If the South won the Civil War, what do you think would have happened to Lincoln?

The legality of the EP is an interesting discussion.

To me, as a war measure, it seems to pass muster. Individuals forced their slaves to further the rebellion. Another amendment is probably not required for the President to seize "property" used by those attacking the U.S. government.

That said, Lincoln writes "all persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free..." I can see a legitimate argument about the legality of the EP after Appomattox.
 
To win the war the south would have needed to protect the Mississippi,New Orleans as the key. With the river secure ,the next president, would have to deal with what ever alliances form, in conquering the rest of the west. President Lincoln returns to Spingfield and is appointed to the supreme court, by President Justin S, Morrill in 1873 ,on the passing of Samuel Chase.
 
Sounding like a broken record here, but I still believe that the slave-owner meant Central America and the Caribbean when he talked about territorial expansion, and complained about not being able to take their slaves into the territories. Watch the other hand.

Ole's right. Until it became possible to dig and pump irrigation wells from a considerable depth (say, the westward expansion of windmills)....most of the west was unsuitable for cotton. Until after the Civil War, there was no demand for beef, so you can't substitute cattle raising. Not to mention the Comanche and Apache (to name two) might interfere a little with cotton farming (find a map of agriculture in Texas through the 1860's--pretty much stops at the Brazos). The Caribbean and Central America were much more likely to be the "expansion" they meant.
 
That sounds good, but there were those who wished to do business in Free states with chattel labor.
From Levi Coffin's reminiscences (link here):
The laws of Indiana, Illinois and Ohio allowed persons from a slave State to pass through with their slaves if they did not stop to locate. If they made any purchases amounting to location, the slaves were to be considered free. The following case came under this law: Two brothers from Maryland, by the name of Dawes, each accompanied by his family and one slave girl, were traveling through Indiana on their way to the State of Missouri, when the illness of the wife of Elisha Dawes, the elder brother, compelled them to stop for a time near Winchester, Randolph County, Indiana. During their stay at that place, they decided to locate there and to buy a tan-yard which was for sale at Winchester, at a great bargain; they being tanners by trade. The terms were agreed upon and were satisfactory to both parties, but before the writings were drawn or the bargain closed, the thought occurred to the Dawes brothers that if they located in Indiana they would lose their slaves; they could not hold them in a free State. This would be a heavy loss to them, as the girls were valuable property, the one belonging to the elder brother being nearly grown, and the other about fourteen years old. They knew not what to do, and consulted with the man with whom they were stopping, who was pro-slavery in his sentiments. He advised them not to close the contract for the property until they had disposed of the slave girls, then the money thus obtained would give them a good
Page 196start in business. In accordance with his advice, they concluded to take the girls to Kentucky by way of Cincinnati, sell them there, and with the money obtained from their sale, buy a quantity of hides in Cincinnati, then return to Winchester and close the contract for the property. Their friend and adviser agreed to go with them and aid them in disposing of their slaves and purchasing stock. But notwithstanding all their wise precautions they made one serious mistake. They contracted for a lot of tan-bark and for some household furniture, which in the sight of the law amounted to location, and the moment they did so the slaves were free.​
The argument that owners did not wish to expand into territories is, I think, bogus. In the above excerpt we see people who wished to use chattel labor - either as a social/status symbol or for raw labor - in free states. That's one of the sticking points, I think. The southern gentry had got it into their heads that the laws of no other states applied to them . So, if Indiana, why not Nebraska? Why not Wyoming? Why not Connecticut - and if Lincoln had genuflected in Charleston Harbor, you can bet the CS government would have been rattling sabers for that very perquisite.
 
Actually, I do agree with you. I was trying to explain why the cotton argument just doesn't hold water. As far as other enterprises, I have no doubt people would want to hold onto their "property." There were slaves on the frontier in Texas--men and women who worked at everything under the sun--just no large cotton plantations by a certain point west.
 
Ole's right. Until it became possible to dig and pump irrigation wells from a considerable depth (say, the westward expansion of windmills)....most of the west was unsuitable for cotton. Until after the Civil War, there was no demand for beef, so you can't substitute cattle raising. Not to mention the Comanche and Apache (to name two) might interfere a little with cotton farming (find a map of agriculture in Texas through the 1860's--pretty much stops at the Brazos). The Caribbean and Central America were much more likely to be the "expansion" they meant.
The reason i gave Morrill a mention was his sponsership of the Homestead Act which was to favor small farmers and blunt slavery. When the war was over it got tweeked to favor the big ranches.
 
There have been so many books and discussions about what life would be like if the South won the American War between the States, but rarely do people discuss what would have become of Honest Abe.

To avoid answers such as it being impossible for the South to win or that it would all depend on certain events, I'll attempt to make the fantasia clearer and fill in those gaps. (This alternate history time-line is partially based off one of the last chapters from the book "The Glittering Illusion: English Sympathy for the Southern Confederacy.")

Let's say that England and France recognizes the Confederacy as it's own country and the C.S.A. wins the war through British intervention - Union Forces in New Orleans are defeated by the British Army and are forced to retreat and The Army of Northern Virginia is reinforced by British brigades during the battle of Gettysburg. Together, they cut the U.S. Army in two which leads to Meade's surrender which happens ironically on the 4th of July. Confederate and British forces ride into Washington D.C. unopposed and the United States Government at the new Capital in Portland, Maine finally answer the cry for peace and end the war.

Now to also avoid a discussion of what would happen to the U.S.A. - Let's also say that the Confederacy has no plans to annex the Union into the C.S.A. and despite what they consider to be war crimes, the Confederacy...in an attempt to cool the tension...do not try to find Lincoln (like in the mocumentary film "The Confederate States of America") and force him to stand trail. The soldiers just turn around and go home. Maryland joins the Confederacy since so many people there in the first place were pro-southern and The District of Columbia becomes The District of Dixie, the C.S.A. becomes apart of the British Empire and slavery soon ends peacefully in the late 1870's.

Which now leads to the current question - It is now 1863 and the Union has been defeated. Would Lincoln be able to continue his term as President? Would he be blamed for the loss? Would he be reelected in 1865? Would he continue to live in the U.S.A? What would he do after his Presidential term was over?


My answer - I think a lot of people would be calling for him to step down as President, but not being a quitter....he would finish out his term as President, but would not run for reelection. I think there would have been a lot of angry families out there that felt their men and boys died for nothing. I think he would face many death threats while trying to live in the United States and be blamed for not only losing the war by some people, but for causing the war by others.....so he would retire to Canada and would write his memoirs a few years after the war in an attempt to tell his side of the story.

There would be no Gettysburg Address, Lincoln's likeness would not appear on the penny, stamps, the five dollar bill or Mount Rushmore. He would not have a holiday in his honor and there would be no monumental for him at the new capital in Portland, Maine, and there would be no street names, schools, or cities named after him and his picture would not appear in American History classes.

I think he would be forgotten by the mainstream and the casual person. All the great things he said and did would be obsolete. He would forever be seen and remembered the same way some people remember King George III. He'd also be seen as one of the worst Presidents of the U.S and would be remembered and blamed by historians and history buffs as the "tyrant" who divided what was once a great nation and lost "The War for Southern Independence".

He'd have gone back to Springfield and resume his law practice as he had always intended to do.
 
Independence for the Southern States would have inevitably helped hasten the natural death of the institution of slavery but the "Emancipation Proclamation" would have had nothing to do with it.

lincoln's proclamation freed not a single slave. It did not apply to States or parts of States "not in rebellion". If other words it only "freed slaves" in territories in which the US government had no physical power to do so. It was at best a PR gimmick designed to discourage Britain from openly aiding the Confederacy and also a cynical attempt to foment a Haitian style slave insurrection in the South. The EP also was of very questionable legality (ole abe himself referred to it as a "war measure")

I like this, I really do... I mean Lincoln described the Emancipation Proclamation as the single act he would be best remembered for.* This from a man who saved the Union from internal destruction, wrote the Gettysburg Address and the Second Inaugural, held and won a democratic election during wartime and appeared to offer the South gracious terms for reconciliation. The EP, "just a PR gimmick"? Yeh, righto.


* "I never in my life felt more certain that I was doing right than I do in signing this paper... If my name ever goes into history it will be for this act, and my whole soul is in it."


ps. If you're at all interested in this issue I would highly recommend Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation: The End of Slavery in America by Allen Guelzo it makes a very good case that the EP was much, much grander than a 'bill of lading'.
 
If the South won--Balkanization of the North American continent. I can't see Texas staying in the CSA for long and once it left who knows what other CS state would have left to preserve its "rights". Also I wonder if the US would have stayed together after losing the war. It was a fact that the New England states had previously threatened to leave the Union over different things from 1776 on to the advent of the Civil War. The fact that the CS would not have been brought back into the US may have caused secession to have occurred on a more frequent basis if any Northern state began to feel slighted by the Federal government and felt it had the right to secede.
 
Had the North not managed to end the war when it did, that's what IMHO would have happened to the Confederacy in short order.

Yes, I think that the Confederacy would have been more at risk of this than the North because of the prevailing (false) sentiment that any area or group of people has the right to alter or abolish its government whenever it sees fit. I don't see how it could continue for any length of time with that as one of its founding myths and principles.

The North would be the more interesting case. There seems to have been a better understanding of what union meant but it might have been hard to resist the lure if a section or state thought they might be better off on their own. On the other hand the Union had what was probably the world's most powerful armed forces at its command by the end of the war. That would be a pretty good incentive for most sections within the Union not to attempt further secession I would imagine.
 
The EP, "just a PR gimmick"? Yeh, righto.

It was, somewhat, and to some extent, a public relations tool both for popular and military reasons. Morale in the army was not good. Public opinion, and therefore support, of the war was also waning...and it wouldn't hit rock bottom until 1863. Antietam (Sharpsburg) had been a military draw, even though McClellan declared it a victory. If nothing more, it was a hollow victory for the Union, because Lee's ANV slipped away and out of McClellan's grasp literally overnight. Making matters only worse, the commander of the AOTP failed to pursue an enemy in flight.

Lincoln did believe in the legitimacy of the EP, and didn't issue it for solely strategic, political reasons. He did think it was the right thing to do. But timing was also a major consideration. After Antietam, perhaps the most devastating engagement for both sides in terms of losses, Lincoln felt that he needed to try and make something positive come out of the battle, so that the more than 12,000 Union casualties weren't in vain.

Besides sending a message of freedom to every slave in the South, the EP had two strategic and politically practical purposes behind it: (1) to help boost the morale of the army after the draw of Antietam; and (2) to help boost public opinion about the war. In a nutshell, it was an effort by Lincoln to get people--both civilians and soldiers--back on his side.

The EP turned out to be one of the most significant documents in America's long history of struggle for social justice. It is culturally, politically, economically and personally significant for many of us who believe that America should have been living up to its principles of fundamental rights all along; those of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, in particular.
 
It was, somewhat, and to some extent, a public relations tool both for popular and military reasons. Morale in the army was not good. Public opinion, and therefore support, of the war was also waning...and it wouldn't hit rock bottom until 1863. Antietam (Sharpsburg) had been a military draw, even though McClellan declared it a victory. If nothing more, it was a hollow victory for the Union, because Lee's ANV slipped away and out of McClellan's grasp literally overnight. Making matters only worse, the commander of the AOTP failed to pursue an enemy in flight.

Lincoln did believe in the legitimacy of the EP, and didn't issue it for solely strategic, political reasons. He did think it was the right thing to do. But timing was also a major consideration. After Antietam, perhaps the most devastating engagement for both sides in terms of losses, Lincoln felt that he needed to try and make something positive come out of the battle, so that the more than 12,000 Union casualties weren't in vain.

Besides sending a message of freedom to every slave in the South, the EP had two strategic and politically practical purposes behind it: (1) to help boost the morale of the army after the draw of Antietam; and (2) to help boost public opinion about the war. In a nutshell, it was an effort by Lincoln to get people--both civilians and soldiers--back on his side.

The EP turned out to be one of the most significant documents in America's long history of struggle for social justice. It is culturally, politically, economically and personally significant for many of us who believe that America should have been living up to its principles of fundamental rights all along; those of life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, in particular.

I agree with so much of this. I really should have put inverted commas around the 'just'. You're right, there was, "somewhat, and to some extent", a PR element to it. But only to a very small degree IMO.

If I disagree anywhere I think that maybe you have overemphasised the timing aspect of it. Lincoln wanted to issue the EP, had drawn it up months in advance and was waiting for the right timing, which, as you point out, Antietam gave him. But the way you've put it ("Lincoln felt that he needed to try and make something positive come out of the battle") if I may say so, reads more like it was an afterthought, a way of glossing over what had happened (a draw) rather than it being the most propitious moment to bring in an idea that was not fully popular.

This is another area where I think you have maybe overemphasised an aspect of its introduction. If not, why wait until a proclaimed victory? Why not do it straight away if the PR to be gained out of doing it would be so positive? Why wait while the popularity of the war continued to wane? No, I think you've got it slightly reversed here. The EP was so monumental it required the right timing. Antietam provided that but the EP came first, Antietam was the afterthought (so to speak), not the other way around.

Having read Guelzo it seems to me that Lincoln "somewhat, and to some extent" went out on a limb with the EP, it was ot universally popular, and this is what I was objecting to when it was described as merely a PR gimmick. It was so much more than that.

Anyway, this is probably a discussion for another thread.

Regards,
S.E.Boyle
 
Sounding like a broken record here, but I still believe that the slave-owner meant Central America and the Caribbean when he talked about territorial expansion, and complained about not being able to take their slaves into the territories. Watch the other hand.

Just stumbled across some interesting info while researching something else. Cotton production in the year 2000 (in bales):

California: 2,200,000
Georgia: 1,640,000

Arizona: 760,000
Alabama: 540,000

New Mexico: 130,000
Florida: 100,000

Oklahoma: 155,000
S. Carolina: 380,000


Source: The World Almanac and Book of Facts 2002, p. 134

So I'm thinking they might have wanted both.
 
Had the South won their independence, there would be a long porous border. People not satisfied with their section could easily vote with their feet. This would set up a competitive environment.

The world would have seen little help in WWI, certainly not enough to tip the scales against Germany. So Germany wouldn't have went through the humiliation that would lead to the rise of Hitler. The most destructive war in human history might have been avoided.

Eventually there would be a reunification between the north and south except that the population of the lower half of South Carolina and all of New England would be shipped off to a colony, never to cause trouble except with themselves.

Any more questions?

dvrmte
 
But the way you've put it ("Lincoln felt that he needed to try and make something positive come out of the battle") if I may say so, reads more like it was an afterthought, a way of glossing over what had happened (a draw) rather than it being the most propitious moment to bring in an idea that was not fully popular. ...
...If not, why wait until a proclaimed victory? Why not do it straight away if the PR to be gained out of doing it would be so positive? Why wait while the popularity of the war continued to wane? No, I think you've got it slightly reversed here. The EP was so monumental it required the right timing. Antietam provided that but the EP came first, Antietam was the afterthought (so to speak), not the other way around.

Having read Guelzo it seems to me that Lincoln "somewhat, and to some extent" went out on a limb with the EP, it was ot universally popular, and this is what I was objecting to when it was described as merely a PR gimmick. It was so much more than that.

Anyway, this is probably a discussion for another thread.

Regards,
S.E.Boyle


I think it is an entirely appropriate discussion for this thread because the question is a "what if" about Lincoln had the South won the war. I submitted earlier that Lincoln would not be as obscure a president simply for losing the war, because of the EP and what it meant for future generations of freed people.

I may not have articulated my point about Antietam and the EP very well. I agree. The EP was at the fore of Lincoln's thinking. He just held off on declaring it until the right timing...like a battle that has been declared a victory. There is no better time to make an unpopular stand, as with the EP, than after something positive has happened...like a declared military victory. It isn't usually politically wise to push an unpopular idea when things are going badly. That usually just makes things go from bad to worse.

But, having said that, the EP did succeed in helping to gloss over the truth about Antietam; that it was really a military draw and a failure to pursue. This is because popular talk shifted, temporarily, from the war to the EP, as contentious an issue as it was.

I totally agree with you, though, that the EP was much more than "just a PR gimmick." It was a milestone in the growth of our nation and the fulfillment of her promises to "all men created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness."
 
Lincoln had written the EP for immediate publication, but saw the value of Seward's advice of waiting for a Union success to buttress its success. Antietam, just happened to be the needed 'success' on which to hang the Proclamation, not because the battle needed any defending,
The EP was precisely worded and tightly reasoned, because Lincoln expected it would have to be defended in the Taney Supreme Court.
 
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