Franklin Hood’s behavior at Franklin

A Mississippian said Franklin was the place where the last glorious moments of the cause for independence played out and that it was better "to be defeated in a blaze of glory than die a coward."
Let's hear from another who fought there! Private Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee called it "the blackest page in the history of the war."
For every quote lauding the "glorious" nature of the useless (what was really gained at Franklin?) Confederate sacrifice in that battle I can find ten describing the horror of unnecessary slaughter on those grounds.
 
What was Wagner's story? Was he supposed to have already pulled back to the main line? Was he legless? That he was relieved after the fight seems to indicate he was at fault.
I believe that Wagner was not really relieved, but demoted from command of a division back down to a brigade. He then resigned.
 
Let's hear from another who fought there! Private Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee called it "the blackest page in the history of the war."
For every quote lauding the "glorious" nature of the useless (what was really gained at Franklin?) Confederate sacrifice in that battle I can find ten describing the horror of unnecessary slaughter on those grounds.

Still no reason to discard the battlefield or the memory of what happened there. Tragedy is a part, if not the main part, of history.

Just because history contains events we don't like or find unsavory doesn't means we shouldn't remember them. Should we disregard the memory of the American Indian Genocide or blood baths such as Cold Harbor or human rights violations such as Jim Crow laws in the South? No. History shouldn't be cherry picked to the events we find "glorious."
 
All attacks in the war were gambles. Many attacks were well thought out, planned and executed. They were not a gamble. But a battle plan. Hood's attack plan in his own words as said to Forrest were "that the enemy was there and there he would attack him." Not really so much of a plan as a reaction, Schofield's entrenched soldier's at Franklin. Hood would make to attempt to flank Schofield, even though several of his generals proposed plans to him. Hood had made his decision. It would be a frontal attack across clear ground, in full view of the enemy. A longer distance than Pickett's Charge. Hood's artillery would play no major role. This was no battle plan it was a reaction to Hood what saw before him. His real eyes were on Nashville. He had told General B.F. Cheatham that "I would prefer to fight them here where they have only eight hours to fortify, than to strike them at Nashville where they have been strengthening themselves for three years and more." Hood has no plan, other than just to attack. It is was also well known in both armies was that Hood was no gambler, and not a good poker player. He could not bluff at all.
 
Oh, make no mistake Novus, I wish that Franklin had been preserved as Gettysburg most certainly was. I believe it is worth preserving--absolutely, it could be a testament to the courage of the Confederate soldier like no other place, no other battle. I was merely suggesting that the devastation that battlefield represented to the citizens of Tennessee might have been the reason that no serious effort was made to preserve the battlefield in the whole. I've have been there and it is repulsive to see that field of honor covered with convenience stores and fast food outlets, especially considering what the earth experienced. Make no mistake, as a student of the Civil War, I know and appreciate what occurred at Franklin--my argument is never with the brave soldiers that fought and suffered, my condemnation of Franklin rests entirely on one individual and the fatal, foolish, unforgivable decision he made on those grounds.
 
Let's hear from another who fought there! Private Sam Watkins of the 1st Tennessee called it "the blackest page in the history of the war."
For every quote lauding the "glorious" nature of the useless (what was really gained at Franklin?) Confederate sacrifice in that battle I can find ten describing the horror of unnecessary slaughter on those grounds.

Except many of us question whether Watkins was even at Franklin, since his company had been disbanded several days earlier, but that is another story. He definitely deserted before the end of the war (gasp). To your point of finding 10 to 1, well now you just sound desperate to make a point. Even your use of "unnecessary slaughter" is not how the average Confederate described Franklin. You can claim so, but the facts do not support your belief, or opinion.
 
Oh, make no mistake Novus, I wish that Franklin had been preserved as Gettysburg most certainly was. I believe it is worth preserving--absolutely, it could be a testament to the courage of the Confederate soldier like no other place, no other battle. I was merely suggesting that the devastation that battlefield represented to the citizens of Tennessee might have been the reason that no serious effort was made to preserve the battlefield in the whole. I've have been there and it is repulsive to see that field of honor covered with convenience stores and fast food outlets, especially considering what the earth experienced. Make no mistake, as a student of the Civil War, I know and appreciate what occurred at Franklin--my argument is never with the brave soldiers that fought and suffered, my condemnation of Franklin rests entirely on one individual and the fatal, foolish, unforgivable decision he made on those grounds.

This argument means that Kennesaw Mountain, Fredericksburg, and Cold Harbor, just to name a few, were also not worth saving. And actually you don't appreciate what happened at Franklin - you continue to disparage it. In fact, you are really disparaging the Federal soldiers who fought there because you remain fixated on Hood and only Hood.
 
If all battlefields were preserved millions of people would have no place to live just in the United States--imagine Europe. People get on with things.
 
you continue to disparage it.
Of course I don't! I don't "disparage" Gettysburg or Pickett's Charge, or Kennesaw, Fredricksburg, or any place where an attempt to assault a line was made. I don't belittle the troops who made the effort but I certainly do question the decisions that led to those futile attempts at "glory". Let's not get into some sort of misdirection based on defintions here--the thread was precipitated on Hood's decision making which I believe, at Franklin, was not rational.
 
I think it is clear that the charge at Franklin was a poor decision in hindsight; however, you can't avoid the situation at hand and the time. It was a desperate situation. A decision had to be made - and made quickly. Hood had limited options. He probably chose the best option - as crazy as that sounds.

Three things in particular contributed to Rebel failure there. First, there was the tenacity of veteran and new troops sitting in reserve within two hundred plus yards of the breakthrough. That breakthrough was literally a hundred plus yards wide.

Secondly, darkness and smoke obscured the field within minutes of the actual breakthrough.

Thirdly, and probably most importantly from a military aspect, the reserve lines of the Rebels - that could have quickly assisted in exploiting the breakthrough, were far too distant to support the initial fracture in the line. By the time the reserve lines in the center arrived, the hole was plugged.

The last - was probably the most frustrating one. The failure for Rebel commanders to realize that supporting lines should be within true supporting distance was a lesson not learned this late in the war. With hundreds of yards separating the two lines, it didn't help matters when the leading brigades took off in a spring chasing Wagner's men. On the other hand, the breakthrough wouldn't have had the success it did - if they hadn't. Chances are - that if the reserve lines had moved forward at a jog when they saw the advance brigades take off, the gap may not have been plugged. Kind of like a dam that has busted. Pour more men into the hole, before it can be repaired and it will catastrophically fail. Give time to plug it, and the assault fails.
 
I think it is clear that the charge at Franklin was a poor decision in hindsight; however, you can't avoid the situation at hand and the time. It was a desperate situation. A decision had to be made - and made quickly. Hood had limited options. He probably chose the best option - as crazy as that sounds.

Three things in particular contributed to Rebel failure there. First, there was the tenacity of veteran and new troops sitting in reserve within two hundred plus yards of the breakthrough. That breakthrough was literally a hundred plus yards wide.

Secondly, darkness and smoke obscured the field within minutes of the actual breakthrough.

Thirdly, and probably most importantly from a military aspect, the reserve lines of the Rebels - that could have quickly assisted in exploiting the breakthrough, were far too distant to support the initial fracture in the line. By the time the reserve lines in the center arrived, the hole was plugged.

The last - was probably the most frustrating one. The failure for Rebel commanders to realize that supporting lines should be within true supporting distance was a lesson not learned this late in the war. With hundreds of yards separating the two lines, it didn't help matters when the leading brigades took off in a spring chasing Wagner's men. On the other hand, the breakthrough wouldn't have had the success it did - if they hadn't. Chances are - that if the reserve lines had moved forward at a jog when they saw the advance brigades take off, the gap may not have been plugged. Kind of like a dam that has busted. Pour more men into the hole, before it can be repaired and it will catastrophically fail. Give time to plug it, and the assault fails.

All three points are exactly right. The Confederate reserves is a factor that most folks never consider.
 
First, I'd like to say that I think the Saint-Gotthard stuff is really well done and an excellent comparison. It may have already been mentioned, but Hood also had the first-hand experience of Lee voluntarily placing his army in a similar river vise at Sharpsburg. Hood likely understood the danger, even if Little Mac did not.

Second, I've enjoyed reading the responses in the thread, and I largely agree that Hood had to make his move before Schofield and Thomas united, and on the day of battle, frontal assault was the only option left to him. I also think that all of the larger level psychology, regardless of Spring Hill, Cheatham, etc. (warning I'm an attorney not a therapist) pushed Hood towards the assault. First, he had invaded (although rather dubiously) Tennessee, and invading armies are by definition undertaking offensive action. It would have made little sense for Hood to pass up his last viable opportunity to hit Schofield under the circumstances. Second, looking at the Union position, Hood likely would not have thought it superior to the one he made his name taking-that at Gaines' Mill. In sum, it all makes sense to me- Hood, with his unquestionably huge supply of personal courage, was at the head of an invading army, seeking to attack while he was at least locally superior, and had enjoyed success with assaults against ostensibly strong positions earlier in the war. So why wouldn't he play hell in Tennessee?
 
Second, looking at the Union position, Hood likely would not have thought it superior to the one he made his name taking-that at Gaines' Mill.

That is the truth. Gaines' Mill was nasty all the way around, and Lee threw about 40,000 men into that assault. At Franklin, the Federal troops only barely held on.
 
Another thing I have noted also. There were unquestionably attempts to make the field at Franklin a national park, but these came in the 1890's and later. There is little doubt - in my mind anyway - that there was no intention by locals to remember that horrible field - as it had happened in their back yards. Many who lived in Franklin lost loved ones in the fight and it was - no doubt - a painful memory.

Within only a couple of years, the blood-soaked battleground was being built on. The town grew, and more land was swallowed up. I would venture to say that it was a good twenty years or more before the men who fought there really cared to revisit the horrors of that field - at least on the Rebel side. The Federal veterans - no doubt - had a much fonder memory of their defeat of Rebel forces there.

Other than veterans, I'm not certain that the locals were yet fond of memorializing the fight. Business men, just like today, had priorities, and in a day and age when transportation was poor and visiting battlefields was not yet a business, profit lay in other priorities.

A combination of Federal resources, war and other factors prevented such a national battlefield at Franklin. It's a shame in hindsight, but just a fact of life in the 1890's.
 
All attacks in the war were gambles. Many attacks were well thought out, planned and executed. They were not a gamble. But a battle plan. Hood's attack plan in his own words as said to Forrest were "that the enemy was there and there he would attack him." Not really so much of a plan as a reaction, Schofield's entrenched soldier's at Franklin. Hood would make to attempt to flank Schofield, even though several of his generals proposed plans to him. Hood had made his decision. It would be a frontal attack across clear ground, in full view of the enemy. A longer distance than Pickett's Charge. Hood's artillery would play no major role. This was no battle plan it was a reaction to Hood what saw before him. His real eyes were on Nashville. He had told General B.F. Cheatham that "I would prefer to fight them here where they have only eight hours to fortify, than to strike them at Nashville where they have been strengthening themselves for three years and more." Hood has no plan, other than just to attack. It is was also well known in both armies was that Hood was no gambler, and not a good poker player. He could not bluff at all.

"Not really so much of a plan as a reaction" How else should he have reacted? The army he was attacking in fact had been retreating......It in fact had marched all night to slip past spring hill and didn't arrive in Franklin until 430 AM....Hood arrives at 130 PM there isn't time to do a flanking maneuver, which besides when he in fact attempted it in the past the army moved far too slowly.........it took till 4pm to just launch the frontal attack....

So not sure what exactly your proposing... He could perhaps try a flanking attempt he might not be able to get off at all, and that if somehow he was able to get it off, and even if it had any success their would be no time to follow it up, leaving them free to slip away again in the night...... , he could wait to attack the next day giving the fatigued army it was attacking more time to rest and entrench, or to slip away again in the night which defeats the whole course of the campaign which was to attack and defeat the army before it could join forces......... Not seeing how waiting or delaying would have improved the chances at all.....

The direct course seems the only course with any chance of success if successful, which unfortunately no commander has a crystal ball to tell him if it will be or not..............
 
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It took Frank Cheatham fourteen years to revisit the battlefield.

This is some of what he said.

"The real fight only lasted about two hours, but there were sharp assaults on both sides until ten o’clock. About eleven the Federals withdrew, and about two o’clock I rode into the town and got a bite to eat, the first I had tasted that day. Just at daybreak I rode upon the field, and such a sight I never saw and can never expect to see again. The dead were piled up like shocks of wheat or scattered about like sheafs [sic] of grain. You could have walked all over the field upon dead bodies without stepping upon the ground. The fierce flame of battle had nearly all been confined within a range of fifty yards, except the cavalry fight on the other side of the river. Almost under your eye, nearly all the dead, wounded and dying lay. In front of the Carter house the bodies lay in heaps and to the right of it a locust thicket had been mowed off by bullets, as if by a scythe. It was a wonder that any man escaped alive from that storm of iron missles [sic]. A man who counted the dead told me that there were over fifteen hundred bodies in the narrow space on the right and left of the pike; nine hundred Confederates and something over six hundred Union. I spent two years in the Mexican war and four years in the late conflict. I never saw anything like that field, and never want to again.

“It is all over now, and these are only reflections upon a sad subject. I did not come here to talk them, but to show you the position of our troops and point out where we began and ended. This is the first time I have visited this battlefield since the fight took place, and I have talked more of the events of the war to day than during all the past fifteen years. I have never read a true story of this battle. It will be exceedingly hard to write one. I should have added to what I said about a visit to the field next morning at daybreak, that we buried the dead, cared for the wounded men of both sides as best we could, and then moved on to the battle of Nashville.”
 
Cheatham also remembered this when he revisited the field 20 years later with his former chief of staff James D. Porter. "Don't you recall, Porter, that as they wheeled into line of battle in full view of the enemy, their precision and military bearing was as beautiful a sight as was ever witnesses in war?" Porter nodded his head. "It was the greatest sight I ever saw," he said, "each division unfolding itself into a single line of battle with as much steadiness as if forming for dress parade." It is easy to see he was remembering the things he had once seen, images burned into their minds. The pageantry and beauty of war and not the debris of war or the blood and broken bodies of the dead.
 
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