Hood's Tennessee Campaign

EricJacobson

Sergeant
Joined
Oct 25, 2006
Location
Spring Hill, TN
Just wanted to pose a question and see what everyone thinks.

I'm guessing everyone is aware that the Army of Tennessee was delayed in the Florence, Alabama area for nearly three weeks before the invasion of Tennessee began. What do you think might have happened had Hood been able to get his army moving north before November 10, when the only troops standing between him and Nashville were some scattered Union cavalry commands and the Fourth Corps? This is one of those "what ifs" but might be interesting to toss about.
 
Another part of your question could also include the "what if" Forrest, Roddy, and Wheeler had not distroyed the rail line north from Athens to Spring Hill, just over a month before. That would have given Hood a much faster direct route to Nashville.
 
Interesting thought. However, Hood could not get his troops across the river at Decatur and the Fourth Corps was in and around Pulaski, the latter town right on the rail line. The railroad was not a wide open path to Nashville.
 
EricJacobson said:
Just wanted to pose a question and see what everyone thinks.

I'm guessing everyone is aware that the Army of Tennessee was delayed in the Florence, Alabama area for nearly three weeks before the invasion of Tennessee began. What do you think might have happened had Hood been able to get his army moving north before November 10, when the only troops standing between him and Nashville were some scattered Union cavalry commands and the Fourth Corps? This is one of those "what ifs" but might be interesting to toss about.

One of the issues with this is that it was Hood who kept upsetting the plans for logistical support and river-crossing. He drifted constantly west without notifying Beauregard, officially his commander, who was in charge of making the arrangements.

Regards,
Tim
 
Back to the part about the railroad? The Nashville-Decatur line was repairable? and was in place in late 1864. Remember that the AOT had no rail cars. The line west from Tuscumbia into Mississippi was missing a few rails and not a lot of cars or locomotives. The railroad system was still in it's infancy. The Nashville-Chattanooga through Cowan and Stevenson was in Federal hands, hence not an AOT option. The problems, aside from a dumb idea, in December 1864 were high water and freezing temperatures. Hood, in a sense, was much like the heralded Jamacan bobsled team; in weather he couldn't control or survive. On the last phase of the war beginning in January 1865, the AOT utilized still much un-completed rail line across Alabama on the way to North Carolina. For the southern cause, this silly war began 50 years to soon. The support structure for a good fight, no disrepect to the Southern soldier, just wasn't there.
 
The support structure for a good fight, no disrepect to the Southern soldier, just wasn't there.
You never fail to come up with a good line, Larry! I'll drink to that.
Ole
 
Hood's Tennessee........

I agree that the delay was fatal, because even with that delay Thomas was still trying to concentrate his army, Hood still almost managed a significant victory at Springhill and still had a chance to destroy what 'arguably' would later be the core of Thomas' still nascent army, at Franklin.
A 3 wk earlier start of his campaign, might, indeed have yielded Hood more significant advantages, they certainly would not have not been less.
 
OpnDownfall said:
I agree that the delay was fatal, because even with that delay Thomas was still trying to concentrate his army, Hood still almost managed a significant victory at Springhill and still had a chance to destroy what 'arguably' would later be the core of Thomas' still nascent army, at Franklin.
A 3 wk earlier start of his campaign, might, indeed have yielded Hood more significant advantages, they certainly would not have not been less.

Probably true. However, it is also possible to argue that A. J. Smith's Corps should have arrived three weeks earlier (or six months earlier for that matter), thus altering the situation drastically by giving George Thomas another 10,000 veteran troops.

The delay in Hood's advance is largely caused by Hood's own decisions and actions. The only way he could have shortened it would have been to:
a) plan and communicate his plans better. This was within his control, so any blame for it is his. Even then, I doubt he could have crossed more than a week earlier.
b) follow his original plan and cross to the East. He abandoned this without informing Beauregard, who was managing the supply issue for him. Once again, Hood is responsible for this.

Regards,
Tim
 
trice said:
One of the issues with this is that it was Hood who kept upsetting the plans for logistical support and river-crossing. He drifted constantly west without notifying Beauregard, officially his commander, who was in charge of making the arrangements.

Regards,
Tim

I believe Hood and Beauregard conferred at Tuscumbia prior to the Tennessee campaign. Beau just didn't go along for the 'ride'.
 
Hood's Winter Campaign

First, Hood was not supplied by rail in his campaign into Tennessee. Hood no longer had a logistical base in Atlanta, to draw supplies. Hood was conducting a winter campaign, which never worked very well with wagons, horses and mules.
Hood at best, was conducting a raid. He did not have the logistical supply to take territory and hold it for long. The great deficit for a large Civil War army was supplying forage for the horses and mules, needed to transport the artillery, the ammunition wagons, and other essential supplies. Run out of forage and you run out of an army.

A winter campaign by Hood in Tennessee was the desperate campaign of the Confederate government. Even with some success, which it basically did not have, it was a doomed venture. Hood was facing a well supplied battle hardened army.
 
Aside from the fact that Hood's army in Tennessee was in very friendly territory, there was no foraging to be had. A couple of inches of ice and frozen mud in mid December. December 12, known as cold Sunday, 13 below. That was three days before battle at Nashville. Dumb time to be fighting. Could have watched a lot of football to better results.
 
Dang, . . .

No fun Larry ! I was just waiting for some unsuspecting reader to ask why I called it Hood's Winter Campaign.
Of course, your data on the freezing weather in Nashville is one of the more secret facts of the Civil War, that "historians" tend to ignore, as to not make the Confederates look bad, I suppose.
I suspect the Nashville Chamber of Commerce doesn't publicize that fact broadly, either.
 
Hood's Tennessee Campaign.

Why exactly was Lee manning the Lines at Petersberg, at that very same time? The letters he was writing Davis, during this time were nothing less than veiled recommendations to surrender.
IF Lee was to survive, Hood had to win at Nashville, not for him the option of retreating into the hinter lands for another day. The time for that, was long past (If it was EVER a real option) Hood was doing what needed to be done, as, apparently Lee was doing in Va. Lee was overmatched in his attempt at victory, but, no more so than Hood; with the same results, both lost their army.
The point is, there was no more time for a better time and place to fight Armageddon, in the West. Decisions by Lee, Davis, Bragg, Johnston, Beauregard Lincoln, Thomas, Sherman, Grant, all precluded any opportunity of Hood fighting a campaign in the summer with plenty of rations and sufficient manpower to survive
 
Whitworth,

I don't know any genuine "historian" who ignores the facts about the atrocious weather in the days before Franklin. Nor do they ignore the ugly weather in the first half of November which prevented the Rebels from getting across the Tennessee River and driving north. Behind the Federals troops themselves the weather was Hood's biggest enemy in late 1864, in my opinion.
 
With horrendous sacrifice of body and equipment, the men of the Army of Tennessee, with considerable assist of infantry under E.C. Walthall and N.B. Forrest, many of them men who had not been engaged at Franklin or Nashville, were able to beat the weather or at least fight it to a draw. The heavily manned, equipped and mostly warm US Army was another matter. Lost opportunity at Springhill on the trek north and a stalemate at Murfreesboro on Dec 7, sealed the fate of the AOT. The battle for Nashville in my humble opinion would have been far more populated and bloodier, but with similar results, had Franklin not occurred.
 
whitworth said:
No fun Larry ! I was just waiting for some unsuspecting reader to ask why I called it Hood's Winter Campaign.
Of course, your data on the freezing weather in Nashville is one of the more secret facts of the Civil War, that "historians" tend to ignore, as to not make the Confederates look bad, I suppose.
I suspect the Nashville Chamber of Commerce doesn't publicize that fact broadly, either.
The weather was the reason Thomas was holed up in Nashville for a week before finally attacking. It was also the subject of several letters between he and Grant. From my observations, it seemed common knowledge.


Don
 
Weather and women are both sometimes fun to discuss. The great thing about weather is that it falls on all within it's impact zone. It was just as wet and cold for Thomas as it was for Hood. The difference was that Thomas had blankets and slickers, a warm stove and some fresh men. Not much of a contest, even had it been 72 and rising. Hood was 'lost' in the wilderness of Williamson county.
 
Hood's Tennessee.......

Hood was lost, because he had an impossible mission. But Tn. was where he needed to be, IF he was to have A chance of affecting the war in the West. The fact that his chances of doing so were almost nil, does not change the fact that, fighting the Union Army was his mission.
If saving Confederate lives for after the war was his mission then, Davis and/or Beauregard should have informed him of that fact.
 
Seems to me some of the Confederates should have been focusing on Sherman? Sherman was the killer blow to the western theatre at Bentonville. That fight should have happened prior to the occupany of Charleston? Maybe that was a financial, political and physical impossibility. Seems to have been much the case. As many have written, the war was essentially over after Jonesboro and lost for sure in the west at Springhill and Franklin.
 
Hood's Tennessee.....

Who would lead the pursuit of Sherman? Johnston, Beauregard, Hood etc.,?
How far behind the AoT would be Thomas' army? How far ahead would be Sherman's army?
It would seem that the AoT would be between Sherman and Thomas, that does not seem to be a winning combination....for the south, anyway. Sherman could finish off the AoT, before continuing his march to the sea.
 
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