"If Grant had not stopped us, we could have gone to Vicksburg."

So there is nothing that you've written on the CW that is supported by documentation?
I know you have blog but I forget if you post anything other than your opinions. Any original research?


Here are some quotes about the recall of Rosecrans by Grant:

A Union perspective: The Confederate Army which held the Mississippi Valley had been routed and demoralized. The Union forces had two railroads leading down through the most productive part of the state, where corn was ripe, supplying plenty of forage so that the enemy could have been pursued with safety. The weather was cool and the roads were getting in prime condition. We should have gone to Vicksburg then, but General Halleck ordered otherwise.

Of course it was Grant not Halleck who ordered Rosecrans back.

Another Union perspective:: "Our regiment pursued the flying rebels with great vigor. The quantities of broken batteries, wagons, tents, knapsacks, guns etc. strewn along the road behind them were immense.... The pursuit of the enemy was being pushed with vigor when the army was ordered to desist and return to camp. It was an astounding order , as it was in our power to destroy the defeated and flying columns. That order was one of the mistakes of Grant's earlier days as a commander. Indeed, we in the rank and file had little confidence in Grant in those days. We reflected that at Shiloh he was miles away from the battlefield at the critical moment... at Iuka Grant, though commander, did not even know the battle was going on, at Corinth he was forty miles away, and now, when we had the enemy almost within our grasp, he suddenly called us back.”

Yet another Union view: "We found General Price's buggy with a fine robe in it. But the owner was gone on. All along the roadside under the bushes and in the hollows and behind logs the panting fugitives were found glad to surrender. Glad to do anything to save all they had left and that was their lives. They all agreed in saying that no such terrible calamity had overtaken them in the West as the battle of the 4th."

A Confederate voice: our retreat was conducted with the greatest confusion.... We lost half of Price's army killed and straggling. Such demoralization was never seen in the army before. I think the cause of the Confederacy is lost in the West. ... I hope we can get back as far as Vicksburg I mean our cavalry I tell you the times look much darker than I ever expected to see them .....


How well defended was Vicksburg? A Confederate perspective from Vicksburg commander ML Smith written on September 30:
"I am seriously apprehensive that the safety of this important place may be, and actually is, overlooked. My conviction is that this command is today at the mercy of the [Union] army at Helena.... Their unaccountable inertness has saved Vicksburg from succumbing, for since the departure of General Breckenridge's division, there has never been a day on which a successful land attack might not have been made by the force at Helena."

Grant received this message from Gen Hurlbut on October 8th: "I have just heard from Holly Springs. There are no forces there; all left on Sunday. There is but one company of Cavalry at Davis' Bridge. Everything in shape of force above Wolf River has moved south. I am of the opinion that the rout of Van Dorn's army is complete, and that Pillow's force late of Holly Springs has caught the panic."

On Nov 2 less than a month after calling Rosecrans back Grant wrote the following to Washington:
With small re-enforcements at Memphis I think I would be able to move down the Mississippi Central road and
cause the evacuation of Vicksburg and to be able to capture or destroy all the boats in the Yazoo River


None of that, as you know, in any way addresses that Vicksburg was 240 miles away. This is not a trivial distance. Nor have you ever been able to show where Rosecrans proposed a move on Vicksburg. Nor have you ever shown an example of how the 240 miles would be covered in 6 days. So while I do appreciate sources, in this case they are once again being used to obfuscate the issue, rather than address it.

Rosecrans reported himself in need of forage "or our animals will starve" before he had even covered 40 miles. This gives an idea of how ill-prepared he was to cover 240 miles in 6 days. And regardless of how poorly Vicksburg itself might have been defended at the time, there were significant CS forces at Holly Springs and other places along the line running there from Ripley. I am not sure why you completely ignore this fact.

Grant did speak of taking Vicksburg in 1862. Did he say it would take 6 days? If not, why not?
 
If Rosecrans were to make that march, he would have to force march and his command would have attrited badly along the march from men dropping out from exhaustion and straggling.


He had already reported them exhausted and his animals starving after about 3 days and less than 40 miles. But that was in 1862, not decades later, when he put forth the whopper in question.
 
None of that, as you know, in any way addresses that Vicksburg was 240 miles away. This is not a trivial distance. Nor have you ever been able to show where Rosecrans proposed a move on Vicksburg. Nor have you ever shown an example of how the 240 miles would be covered in 6 days. So while I do appreciate sources, in this case they are once again being used to obfuscate the issue, rather than address it.

Rosecrans reported himself in need of forage "or our animals will starve" before he had even covered 40 miles. This gives an idea of how ill-prepared he was to cover 240 miles in 6 days. And regardless of how poorly Vicksburg itself might have been defended at the time, there were significant CS forces at Holly Springs and other places along the line running there from Ripley. I am not sure why you completely ignore this fact.

Grant did speak of taking Vicksburg in 1862. Did he say it would take 6 days? If not, why not?
Here is what Rosecrans wrote to Grant on October 7 1862: "I have ordered rations sent to [Hurlbut] and have begged him not to return to Bolivar until I can communicate with Sherman: I want him to appear to threaten the enemy. I think Sherman should go to Holly Springs by all means, and that the roads should be opened to take supplies to him... I repeat, it is of the utmost importance to give the enemy no rest day or night, to push him to Mobile or Jackson. Beg the authorities North to send us more troops.
Ship everything you can: our time is now: we must not give the enemy time to reinforce or recruit. Every nerve must be strained. Everything will be sent to see our troops lack nothing of the necessities to keep them going."
AND ON OCT 7


GENERAL: Yours 8.30 p.m. received. Our troops occupy Ripley. I most deeply dissent from your views as to the manner of pursuing. We have defeated, routed, and demoralized the army which holds the Lower Mississippi Valley. We have the two railroads leading down toward the Gulf through the most productive parts of the State, into which we can now pursue them with safety. The effect of our return to old position will be to pen them up in the only corn country they have west of Alabama, including the Tuscumbia Valley, and to permit them to recruit their forces, advance and occupy their old ground, reducing us to the occupation of a defensive position, barren and worthless, with a long front, over which they can harass us until bad weather prevents an effectual advance except on the railroads, when time, fortifications, and rolling stock will again render them superior to us. Our force, including what you have with Hurlbut, will garrison Corinth and Jackson and enable us to push them. Our advance will cover even Holly Springs, which would be ours when we want it. All that is needful is to continue pursuing and whip them. We have whipped, and should now push to the wall and capture all the rolling stock of their railroads. Bragg's army alone west of Alabama River and occupying Mobile could repair the damage we have it in our power to do them. If, after considering these matters, you still consider the order for my return to Corinth expedient I will obey it and abandon the chief fruits of a victory, but I beseech you bend everything to push them while they are broken and hungry, weary and ill-supplied. Draw everything possible from Memphis to help move on Holly Springs and let us concentrate. Appeal to the Governors of the States to rush down some twenty or thirty new regiments to hold our rear and we can make a triumph of our start

I think the real take away from this is that it is Rosecrans who is taking the initiative. Grant, whose present reputation is
as a relentless fighting general, is not just reactive but an obstructionist.

It is this Grant that is the reason for the despairing letters about him written by Joseph Medill and Cadwalader Washburn. I can produce excerpts from them if you wish.

As far as the 240 miles that was written decades later. In 1862 Rosecrans is simply calling for Grant to be agresssive. He sets no time tables. A month later Grant himself started out for Vicksburg. He seemed pretty confident that with "small reenforcements" he would be able to force the evacuation of Vicksburg.

I know there is nothing that I can post either from the 19th century or later that will make you change your opinion about Grant or Rosecrans. Every eyewitness is mistaken; every current historian who comes to a different conclusion is a Grant hater. However I post these things for those who have open minds so that they may do their own research or at least know there are historians who question the accepted story line. Albert Castel's essays on the Grant-Rosecrans relationship is a good place to start learning.
 
[An astounding 40 mile a day average to cover the distance]
The 240 in nine days figure is not from 1862.
One would have to look at Rosecrans correspondence from the time the article was written to see why he came up with that figure. In 1862 he simply wanted Grant to go on the offensive. He also envisioned using the railroads.

Rosecrans was a quick mover when he was ready.
Historian Edward Hagerman wrote the following regarding Rosecrans in Tennessee:
Rosecrans’s speed of movement was remarkable…. He moved approximately eighty miles in only nine days, for an average of nine miles per day. Subtracting thirty-six hours that he halted at Hoover’s Gap and sixty hours in front of Winchester, he averaged over sixteen miles a day. This rate exceeds Sherman’s averages of around nine miles a day through the Carolinas.
 
On threads dealing with Rosecrans and the Cracker line Mr.Moore also avoids direct questions to questions asked of him.on one of his last post he even said we should not believe what authors write on articles on the internet.he likes to show up every six months or so and mst of us just toy with him.his blood pressure goes up and we laugh a lot.
 
So there is nothing that you've written on the CW that is supported by documentation?

So now you resort to deliberate falsehoods instead of directly addressing what's been posted.

If this is an example of your scholarship, David, then no one should ever buy anything you've written.

None of the quotes you provided address the point that's been made.

Your hero lied and you swallowed it.
 
Here is what Rosecrans wrote to Grant on October 7 1862: "I have ordered rations sent to [Hurlbut] and have begged him not to return to Bolivar until I can communicate with Sherman: I want him to appear to threaten the enemy. I think Sherman should go to Holly Springs by all means, and that the roads should be opened to take supplies to him... I repeat, it is of the utmost importance to give the enemy no rest day or night, to push him to Mobile or Jackson. Beg the authorities North to send us more troops.
Ship everything you can: our time is now: we must not give the enemy time to reinforce or recruit. Every nerve must be strained. Everything will be sent to see our troops lack nothing of the necessities to keep them going."
AND ON OCT 7


GENERAL: Yours 8.30 p.m. received. Our troops occupy Ripley. I most deeply dissent from your views as to the manner of pursuing. We have defeated, routed, and demoralized the army which holds the Lower Mississippi Valley. We have the two railroads leading down toward the Gulf through the most productive parts of the State, into which we can now pursue them with safety. The effect of our return to old position will be to pen them up in the only corn country they have west of Alabama, including the Tuscumbia Valley, and to permit them to recruit their forces, advance and occupy their old ground, reducing us to the occupation of a defensive position, barren and worthless, with a long front, over which they can harass us until bad weather prevents an effectual advance except on the railroads, when time, fortifications, and rolling stock will again render them superior to us. Our force, including what you have with Hurlbut, will garrison Corinth and Jackson and enable us to push them. Our advance will cover even Holly Springs, which would be ours when we want it. All that is needful is to continue pursuing and whip them. We have whipped, and should now push to the wall and capture all the rolling stock of their railroads. Bragg's army alone west of Alabama River and occupying Mobile could repair the damage we have it in our power to do them. If, after considering these matters, you still consider the order for my return to Corinth expedient I will obey it and abandon the chief fruits of a victory, but I beseech you bend everything to push them while they are broken and hungry, weary and ill-supplied. Draw everything possible from Memphis to help move on Holly Springs and let us concentrate. Appeal to the Governors of the States to rush down some twenty or thirty new regiments to hold our rear and we can make a triumph of our start

I think the real take away from this is that it is Rosecrans who is taking the initiative. Grant, whose present reputation is
as a relentless fighting general, is not just reactive but an obstructionist.

It is this Grant that is the reason for the despairing letters about him written by Joseph Medill and Cadwalader Washburn. I can produce excerpts from them if you wish.

As far as the 240 miles that was written decades later. In 1862 Rosecrans is simply calling for Grant to be agresssive. He sets no time tables. A month later Grant himself started out for Vicksburg. He seemed pretty confident that with "small reenforcements" he would be able to force the evacuation of Vicksburg.

I know there is nothing that I can post either from the 19th century or later that will make you change your opinion about Grant or Rosecrans. Every eyewitness is mistaken; every current historian who comes to a different conclusion is a Grant hater. However I post these things for those who have open minds so that they may do their own research or at least know there are historians who question the accepted story line. Albert Castel's essays on the Grant-Rosecrans relationship is a good place to start learning.


So it was OK for Rosecrans to lie because it "was written decades later." You ever cut Grant that sort of enormous slack? Rosecrans lied when he said Grant stopped him from going to Vicksburg and he lied when he said it was 6 days march.

Grant realistically saw that the opportunity for a successful pursuit had passed by once Van Dorn had crossed the Hatchie. A more extended pursuit would merely increase the risk, with little possibly for reward. Rosecrans knew this as well, when on the 6th he ordered McKean back to Corinth because it was "threatened by the enemy's reinforcements, including 10,00 paroled men."

Prior to October 7, Rosecrans had called on Grant for re-inforcements, and forage for his starving animals, statements oddly left out of this later correspondence. Grant, told Rosecrans "Every regiment that could possibly be spared from Columbus to this place, has already been sent you and Hurlbut." It would take some days to provide forage to Rosecrans' starving animals in Ripley. The Rail line had been broken by Van Dorn for some miles north of Corinth.

Rosecrans in the memo quoted above gives no timetable for receiving the reinforcements and forage he asked for. Were these no longer required for the March on Vicksburg? Previously, both here and in your book, you follow up Rosecrans lies about going to Vicksburg in 6 days with a statement from ML Smith about how weak Vicksburg was at this time. The statement that Rosecrans wasn't actually asking to go to Vicksburg (in 6 days) but simply wanted Grant to be "aggressive" is quite a contradiction.

And you are right, Grant, once reinforced and resupplied, with repairs and extension of the railnet completed started south a few weeks later. This represents a more realistic timetable for the supplies and reinforcements Rosecrans had called for to move to the front.

I wasn't sure Rosecrans was lying when I first read his statements about taking Vicksburg in 6 days. But you have convinced me that he was. Thus disproving your hypothesis that "nothing that I can post either from the 19th century or later that will make you change your opinion about Grant or Rosecrans."
 
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You should look at what Rosecrans actually proposed in 1862. What he wrote in 1886 is less important. I have posted his 1862 correspondence with Grant elsewhere on this thread.


But that's not what you said in your book. Were you wrong when you supported the "6 days to Vicksburg" lie with statements from ML Smith and "an Ohio veteran." Was your inclusion of those quotes meant to show how the 1886 statement was "less important?"
 
Instead of getting a better understanding of the '240 miles in 6 days' , there are now two different accounts: one at the time, and one stated in the 1880's. In my usual blunt fashion I ask:

Did Rosecrans seriously propose that it was a realistic option to cover the excessive mileage in a limited number of days in 1862?
 
What he wrote in 1886 is less important.
On the contrary, it is more important for the issue being discussed.

A lot of ink has been spilled on what Grant wrote years after the war and what others wrote years later also gets debated.
From the perspective of over 20 years, it should have been possible to make sensible observations about the conditions faced at the time. There was no more fog of war, heat of the moment.

As you point out, during Tullahoma, after substantial preparation, Rosecrans averaged less than 10 miles per day and if you cherry pick out the days he was delayed by obstacles he averaged less than 20 miles per day. The historian you quote called this remarkable.

I asked a simplequestion about what you thought reagrding marching from northern Mississippi to Vicksburg -- "And you think it is actually possible to cover that distance by marching in 6 day?" -- yet still no answer.
 
Instead of getting a better understanding of the '240 miles in 6 days' , there are now two different accounts: one at the time, and one stated in the 1880's. In my usual blunt fashion I ask:

Did Rosecrans seriously propose that it was a realistic option to cover the excessive mileage in a limited number of days in 1862?

I don't see that he did. In addition to the memo above that David Moore included in #43, Rosecrans mentions Mobile and Jackson (MS presumably) on the same day:




Screenshot 2017-01-28 11.56.03.png



But lets take a look at every item Rosecrans calls for to continue the advance, whether it be to Vicksburg in 6 days, or any other point in some other amount of time.

1) "Draw everything possible from Memphis to help move on Holly Springs and let us concentrate."

2) "Appeal to the Governors of the States to rush down some twenty or thirty new regiments to hold our rear and we can make a triumph of our start"

3) "Out of rations" meaning rations must be sent.

4) "Sherman should go to Holly Springs"

5) "the road should be opened (from Memphis) to take supplies to him (Sherman)"

6) "Telegraph line should be put up"

7) "The superintendent should immediately supply himself -with a large stock of wire and supplies of all kinds that may be needed in the work"

8) " Beg the authorities North to send us more troops.

9) "Ship everything you can"

10) "Among other things, rolling stock and material for repairs are needed"


So that is quite a laundry list of items Rosecrans is requiring to make an advance. Rosecrans was a solid military guy with broad knowledge and experience. He must have had some idea the time required to get this list of tasks sufficiently completed, and understood that it would be weeks (particularly the more troops and opening the railroad from Memphis) and not days.
 
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I think the real take away from this is that it is Rosecrans who is taking the initiative.

A take away for me is the erratic nature of Rosecrans.
On the 5th he wrote Grant that progress was slow and that he needed forage immediately or his animals would starve, and that the rebels talked of reinforcement and fighting again, and on the 7th he wrote that he was out of rations.
So while he was writing to Grant about aggressively pushing on, he was also writing to Grant about how he was not really able to do so.
 
Pure and simple those who believe Old Rosey could have covered 250 miles in 6 days with the Infantry, Arty & a supply train needed to take Vicksburg have little or no true understanding of 19th century military campaigns or even basic military logistics of the era. If a General honestly believes such he should be cashiered or ushered off somewhere where his lack of competence won't get anybody killed... which is pretty much what happened to Rosecrans. If an "author" cannot differentiate between the fantasy and reality of moving a sizeable force 250 odd miles through enemy territory it's unlikely that author will be able to produce an honest historical work of note.

Old Rosey was a bitter hater of Grant and spared little in going after him. It would appear the current crop of worshipers are following along.
 
A take away for me is the erratic nature of Rosecrans.
On the 5th he wrote Grant that progress was slow and that he needed forage immediately or his animals would starve, and that the rebels talked of reinforcement and fighting again, and on the 7th he wrote that he was out of rations.
So while he was writing to Grant about aggressively pushing on, he was also writing to Grant about how he was not really able to do so.
Id say he wanted Grant to get involved in the fight. His experience at Iuka had probably convinced him there was no assurance that would ever get involved. There were of course others who thought the Union should press Van Dorn. Rosecrans' opinion wasn't the only one.
 
On the contrary, it is more important for the issue being discussed.

A lot of ink has been spilled on what Grant wrote years after the war and what others wrote years later also gets debated.
From the perspective of over 20 years, it should have been possible to make sensible observations about the conditions faced at the time. There was no more fog of war, heat of the moment.

As you point out, during Tullahoma, after substantial preparation, Rosecrans averaged less than 10 miles per day and if you cherry pick out the days he was delayed by obstacles he averaged less than 20 miles per day. The historian you quote called this remarkable.

I asked a simplequestion about what you thought reagrding marching from northern Mississippi to Vicksburg -- "And you think it is actually possible to cover that distance by marching in 6 day?" -- yet still no answer.
So you think comments made 20 years after the fact are better than those made during the event? Grant made a decision based on what Rosecrans wrote him in 1862. The time it would take to get it to Vicksburg is not mentioned in the 1862 correspondence. Rosecrans also mentions using the two railroads available to him. Hardly any serious historian believes Grant's Memoirs should be taken at face value. I suggest you read Albert Cadtel's discussion of this topic.
 
But that's not what you said in your book. Were you wrong when you supported the "6 days to Vicksburg" lie with statements from ML Smith and "an Ohio veteran." Was your inclusion of those quotes meant to show how the 1886 statement was "less important?"
I was including as many opinions by participants as I could find. The opposite of cherry picking. Would help if you'd post my entire treatment of this topic
 
So it was OK for Rosecrans to lie because it "was written decades later." You ever cut Grant that sort of enormous slack? Rosecrans lied when he said Grant stopped him from going to Vicksburg and he lied when he said it was 6 days march.

Grant realistically saw that the opportunity for a successful pursuit had passed by once Van Dorn had crossed the Hatchie. A more extended pursuit would merely increase the risk, with little possibly for reward. Rosecrans knew this as well, when on the 6th he ordered McKean back to Corinth because it was "threatened by the enemy's reinforcements, including 10,00 paroled men."

Prior to October 7, Rosecrans had called on Grant for re-inforcements, and forage for his starving animals, statements oddly left out of this later correspondence. Grant, told Rosecrans "Every regiment that could possibly be spared from Columbus to this place, has already been sent you and Hurlbut." It would take some days to provide forage to Rosecrans' starving animals in Ripley. The Rail line had been broken by Van Dorn for some miles north of Corinth.

Rosecrans in the memo quoted above gives no timetable for receiving the reinforcements and forage he asked for. Were these no longer required for the March on Vicksburg? Previously, both here and in your book, you follow up Rosecrans lies about going to Vicksburg in 6 days with a statement from ML Smith about how weak Vicksburg was at this time. The statement that Rosecrans wasn't actually asking to go to Vicksburg (in 6 days) but simply wanted Grant to be "aggressive" is quite a contradiction.

And you are right, Grant, once reinforced and resupplied, with repairs and extension of the railnet completed started south a few weeks later. This represents a more realistic timetable for the supplies and reinforcements Rosecrans had called for to move to the front.

I wasn't sure Rosecrans was lying when I first read his statements about taking Vicksburg in 6 days. But you have convinced me that he was. Thus disproving your hypothesis that "nothing that I can post either from the 19th century or later that will make you change your opinion about Grant or Rosecrans."
Would you like to comment on the statements made by the people who are there other than Rosecrans? Were they lying too? They - unlike Grant- saw firsthand the state of Van Dorn's army. However let's bring in a third opinion Castel's. Evidently it's not possible to copy parts of his book electronically but it is possible to do it the whole fashioned way transcribing or perhaps taking a picture of the pages. Would you like to do that? No cherry picking please. If not I'll do it when I get a chance.
 
So now you resort to deliberate falsehoods instead of directly addressing what's been posted.

If this is an example of your scholarship, David, then no one should ever buy anything you've written.

None of the quotes you provided address the point that's been made.

Your hero lied and you swallowed it.
Cash you've done nothing but opine. Please give specific examples. Did you ever read the review of my book in CW Times? Even the late Michael Ballard called it researched.
 
On threads dealing with Rosecrans and the Cracker line Mr.Moore also avoids direct questions to questions asked of him.on one of his last post he even said we should not believe what authors write on articles on the internet.he likes to show up every six months or so and mst of us just toy with him.his blood pressure goes up and we laugh a lot.
Please give me at least direct questions and Inwill answer them. Is your wish I should die?
 
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