I have to admit I’ve always wondered why the Confederates were counterattacking every Federal advance & not just utilizing defensive position to stem Hookers advance. The following excerpt is an Interesting perspective on Hoods attack into the Cornfield at Antietam by David A. Welker in his “The Cornfield: Antietam's Bloody Turning Point”.
“In many respects, the reasons the 1st Texas’s attack failed reflect the same problems plaguing Hood’s larger assault into the Cornfield. Hood moved quickly into battle, putting his division in the right place at the right time to turn back Gibbon’s Union attack and secure Jackson’s salient south of the Cornfield. Had Hood been content with these achievements, his division’s actions at Antietam would today be judged a success that had also prepared Hood’s Division to meet the advance of Meade’s fresh brigades. Instead, Hood chose to push beyond defensive goals and launched a wider counterattack into the Cornfield, a tremendous gamble the Confederacy lost because Hood’s command mismanagement early-on surrendered control of the fight’s direction and momentum. Despite Hood’s initial success against Gibbon and the 90th Pennsylvania, he should have anticipated the looming threat of large numbers of fresh Union troops and acted accordingly. The fate of Lawton’s, Trimble’s, and Hays’s Brigades should have warned Hood to the presence of unseen reinforcements; instead, Hood pressed on to counterattack, playing right into Hooker’s advantages of greater manpower and mass once Meade’s Division entered the fight. Hood acknowledged this in his postwar memoir, writing “Not far distant in our front were drawn up, in close array, heavy columns of Federal infantry; not less than two corps were in sight to oppose my small command, numbering approximately, two thousand effectives. However, with the trusty Law on my right, in the edge of the woods, and the gallant Colonel Wofford in command of the Texas Brigade on the left, near the pike, we moved forward to the assault.” Was it overconfidence bordering on hubris that propelled Hood’s advance or the common military assumption that securing the initiative can overcome manpower and firepower deficiencies of an attack? Regardless why it was so, Hood chose poorly.”
— The Cornfield: Antietam's Bloody Turning Point by David A. Welker ~ reading it kindle so it’s page #130-131 may not be the same as printed versions of this book.
“In many respects, the reasons the 1st Texas’s attack failed reflect the same problems plaguing Hood’s larger assault into the Cornfield. Hood moved quickly into battle, putting his division in the right place at the right time to turn back Gibbon’s Union attack and secure Jackson’s salient south of the Cornfield. Had Hood been content with these achievements, his division’s actions at Antietam would today be judged a success that had also prepared Hood’s Division to meet the advance of Meade’s fresh brigades. Instead, Hood chose to push beyond defensive goals and launched a wider counterattack into the Cornfield, a tremendous gamble the Confederacy lost because Hood’s command mismanagement early-on surrendered control of the fight’s direction and momentum. Despite Hood’s initial success against Gibbon and the 90th Pennsylvania, he should have anticipated the looming threat of large numbers of fresh Union troops and acted accordingly. The fate of Lawton’s, Trimble’s, and Hays’s Brigades should have warned Hood to the presence of unseen reinforcements; instead, Hood pressed on to counterattack, playing right into Hooker’s advantages of greater manpower and mass once Meade’s Division entered the fight. Hood acknowledged this in his postwar memoir, writing “Not far distant in our front were drawn up, in close array, heavy columns of Federal infantry; not less than two corps were in sight to oppose my small command, numbering approximately, two thousand effectives. However, with the trusty Law on my right, in the edge of the woods, and the gallant Colonel Wofford in command of the Texas Brigade on the left, near the pike, we moved forward to the assault.” Was it overconfidence bordering on hubris that propelled Hood’s advance or the common military assumption that securing the initiative can overcome manpower and firepower deficiencies of an attack? Regardless why it was so, Hood chose poorly.”
— The Cornfield: Antietam's Bloody Turning Point by David A. Welker ~ reading it kindle so it’s page #130-131 may not be the same as printed versions of this book.