Hunt-Hancock Artillery Controversy

Also forgot to recon at Cold Harbor, how did that work out?

Oh, how this happened is interesting. Let me dig out an old post.

The lack of a recce is simple, Grant had not allowed time for it.

Hancock had not been in said area. On the afternoon of the 9th Grant had sent three divisions of 2nd Corps off on their own. They crossed the Po River and became isolated. This gave Lee a huge opportunity to destroy one of Grant's Corps, and he sent Heth's and Mahone's divisions against them. Grant meanwhile the next morning ordered Hancock to leave one division isolated across the Po and bring the other two to stiffen a direct frontal attack against an entrenched position.

Of course, Hancock obeyed, and Heth in turn shattered Barlow's isolated division that Grant's lack of situational awareness had left dangling. Hancock had initially obeyed Grant's instruction to head to the Laurel Hill sector and take command, but as soon as Heth caved in Barlow he went back and was instrumental in Barlow's division merely being destroyed as a fighting unit rather than captured. The leadership he displayed on 10th May was superb.

The orders of 11th May for the 12th May attack were delivered by Comstock in person at 1600 hrs, and Comstock then went show Hancock's staff where the attack was to go in. However it was raining and Comstock got lost. Eventually they went too far SE and hit Burnside's skirmish line. They were set right, but was dusk when Comstock lead Hancock's staff to the proposed start line. It was simply too late to make a recce, as Comstock's navigational error had consumed all the remaining daylight. Perhaps it would be useful to give a rough timeline:

11th May
Before 1500: Grant is entertaining his main political sponsor, Washburn until lunchtime. After lunch Grant communicates with Halleck about other matters before finally turning to the matter of his army.

1500: Grant decides to make a dawn assault on the 12th, using Hancock against the Mule Shoe. He tells Meade and they start the process of making a plan and writing the orders

1600: Comstock leaves Grant's/Meade's HQ with the attack order for Hancock.

ca. 1620-30: Comstock arrives at Hancock's CP and delivers the order. There is to be an O-group (orders group) at Meade's/ Grant's HQ at 1800. Comstock will take two staff officers (Lt Col Morgan, 2nd Corps inspector general and Maj William Mitchell) and a few others to recce the position they are to attack. The R-group will get lost, as mentioned above.

1800: Hancock attends the O-group for the attack with Meade and Staff, Warren and Wright, and some of their staff. Burnside was not present, and won't be informed of the attack until Comstock joins him well after dark.

1900: Back at his CP Hancock holds an O-gp with his division commanders, giving said orders.

2030-2100-ish: Morgan returns reporting they had seen nothing. Lt Col Mendell, a guide from Grant's HQ, arrives to pilot the corps to the start line.

2200: Barlow's division, led by Mendell and Morgan, starts.

0030(12th): the lead part of Barlow's division arrives.

ca. 0100-0200: Hancock, the division commanders etc. finalise their plans at the Brown House. They can't see the enemy, have no time for a recce and the recce officers didn't find the enemy position. They settle on simple attacking down a compass bearing to where the map shows the enemy are. Hancock gets an hours sleep whilst the division commanders start trying to move their units into line.

0330: the tail of the divisions arrives and is put into position

0400: H-hour, but there is heavy fog. Hancock won't approve the attack until he can see they're at least going the right way.

0435: The fog thins enough that they can at least see that they're pointing at the Mule Shoe. Hancock issued the go order.

0445: Barlow receives the order and starts to advance...

I'd say Hancock worked miracles.
 
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That's why they were mentioned (and Gibbon authored the Artillerist's Manual). Ayres and Ricketts are two more examples, as is Upton (his experience was acquired as a battery commander in 1862).
There are several good examples -- the only way a good artillery officer could gain a promotion to match his ability was transferring to the infantry.
 
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There are several good examples -- the only way a good artillery officer could gain a promotion to match his ability was transferring to the infantry.

Indeed. Part of the reason that Henry Hunt lobbied for artillery brigades at the corps level was so that he could promote worthy officers to ranks commensurate with their level of command. He wanted the corps' artillery brigade commanders to be full colonels and brigadiers but that just wasn't in the cards with the government. Very talented artillery officers were constantly transferring to the infantry and cavalry in order to get their deserved promotions (Stephen Weed, Romeyn Ayres, Alanson Randol, Alexander Pennington, Charles Griffin, etc.).

Ryan
 
Indeed. Part of the reason that Henry Hunt lobbied for artillery brigades at the corps level was so that he could promote worthy officers to ranks commensurate with their level of command. He wanted the corps' artillery brigade commanders to be full colonels and brigadiers but that just wasn't in the cards with the government. Very talented artillery officers were constantly transferring to the infantry and cavalry in order to get their deserved promotions (Stephen Weed, Romeyn Ayres, Alanson Randol, Alexander Pennington, Charles Griffin, etc.).

Ryan
Which also accounts for why the gunners who displayed great heroism and were killed/MW at their guns frequently were young guys just out of West Point - Cushing, Kirby, Woodruff, Hazlett, for example.
 
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