Eric Calistri
2nd Lieutenant
- Joined
- May 31, 2012
- Location
- Austin Texas
So there is nothing that you've written on the CW that is supported by documentation?
I know you have blog but I forget if you post anything other than your opinions. Any original research?
Here are some quotes about the recall of Rosecrans by Grant:
A Union perspective: The Confederate Army which held the Mississippi Valley had been routed and demoralized. The Union forces had two railroads leading down through the most productive part of the state, where corn was ripe, supplying plenty of forage so that the enemy could have been pursued with safety. The weather was cool and the roads were getting in prime condition. We should have gone to Vicksburg then, but General Halleck ordered otherwise.
Of course it was Grant not Halleck who ordered Rosecrans back.
Another Union perspective:: "Our regiment pursued the flying rebels with great vigor. The quantities of broken batteries, wagons, tents, knapsacks, guns etc. strewn along the road behind them were immense.... The pursuit of the enemy was being pushed with vigor when the army was ordered to desist and return to camp. It was an astounding order , as it was in our power to destroy the defeated and flying columns. That order was one of the mistakes of Grant's earlier days as a commander. Indeed, we in the rank and file had little confidence in Grant in those days. We reflected that at Shiloh he was miles away from the battlefield at the critical moment... at Iuka Grant, though commander, did not even know the battle was going on, at Corinth he was forty miles away, and now, when we had the enemy almost within our grasp, he suddenly called us back.”
Yet another Union view: "We found General Price's buggy with a fine robe in it. But the owner was gone on. All along the roadside under the bushes and in the hollows and behind logs the panting fugitives were found glad to surrender. Glad to do anything to save all they had left and that was their lives. They all agreed in saying that no such terrible calamity had overtaken them in the West as the battle of the 4th."
A Confederate voice: our retreat was conducted with the greatest confusion.... We lost half of Price's army killed and straggling. Such demoralization was never seen in the army before. I think the cause of the Confederacy is lost in the West. ... I hope we can get back as far as Vicksburg I mean our cavalry I tell you the times look much darker than I ever expected to see them .....
How well defended was Vicksburg? A Confederate perspective from Vicksburg commander ML Smith written on September 30:
"I am seriously apprehensive that the safety of this important place may be, and actually is, overlooked. My conviction is that this command is today at the mercy of the [Union] army at Helena.... Their unaccountable inertness has saved Vicksburg from succumbing, for since the departure of General Breckenridge's division, there has never been a day on which a successful land attack might not have been made by the force at Helena."
Grant received this message from Gen Hurlbut on October 8th: "I have just heard from Holly Springs. There are no forces there; all left on Sunday. There is but one company of Cavalry at Davis' Bridge. Everything in shape of force above Wolf River has moved south. I am of the opinion that the rout of Van Dorn's army is complete, and that Pillow's force late of Holly Springs has caught the panic."
On Nov 2 less than a month after calling Rosecrans back Grant wrote the following to Washington:
With small re-enforcements at Memphis I think I would be able to move down the Mississippi Central road and
cause the evacuation of Vicksburg and to be able to capture or destroy all the boats in the Yazoo River
None of that, as you know, in any way addresses that Vicksburg was 240 miles away. This is not a trivial distance. Nor have you ever been able to show where Rosecrans proposed a move on Vicksburg. Nor have you ever shown an example of how the 240 miles would be covered in 6 days. So while I do appreciate sources, in this case they are once again being used to obfuscate the issue, rather than address it.
Rosecrans reported himself in need of forage "or our animals will starve" before he had even covered 40 miles. This gives an idea of how ill-prepared he was to cover 240 miles in 6 days. And regardless of how poorly Vicksburg itself might have been defended at the time, there were significant CS forces at Holly Springs and other places along the line running there from Ripley. I am not sure why you completely ignore this fact.
Grant did speak of taking Vicksburg in 1862. Did he say it would take 6 days? If not, why not?