Chancellorsville How long could the Union have held Jackson's flank attack at Chancellorsville if they knew he was coming?

And since you seem focused on technicality, how's this: "much of Longstreet's Corps and Longstreet himself ..."
That "technicality" corrects what was a serious part of your argument. Imagine if Anderson and McLaw had not been at Chancellorsville.

Last, your Grant analogy is defective - you simply ignore Donelson and Henry and you focus on one day pf a two-day battle.

Grant was not an army commander at Ft. Henry and Doneldson. Grant's first battle as army commander (Army of West Tennessee/ the Tennessee) was at Shiloh.
 
Right on! And don’t forget Sykes pulled back at a golden opportunity on May 1 and Meade was uncontested on Lee’s right flank on May 1 when both received orders from Hooker to fall back toward the Chancellorville house.
Hope you don't mind me posting but what exactly was Sykes "golden opportunity"? AFAIK, Hanckock was on his way to rescue Sykes from being flanked. Also, what good would it have done for Meade to have reached Bank's Ford with two divisions.
 
One certainly can but some people never learn.

Keeping his opinions to himself was Hooker's biggest problem. He improved though when sent west thanks to Butterfield but when his CoS got diarrhea and was no longer around Hooker was doomed.
 
Wasn't it Lincoln who said that you don't throw a gun away just because it misfired once (or something like that)? Hooker's problem had to do with Halleck who despised Hooker (and vice versa) and refused him the Harper's Ferry garrison. That was the last straw for Hooker and tendered his resignation from command of the AOP.
Remind us of the decisions Halleck made at Chancellorsville, which is the topic of this thread. You quote Lincoln. I don't recall Lincoln wasting one ounce of energy or ink trying to persuade Joe to retract his resignation. The fact that Lincoln did not do so despite being in the midst of an invasion with a clash imminent speaks volumes. Feel free to supply evidence to the contrary.
 
That "technicality" corrects what was a serious part of your argument. Imagine if Anderson and McLaw had not been at Chancellorsville.



Grant was not an army commander at Ft. Henry and Doneldson. Grant's first battle as army commander (Army of West Tennessee/ the Tennessee) was at Shiloh.
I think you're getting a bit hypertechnical now with titles. I'm sure you get the point. He wasn't a corps commander or a division commander there. Maybe he wasn't actually present.
 
That "technicality" corrects what was a serious part of your argument. Imagine if Anderson and McLaw had not been at Chancellorsville.



Grant was not an army commander at Ft. Henry and Doneldson. Grant's first battle as army commander (Army of West Tennessee/ the Tennessee) was at Shiloh.
"That "technicality" corrects what was a serious part of your argument. Imagine if Anderson and McLaw had not been at Chancellorsville."

More futile deflection. It doesn't "correct" the argument. And "imagin[ing" the result doesn't require much work - the odds against Lee would have been even worse than they were. Now give us the ratio of the two sides with them present. Here's a hint - the word "double" might be involved.
 
Hope you don't mind me posting but what exactly was Sykes "golden opportunity"? AFAIK, Hanckock was on his way to rescue Sykes from being flanked. Also, what good would it have done for Meade to have reached Bank's Ford with two divisions.
Hope you don't mind me posting but what exactly was Sykes "golden opportunity"? AFAIK, Hanckock was on his way to rescue Sykes from being flanked. Also, what good would it have done for Meade to have reached Bank's Ford with two divisions.
Perhaps “golden opportunity “ was over stated. The way I see it (and I am no battlefield tactician) ... Sykes had a full corps in front if Zoan Church (west of the church) early in the day (before 1030 or 11 am) there were only two southern brigades between him and the ANVs defense (supporting southern divisions had not arrived). By taking the knoll that Zoan Church sits on would have been akin to possessing Little Road Top at Gettysburg. But Sykes waited too long as time passed Jackson place men on his right flank and front. Sykes asked for support but got none.
As far as Meade goes, had he turned right just prior to reaching Banks ford he could have possibly rolled up the weak southern right flank. Hope this helps and makes sense.
 
Perhaps “golden opportunity “ was over stated. The way I see it (and I am no battlefield tactician) ... Sykes had a full corps in front if Zoan Church (west of the church) early in the day (before 1030 or 11 am) there were only two southern brigades between him and the ANVs defense (supporting southern divisions had not arrived). By taking the knoll that Zoan Church sits on would have been akin to possessing Little Road Top at Gettysburg. But Sykes waited too long as time passed Jackson place men on his right flank and front. Sykes asked for support but got none.
As far as Meade goes, had he turned right just prior to reaching Banks ford he could have possibly rolled up the weak southern right flank. Hope this helps and makes sense.
Once again, this is both confused and confusing - at Chancellorsville George Sykes was only a division commander in George Meade's Union Fifth Corps, commanding the division which included the brigade of United States Regulars which he had also formerly led. It wasn't until on the march to Gettysburg that Sykes moved up to command of the Fifth Corps when Meade was tapped to replace Hooker. Agreed there was an opportunity missed when Hooker sent word halting Meade's advance along the River Road - an incredulous Meade even put the bearer of the dispatch under arrest until he could verify its authenticity!
 
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Remind us of the decisions Halleck made at Chancellorsville, which is the topic of this thread. You quote Lincoln. I don't recall Lincoln wasting one ounce of energy or ink trying to persuade Joe to retract his resignation. The fact that Lincoln did not do so despite being in the midst of an invasion with a clash imminent speaks volumes. Feel free to supply evidence to the contrary.

Yes, the OP is about Jackson's flank attack at Chancellorsville but the response has to do with the removal of Hooker as commander of the AOP. Lincoln was disposed to remove Hooker soon after Chancellorsville but none of the interviewees would accept command so he decided to stick with Hooker for the time being. The don't throw away the gun because it misfires once (to paraphrase what Lincoln said after interviewing Reynolds) was (IMO) a reflection of Lincoln's frustration at the Corp commanders who were not willing to accept the responsibility of command of the AOP while carping on the need to remove Hooker from command. When Hooker requested to be removed from command on the 28th everyone in the cabinet (except for Chase) had lost confidence in Hooker and I think Lincoln had to make the very hard choice at a very unfortunate time. It's also possible that Lincoln was also hoping for Hooker to resign in order not to get the Radical Republicans who supported Hooker on his case if he fired Hooker. The back and forth's between Halleck, Hooker and Lincoln during this period (especially the one for June 5th when Lincoln wires Hooker that from then on Hooker is to communicate directly with Halleck and obey all his orders, thus ending the Hooker - Lincoln bypass of Halleck) set the stage for Halleck to so frustrate Hooker that he would end up resigning, which is what occurred.
 
I think you're getting a bit hypertechnical now with titles. I'm sure you get the point. He wasn't a corps commander or a division commander there. Maybe he wasn't actually present.
So now it's "hypertechnical". Why not just admit that you got it wrong and move on. It's nothing to be ashamed of. I would say that many of the posters do make posting to correct the record.
 
Perhaps “golden opportunity “ was over stated. The way I see it (and I am no battlefield tactician) ... Sykes had a full corps in front if Zoan Church (west of the church) early in the day (before 1030 or 11 am) there were only two southern brigades between him and the ANVs defense (supporting southern divisions had not arrived). By taking the knoll that Zoan Church sits on would have been akin to possessing Little Road Top at Gettysburg. But Sykes waited too long as time passed Jackson place men on his right flank and front. Sykes asked for support but got none.
As far as Meade goes, had he turned right just prior to reaching Banks ford he could have possibly rolled up the weak southern right flank. Hope this helps and makes sense.

I believe that Anderson's (not part of Jackson's Corp) division was already in position and entrenched west of Zoan Church by the morning of the May 1st so Sykes would have had a hard time getting to Zoan Church. When McLaw's (not part of Jackson's Corp) division arrived Anderson's division took the Orange Plank Road and faced off against Slocum's Corp. I believe it was McLaws division that was on the verge of flanking Sykes. Looking at Sykes report it's clear he was in a pickle. Meade tried to connect with Sykes by sending patrols down "the Mine and Duerson's Mill roads to meet Sykes halfway, but found no one. An attempt by 8th Pennsylvania troopers and by one of Sykes staff to reach Meade by going cross lots ran up against a screen of McLaw's flankers". Sears, Chancellorsville p 207
 
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