Wesley P Ellington
Corporal
- Joined
- Jul 8, 2018
- Location
- Maryland
On September 11, 1862 near Rockville, Maryland, George McClellan writes to General-in-Chief Henry Halleck,
“All the evidence that has been accumulated from various sources since we left Washington goes to prove most conclusively that almost the entire rebel army in Virginia, amounting to not less than 120,000 men, is in the vicinity of Frederick City.”
On September 13 at Frederick, Maryland, McClellan finds Special Order 191, and, combined with his own intelligence, learns that the confederate forces are divided. Lee has moved the “main body of the army” to Boonsboro and Hagerstown, Maryland, and has sent several detachments south of the Potomac to capture 14,000 federal troops at Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry, Virginia.
According to Stephen W. Sears (George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon, page 286), McClellan believes that Longstreet, Jackson, and D.H. Hill each command a corps of 30,000 men, while McLaws, Anderson, Walker, Hood, and A.P. Hill each command a division of 6,000 men. Order 191 states that Longstreet and D.H. Hill are at Boonsboro, while Jackson, McLaws, Anderson, and Walker are at Martinsburg/Harpers Ferry. Hood and A.P. Hill are not mentioned, so they could be anywhere.
If we do the math using these numbers, then McClellan believes that there are 60-72,000 confederates at Boonsboro/Hagerstown, and 48-60,000 at Martinsburg/Harpers Ferry.
McClellan decides to attack the confederates at Boonsboro in an attempt to quickly defeat Lee’s army while it is divided, but he also sends 20,000 troops under Franklin to rescue the men at Harpers Ferry.
With an army of only 95,000 men, why would McClellan detach Franklin’s 20,000 men?
First, McClellan would be left with only 75,000 men to attack up to 72,000 confederates at Boonsboro. That’s barely any advantage in manpower, and by attacking uphill through the mountain gaps he will have a significant terrain disadvantage.
Second, Franklin’s 20,000 men would be sent toward a confederate force of up to 60,000. Franklin would need to push through Crampton’s gap, then march down Pleasant Valley, and then attack up Maryland Heights. Does McClellan think that the confederates will neither defend Crampton’s gap nor move men across the Potomac River to Maryland Heights when they realize that the federals are threatening to lift the siege at Harpers Ferry?
I see no reasonable explanation for detaching Franklin except that McClellan doesn’t really believe that Lee has 120,000 men.
If McClellan thinks that Longstreet, Jackson, and D.H. Hill each command a corps, and an average corps has 3 divisions, and there are 5 additional divisions (McLaws, Anderson, Walker, Hood, and A.P. Hill), then this totals 14 confederate divisions in Lee’s army. If Stuart commands a division of cavalry, then it brings the total to 15. If each division averages about 6,000 men, then this means that Lee’s army has about 90,000 men. I believe that this is McClellan’s true estimate of confederate forces on the campaign.
Using this estimate, there should be 36-54,000 confederates (6-9 divisions) in each area. If McClellan thinks that he will face a maximum of 54,000 at Boonsboro, then it‘s understandable that he would be willing to part with Franklin’s 20,000 men, because with 75,000 he would still have at least a 21,000 man (40%) advantage against Longstreet/Hill.
90,000 is still a large overestimation of the size of the confederate army, but it’s not the ridiculous figure of 120,000 that he reports to Washington. After the Seven Days, he reported another grossly inflated number: 200,000 confederates around Richmond.
Such exaggerations serve his own interests. If he‘s up against superior forces and fails, then he has an excuse, like on the Peninsula, but if he succeeds, then he looks brilliant, like in West Virginia and Maryland.
“All the evidence that has been accumulated from various sources since we left Washington goes to prove most conclusively that almost the entire rebel army in Virginia, amounting to not less than 120,000 men, is in the vicinity of Frederick City.”
On September 13 at Frederick, Maryland, McClellan finds Special Order 191, and, combined with his own intelligence, learns that the confederate forces are divided. Lee has moved the “main body of the army” to Boonsboro and Hagerstown, Maryland, and has sent several detachments south of the Potomac to capture 14,000 federal troops at Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry, Virginia.
According to Stephen W. Sears (George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon, page 286), McClellan believes that Longstreet, Jackson, and D.H. Hill each command a corps of 30,000 men, while McLaws, Anderson, Walker, Hood, and A.P. Hill each command a division of 6,000 men. Order 191 states that Longstreet and D.H. Hill are at Boonsboro, while Jackson, McLaws, Anderson, and Walker are at Martinsburg/Harpers Ferry. Hood and A.P. Hill are not mentioned, so they could be anywhere.
If we do the math using these numbers, then McClellan believes that there are 60-72,000 confederates at Boonsboro/Hagerstown, and 48-60,000 at Martinsburg/Harpers Ferry.
McClellan decides to attack the confederates at Boonsboro in an attempt to quickly defeat Lee’s army while it is divided, but he also sends 20,000 troops under Franklin to rescue the men at Harpers Ferry.
With an army of only 95,000 men, why would McClellan detach Franklin’s 20,000 men?
First, McClellan would be left with only 75,000 men to attack up to 72,000 confederates at Boonsboro. That’s barely any advantage in manpower, and by attacking uphill through the mountain gaps he will have a significant terrain disadvantage.
Second, Franklin’s 20,000 men would be sent toward a confederate force of up to 60,000. Franklin would need to push through Crampton’s gap, then march down Pleasant Valley, and then attack up Maryland Heights. Does McClellan think that the confederates will neither defend Crampton’s gap nor move men across the Potomac River to Maryland Heights when they realize that the federals are threatening to lift the siege at Harpers Ferry?
I see no reasonable explanation for detaching Franklin except that McClellan doesn’t really believe that Lee has 120,000 men.
If McClellan thinks that Longstreet, Jackson, and D.H. Hill each command a corps, and an average corps has 3 divisions, and there are 5 additional divisions (McLaws, Anderson, Walker, Hood, and A.P. Hill), then this totals 14 confederate divisions in Lee’s army. If Stuart commands a division of cavalry, then it brings the total to 15. If each division averages about 6,000 men, then this means that Lee’s army has about 90,000 men. I believe that this is McClellan’s true estimate of confederate forces on the campaign.
Using this estimate, there should be 36-54,000 confederates (6-9 divisions) in each area. If McClellan thinks that he will face a maximum of 54,000 at Boonsboro, then it‘s understandable that he would be willing to part with Franklin’s 20,000 men, because with 75,000 he would still have at least a 21,000 man (40%) advantage against Longstreet/Hill.
90,000 is still a large overestimation of the size of the confederate army, but it’s not the ridiculous figure of 120,000 that he reports to Washington. After the Seven Days, he reported another grossly inflated number: 200,000 confederates around Richmond.
Such exaggerations serve his own interests. If he‘s up against superior forces and fails, then he has an excuse, like on the Peninsula, but if he succeeds, then he looks brilliant, like in West Virginia and Maryland.
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