How many men does McClellan really think are in Lee’s army during the Maryland campaign?

Magic, no. However things did "dry up". It's not magic because when rain stops things slowly get drier.

If you'd look at the weather, you'd find a huge storm rolled in on the evening of 1st June, and lasted on and off for a week. You'd perhaps know the Chickahominy inundated, the bridges were damaged etc. It stopped around the evening of the 8th June, and although there were showers, the ground started to dry.

Incidently, it dried for both sides at the same rate. It all kicked off around the 25th because the ground had become firm enough to support vehicles off of cordroyed roads etc., and hence both sides could move their artillery, ambulances etc. The ground was the same for both sides, but the effect is very different. The rebels just have to sit around fires, eating food brought in by rail. The Federals have to slog forward, and can't even eat unless huge effort is expended.



Indeed, but on 31st May the ground was dry, because the huge storm front had just about reached the west of Virginia, and was a day away from Richmond.



They didn't cross until the 26th, after the ground had dried, and the Chickahominy drained.
The "ground was dry" on May 31? Not hardly. On top of the lengthy period of off and on wet which lasted well into May, the night of May 30 saw a massive drenching storm which put the Chickahominy in flood (read the reports of Sumner's crossing to the south on his relief mission - nearly losing a battery, among other harms) and rendered the roads a morass. There are innumberable accounts from both sides about the storm on the night of May 30, including a few fatalities from lightning. For only one example read Israel Richardson's report of the crossing of his division on May 31, describing the "large quantity of rain" that had fallen and the "deep mud" (OR Vol. XI Part 1 at 764). Nonetheless Johnston pressed a full-on attack. Had it not been for his vague verbal orders and Longstreet and Huger debating seniority at a crossroads, the attack may well have accomplished even more than it did - aided by the placement by McClellan of the weakest division from his weakest corps at the pivotal point of attack.
 
The "ground was dry" on May 31? Not hardly. On top of the lengthy period of off and on wet which lasted well into May, the night of May 30 saw a massive drenching storm which put the Chickahominy in flood

It's almost like as it rains more, the ground gets wetter, isn't it?

The weather front was to the west, but if you consult a map, you'll see the Chickahominy rises at the Blue Ridge, which is where the front was on the 30th. In fact, it was raining heavily well to the west of that area, but the water drained eastwards to the sea via the river system. The front moved east slowly, and reached the battlefield on the evening of the 1st.

In short - the ground out of the "valleys" was dry enough for movement, but the Chickahominy flood plain was in full flood due to the storm over the Blue Ridge.
 
It's almost like as it rains more, the ground gets wetter, isn't it?

The weather front was to the west, but if you consult a map, you'll see the Chickahominy rises at the Blue Ridge, which is where the front was on the 30th. In fact, it was raining heavily well to the west of that area, but the water drained eastwards to the sea via the river system. The front moved east slowly, and reached the battlefield on the evening of the 1st.

In short - the ground out of the "valleys" was dry enough for movement, but the Chickahominy flood plain was in full flood due to the storm over the Blue Ridge.
The river was in flood but not just because of anything going on well downstream. It was in flood - and the roads a morass - on May 31 because the heavens opened on that part of the Peninsula the night of May 30. As I said, there are any number of accounts from both the Army of the Potomac and from Johnston's army about that night, the "torrents" that fell, and the way things were left the next morning when Johnston attacked. It is one of the best-documented weather events of the entire war.
 
Anybody read Dave Powell today?

Thanks for posting!
 
My long reply got eaten by a windows restart.

However, I'm not sure what your argument is? Is it that a weeks worth of storms that stops all vehicular movement for weeks afterwards is the same as a short storm that puts an inch of mud on the ground?
 
My long reply got eaten by a windows restart.

However, I'm not sure what your argument is? Is it that a weeks worth of storms that stops all vehicular movement for weeks afterwards is the same as a short storm that puts an inch of mud on the ground?
I accept the concession that your weather analysis was wrong regarding May 31 and you've apparently moved on to "Plan B". The storm that dumped torrents on May 30 put the river in flood and made those Peninsula roads (with all of their soil characteristics) a morass. As you know, May was hardly a month of drought in that area already. Nonetheless, Johnston (Joe Johnston, of all people) still launched an assault. McClellan would not have. "Bank it". As he told Stanton in his message dated May 31, 1862 at 9:30 P.M." "Terrible storm this afternoon and night; roads again frightful." OR Vol XI Part 3 at 201. I think we've exhausted this topic.
 
I accept the concession that your weather analysis was wrong regarding May 31 and you've apparently moved on to "Plan B". The storm that dumped torrents on May 30 put the river in flood and made those Peninsula roads (with all of their soil characteristics) a morass. As you know, May was hardly a month of drought in that area already. Nonetheless, Johnston (Joe Johnston, of all people) still launched an assault. McClellan would not have. "Bank it". As he told Stanton in his message dated May 31, 1862 at 9:30 P.M." "Terrible storm this afternoon and night; roads again frightful." OR Vol XI Part 3 at 201. I think we've exhausted this topic.

Oh no. My long explanation which got deleted can be summarised as:

1. The storm was mostly to the west. It inundated Jackson at Halltown that morning, and reached Richmond proper at noon. However, rain didn't move over to Seven Pines until nightfall. Seven Pines was on the periphery of the storm, and did catch several hours of heavy rain during the night.

2. You confused up and downstream. The water in the Chickahominy comes downstream from the Blue Ridge.

3. The soil in the area of spongy, but drained well. Hence the "valley bottom" because a huge bog, but the high ground where the fighting was was relatively dry, with water pooling in the dips. The small stream which Casey's Division used as cover also became a bog.

4. Whilst in places the ground soft, artillery could be maneouvred and used. For example, Boudurant's Carter's batteries provided effective close support for the initial attack, moving forward with the infantry. So, one short rainstorm didn't stop artillery being maneouvred on the heights that Seven Pines was fought on. However, the flooded river, risen by rain falling in the catchment area to the west, became a bog preventing additional artillery reaching the field.

5. Johnston committed to the assault before the storm was known about. It did actually impede his movement, as he had to cross the White Oak, which rose and flooded. He couldn't bring his artillery over that, like the Federal artillery couldn't get out of the Chickahominy bog.

Hence you are confusing different things; the bogs at the bottom, and the heights which were dry enough that artillery could advance with the infantry.
 
Anybody read Dave Powell today?

In an attempt to get back to the original point of this thread.....

The great question of the Maryland Campaign is what happened to Lee's army?

1. The evidence seems pretty strong that Lee entered into Maryland with over 70,000 men under his command.

2. He fought at Sharpsburg with somewhere between 40,000 and 50,000 men all told. The exact number is probably impossible to determine.

3. Within a few weeks while the army was recuperating around Winchester, the army's strength was back up to over 70,000 men. This suggests that many men who were absent on September 17 eventually returned to the ranks.

If all this is accepted as true (as I think the evidence strongly suggests that is), that means 20,000 or more of Lee's army was absent without leave on September 17. That's a heck of a lot of men (somewhere around 1/3 of the army)....

This suggests to me a few things (again, if the above is true):

1. The Army of Northern Virginia was closer to disintegration by mid-September 1862 than it would be at any other time of the war until April 1865.

2. Where did those men go? Obviously the Army of the Potomac did not pick them up.

2. McClellan was not as big a fool as historians have supposed him to be. His "wild imagining" that there were Confederate reinforcements waiting behind the hills of Sharpsburg does not seem so far-fetched. McClellan could probably make a pretty good estimate of the Confederate strength he could see during the battle, but he probably didn't expect that 1/3 of Lee's army was AWOL -- especially since, as Harsh suggests, Lee may not have realized it himself.
 
Oh no. My long explanation which got deleted can be summarised as:

1. The storm was mostly to the west. It inundated Jackson at Halltown that morning, and reached Richmond proper at noon. However, rain didn't move over to Seven Pines until nightfall. Seven Pines was on the periphery of the storm, and did catch several hours of heavy rain during the night.

2. You confused up and downstream. The water in the Chickahominy comes downstream from the Blue Ridge.

3. The soil in the area of spongy, but drained well. Hence the "valley bottom" because a huge bog, but the high ground where the fighting was was relatively dry, with water pooling in the dips. The small stream which Casey's Division used as cover also became a bog.

4. Whilst in places the ground soft, artillery could be maneouvred and used. For example, Boudurant's Carter's batteries provided effective close support for the initial attack, moving forward with the infantry. So, one short rainstorm didn't stop artillery being maneouvred on the heights that Seven Pines was fought on. However, the flooded river, risen by rain falling in the catchment area to the west, became a bog preventing additional artillery reaching the field.

5. Johnston committed to the assault before the storm was known about. It did actually impede his movement, as he had to cross the White Oak, which rose and flooded. He couldn't bring his artillery over that, like the Federal artillery couldn't get out of the Chickahominy bog.

Hence you are confusing different things; the bogs at the bottom, and the heights which were dry enough that artillery could advance with the infantry.
You're simply avoiding the obvious and continue to adapt the narrative as facts are brought forward. We're making progress, however, from the erroneous starting point that the roads were "dry" on May 31. McClellan was commenting on the condition of the roads specifically in that area at that very time. I don't think we need a dictionary in order to define "frightful". Johnston could easily have suspended the attack based on that - he didn't. The major reason for the delay was Longstreet's decision to "free lance" regarding choice of approach roads and assignment of priority in using one of the roads, aggravated by the vague and verbal nature of Johnston's orders. Those orders were only given during May 30, so they were easy enough to put in abeyance if Johnston were as absorbed with the condition of the roads by 9:30 PM, as was McClellan. Out of curiosity, how did Carter's and Bondurant's batteries get to their supporting positions? Last I saw, they were attached to D.H. Hill's division and moved with him - along the roads. "Heights" all the way? Again, we've probably exhausted this topic.
 
In an attempt to get back to the original point of this thread.....

The great question of the Maryland Campaign is what happened to Lee's army?

1. The evidence seems pretty strong that Lee entered into Maryland with over 70,000 men under his command.

2. He fought at Sharpsburg with somewhere between 40,000 and 50,000 men all told. The exact number is probably impossible to determine.

3. Within a few weeks while the army was recuperating around Winchester, the army's strength was back up to over 70,000 men. This suggests that many men who were absent on September 17 eventually returned to the ranks.

If all this is accepted as true (as I think the evidence strongly suggests that is), that means 20,000 or more of Lee's army was absent without leave on September 17. That's a heck of a lot of men (somewhere around 1/3 of the army)....

This suggests to me a few things (again, if the above is true):

1. The Army of Northern Virginia was closer to disintegration by mid-September 1862 than it would be at any other time of the war until April 1865.

2. Where did those men go? Obviously the Army of the Potomac did not pick them up.

2. McClellan was not as big a fool as historians have supposed him to be. His "wild imagining" that there were Confederate reinforcements waiting behind the hills of Sharpsburg does not seem so far-fetched. McClellan could probably make a pretty good estimate of the Confederate strength he could see during the battle, but he probably didn't expect that 1/3 of Lee's army was AWOL -- especially since, as Harsh suggests, Lee may not have realized it himself.

Lee had basically run his army into the ground between all the marching and fighting during the Seven Days, 2nd Manassas, and the early Maryland Campaigns. I agree that the army would not again be reduced to this condition until the end stages of the war.

Ryan
 
In an attempt to get back to the original point of this thread.....

The great question of the Maryland Campaign is what happened to Lee's army?

1. The evidence seems pretty strong that Lee entered into Maryland with over 70,000 men under his command.

2. He fought at Sharpsburg with somewhere between 40,000 and 50,000 men all told. The exact number is probably impossible to determine.

3. Within a few weeks while the army was recuperating around Winchester, the army's strength was back up to over 70,000 men. This suggests that many men who were absent on September 17 eventually returned to the ranks.

If all this is accepted as true (as I think the evidence strongly suggests that is), that means 20,000 or more of Lee's army was absent without leave on September 17. That's a heck of a lot of men (somewhere around 1/3 of the army)....

This suggests to me a few things (again, if the above is true):

1. The Army of Northern Virginia was closer to disintegration by mid-September 1862 than it would be at any other time of the war until April 1865.

2. Where did those men go? Obviously the Army of the Potomac did not pick them up.

2. McClellan was not as big a fool as historians have supposed him to be. His "wild imagining" that there were Confederate reinforcements waiting behind the hills of Sharpsburg does not seem so far-fetched. McClellan could probably make a pretty good estimate of the Confederate strength he could see during the battle, but he probably didn't expect that 1/3 of Lee's army was AWOL -- especially since, as Harsh suggests, Lee may not have realized it himself.
This raises something I've never understood. By September 17, 1862, no matter what analysis is used, the ANV appears to have lost significant numbers of stragglers. Just for example, in his report (OR Vol. XIX part 1 at 1026), D.H. Hill castigated the "enormous straggling" which he claimed reduced the ANV to 30,000 at the battle. I've seen another precise calculation which gives Lee c. 35,000 that morning - a significant reduction from Owen's/Harsh's 75,000 at the outset. Where were they? By that point Lee had been operating in a part of Maryland that was largely Unionist in sentiment and there must have been large numbers of stragglers roaming about the landscape, yet that doesn't appear to be something that was showing up to the Federals. If nothing else, that's the sort of thing one would thnk that Pleasanton would have been reporting back in abundance.
 
"Heights" all the way? Again, we've probably exhausted this topic.

I said the ground was dry on the field. In the military sense, it was.

You might notice, if you look at a topographical map, that the fighting was on a plateau. North of the plateau is the Chickahominy flood plain that washed out due to the water coming downriver from the catchment area to the west:

1569093007978.png


That you don't think the roads on a fairly well drained plateau might be better than in the swampy lowlands?
 
"How many men does McClellan really think are in Lee’s army during the Maryland campaign?"

Take the entire white population of the confederacy and divide by two. :lee::lee::lee::lee::lee::lee::lee::lee::lee::lee::lee::lee::lee::lee::lee::lee:
 
This raises something I've never understood. By September 17, 1862, no matter what analysis is used, the ANV appears to have lost significant numbers of stragglers. Just for example, in his report (OR Vol. XIX part 1 at 1026), D.H. Hill castigated the "enormous straggling" which he claimed reduced the ANV to 30,000 at the battle. I've seen another precise calculation which gives Lee c. 35,000 that morning - a significant reduction from Owen's/Harsh's 75,000 at the outset. Where were they? By that point Lee had been operating in a part of Maryland that was largely Unionist in sentiment and there must have been large numbers of stragglers roaming about the landscape, yet that doesn't appear to be something that was showing up to the Federals. If nothing else, that's the sort of thing one would thnk that Pleasanton would have been reporting back in abundance.

In all likelyhood, their strength wasn't as low as 40,000. Hence why Jackson's divisions AAG counted 1,684 on the 16th, but Starke was able to report ca. 1,500 in his brigade alone the next morning.

The straggling seems to have happened when Lee tried to reconcentrate at Sharpsburg by forced marches. A large number of men fell out on the march, and were catching up.

DH Hill is interesting. He tried to lowball his strength down to 3,000. Yet his commanders recorded their strength in action as follows:
  • Ripley: 1,349
  • Rodes: 3rd, 6th and 12th Alabama had around 800. There is no information on the 5th or 26th Alabama, but if average then the brigade would be around 1,300-1,400
  • Colquitt: the 4 GA regiments totalled around 1,500 in action. The strength of the 13th Alabama is unknown, but they were a strong regiment (612 men on 2nd September). The brigade thus had around 1,900-2,000 in action
  • Garland: the 5th NC alone reported 625 in action, not surprising as they received hundreds of recruits less than a month earlier and marched out of Richmond ca. 900 strong. The strength of the other regiments is not known, but the brigade likely had close to 2,000
  • GB Anderson: 1,174
Using only those regiments who reported their strength on the field gets you north of 5,400 on the field. Add the unknowns and DH Hill's division had 7,500-8,000 infantry effectives on the field. More than double his claimed 3,000.
 
In all likelyhood, their strength wasn't as low as 40,000. Hence why Jackson's divisions AAG counted 1,684 on the 16th, but Starke was able to report ca. 1,500 in his brigade alone the next morning.

The straggling seems to have happened when Lee tried to reconcentrate at Sharpsburg by forced marches. A large number of men fell out on the march, and were catching up.

DH Hill is interesting. He tried to lowball his strength down to 3,000. Yet his commanders recorded their strength in action as follows:
  • Ripley: 1,349
  • Rodes: 3rd, 6th and 12th Alabama had around 800. There is no information on the 5th or 26th Alabama, but if average then the brigade would be around 1,300-1,400
  • Colquitt: the 4 GA regiments totalled around 1,500 in action. The strength of the 13th Alabama is unknown, but they were a strong regiment (612 men on 2nd September). The brigade thus had around 1,900-2,000 in action
  • Garland: the 5th NC alone reported 625 in action, not surprising as they received hundreds of recruits less than a month earlier and marched out of Richmond ca. 900 strong. The strength of the other regiments is not known, but the brigade likely had close to 2,000
  • GB Anderson: 1,174
Using only those regiments who reported their strength on the field gets you north of 5,400 on the field. Add the unknowns and DH Hill's division had 7,500-8,000 infantry effectives on the field. More than double his claimed 3,000.

My issue with this is that it just doesn't pass the smell test. The AotP was able to push the AoNV to the very brink and if Lee had significantly more than 40,000 men, the Union troops simply would not have been able to do so since they were engaging in almost equal numbers. While I agree that the 35,000 odd number is almost certainly too low, 50,000 odd troops is going to be too high. I can easily see somewhere between 40-45,000 but no more than that.

Ryan
 
I said the ground was dry on the field. In the military sense, it was.

You might notice, if you look at a topographical map, that the fighting was on a plateau. North of the plateau is the Chickahominy flood plain that washed out due to the water coming downriver from the catchment area to the west:

View attachment 326507

That you don't think the roads on a fairly well drained plateau might be better than in the swampy lowlands?
You're trying too hard. "Better"? Maybe. "Dry" (as you started out with)? Not even close Now - instead of a moderrn-day topo (which shows nothing about drainage in 1862) - get us a soils map. That will tell you a lot more about the condition of the roads after the May 30 drenching - on top of a wet April and May. Let's stick with McClellan's description of the "roads" - "frightful". If you think that with that viewpoint McClellan would have attacked on May 31 AM, i'll sell you some of those Chickahominy bottom lands. I suggest (again) that we move back to the original topic.
 
My issue with this is that it just doesn't pass the smell test. The AotP was able to push the AoNV to the very brink and if Lee had significantly more than 40,000 men, the Union troops simply would not have been able to do so since they were engaging in almost equal numbers. While I agree that the 35,000 odd number is almost certainly too low, 50,000 odd troops is going to be too high. I can easily see somewhere between 40-45,000 but no more than that.

Ryan
I've seen a very detailed analysis which gives Lee 35,112 infantry on 9/17 AM - "Evans" - 3,111; DR Jones - 3,810; DH Hill - 7,773; Jackson - 4,430; "Ewell" - 4,401; Walker - 3,764; McLaws - 2,823; RH Anderson - 5,000. Total = 35,112. During the day this analysis would add 3,914 from AP Hill but would subtract losses of 9,919,
 
I've seen a very detailed analysis which gives Lee 35,112 infantry on 9/17 AM - "Evans" - 3,111; DR Jones - 3,810; DH Hill - 7,773; Jackson - 4,430; "Ewell" - 4,401; Walker - 3,764; McLaws - 2,823; RH Anderson - 5,000. Total = 35,112. During the day this analysis would add 3,914 from AP Hill but would subtract losses of 9,919,
If you don't mind, could you share your source? Thanks
 
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