- Joined
- May 18, 2005
- Location
- Spring Hill, Tennessee
I'm always perplexed when I read Hood's report that reflects on the Atlanta Campaign. His report while he was in command of the Army was simply supposed to contain what happened to it and what it did while under his command, but he explained in great depth what happened and how it was lead in the months preceding his appointment to its command.
First, I think this was mostly unheard of. Few reports, if any that I have read, dressed down the predecessor's actions and intent.
But, one thing that struck me was the importance of offensive action that he relates over and over in regard to an army's success early in his report.
The whole thing can be read here: https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/074/0628
But then, following his actions at the Battle of Atlanta and then Ezra Church a few days later, he admits something that really stuck out to me. First, I will note that in the following portions of his report - he is never responsible for what happened.
The first is regarding Peach Tree Creek.
Owing to the demonstrations of the enemy on the right, it became necessary to extend Cheatham a division front to the right. To do this Hardee and Stewart were each ordered to extend a half division front to close the interval. Foreseeing that some confusion and delay might result, I was careful to call General Hardee's attention to the importance of having a staff officer on his left to see that the left did not take more than half a division front. This unfortunately was not attended to, and the line closed to the right, causing Stewart to move two or three times the proper distance. In consequence of this the attack was delayed until nearly 4 p. m. At this hour the attack began as ordered, Stewart's corps carrying the temporary works in his front. Hardee failed to push the attack, as ordered, and thus the enemy, remaining in possession of his works on Stewart's right, compelled Stewart by an enfilade fire to abandon the position he had carried. I have every reason to believe that our attack would have been successful had my order been executed.
At the Battle of Atlanta:
Hardee failed to entirely turn the enemy's left as directed, took position and attacked his flank.
At Utoy Creek:
On the 26th of August the enemy abandoned his works on the extreme right and took up a line, the left resting in front of our works on the Dalton railroad and extending to the railroad crossing the river. Again he withdrew, on the night of the 27th, across the Utoy Creek, throwing one corps across the river to hold the railroad crossing and the intermediate points. His left then rested on the Chattahoochee River, strongly fortified and extending across the West Point railroad. The corps defending the crossing of the Chattahoochee, his works on this side of the river, and the obstacle formed by the Utoy and Camp Creeks, rendered it impossible for me to attack him with any possibility of success between the river and railroad.
Isn't that interesting? Hood was placed in a position that rendered it impossible.
At Jonesboro:
Hardee's and Lee's corps moved accordingly, Hardee in command. It was impressed upon General Hardee that the fate of Atlanta depended upon his success. Six hours before I had any information of the result of his attack I ordered Lee to return in the direction of Atlanta, to be ready to commence the movement indicated in the event of success, and if unsuccessful to cover the evacuation of Atlanta, which would thus be compelled. As it turned out unsuccessful it allowed the enemy the opportunity either to strike us as we marched out of Atlanta or to concentrate on Hardee.
I did not fear the destruction of Hardee before Stewart and Lee could join him, as his position on a ridge between two rivers I thought strong in front, and want of time would prevent the enemy from attacking him in flank. The small loss in Hardee's corps, and the much greater loss of the enemy, show my views to have been correct. The attack at Jonesborough failed, though the number of men on our side considerably exceeded that of the enemy. The vigor of the attack may be in some sort imagined when only 1,400 were killed and wounded out of the two corps engaged. The failure [Hardee's] necessitated the evacuation of Atlanta.
I hope Hood never learned of the forces confronting Hardee - because that was a bold statement!
Isn't it interesting though that Hood has chosen to have a subordinate that has failed him over and over on this campaign be in command of the largest part of his army. In my experience and reading of history, the commander always goes with the larger force and is in command of the most important part of the action. Hood has - in this case however - given that distinction to Hardee. Interesting.
Now, going back slightly in his report I found this mention to be intriguing...
From this time [July 30] till the 26th of August there is nothing of any particular movement to mention. The enemy gradually extended his right, and I was compelled to follow his movement
But early in his report, he went on so much about how maintaining the attack would provide more success than reacting to the enemy. And now he finds himself in Johnston's shoes - constantly having to extend his army in the direction of the enemy movement.
This report was submitted to the War Department on February 15, 1865.
This is something interesting to include along with it. Governor Isham Harris of Tennessee had been on the entire Atlanta Campaign and Tennessee Campaign with the Army of Tennessee and General Hood. This was recorded by Campbell Brown in his memoir.
"On Harris’ first arrival in Richmond, he went to the Spotswood, and being tired and dusty, went immediately to his room and ordered a bath. One of Hood’s Staff had seen him at the office and gone straight to Hood’s room with the news. Before Gov. Harris had fairly reached his room, this Staff officer came in hot haste to beg him to come to Hood’s room, that he was very anxious to see him. He sent back word that he was just off the cars, in his dirty clothes and would come as soon as he had bathed and dressed. A message came back not to mind the bathing but please come at once. He went down. Hood told him he wanted him to listen to his official report before it was handed in, and that a fair copy of it was just finished. As he spoke, the clerk came in with it. Hood took it and read a page, then asked Harris’ opinion. “Go on General, read the whole of it, and then I will mention any points that seem to me to require correction.” Hood finished, and as he went over the last part, Harris was surprised to find the responsibility for the failure at Spring Hill still laid on Cheatham.
Hood having again asked his opinion, Harris replied “Well, General, I must tell you frankly that all this part relative to Gen. Johnston’s previous movements has no business in your report. You are not reporting Gen. Johnston’s campaign, it certainly does not appear in good taste for you to criticize it. If I were to advise you, I would say strike out all that precedes the commencement of your own command, state simply the numbers and position of your troop then and your subsequent movements”. Hood attempted to argue the correctness of his course, but after some discussion gave it up, and said in a tone almost of anguish; “You are right, Governor, I wish to God I had seen you sooner, but it is too late, - I cannot change it now.” Harris continued to urge him for a time, but Hood repeated his former answer with yet greater emphasis. Harris told me his own unavoidable inference at the time was that Hood had been put up to write this by some one else, and that it had been seen and approved by either the President or Secretary of War.
As to the style of the report, he found it containing a great many adjectives and phrases perfectly useless, intended to add force, but in reality taking away the dignity of an official report, and substituting the violence of a party document. His opinion from the style was that it was the production of one of Hood’s friends, the same Woolley who wrote a violent attack on Gen. Bragg. He induced Hood to let him strike out some of these, and they went over the whole report together, making many verbal alterations. The error with regard to Cheatham he insisted on having corrected, and after a while got most of it struck out or changed. During the whole of this remarkable interview, he was struck with the fact that Hood was a puppet in the hands of others who were sacrificing him to gain their own ends, and striking through him a blow at Gen. Johnston.”
What think you?
First, I think this was mostly unheard of. Few reports, if any that I have read, dressed down the predecessor's actions and intent.
But, one thing that struck me was the importance of offensive action that he relates over and over in regard to an army's success early in his report.
The whole thing can be read here: https://ehistory.osu.edu/books/official-records/074/0628
But then, following his actions at the Battle of Atlanta and then Ezra Church a few days later, he admits something that really stuck out to me. First, I will note that in the following portions of his report - he is never responsible for what happened.
The first is regarding Peach Tree Creek.
Owing to the demonstrations of the enemy on the right, it became necessary to extend Cheatham a division front to the right. To do this Hardee and Stewart were each ordered to extend a half division front to close the interval. Foreseeing that some confusion and delay might result, I was careful to call General Hardee's attention to the importance of having a staff officer on his left to see that the left did not take more than half a division front. This unfortunately was not attended to, and the line closed to the right, causing Stewart to move two or three times the proper distance. In consequence of this the attack was delayed until nearly 4 p. m. At this hour the attack began as ordered, Stewart's corps carrying the temporary works in his front. Hardee failed to push the attack, as ordered, and thus the enemy, remaining in possession of his works on Stewart's right, compelled Stewart by an enfilade fire to abandon the position he had carried. I have every reason to believe that our attack would have been successful had my order been executed.
At the Battle of Atlanta:
Hardee failed to entirely turn the enemy's left as directed, took position and attacked his flank.
At Utoy Creek:
On the 26th of August the enemy abandoned his works on the extreme right and took up a line, the left resting in front of our works on the Dalton railroad and extending to the railroad crossing the river. Again he withdrew, on the night of the 27th, across the Utoy Creek, throwing one corps across the river to hold the railroad crossing and the intermediate points. His left then rested on the Chattahoochee River, strongly fortified and extending across the West Point railroad. The corps defending the crossing of the Chattahoochee, his works on this side of the river, and the obstacle formed by the Utoy and Camp Creeks, rendered it impossible for me to attack him with any possibility of success between the river and railroad.
Isn't that interesting? Hood was placed in a position that rendered it impossible.
At Jonesboro:
Hardee's and Lee's corps moved accordingly, Hardee in command. It was impressed upon General Hardee that the fate of Atlanta depended upon his success. Six hours before I had any information of the result of his attack I ordered Lee to return in the direction of Atlanta, to be ready to commence the movement indicated in the event of success, and if unsuccessful to cover the evacuation of Atlanta, which would thus be compelled. As it turned out unsuccessful it allowed the enemy the opportunity either to strike us as we marched out of Atlanta or to concentrate on Hardee.
I did not fear the destruction of Hardee before Stewart and Lee could join him, as his position on a ridge between two rivers I thought strong in front, and want of time would prevent the enemy from attacking him in flank. The small loss in Hardee's corps, and the much greater loss of the enemy, show my views to have been correct. The attack at Jonesborough failed, though the number of men on our side considerably exceeded that of the enemy. The vigor of the attack may be in some sort imagined when only 1,400 were killed and wounded out of the two corps engaged. The failure [Hardee's] necessitated the evacuation of Atlanta.
I hope Hood never learned of the forces confronting Hardee - because that was a bold statement!
Isn't it interesting though that Hood has chosen to have a subordinate that has failed him over and over on this campaign be in command of the largest part of his army. In my experience and reading of history, the commander always goes with the larger force and is in command of the most important part of the action. Hood has - in this case however - given that distinction to Hardee. Interesting.
Now, going back slightly in his report I found this mention to be intriguing...
From this time [July 30] till the 26th of August there is nothing of any particular movement to mention. The enemy gradually extended his right, and I was compelled to follow his movement
But early in his report, he went on so much about how maintaining the attack would provide more success than reacting to the enemy. And now he finds himself in Johnston's shoes - constantly having to extend his army in the direction of the enemy movement.
This report was submitted to the War Department on February 15, 1865.
This is something interesting to include along with it. Governor Isham Harris of Tennessee had been on the entire Atlanta Campaign and Tennessee Campaign with the Army of Tennessee and General Hood. This was recorded by Campbell Brown in his memoir.
"On Harris’ first arrival in Richmond, he went to the Spotswood, and being tired and dusty, went immediately to his room and ordered a bath. One of Hood’s Staff had seen him at the office and gone straight to Hood’s room with the news. Before Gov. Harris had fairly reached his room, this Staff officer came in hot haste to beg him to come to Hood’s room, that he was very anxious to see him. He sent back word that he was just off the cars, in his dirty clothes and would come as soon as he had bathed and dressed. A message came back not to mind the bathing but please come at once. He went down. Hood told him he wanted him to listen to his official report before it was handed in, and that a fair copy of it was just finished. As he spoke, the clerk came in with it. Hood took it and read a page, then asked Harris’ opinion. “Go on General, read the whole of it, and then I will mention any points that seem to me to require correction.” Hood finished, and as he went over the last part, Harris was surprised to find the responsibility for the failure at Spring Hill still laid on Cheatham.
Hood having again asked his opinion, Harris replied “Well, General, I must tell you frankly that all this part relative to Gen. Johnston’s previous movements has no business in your report. You are not reporting Gen. Johnston’s campaign, it certainly does not appear in good taste for you to criticize it. If I were to advise you, I would say strike out all that precedes the commencement of your own command, state simply the numbers and position of your troop then and your subsequent movements”. Hood attempted to argue the correctness of his course, but after some discussion gave it up, and said in a tone almost of anguish; “You are right, Governor, I wish to God I had seen you sooner, but it is too late, - I cannot change it now.” Harris continued to urge him for a time, but Hood repeated his former answer with yet greater emphasis. Harris told me his own unavoidable inference at the time was that Hood had been put up to write this by some one else, and that it had been seen and approved by either the President or Secretary of War.
As to the style of the report, he found it containing a great many adjectives and phrases perfectly useless, intended to add force, but in reality taking away the dignity of an official report, and substituting the violence of a party document. His opinion from the style was that it was the production of one of Hood’s friends, the same Woolley who wrote a violent attack on Gen. Bragg. He induced Hood to let him strike out some of these, and they went over the whole report together, making many verbal alterations. The error with regard to Cheatham he insisted on having corrected, and after a while got most of it struck out or changed. During the whole of this remarkable interview, he was struck with the fact that Hood was a puppet in the hands of others who were sacrificing him to gain their own ends, and striking through him a blow at Gen. Johnston.”
What think you?