Heavy freight moved by water transport.

wausaubob

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Although Chris Gabel computed how much better railroads were than mule wagons with respect to tonsXmiles/ton of fuel, file:///C:/Users/BOB/AppData/Local/Temp/a445773.pdf, he admitted in one his oral talks, steamboats and steamships were even better.
The history of the quartermaster corps confirms that observation.
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see page 406. https://books.google.com/books?id=U...hur Edwards" Quartermaster Bridgeport&f=false
And of course a large volume ocean transport would be even more efficient even if had to dock at a city away from the front and discharge its cargo into a shallow draft vessel. The savings were so numerous I probably will miss some. But there was less wear and tear on railroad lines and equipment. Fewer mules and horses were needed, so more food and forage could be directed to the front. Long logistical lines could be patrolled by naval vessels, which at least the US had to have anyway. The manpower requirements of staffing the steamboats and steamships were also probably less per ton of cargo.
 
Although Chris Gabel computed how much better railroads were than mule wagons with respect to tonsXmiles/ton of fuel, file:///C:/Users/BOB/AppData/Local/Temp/a445773.pdf, he admitted in one his oral talks, steamboats and steamships were even better.
The history of the quartermaster corps confirms that observation.
View attachment 416132
see page 406. https://books.google.com/books?id=Ud8fejE_4XkC&pg=PA414&lpg=PA414&dq="Arthur+Edwards"+Quartermaster+Bridgeport&source=bl&ots=mLDe4VtjkS&sig=ACfU3U0fKeXKv8W4m3jfCIcRRoE9aERpcg&hl=en&sa=X&ved=2ahUKEwjd-PzV2IrwAhXOKM0KHWsSC5MQ6AEwC3oECBAQAw#v=onepage&q="Arthur Edwards" Quartermaster Bridgeport&f=false
And of course a large volume ocean transport would be even more efficient even if had to dock at a city away from the front and discharge its cargo into a shallow draft vessel. The savings were so numerous I probably will miss some. But there was less wear and tear on railroad lines and equipment. Fewer mules and horses were needed, so more food and forage could be directed to the front. Long logistical lines could be patrolled by naval vessels, which at least the US had to have anyway. The manpower requirements of staffing the steamboats and steamships were also probably less per ton of cargo.

Did the US deploy this advantage? The answer is they did, at enormous savings, even despite the early corruption and overpayment detailed in the records.
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p. 415.
But this did not make into the historical record. The 1865-1875 decade was a railroad decade. The volume of railroad traffic, the explosion in building, and the coming of basic innovations in safety and efficiency made people forget how the US had grown based on water transport, and how much it still depended on that system in 1860.
 
Did the US deploy this advantage? The answer is they did, at enormous savings, even despite the early corruption and overpayment detailed in the records.
View attachment 416133
View attachment 416134
p. 415.
But this did not make into the historical record. The 1865-1875 decade was a railroad decade. The volume of railroad traffic, the explosion in building, and the coming of basic innovations in safety and efficiency made people forget how the US had grown based on water transport, and how much it still depended on that system in 1860.
As early as May of 1862, in the preliminary report of the 1860 Census, the administration reminded politicians and international representatives, that the US 5,000,000 ton shipping fleet consisted of much more than ocean going ships engaged in the world's merchant services industry.
See page 106:
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file:///C:/Users/BOB/AppData/Local/Temp/1860e-06.pdf

The US conducted shipping business on the Great Lakes, it numerous canals, and on the internal rivers, especially the Ohio, the Mississippi and Missouri Rivers. Cities located on these waterways built the boats needed, and most of the routes were completely protected from Confederate interference and foreign disruption.
There were important ocean routes, from New York to Key West to Panama, and from Panama to San Francisco. But these routes were easily patrolled by the older, slower naval vessels, which just had to show arms to protect the shipping. The key route from New York to Liverpool was not dependent on US ships. English and German ships could provide the services, and it did not matter if the English ships had once been US ships and had been reflagged. Their neutrality protected them.
 
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An enormous amount of troops and freight moved by water. See page 327, https://www.jstor.org/stable/1888813?seq=4#metadata_info_tab_contents And water transport made the transportation of fort wrecking heavy naval artillery much easier. By 1864, the US navy could outgun the Confederate forts, and ocean going steam sloops could bolt on temporary armor to deflect well aimed Confederate shots.
 
Journalists and historians forget that early US successes, such as Burnside's success at Roanoke Island, and the Grant/Foote operation on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, were combined arms operations relying on water born logistics.
But the biggest operations of that spring, the capture of New Orleans, and McClellan's assault on Virginia, were both supplied via ocean going ships. McClellan's army was unable to enter Richmond, but the design of the operation was correct in general. Grant did the same thing two years later and just disguised it from the President and the press.
 
This advantage in cost and efficiency is what made it so difficult for the Confederacy to financially or materially exhaust the US. Especially in the west, the US had logistical advantages the made their victories if not inevitable, at least very predictable.
 
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