Hood's other options at Franklin.

major bill

Brev. Brig. Gen'l
Forum Host
Joined
Aug 25, 2012
We on CivilWarTalk are all armchair quarterbacks to a certain extent. In hind sight we all know what happened at the Battle of Franklin. But did Hood have any other viable options?

How Hood could have evaluated this was ask three of his staff to pick a different option and list three good points to the option. The staff given the the other options are allowed to point out three negative points for each option. After hearing all three options discussed Hood could pick the best option.

So what I am looking for is a military staff type study. Some/many of us have did these staff studies more than once. So we know what option Hood used, attack as soon as possible. What might be the other two options?

1. Have an infantry Corps follow Forrest to Hughes Ford while the rest of his army locked the Union Army in place. This would avoid attacking the defense works at Franklin. This might end up being a race to see if the flanking Confederate Corps,that crossed at Hughes Ford, could drive into the Union forces north of the Harpeth River before the Union forces there could be reinforced. The Union forces on the south side of the Harpeth River would be cut off. The major draw back of this plan was spiting your forces in the face of the enemy.

2. Hood could wait until most of the Union forces crossed the Harpeth River and there were to few to Union men to man the defensive works at Franklin, then attack what Union forces had yet to cross the river. The advantages is that part of the Union forces would be captured and the morale of the Union forces would drop while the victorious Confederates would get a boost. It is possible that Hood could have crossed the river after capturing the Union forces left south of the river, and then pounced on the retreating Schofield. The major down point of this option is that small Confederate victories was not what Hood was looking for. A night pursuit would be very difficult, so Hood could have a strung out army ripe for a counter attack in the morning.
 
It is late and I do not have time to mount a thorough discussion. But I do want to point out a couple of constraints.

1. The battle commenced just before sunset. Not a lot of time for maneuvering.

2. Fort Granger and it’s massive artillery complement commanded the Confederate right flank on the Harpeth. Dominated my be a better description.
 
It is late and I do not have time to mount a thorough discussion. But I do want to point out a couple of constraints.

1. The battle commenced just before sunset. Not a lot of time for maneuvering.

2. Fort Granger and it’s massive artillery complement commanded the Confederate right flank on the Harpeth. Dominated my be a better description.

Exactly! Once I went up there and "saw"* what they could do as far as being able to pound the heck out of the right flank...that pretty much sealed the deal. And you really can't go far left due to the hills. It was down the middle or nothing.

*You can't exactly "see" due to trees now--but they wouldn't have had that problem in 1864. What a view! I thought about what Porter Alexander said about Fredericksburg. Yep.
 
After you walk the ground at Franklin, you realize that the options were, indeed, limited. Spring Hill really sealed the deal. Had Opdyke's men not made it back to the Carter House (the center of the attack), it might have succeeded.
Correct! Not Closing the Pike at Spring Hill sealed the fate.. Cheatem & Cleburne didn't wanted a night battle but got one the next day.. And the AOT paid a high price for it
 
Jefferson Davis liked aggressive generals. Perhaps Hood feared being relieved if he did not boldly attack.
 
Jefferson Davis liked aggressive generals. Perhaps Hood feared being relieved if he did not boldly attack.
I don't think he feared being relieved.. Orders where there at Spring Hill yet unfollowed..

Tod Carter could have told the lay of the land what was there and crossings no one asked him. Fort Granger the right flank got destroyed by it as the center … How much hit the left I do not know.. There was some confederate Artillery how effective it was I don't know.

You truly have to view the land the right flank funnels into a death trap... many died not firing a single shot
 
Correct! Not Closing the Pike at Spring Hill sealed the fate.. Cheatem & Cleburne didn't wanted a night battle but got one the next day.. And the AOT paid a high price for it
It was his only realistic option IMO, there was little time, and he was pursuing a retreating army, realisticly there was no way to predetermine they would put up as a fierce fight as they did. Ussually armies are retreating for a reason, they dont feel they can stand up and fight...……….Even after the battle the Union continued to retreat.
 
The Confederates' best chance came right at the beginning of the battle, when they chased the advanced Union troops back to the opening in the center of the main defensive line and pushed through themselves. At that point, they had a chance of wining, but Union reserves were able to seal the gap and the battle then degenerated into repeated vain, costly frontal assaults. If Hood had recognized and accepted that the moment had passed, most of the losses and tragedy of Franklin could have been avoided.
 
2. Fort Granger and it’s massive artillery complement commanded the Confederate right flank on the Harpeth. Dominated my be a better description.

That is not accurate. The role of the ten guns posted directly behind the Federal left (Battery M, 4th U. S. and Battery G, 1st Ohio) was much more decisive. Those guns fired almost 1,150 rounds during the battle. The Granger guns (Battery D, 1st Ohio) fired less than 180.
 
Hood had few good options at Franklin.

A flanking maneuver would have been almost impossible. I have argued for years getting across the was not the problem - the problem was what could the Confederates do once they crossed? There were 10,000 Federal cavalry and infantry strung out from the ford to beyond Fort Granger so Southern troops would have had to deal with significant enemy troops and at least 5-7 miles of ground to traverse.

Doing nothing was not an option.

A frontal assault was fraught with risk.

We know what Hood chose, and incredibly had it not been for a Federal reserve line filled with new troops who bought a precious few minutes and then Opdycke's Brigade moving into the fray......
 
Hood executed the most viable option he had. In his mind, he had just attempted a highly coordinated flanking maneuver the day before and it failed with two days' prior planning. In his mind, his subordinates had let him down. There was limited daylight, and even the frontal attack could not be launched until thirty minutes before sunset.

The whole goal that he was attempting to achieve was the destruction of the Union army before it could reach Nashville - which was the prize. They were one days march from the objective. I think the Confederate corps commanders were likely in agreement with the decision even if they "don't like the looks" of things.
 
Well, he shouldn't have attacked. A flanking move on Schofield would have compelled him to fall back. Having those extra soldiers in front of Nashville might have made that battle less of a disaster than it was.
 
Please explain further. Schofield had 10,000 cavalry and infantry protecting his left flank, four 3-inch guns inside Ft Granger, and at least three four-gun batteries sitting in park next to it.

Schofield was involved in a holding action, gaining time for Thomas to collect the rest of his army, including AJ Smith. Hood could have used Hughes Ford (roughly 3 miles east/southeast of Franklin to move a Corps over the river and threaten, just threaten Schofield's line of retreat. Keep the other two Corps in a position to attack the Franklin lines of defense in an opportunity arises. I think that distance keeps those guns irrelevant.

I'd also submit that Hood simply could have waited for The Union force to simply fall back. Schofield was waiting for the bridges across the Harpeth to be repaired.
 
So it seems like most forum members support Hood's attack at Franklin. So was Hood's attack at Franklin an example of his tactical skills and a justification of his appointment of Army commander?
 
So it seems like most forum members support Hood's attack at Franklin. So was Hood's attack at Franklin an example of his tactical skills and a justification of his appointment of Army commander?

I definitely do not support his attack. His was a foolish plan, in which the command structure of his army was devastated. Just like his three attacks at Atlanta, he lost a great deal more than he could afford
 
So it seems like most forum members support Hood's attack at Franklin. So was Hood's attack at Franklin an example of his tactical skills and a justification of his appointment of Army commander?
??? Do you consider Cold Harbor or Chickasaw Bayou an example of Grant and Sherman tactical skills or appointment? Would think in all 3 they thought there was a chance to brush aside the opposition. War however isnt an exact science and results not known till an attempt is actually made.

If the goal was indeed to prevent Schofield from linking to forces at Nashville, attacking the retreating army was the only option.........Flanking them to retreat, or waiting for them to retreat wouldn't prevent Schofield from linking to Nashville, sometimes one has to roll the dice.

I've always thought if judging ones command ability, the fact the AoT had little success under any of its commanders......Bragg, Johnston, Hood or Stewart should be factored in. Much less if ones only chance of command is being given a command that already had morale and desertion problems from it previous commanders continual retreats.
 
Last edited:
The Confederates' best chance came right at the beginning of the battle, when they chased the advanced Union troops back to the opening in the center of the main defensive line and pushed through themselves. At that point, they had a chance of wining, but Union reserves were able to seal the gap and the battle then degenerated into repeated vain, costly frontal assaults. If Hood had recognized and accepted that the moment had passed, most of the losses and tragedy of Franklin could have been avoided.

Agreed. This is true once the battle is joined. Are there actions leading up to the battle that Hood could have done differently, in your opinion, or is that beyond the OP's scope?
 
??? Do you consider Cold Harbor or Chickasaw Bayou an example of Grant and Sherman tactical skills or appointment? Would think in all 3 they thought there was a chance to brush aside the opposition. War however isnt an exact science and results not known till an attempt is actually made.

If the goal was indeed to prevent Schofield from linking to forces at Nashville, attacking the retreating army was the only option.........Flanking them to retreat, or waiting for them to retreat wouldn't prevent Schofield from linking to Nashville, sometimes one has to roll the dice.

I've always thought if judging ones command ability, the fact the AoT had little success under any of its commanders......Bragg, Johnston, Hood or Stewart should be factored in. Much less if ones only chance of command is being given a command that already had morale and desertion problems from it previous commanders continual retreats.
Bragg had success but failed in the out come count put the nail in the coffin .. Solders loved Johnsons but he retreated . Hood was a fighter … loss of leg basically a loss of arm no real proof of being on drugs... I admire the man after all married and had numerous kids …. agree some of choices

which Stewart do speak of
 
Back
Top