How Successful were Rebel Privateers and Commerce Raiders?

And perhaps more importantly, insurance companies wouldn't cover down on shipping whose stated destination was a 'blockaded' port...and if said shipping ended up far away from her filed and insured course of travel, this voids the coverage. Hence, no more bulk carriers to the South.
Well, what I mean is that legally speaking a blockade only has force if it materially exists - it's illegal to just declare a port blockaded without stationing ships there. Admiral Milne gathered sufficient evidence in 1861 that the US blockade of the South did not materially exist for several ports, by stationing a ship there and making smoke (and not being noticed or inspected, thus proving there was no blockade there).

The British declined to challenge the validity of the blockade, though they certainly could have.
 
And perhaps more importantly, insurance companies wouldn't cover down on shipping whose stated destination was a 'blockaded' port...and if said shipping ended up far away from her filed and insured course of travel, this voids the coverage. Hence, no more bulk carriers to the South.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
And the next step is the British insurance companies advising that they can apply peace time rates to American ships, only if they get reflagged to British owners. (And we have a list of potential buyers in the other office.)
 
Well, what I mean is that legally speaking a blockade only has force if it materially exists - it's illegal to just declare a port blockaded without stationing ships there. Admiral Milne gathered sufficient evidence in 1861 that the US blockade of the South did not materially exist for several ports, by stationing a ship there and making smoke (and not being noticed or inspected, thus proving there was no blockade there).

The British declined to challenge the validity of the blockade, though they certainly could have.
I think that is right. Which is evidence that the British were not quite as neutral as the claimed: as between the two categories of Yanks, the northern Yanks who did not allow slavery and did not confiscate British property were preferable to the southern Yanks who intended to unleash pirates.
So perhaps reading international law and being willing to take some advice made a difference. :D:smile coffee:
 
Well, what I mean is that legally speaking a blockade only has force if it materially exists - it's illegal to just declare a port blockaded without stationing ships there. Admiral Milne gathered sufficient evidence in 1861 that the US blockade of the South did not materially exist for several ports, by stationing a ship there and making smoke (and not being noticed or inspected, thus proving there was no blockade there).

The British declined to challenge the validity of the blockade, though they certainly could have.

Completely agree sir. At first it was a 'paper tiger'. Which my point is - economic considerations initially enforced the blockade rather than political and / or ability considerations.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
The announcements that the Confederacy would permit privateering, and confiscate debts owed to the United States, were both public relations errors of the first order. These were mistakes that a rebellious nation that had to win in the court of public opinion could not afford.
 
I think that is right. Which is evidence that the British were not quite as neutral as the claimed: as between the two categories of Yanks, the northern Yanks who did not allow slavery and did not confiscate British property were preferable to the southern Yanks who intended to unleash pirates.
So perhaps reading international law and being willing to take some advice made a difference. :D:smile coffee:
Perhaps, though my understanding is that the British also preferred to make the legal precedent for blockade stronger rather than weaker - they'd be the blockading power in any conceivable future war. (The giant book of precedent they quietly gathered during 1861-5 did come out during 1914-8.)

It says a lot for how intemperate US domestic politics and newspapers could get, though, that British sympathies swayed towards the South a bit at times (The New York Herald, for example, openly speculated about confiscating all British-owned stocks and properties in the US in the event of war - even though during the War of 1812 the US had continued to do business through Barings Bank without interruption). Fortunately cooler heads prevailed.
 
And the next step is the British insurance companies advising that they can apply peace time rates to American ships, only if they get reflagged to British owners. (And we have a list of potential buyers in the other office.)

Which being exactly what happened...brings us back to post #1.

The flow of goods never stopped and actually increased to the Union during the war. Therefore - how 'successful'? Very - on an individual ship level. Minor - to the overall war effort.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
Which being exactly what happened...brings us back to post #1.

The flow of goods never stopped and actually increased to the Union during the war. Therefore - how 'successful'? Very - on an individual ship level. Minor - to the overall war effort.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
And that is where #227 comes into play. For a very small benefit, they provoked a fire storm of anger. One has to especially consider the actions of the Shenandoah to be nothing more than terrorism. There were reasons why uncompensated emancipated and forced repudiation of Confederate debt were demanded as the price of reunion. :cautious::throwball:
 
One has to especially consider the actions of the Shenandoah to be nothing more than terrorism.

Indeed sir but given the state of communications of the day...understandable.

Like the Treaty of Ghent being signed and sealed but word not reaching the Western Hemisphere until after the Battle of NOLA is fought. An interesting 'What if'... the Brits had won that fight and advance further into LA...

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
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Perhaps, though my understanding is that the British also preferred to make the legal precedent for blockade stronger rather than weaker - they'd be the blockading power in any conceivable future war.

For the 'long range' considerations - completely understandable. And for the immediate situation also. By 'officially' recognizing the 'blockade', the UK loses nothing. Commerce still booms on a cash-and-carry basis to both sides, (Loans and Confederate Cotton Bonds not withstanding but that was an individual risk, not something officially sanctioned or backed by the British Government), the Brits can 'officially' shrug their governmental shoulders when the USN 'curbs' and seizes commercial vessels, (Red Ensign - not Blue - no more RMS Trent dust-ups... ), while at the same time allowing her citizens ( sorry - subjects ) a great deal of leeway to make the most of the state of affairs, keeps lunatic fringe in Union quiet...and as you stated, sets the precedent for future conflicts. Many advantages for little or no effort on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

If she 'officially' DOES NOT recognize the Blockade, then the United Kingdom HAS TO 'officially' act when the USN enforces it. This gains the UK nothing and has the potential to be a tremendous time / treasury / blood wasting endeavor, regardless of the eventual outcome. Those '...minor unsanctioned acts of war...' now become actual casus belli if for no other reason than to enforce the sanctity of the word of the UK Government. She gains nothing in this scenario and risks the potential to lose much even if she 'won'. A Pyrrhic victory at best. She had better things to do and greater concerns to concentrate on. In the UK, those 'cooler heads' prevailed and she picked the course of action that was best for her at that time.

Thankfully...

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
(Red Ensign - not Blue - no more RMS Trent dust-ups... ),
That's slightly anachronistic. The designations as to which ensign was for public service / RN ships / merchant ships took place in 1864.

Those '...minor unsanctioned acts of war...' now become actual casus belli if for no other reason than to enforce the sanctity of the word of the UK Government.
I was actually referring to Trent, which was considered a casus bellum.
 
And a key point that cannot be understated is that it was RMS Trent. A Royal Mail Steamship, a vessel under charter to Her Majesty's Government. (This is not just any regular Merchant ship, even taking her to a Prize Court is questionable)
And as such as much an official instrument and agency as the USPS is of the USA.
The Postmaster General was a member of the Cabinet, as was his US equivalent at the time. It could easily be interpreted as a direct attack on a function of the state ie. An Act of War!
 
Indeed sir but given the state of communications of the day...understandable.

Like the Treaty of Ghent being signed and sealed but word not reaching the Western Hemisphere until after the Battle of NOLA is fought. An interesting 'What if'... the Brits had won that fight and advance further into LA...

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
The Shenandoah came out so late, and headed off into such a secondary area and attacked an unprotected and unimportant industry, that the only real affect was vengeance. At that point history shows evidence that the Confederates were beginning to rationalize bank robbery and arson as acts of war. Was the burning of whaling ships any different than the burning of Chambersburg?
I'll give Semmes credit for trying to follow the law of war, which was difficult considering that all the important nations followed the rules of neutrality. But the Shenandoah was creating damage that had no affect on the war. It was not different than arranging a duel with rigged pistols.
 
The Shenandoah came out so late, and headed off into such a secondary area and attacked an unprotected and unimportant industry, that the only real affect was vengeance.
Well, it's financial damage - the raiding of commerce - and concorded with the laws of war at the time. The intent was of course to inflict financial damage and thus create incentive for Northern financial interests to call for an end to the war.

Was the burning of whaling ships any different than the burning of Chambersburg?
Tricky one, not least because Chambersburg is sort of the counterpart to Sherman's march destroying around it as well as taking food. But it's not like Semmes could have sent them all in to the prize court instead, since Union diplomatic efforts had secured the concept that neutral ports were not permitted as recipients of prizes.

The common thread there is that civilian ships and civilian towns are legitimate targets for ransom or destruction, though civilian persons are not.
 
The war was well past the point at which any financial damage to the whaling industry was going to any affect on the United States. If a belligerent engages in arson and robbery and loses, it has provoked revenge.
The revenge in the case of the Civil War took the form of forced repudiation of Confederate debt. The Republicans took control of federal fiscal and monetary policy with an iron grip. In an era in which financial aid to the south could have been profitable, the Republicans pursued an immigration policy and a western policy, and used their control to keep the gold premium in place on the national debt interest payments.
 
The CSS Nashville was a 1221 -ton side-wheel steamer of exceptional speed built originally as a passenger steamer at Greenpoint, NY, in 1853. She was seized by the Confederacy at Charleston SC and converted and commissioned as an armed cruiser in October 1861. She made one combat cruise under the Confederate flag captured and burned the sailing merchantman Harvey Birch in the English Channel on November 19, and spent sometime at Southampton, England. Returning to American waters early in 1862, she captured and burnt the schooner Robert Gilfillan on 26 February. Two days later,she ran the blockade into Beaufort, NC remaining there until-mid-March, whenshe went to Georgetown, SC. Sold to private interests and renamed the Thomas L. Wragg, she operated as a blockade runner, but was hindered in this employement by her deep draft. After arrival near Savannah,GA, she was sold again in November 1862, to become a privateer under the name Rattlesnake. On 28 February 1863, while still in the Savannah area, she was destoyed by the ironclad monitor USS Montauk whose chief purpose was to destroy the privateer and reduce Fort McAllister at Genesis Point on the Ogeechee River. Thus ended the career of this historic vessel, the first vessel commisioned by the Confederacy.
 
She was one of the ones which was a privateer, yeah. That's a bit of an odd legal footnote.

Pre-ACW, the US position was that if one combatant hadn't signed the Treaty of Paris then they were allowed to use privateers, even if the other side had.
During the ACW the US said it would adhere to the Treaty of Paris, so the Confederates weren't allowed to use privateers.
But they didn't sign the treaty, saying that post ACW they still wanted to be able to use privateers.

Not cricket, what?
 
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