Forums>Battle of Gettysburg>

"I received my copy of the Journal of the Company of Military Historians today. We sponsor a history essay at West Point and the winning article, “Lee and the Artillery on the Third Day at Gettysburg”, was printed. Two quotes from the articles; “Lee did a poor job of implementing his mediocre plan.” “On the third day at Gettysburg Lee failed his subordinates. He demonstrated operational incompetence that ensured the failure of the Army of Northern Virginia, brought down by an unclear view of the battlefield and the men on it that made him blind to better counsel.”

This article places the blame on Pendleton whereas, IMHO, Lee, as commander, should have known what was up.

The article also mentions the inferior Confederate fuses. I've always wondered who manufactured those inferior fuses?
I think they came out of Augusta, where women made them, but I may be wrong....didn't quality control exist?
At 0610 hours on July 6 of this year, I stood at the monument to the Excelsior Brigade, and it hit me how badly managed the Confederate Artillery was during the third day. Granted my modern military mind with an immersion in synchronizing operations is a bit biased, but I can't help assuming that by 19th Century standards it was a botched job. I would love to see that article. A good leader knows their subordinates limitations e.g. Pendleton, and intervenes accordingly, rather than trusting in divine providence. A local guide told me they didn't even get the English Whitworth's into the Day 3 fray.
 
I somewhat disagree. The Confederates were limited in where they could deploy their guns and their placement was about as well as could be expected. In addition, while you are correct that the Confederate fire scoured the plain behind the front lines, it was not wholly ineffective. The condition of the Second Corps batteries indicates that they took a great deal of fire during the bombardment.

The real problem is that Lee's expectations for the artillery were not particularly realistic. Not to mention that even if they Union batteries were driven off, reserve artillery was available to fill in any gaps created.

Ryan

I read recently that the artillery fired by US artillery in the first four hours of the WWI Battle of the Meuse Argonne more than equalled the weight and power of all the artillery fire of the Union army in the entire Civil War.

Whaf seemed like heavy fire in 1863 would barely have registered in 1917
 
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The real problem is that Lee's expectations for the artillery were not particularly realistic. Not to mention that even if they Union batteries were driven off, reserve artillery was available to fill in any gaps created.

Ryan
I just read Hunt's [the Union artillery officer] after-action report. You are spot on about the reserve artillery and Lee's expectations... When guns were hit, they brought in reserve artillery very quickly. He states that post-battle, a big concern was the number of caissons taken out by the rebel bombardment. There were also a couple bits that are absolutely new to me, which is that the Confed artillery opened up at about the time Pickett's charge hit the Union lines, despite causing friendly fire.

An interesting "game-it-out" question might be something along the lines of "could the AofNV position used a better combination of shot-type and positioning from Seminary Ridge to more effectively bombard the Union lines and artillery? I think my answer is "not by day #3". Brought a different strategic goal for day #3 to mind though. Suppose that in the morning, the AofVV launches a hell on wheels co-ordinated attack designed to capture the Union artillery reserve, and then beat streets along their own lines to the south, leaving the "in place artillery" nothing to shoot at. Question would be, could they have pulled it off. Probably not... but a fun thought nonetheless. May have to try for a variant like that on the Tiller games!
 
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