If you were General Pemberton ? . . .

7th Mississippi Infantry

Brev. Brig. Gen'l
Joined
Sep 28, 2013
Location
Southwest Mississippi
The Pemberton/Davis/Johnston issues regarding Vicksburg are well known. I've read all of the exchanges on this forum about the controversy. Just out of curiosity, I'm interested how others feel about Pemberton's "Catch-22".

So if you were General Pemberton, which orders would you obey ?

Davis' or Johnston's ?
 
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I don't know the full story of Vicksburg vs other battles. I am thinking did Pemberton really have any good options of breaking the siege? Did Grant just have to many troops so therefore Pembertons fate was cast in iron? In Pembertons defense on the whole the CSA just didn't have the manpower to defend fixed points and few if any other generals did any better. Even Lee at petersburg was only able to do so much and we all know how that turned out.
Leftyhunter
 
The Pemberton/Davis/Johnston issues regarding Vicksburg are well known. I've read all of the exchanges on this forum about the controversy. Just out of curiosity, I'm interested how others feel about Pemberton's "Catch-22".

So if you were General Pemberton, which orders would you obey ?

Davis' or Johnston's ?

Pemberton should have obeyed his own! Davis wanted Vicksburg protected and Johnston wished for Pemberton to move out into the grand wide open (into the mythical Netherland). In reality, there was no initial problem between Pemberton and Davis. It appears they were somewhat on the same page. Anyway, regardless of Davis's or Johnston's wishes, Pemberton had correctly concluded that Grant's main objective was Edwards. As a consequence, he arrayed his army on defensive (high) ground around Edwards (not to be confused with the bridgehead at the Big Black River Bridge). He also aligned his troops to cover all the ferries or crossings which threatened Vicksburg and his rear. It was there outside Edwards where Pemberton awaited Grant's men -- on high ground in defensive positions with a potential offensive move.

Pemberton's decision to place his army in such a manner was decided before Johnston stuck his nose in the matter. I'm not saying Pemberton would have defeated Grant in what would have been a battle in and around Edwards, but it would have likely been a battle on a scale similar to battles fought in Virginia. In the end Pemberton "obeyed" Johnston after debate with Richmond as to whom had control or final say over his army. Pemberton decided he had to try and follow Johnston's orders. He thusly left the high ground, got into low ground with both flanks in the air, all the while trying to decipher more messages sent from a deluded Johnston while he moved. We now know the result of that decision. It's only a wonder how he (Pemberton) alluded disaster.

In contrast, Grant received an order on May 17, 1863, while his army was preparing to attack the Rebels trapped in the bridgehead at the Railraod Bridge at Big Black after Champion's Hill, to retreat and remove his army to help Banks to take Port Hudson. Grant basically told the messenger to screw off, regardless of how high up the order came. He moved ahead with his plan and eventually took Vicksburg.

Pemberton should have done the same with Johnston -- disobeyed the order or, at least, resigned his command on the spot. He did neither. As a result, a comedy of errors occurred.
 
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The Pemberton/Davis/Johnston issues regarding Vicksburg are well known. I've read all of the exchanges on this forum about the controversy. Just out of curiosity, I'm interested how others feel about Pemberton's "Catch-22".

So if you were General Pemberton, which orders would you obey ?

Davis' or Johnston's ?

Neither. J.E. Johnston and Pemberton were both too defensive-minded and pessimistic about the situation, and lacked confidence in their ability to achieve any kind of success. The Confederacy needed an aggressive general in command at Vicksburg. Edwin Bearss suggested that Grant's impetuous pursuit after the battle of Port Gibson gave "the Confederate leaders a chance to destroy or maul one of his corps." Pemberton did assemble a force capable of doing just this at Hankinson's Ferry but then dispersed it to defend against any one of the possible advances that Grant's army could take next. An aggressive general would have kept this force concentrated, and seized the initiative by going on the attack, possibly routing one of Grant's corps. But who? The only viable candidate was probably Richard Taylor...
 
Who was it that said,"When your in command, command"! Pemberton was that man and should have acted acordingly.

This.

(I can't remember who said it either, thought the version I heard was "When in charge, take charge!" Maybe it's just a standard military aphorism we've heard in our former service...)

Although Grant was operating with a less-than-complete supply line (though not completely without a supply line, as he'd later claim), it still would have thrown a major wrench into his plans to have hit his rear areas near the river as he moved inland; it would have played havoc with his ammunition supply. Though this is with the benefit of a century and a half's hindsight...

There do seem to be a number of cases where Pemberton seemed unable to settle on a consistent course of action, such as his back-and-forth movements just prior to Champion Hill. While a good deal of credit must necessarily be given to Grant, Pemberton did cooperate with Grant by acting like the proverbial duck hit on the head, Hooker-like.

How would it have gone with Bowen in top command, I wonder? Or "Blizzards" Loring?
 
Pemberton should have done the same with Johnston -- disobeyed the order or, at least, resigned his command on the spot. He did neither.
I don't think a soldier in wartime, even a general officer, has the option to resign. If you get two contradictory orders you pick the one you like and obey that one. Or, because you are a general officer, you gamble and make your own decision. But you don't resign.
 
So called Catch-22's are figments of the imagination(or in this case, the lack of imagination), as noted by others on this thread, people of decision, do not recognize such things as controlling of the instructions from their own training and abilities.
More explicitly, Pemberton should have immediately obeyed Johnston's First tepid instructions to fall back, with his whole army and join with Johnston.
If Grant could be defeated in open battle, Vicksburg is automatically saved; if not Vicksburg is lost in any case.
 
Compare Pemberton's defense of Vicksburg with Lee's defense of Richmond - in both cases they were given orders by Davis to defend the city. I'm not aware of any orders from Davis saying HOW they should be defended (although Pemberton probably had more discretion than Lee due to his distance from Davis). So if Pemberton had taken Lee's approach, he would have condensed his defenses to the bare minimum and thereby free up a force which could operate as an offensive striking force.

Note that Johnston, a year earlier when taking a tour of the area as part of his Dept. command duties, commented that the Vicksburg defenses were poorly laid out, taking far to many men to man than would ever be available.
 
Pemberton knew what abandoning Vicksburg would bring down upon him. Remember, he was a yankee in a Confederate uniform. I think he should have obeyed Davis, tightened his defenses,even if this meant moving the citizens of Vicksburg out, and slugged it out with Grant or at least hold out until forces could be gathered to come and pull him out.
 
Pemberton knew what abandoning Vicksburg would bring down upon him. Remember, he was a yankee in a Confederate uniform. I think he should have obeyed Davis, tightened his defenses,even if this meant moving the citizens of Vicksburg out, and slugged it out with Grant or at least hold out until forces could be gathered to come and pull him out.


That, imho, was the biggest black mark against Pemberton - he was a Yankee by birth! That he was just as devoted to the Southern cause as any native born Southerner was, in some people's minds, beside the point. But, that aside, he was rather a victim of Davis' unfortunate misreading of (and misplaced loyalty to) his generals. Even though Pemberton had not displayed any ability other than that of being a decent enough general, he was placed in command of the defense of the most critical spot on the Mississippi with his opponent being the most dangerous man in the West. He couldn't get any help from Kirby Smith, who certainly could have helped considerably from his side of the river, and he had poor intelligence. Grant easily kept him off balance and full of red herring. Both Pemberton and Smith looked fruitlessly for Grant's supply line so they could chop it, thus making a siege less of an attraction to him. Grant, however, marched to a different drummer. He didn't have a supply line. Johnston, whose hatred of Davis was as one observer noted 'almost a religion', would not obey the president's orders let alone listen to his suggestions. He stalled and stalled until the fall of Vicksburg was writ in stone and then, rather lamely, telegraphed Davis, "I am too late." His basic idea, though, of bringing out the army and fighting Grant to re-take Vicksburg in a field where he could maneuver, might have been the best. It worked well with Sherman. But Grant was not Sherman. I do think Pemberton should have obeyed Davis, who seemed to have a better grip on the military point of view. Johnston, at this time, was being greatly influenced by his friends in political circles, and was wanting a political victory more than a military one. Still, the loss of Vicksburg was probably inevitable no matter who was in command there. Davis had created a division in the Confederacy that would crack with a few taps from the enemy by the way he set up the departments in the first place.
 
I don't know the full story of Vicksburg vs other battles. I am thinking did Pemberton really have any good options of breaking the siege? Did Grant just have to many troops so therefore Pembertons fate was cast in iron? In Pembertons defense on the whole the CSA just didn't have the manpower to defend fixed points and few if any other generals did any better. Even Lee at petersburg was only able to do so much and we all know how that turned out.
Leftyhunter

Grant always had too many troops...lol It's what made him so good, that and his bulldog toughness.

Respectfully,

William
 
Grant always had too many troops...lol It's what made him so good, that and his bulldog toughness.
Respectfully,
William


Actually he didn't have too many troops on the East Side of the Mississippi. He concentrate just enough at vital points during the campaign, because Johnston and Pemberton did not (or were not able to) concentrate all avalilable confederate forces at those vital points, in time.
 
Pemberton should have obeyed his own! ....

I take the opposite point of view: Pemberton failed because he followed his own ideas. Johnston suggested Pemberton attack the force at Clinton; Pemberton decided to do something different -- he moved southeast toward Dillons in hopes of cutting Grant's supply line. So he wasnt doing what Johnston had ordered, he was doing his own thing.
 
A sincere thanks to everyone that replied to my question ! I thoroughly enjoyed reading your opinions. Each of you made valid points. As a new guy, I'm amazed each day with the level of knowledge that I see on any given topic at CWT. Thanks again to all.
 
A sincere thanks to everyone that replied to my question ! I thoroughly enjoyed reading your opinions. Each of you made valid points. As a new guy, I'm amazed each day with the level of knowledge that I see on any given topic at CWT. Thanks again to all.
7th, get used to it. I've been here 10 years and am daily surprised at what I don't know. Hang in there, you might know something we don't. Meanwhile, contribute. We're mostly all here to learn something.
 
7th, get used to it. I've been here 10 years and am daily surprised at what I don't know. Hang in there, you might know something we don't. Meanwhile, contribute. We're mostly all here to learn something.

I hear Ya. Yesterday I learned that after the CSS Atlanta was captured, repaired, and placed in US service, she was then sold to Haiti. A Confederate ironclad in Haitian service ? Who would have guessed Haiti even had a Navy during the 19th century , much less ironclads ?

http://civilwartalk.com/threads/post-war-career-of-css-atlanta.88633/
 
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The Confederacy lost the Mississippi river. The Confederacy could hold for a time at Vicksburg, but in time it would lose. The beseiged in a war usually lose. The Confederacy had control of Vicksburg. It didn't have control of the Mississippi River or control over its logistics. The Union had logistics and the river.
 
Was it true Pemberton held out too long, given the inevitability of the surrender? That isn't intended to start a bruhaha, it's just a question. I bumped into a couple diary-type things, housewives, etc., from the siege, seemingly frustrated by the starvation, horrible conditions within the city- Pemberton not a popular figure, nothing to do with loyalty to the South or not. Loyal Southerners, just speaking of hostility towards Pemberton on the grounds that it appeared to them the city was lost regardless, why was he prolonging their suffering.
 
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