I think it is clear that the charge at Franklin was a poor decision in hindsight; however, you can't avoid the situation at hand and the time. It was a desperate situation. A decision had to be made - and made quickly. Hood had limited options. He probably chose the best option - as crazy as that sounds.
Three things in particular contributed to Rebel failure there. First, there was the tenacity of veteran and new troops sitting in reserve within two hundred plus yards of the breakthrough. That breakthrough was literally a hundred plus yards wide.
Secondly, darkness and smoke obscured the field within minutes of the actual breakthrough.
Thirdly, and probably most importantly from a military aspect, the reserve lines of the Rebels - that could have quickly assisted in exploiting the breakthrough, were far too distant to support the initial fracture in the line. By the time the reserve lines in the center arrived, the hole was plugged.
The last - was probably the most frustrating one. The failure for Rebel commanders to realize that supporting lines should be within true supporting distance was a lesson not learned this late in the war. With hundreds of yards separating the two lines, it didn't help matters when the leading brigades took off in a spring chasing Wagner's men. On the other hand, the breakthrough wouldn't have had the success it did - if they hadn't. Chances are - that if the reserve lines had moved forward at a jog when they saw the advance brigades take off, the gap may not have been plugged. Kind of like a dam that has busted. Pour more men into the hole, before it can be repaired and it will catastrophically fail. Give time to plug it, and the assault fails.