Hood explains Gettysburg

True, but thats my point. Lee could have brought up Robertson and Jones at any time but didnt seem to consider it. Whether it was because he expected Stuart to appear at any moment or some other reason, it was his own call to leave them guarding passed that no longer needed guarding.

In Lee's defense, Robertson had orders to follow up the rest of the army but stayed put far longer than he should have. Robertson was incompetent and there's a reason that Lee dismissed him after Gettysburg.

Ryan
 
True, but thats my point. Lee could have brought up Robertson and Jones at any time but didnt seem to consider it. Whether it was because he expected Stuart to appear at any moment or some other reason, it was his own call to leave them guarding passed that no longer needed guarding.
Thanks for your reply. Robertson was to guard the passes, then to follow and protect the armies rear. My understanding is Lee sent couriers but they didn't get through. Lee would have no way of knowing Robertson was still setting in the valley.
 
Perhaps some credit for the Union victory could be granted to the Union command who in spite of past performance against Lee, and being lead by a General who had only been promoted to his position three days before the battle withstood multiple attempts by the Rebs and held the ground on July 4.
The other part of the story is that after suffering many losses during the spring campaign, The Army of Northern Virginia had been reinforced with green replacements who had little training.
 
I have to remind myself every time I go over Gettysburg in my head that Lee had not planned to engage the Union there. Speaking only for myself, trying to blame any one single commander involved in the outcome of Gettysburg denies that basic fact.
I can not bring myself to make excuses for Lee at Gettysburg. He was in charge, it was his analysis of the battlefield and his plan that was executed. He met with Longstreet and Hood and other listened to their concerns and recommendations, and went ahead with his plan while complaining that Stuart's absence left him blind.
In his previous victories he waited to spring his traps, he carefully determined the enemies weakness then exploited it. He maneuvered, and put witted his opponents.
He had completed one state goal for his invasion of Pennsylvania, IMO the most important mission was raiding the pantry, his livestock and food goods trains stretched out over some 25 miles by many accounts, his frontiersmen had to clear fence rails on both sides of the pikes to have the room needed to have troops marching on both sides of the trains and guiding the livestock.
Declare victory and get home. At most demonstrate to buy time for the supply trains to get back k into Virginia.
But he insisted on a full frontal assault to as witnesses close to him said "end this once and for all."
He had bought into Davis's fantasy about fighting that one big battle that would finally convince the North to give up .
But with every big battle and victory what happened? A bigger Union army challenged him, while Union forces were carving up the Tennessee the Trans Mississippi and marching into the Deep South, Lee was looking for one final battle to end all battles in Virginia, Maryland or Pennsylvania.
The dog still had bite. But his hamstrings were being chewed up. Lee may have been the head of CSA but if you kill the body the head dies,
At Gettysburg came Lee's greatest feat, his brilliant withdrawal. Imagine his statue and the moral of his men and the embarrassment of the Union, if as the morning smoke filled mist slowly lifted as the sun warmed the wheat fields and orchards only to allow the Yankees to see the ANV had slipped back into Virginia.
Did Lee suffer from a attach prior to the battle and had to be carry via a wagon or was that at another battle? Would such a medical case have effected his judgement? There is a theory that Lee was just making the same plan that he had in mind but was halted at Sharpesburg/Antietam correct? Would it have been possible for Lee to move around Meade on the first day? Did Lee not see himself as Burnside was at Fredericksburg or was that a myth that Longstreet tried to remind Lee of ?
 
Did Lee suffer from a attach prior to the battle and had to be carry via a wagon or was that at another battle? Would such a medical case have effected his judgement? There is a theory that Lee was just making the same plan that he had in mind but was halted at Sharpesburg/Antietam correct? Would it have been possible for Lee to move around Meade on the first day? Did Lee not see himself as Burnside was at Fredericksburg or was that a myth that Longstreet tried to remind Lee of ?
There is some evidence that Lee suffered a heart attack prior to Gettysburg, perhaps others have more information.
 
Anything is possible but most sources describe Lee as pugnacious and active during the battle. He was up nearly all night on the 1st, traveling back and forth between Ewells front several times, and was seen all over Seminary Ridge looking over Longstreets front on the 2nd.
 
There are contemporary sources (mainly Lee's doctor and Freemantle) indicating that Lee was pretty restless, agitated, and reticent at times. Also, additional sources, Lee's aides, suggest that he was going often behind the woods on the second day of the battle to relieve himself. The hypothesis is that he was suffering with dysentery/diarrhea
 
Did Lee suffer from a attach prior to the battle and had to be carry via a wagon or was that at another battle?

There really is no good contemporary evidence that Lee's heart was giving him trouble but, as @E_just_E pointed out, there is contemporary evidence that the cherries were getting the better of Lee's intestines. In that respect, he was suffering much like many of his soldiers who were also eating fruit on their way to Gettysburg.


Would such a medical case have effected his judgement?

I suppose that it's possible but, to my mind, Gettysburg was vintage Lee. It just didn't work out like it had back in Virginia.


Would it have been possible for Lee to move around Meade on the first day?

No. For one thing, less than half the Army of the Potomac had arrived by nightfall on the 1st. Secondly, if Lee had begun to move his army, it's likely that the Union cavalry would have detected him (the Confederate cavalry was not present in large enough numbers to screen the Army of Northern Virginia) and Meade could have reacted accordingly (by falling back to Pipe Creek, for example).


Did Lee not see himself as Burnside was at Fredericksburg or was that a myth that Longstreet tried to remind Lee of ?

The Union position was no where near as formidable as Fredericksburg. In all honesty, with the information that Lee had on July 3, his plan had a chance of success. It was no doubt a gamble, but Lee rolled the dice a lot over the previous year and had met with success quite often along the way. Only in hindsight and knowing that so much went wrong, done ask ourselves how he could have thought that the assault would succeed.

Ryan
 
Perhaps some credit for the Union victory could be granted to the Union command who in spite of past performance against Lee, and being lead by a General who had only been promoted to his position three days before the battle withstood multiple attempts by the Rebs and held the ground on July 4.

I think that this is a point that needs to be made more often. The Army of the Potomac fought the battle of their lives at Gettysburg and they have to receive a lot of the credit for their victory.

Ryan
 
@rpkennedy Ok, thanks. I never read that he was ailing to the extent that he needed any assistance getting around at Gettysburg. Is that correct do you think?
 
@rpkennedy Ok, thanks. I never read that he was ailing to the extent that he needed any assistance getting around at Gettysburg. Is that correct do you think?

That is correct. Lee did ride around the field pretty freely during the battle. He may have been experiencing some intestinal issues but evidence indicates that it did not keep him from doing his job or limiting him in any way.

Ryan
 
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The Union position was no where near as formidable as Fredericksburg. In all honesty, with the information that Lee had on July 3, his plan had a chance of success.

Maybe, but he did not quite use it...

On July 2, his attack broke the US line in 2 places, but its uncoordinated nature did not allow for reinforcements, and the CS was pushed back. Lesson learned: need reinforcements.

On July 3, his front was too wide (at least 1.5 miles) and his army was not deep enough. Matter of fact the only place the US line was broken was when Lee's formation was 2 brigades deep (Armistead behind Garnett.) If a third and a fourth brigade were behind them, things might have been different, esp. with the US cannons empty at that point. He had 11 brigades available for the charge, plus Rodes's 4 waiting for Godot at where the hospital is now, and 3 of the 11 kinda going half way (Brockenbrough, Wilcox, Lane). I think that if he formed himself 2 deep per brigade, 2 brigades wide and 5 (or so) deep, based on the information he learned from the previous day, things might have been different, esp with Rodes's aligning in a way to protect their exposed flank.

But that's another what if :wink:
 
Maybe, but he did not quite use it...

On July 2, his attack broke the US line in 2 places, but its uncoordinated nature did not allow for reinforcements, and the CS was pushed back. Lesson learned: need reinforcements.

On July 3, his front was too wide (at least 1.5 miles) and his army was not deep enough. Matter of fact the only place the US line was broken was when Lee's formation was 2 brigades deep (Armistead behind Garnett.) If a third and a fourth brigade were behind them, things might have been different, esp. with the US cannons empty at that point. He had 11 brigades available for the charge, plus Rodes's 4 waiting for Godot at where the hospital is now, and 3 of the 11 kinda going half way (Brockenbrough, Wilcox, Lane). I think that if he formed himself 2 deep per brigade, 2 brigades wide and 5 (or so) deep, based on the information he learned from the previous day, things might have been different, esp with Rodes's aligning in a way to protect their exposed flank.

But that's another what if :wink:

Henry Hunt, Thomas Osborne, and Freeman McGilvery would have salivated at the prospect of those dense columns advancing.

Ryan
 
There really is no good contemporary evidence that Lee's heart was giving him trouble but, as @E_just_E pointed out, there is contemporary evidence that the cherries were getting the better of Lee's intestines. In that respect, he was suffering much like many of his soldiers who were also eating fruit on their way to Gettysburg.




I suppose that it's possible but, to my mind, Gettysburg was vintage Lee. It just didn't work out like it had back in Virginia.




No. For one thing, less than half the Army of the Potomac had arrived by nightfall on the 1st. Secondly, if Lee had begun to move his army, it's likely that the Union cavalry would have detected him (the Confederate cavalry was not present in large enough numbers to screen the Army of Northern Virginia) and Meade could have reacted accordingly (by falling back to Pipe Creek, for example).




The Union position was no where near as formidable as Fredericksburg. In all honesty, with the information that Lee had on July 3, his plan had a chance of success. It was no doubt a gamble, but Lee rolled the dice a lot over the previous year and had met with success quite often along the way. Only in hindsight and knowing that so much went wrong, done ask ourselves how he could have thought that the assault would succeed.

Ryan
One of the major issues that seems to be taken for granted is that of communication between the different commands in the field esp. for the Confederate forces.Where the Union being on the high ground one of the first things Meade did was to establish flags on the high ground so that they not only saw movement of Confederate units but could and did move troops to counter these actions.Only if the artillery could have placed a round of balls that high then would that have had any effect?
 
I agree with those who think there were extentuating circumstances, that renders the historical value of Hood;s ltr., questionable.

The passage of time(and its effects on memories), Hood;s severe wounding so early in the battle, would seem to eliminate any first hand knowlege of events after his removal from the battle field. Add to this, the fact that in the years following the war(and Lee's death), the propaganda battles in the South in the deification of Lee, would, I think, necessarily make hood circumspect in his handling of any controversys of the War. He would be cautious to imnply any serious errors to his old boss Longstreet, much less the recently sainted Lee, especially if expected any kind ofcomfortable life and career in the South.


P.S. Getting Lee to retreat, from Pa. back into Va., seems to have always been, Meade's main goal of his campaign in Pa., and, if it could be done without a major battle, so much the better, if his ill-considered congratulatory letter to his Army, after Lee had recrossed the Potomac, is any indication.
 
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