How Decisive Was the Naval War to Union Victory?

The Confederacy could not compete with the resources that the North could bring to strengthen its naval forces. Although the Confederacy attempted to build an ironclad fleet (with some successes such as CSS Virginia and Arkansas), it had not the manpower or industrial resources to match that of the North. To its credit, and Confederate Navy Secretary Mallory, the south made strides in weaponry such as "torpedoes" and the first successful combat submarine, and built an impressive force of sea going raiders that may not have been decisive but gave the Union a run for its money (and longer term weakened the United States merchant fleet for decades).
 
Given that banking and finance were heavily concentrated in New York, Boston and Philadelphia, and the US retained Baltimore, Louisville and St. Louis, the loss of New Orleans made it extremely difficult for the Confederacy to finance a prolonged war.
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See page 193 of the appendix: https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1860/preliminary-report/1860e-08.pdf
 
The Confederacy could not compete with the resources that the North could bring to strengthen its naval forces. Although the Confederacy attempted to build an ironclad fleet (with some successes such as CSS Virginia and Arkansas), it had not the manpower or industrial resources to match that of the North. To its credit, and Confederate Navy Secretary Mallory, the south made strides in weaponry such as "torpedoes" and the first successful combat submarine, and built an impressive force of sea going raiders that may not have been decisive but gave the Union a run for its money (and longer term weakened the United States merchant fleet for decades).
The US was well on the way to converting from a coastal economy to a continental economy before the Civil War began. The economy was in transition from steamboats to steam locomotives. Although the annual rate of locomotive production was about 476 per year in 1860, by 1870 it reached 1,100 per year. And each year the engines were bigger, more tightly manufactured, heavier and more powerful.
 
Generals and Admirals like battles -- they where the glory, promotions and medals are. Presidents and kings like battles -- shows you are tough and forcing your will. In fact, wars are mostly won by quiet, uninteresting (to many) methods and processes.

Since this thread started, I have been trying to remember a war, in which both sides had a meaningful naval presence, where the winning side did not have the (usually) larger and more powerful navy, or was allied with a nation who had such navy. I'm sure someone will think of one or two (like Viet Nam), but the difficulty in thinking of examples show how true it is -- strong navies win wars.

BUT, strong navies do not necessarily have to win a lot of battles to win the wars. Examples: US blockaded Japan in WW2 with subs and mines, they won the war, but battles are more fun (unless you are them). Britain won WW1 by blockade of Germany (starvation at home caused the collapse) and the protection of supply lines to US and France. Japan won Russo-Japanese War by blockade of eastern Russia and protection of supply lines to the war zone. US won Revolution because France/Spain/etc were taking colonies and isolating the British army in the US.

Battles are fun to study and they sometimes matter, but it is the slow, steady, grinding effect on the logistics world that wins wars in the long run. Such is true in the CW as well -- as long as the Confederacy or an ally could not break the US blockade, the North would eventually win the war because the South's logistics could not survive a long war.
 
I can't help but thinking that the role of the Union Navy might have been one of the most decisive in attaining victory for the North. To support that position, I maintain that the key to northern victory was the conquest and control of the western riverine system in 1861 to 1863, in which the Union accomplished key objectives of reaching into the Confederate heartland, capturing and controlling important southern transportation and commercial hubs, and splitting apart the trans-Mississippi region. While federal armies and commanders carried out much of the hard work (and received the lion share of credit), it was the Navy that enabled the land forces to do so. The creation of the Western Gunboat Flotilla and the US Ram Fleet (notwithstanding the fact that the army had technical control), were instrumental in opening up the Mississippi from Island No. 10 in the North to Memphis, and in supporting army operations at Belmont, Fort Donelson, and Vicksburg. Concurrently, the blue-water navy was mainly responsible for running Fts. Jackson and St. Philip, thereby achieving the seizure of New Orleans. Beyond the western riverine system and along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, naval operations (sometimes with army cooperation), established beachheads at Hatteras Inlet, Roanoke Island, Port Royal, Fernandina, and Ship Island. Not only did these landings assist the blockading fleet by providing it with necessary coal and supply depots, but inroads (particularly in North Carolina), were effective in pinning down scarce Confederate manpower and threatening further advances inland. While the Navy had renowned commanders (Farragut, Porter, Foote, Walke), it sometimes seems as if the army gets most of the attention. But without the Navy, the outcome of the war might have been very different.

I agree wholeheartedly.
 
Generals and Admirals like battles -- they where the glory, promotions and medals are. Presidents and kings like battles -- shows you are tough and forcing your will. In fact, wars are mostly won by quiet, uninteresting (to many) methods and processes.

Since this thread started, I have been trying to remember a war, in which both sides had a meaningful naval presence, where the winning side did not have the (usually) larger and more powerful navy, or was allied with a nation who had such navy. I'm sure someone will think of one or two (like Viet Nam), but the difficulty in thinking of examples show how true it is -- strong navies win wars.

BUT, strong navies do not necessarily have to win a lot of battles to win the wars. Examples: US blockaded Japan in WW2 with subs and mines, they won the war, but battles are more fun (unless you are them). Britain won WW1 by blockade of Germany (starvation at home caused the collapse) and the protection of supply lines to US and France. Japan won Russo-Japanese War by blockade of eastern Russia and protection of supply lines to the war zone. US won Revolution because France/Spain/etc were taking colonies and isolating the British army in the US.

Battles are fun to study and they sometimes matter, but it is the slow, steady, grinding effect on the logistics world that wins wars in the long run. Such is true in the CW as well -- as long as the Confederacy or an ally could not break the US blockade, the North would eventually win the war because the South's logistics could not survive a long war.
Its the ships that never test the blockade, and the cargoes that never get loaded because they don't sell for enough $$ per lb, that drag down the economy. And as the US took control of the internal rivers, many practitioners of walk away farming in the south decided to head north or head west, for the duration or for good, to places where there was affordable land and the town store had all the usual goods.
The Confederate economy slowly melted away because there were so many men at the front and so little of the normal goods produced in NY and Boston were flowing into the Confederacy.
We know that for most of the battles the Confederacy fought, they had munitions and medical supplies. But we don't know when the Confederates exercised caution to avoid exhausting limited resources.
 
The story of the US advantages was written primarily based on the 1860 census survey of big business and farming.
What was missed was that US had a tremendous amount of unused capacity to produce ships and boats. They could expand production considerably if they could hire the labor.
Something similar was true with respect to railroad iron, cast iron and locomotives. The US economy was recovering by the time the mobilization began in April 1861 and by 1863 it was roaring.
The potential capacity in many industries far exceeded the 1860 production levels.
 
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While I was primarily considering the role of the brown water navy in having a decisive role in the war's outcome, the blockade was also an important contributor to northern victory. But the blockade was not particularly effective in the early years, whereas the conquest of the major western waterways was.
Actually the blockade was very effective early on. By mid 1862 there are massive layoffs in Western Europe and Czarist Poland due to the lack of cotton.
Leftyhunter
 
The Confederate raiders were very successful in capturing slower ships used to sail and steam in the southern oceans. But there is not much information that they seriously disturbed the traffic between New York and Liverpool, and not evidence that the traffic was carried by American ships anyway. The faster English and German steamships had probably taken most of this traffic already.
Similarly, regular traffic to and from Panama, on the Atlantic side and the Pacific was disrupted at first by raiders like Semmes. But the slower US military vessels that were not useful in the blockade were probably very useful in conducting escorts to maintain this essential traffic which allowed people and goods to travel to and from California.
Plus many American ships were sold to foreiegn owners who could now place their nations flag on their ship so a Confedrate Raider couldn't do anything to stop the ship.
Leftyhunter
 
I can't help but thinking that the role of the Union Navy might have been one of the most decisive in attaining victory for the North. To support that position, I maintain that the key to northern victory was the conquest and control of the western riverine system in 1861 to 1863, in which the Union accomplished key objectives of reaching into the Confederate heartland, capturing and controlling important southern transportation and commercial hubs, and splitting apart the trans-Mississippi region. While federal armies and commanders carried out much of the hard work (and received the lion share of credit), it was the Navy that enabled the land forces to do so. The creation of the Western Gunboat Flotilla and the US Ram Fleet (notwithstanding the fact that the army had technical control), were instrumental in opening up the Mississippi from Island No. 10 in the North to Memphis, and in supporting army operations at Belmont, Fort Donelson, and Vicksburg. Concurrently, the blue-water navy was mainly responsible for running Fts. Jackson and St. Philip, thereby achieving the seizure of New Orleans. Beyond the western riverine system and along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, naval operations (sometimes with army cooperation), established beachheads at Hatteras Inlet, Roanoke Island, Port Royal, Fernandina, and Ship Island. Not only did these landings assist the blockading fleet by providing it with necessary coal and supply depots, but inroads (particularly in North Carolina), were effective in pinning down scarce Confederate manpower and threatening further advances inland. While the Navy had renowned commanders (Farragut, Porter, Foote, Walke), it sometimes seems as if the army gets most of the attention. But without the Navy, the outcome of the war might have been very different.
The USN also supported Unionist guerrillas in South East Florida and formed the 2nd Florida Cavalry Union which was officered by naval officers and most of the men were Confedrate defectors. The USN and the 2nd Florida spent a lot of time attacking Confedrate salt works.
Leftyhunter
 
I can't help but thinking that the role of the Union Navy might have been one of the most decisive in attaining victory for the North. To support that position, I maintain that the key to northern victory was the conquest and control of the western riverine system in 1861 to 1863, in which the Union accomplished key objectives of reaching into the Confederate heartland, capturing and controlling important southern transportation and commercial hubs, and splitting apart the trans-Mississippi region. While federal armies and commanders carried out much of the hard work (and received the lion share of credit), it was the Navy that enabled the land forces to do so. The creation of the Western Gunboat Flotilla and the US Ram Fleet (notwithstanding the fact that the army had technical control), were instrumental in opening up the Mississippi from Island No. 10 in the North to Memphis, and in supporting army operations at Belmont, Fort Donelson, and Vicksburg. Concurrently, the blue-water navy was mainly responsible for running Fts. Jackson and St. Philip, thereby achieving the seizure of New Orleans. Beyond the western riverine system and along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, naval operations (sometimes with army cooperation), established beachheads at Hatteras Inlet, Roanoke Island, Port Royal, Fernandina, and Ship Island. Not only did these landings assist the blockading fleet by providing it with necessary coal and supply depots, but inroads (particularly in North Carolina), were effective in pinning down scarce Confederate manpower and threatening further advances inland. While the Navy had renowned commanders (Farragut, Porter, Foote, Walke), it sometimes seems as if the army gets most of the attention. But without the Navy, the outcome of the war might have been very different.
There are quite a few online articles on the Lancashire Cotton Famine which struck the Greater Manchester area hard by 1862. By 1864 the crisis was eased as cotton from British India, Egypt and the Union controlled South were imported.
Leftyhunter
 
How much more willing are the British or French to intervene if the Union looks weak by having no Navy and no blockade?

How much better off are the Confederates if cotton flows out freely and needed supplies flow in freely?

How does New Orleans fall without the Navy? How does Grant take Vicksburg without Porter to ferry his men across the river?

The Peninsular Campaign doesn't take place without the Navy. How could the siege of Petersburg be conducted without Navy supplying Grant's army there?

Sherman would not have been able to march to the sea. No seizure of the NC coast or Pensacola. Can the Union even keep hold of Key West without a Navy? Do they even have a reason to do so?
 
Actually the blockade was very effective early on

In terms of shipping disrupted by the blockade, I have understood the effectiveness to have increased as the war dragged on. But I suppose that the lack of cotton supplies to British mills in 1861 and 1862 could be a metric by which to measure the blockade's effectiveness. On the other hand, wasn't it Confederate policy to withhold the shipment of cotton in an attempt to force European intervention?
 
How much more willing are the British or French to intervene if the Union looks weak by having no Navy and no blockade?

How much better off are the Confederates if cotton flows out freely and needed supplies flow in freely?

How does New Orleans fall without the Navy? How does Grant take Vicksburg without Porter to ferry his men across the river?

The Peninsular Campaign doesn't take place without the Navy. How could the siege of Petersburg be conducted without Navy supplying Grant's army there?

Sherman would not have been able to march to the sea. No seizure of the NC coast or Pensacola. Can the Union even keep hold of Key West without a Navy? Do they even have a reason to do so?

All important points that have me putting the navy's role during the CW on a higher pedestal. The Union victory in the west was driven primarily by the Navy's success in the riverine war. And as you point out, the Navy's cooperating role in running past the New Orleans defenses, running the Vicksburg batteries, and supporting the assault on Ft. Fisher were critical in ensuring Union success.
 
In terms of shipping disrupted by the blockade, I have understood the effectiveness to have increased as the war dragged on. But I suppose that the lack of cotton supplies to British mills in 1861 and 1862 could be a metric by which to measure the blockade's effectiveness. On the other hand, wasn't it Confederate policy to withhold the shipment of cotton in an attempt to force European intervention?
There was a voluntary blockade for the first six months of the war . It was a really stupid idea since the USN was small and Secretary of War Floyd has USN ships scattered around the world so cotton could be easily exported in those six months and then barttered supplies could easily be imported from Western Europe.
Leftyhunter
 
I can't help but thinking that the role of the Union Navy might have been one of the most decisive in attaining victory for the North. To support that position, I maintain that the key to northern victory was the conquest and control of the western riverine system in 1861 to 1863, in which the Union accomplished key objectives of reaching into the Confederate heartland, capturing and controlling important southern transportation and commercial hubs, and splitting apart the trans-Mississippi region. While federal armies and commanders carried out much of the hard work (and received the lion share of credit), it was the Navy that enabled the land forces to do so. The creation of the Western Gunboat Flotilla and the US Ram Fleet (notwithstanding the fact that the army had technical control), were instrumental in opening up the Mississippi from Island No. 10 in the North to Memphis, and in supporting army operations at Belmont, Fort Donelson, and Vicksburg. Concurrently, the blue-water navy was mainly responsible for running Fts. Jackson and St. Philip, thereby achieving the seizure of New Orleans. Beyond the western riverine system and along the Atlantic and Gulf Coasts, naval operations (sometimes with army cooperation), established beachheads at Hatteras Inlet, Roanoke Island, Port Royal, Fernandina, and Ship Island. Not only did these landings assist the blockading fleet by providing it with necessary coal and supply depots, but inroads (particularly in North Carolina), were effective in pinning down scarce Confederate manpower and threatening further advances inland. While the Navy had renowned commanders (Farragut, Porter, Foote, Walke), it sometimes seems as if the army gets most of the attention. But without the Navy, the outcome of the war might have been very differen
There are many reasons why the USN was superior to the CSN not the least was because the USN was briefly intergrated during the ACW and approximately twenty five percent sailiors of color including per our own @AndyHall one of Jefferson Davis's sons who served at age 14 or 15 for about a year. Skilled immigrant labor played a big part as well. The USN could freely service their ships at Union ports including close to the Confedracy such has New Orleans and Norfolk among other Southern ports so they can quickly get back to blockade duty.
CSN ships could only briefly stay at a foreign port although the Alabama spent some time in Melbourne Australia. @Mark F. Jenkins would be more knowledgeable but ships need a certain amount of down time for renovations and repair. Eventually the CSN Raiders would fall apart of they can't stay in Port for an extended amount of time.
Leftyhunter
 
Generals and Admirals like battles -- they where the glory, promotions and medals are. Presidents and kings like battles -- shows you are tough and forcing your will. In fact, wars are mostly won by quiet, uninteresting (to many) methods and processes.

Since this thread started, I have been trying to remember a war, in which both sides had a meaningful naval presence, where the winning side did not have the (usually) larger and more powerful navy, or was allied with a nation who had such navy. I'm sure someone will think of one or two (like Viet Nam), but the difficulty in thinking of examples show how true it is -- strong navies win wars.

BUT, strong navies do not necessarily have to win a lot of battles to win the wars. Examples: US blockaded Japan in WW2 with subs and mines, they won the war, but battles are more fun (unless you are them). Britain won WW1 by blockade of Germany (starvation at home caused the collapse) and the protection of supply lines to US and France. Japan won Russo-Japanese War by blockade of eastern Russia and protection of supply lines to the war zone. US won Revolution because France/Spain/etc were taking colonies and isolating the British army in the US.

Battles are fun to study and they sometimes matter, but it is the slow, steady, grinding effect on the logistics world that wins wars in the long run. Such is true in the CW as well -- as long as the Confederacy or an ally could not break the US blockade, the North would eventually win the war because the South's logistics could not survive a long war.
Steven Bernstein agrees with @DaveBrt .
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No big flashy battle was involved. But Confederate decisions about trade and vital railroad equipment poisoned Confederate relations with Kentucky. By holding back, Lincoln waited until the Confederates made the mistakes which caused Kentucky to lose sympathy with the Confederate cause.
Bernstein also pinpoints May 21, 1861 as the time at which the Confederate Congress adopted a short term embargo strategy. Unless the war ended in 1861, those embargo decisions were going to work against the Confederacy.
 
And to further confirm Dave's point, no big battle was involved in the Confederate decision to issue Letters of Marque, as this thread pointed out. https://civilwartalk.com/threads/confederate-letters-of-marque.26951/
All that was involved was the Confederate decision to refuse to recognize the world had changed. The British Empire was by 1856 the suppressor of piracy, where in the days of the Spanish Main, English captains had been skillful practitioners of privateering.
 
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How much more willing are the British or French to intervene if the Union looks weak by having no Navy and no blockade?

How much better off are the Confederates if cotton flows out freely and needed supplies flow in freely?

How does New Orleans fall without the Navy? How does Grant take Vicksburg without Porter to ferry his men across the river?

The Peninsular Campaign doesn't take place without the Navy. How could the siege of Petersburg be conducted without Navy supplying Grant's army there?

Sherman would not have been able to march to the sea. No seizure of the NC coast or Pensacola. Can the Union even keep hold of Key West without a Navy? Do they even have a reason to do so?
Starting with Port Royal, there were French and English observers on board the US ships that broke through the harbor defenses. Their information may not have penetrated to all the people commenting on the US Civil War, but the military people seemed to have been more cautious about the cost involved in picking a fight with the US.
And at New Orleans, the US navy was able to steam past the forts and capture the city, which the British had been unable to do.
Those two efforts, when joined by the third big combined arms campaign to capture Vicksburg, caused the British to lose interest in intervention. It was clear the US was probably going to win and by July 1863 the US controlled the main cotton production areas even if the British could force an armistice on the belligerents.
 
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There was a voluntary blockade for the first six months of the war . It was a really stupid idea since the USN was small and Secretary of War Floyd has USN ships scattered around the world so cotton could be easily exported in those six months and then barttered supplies could easily be imported from Western Europe.
And few paid attention to the "voluntary blockade". But even that was of little value. By the early spring of 1861, the majority of the 1860 crop had already been shipped both North and to Europe, so there was no famine that year (besides, both the 1859 and 1860 production was above average. The 1861 crop wouldn't be ready for shipment until the fall, and by then there was some beginning of blockading of major ports.
 
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