BillO
Captain
- Joined
- Feb 2, 2010
- Location
- Quinton, VA.
I would vote for Sickles and Forrest.
From what I read, Sickles had a lot of supporters in his day.Although one could say that the "divided" opinion was most people on one side and Dirty Dan on the other.
Definitely Longstreet.Having noticed that Saphroneth has placed all of the stuff on McClellan in one place (great work by the way!) I just wondered has any other general from either side divided opinion more than McClellan or even come close to the love him/hate him relationship he seems to have attained?
Bragg seems to be the one guy who isn’t controversial. It seems almost everyone agrees in their dislike of old Braxton. (Except Davis)Thank you for all of the contributions thus far - generating quite a list!
Surprised no one mentioned Bragg - or did everyone think the same about him, perhaps apart from Jefferson Davis?
Sheridan? considering what he did to Warren.
Didn't Sickles get lucky - his position may have been poor judgement but it disrupted the Confederate assault completely. If he had not been there would the Confederate assault possibly have turned the Union flank by hitting the line directly?
Sickles is for those focused on GettysburgI would say Dan Sickles.
I agree. “Who wasn’t?” is the real question; this was/is democratic, opinionated, and vociferous America after all - there doesn’t seem to be a military decision that one can’t put a good or bad spin on if one is in the mood.When you think about it, is there any well known commander, say of a division, corps, or army, that has not been involved in some kind of controversy? Even Cleburne was caught up in the dispute over arming slaves.
As I indicated, the point isn't whether Meade handled this the way he should have - he didn't. But Sickles made the circumstances much worse. Some years ago in Gettysburg magazine Dave Powell did an excellent analysis of the numerous reasons why Sickles' decision was an abysmally poor military judgment. Dave shows how Sickles actually facilitated Longstreet's attack, which would have faced a tougher obstacle had Sickles simply stayed put. It had to do with Longstreet's bad intel regarding the original Union line as established by Meade.An interesting (though not conclusive) method is to look at the strength of Sickles' original line and then compare it to the strength of the force that it actually took to stop Longstreet's attack.
We can reasonably assume that Longstreet's attack was at least somewhat disrupted by fighting through the whole of Sickles' corps (albeit by less than the resistance Sickles would have been able to put up either fully established on the advanced line or fully established on the original line) but after going through 3rd Corps and despite a whole division veering off to attack the Round Tops it was still a lot of work for all the reinforcements (i.e. functionally 5th Corps) plus what would have been there in the first place (everyone else except for Sickles) to stop Longstreet.
Based on this, I suspect that there's a case to be made that if Sickles doesn't push his forces out then what actually happens is that Longstreet makes somewhat better progress against "Sickles plus the rest of the Union left flank, but not Sykes" than he did against "Sykes plus the rest of the Union left flank". (He would then be stopped by the arrival of part of Sykes.)
Since that means the fighting starts practically on top of the Taneytown road instead of several hundred yards further west, Longstreet would thus be likely to gain access to the Taneytown road. (If he pushed Sickles back just a couple of hundred yards this would be achieved.)
This is not immediately a better situation than historical.
On the other hand, I think that there is also a case to be made that what actually happened was the worst of both worlds compared to if Meade had actually gone over and looked (and verified either that the position was good enough and reaffirmed his orders to Sickles, or realized the flaw and moved the line further out in a timely fashion). As it was Meade did essentially everything to reinforce the idea that he wasn't paying attention to Sickles' concerns and just wanted him to shut up, even though the man he sent to reassure Sickles actually agreed with Sickles about the flaws in the line.
What this means is not that Sickles is exonerated, but rather that Meade also acted badly - he was paying no real attention to the part of his line where Lee's main blow fell on the second day despite the corps commander in question raising issues about the position. This can all be explained by the immediately previous history of the commanders, Sickles in particular having been in a situation so similar just a couple of months previously that deja vu is not an unwarranted term...
While I know Longstreet had bad intel on the original Union line, my understanding is that (and quite by accident) Longstreet's projected route of march would have the effect of forming an attack en echelon on the actual Union positions.As I indicated, the point isn't whether Meade handled this the way he should have - he didn't. But Sickles made the circumstances much worse. Some years ago in Gettysburg magazine Dave Powell did an excellent analysis of the numerous reasons why Sickles' decision was an abysmally poor military judgment. Dave shows how Sickles actually facilitated Longstreet's attack, which would have faced a tougher obstacle had Sickles simply stayed put. It had to do with Longstreet's bad intel regarding the original Union line as established by Meade.
To mount an echelon attack masked by LRT there's not actually much about Longstreet's dispositions that need to be changed - just what they're to do as they advance. He needs to replan when he reaches the yellow marked position, but he has enough time to do so because he doesn't immediately need to change the directions of his divisions for them to become an echelon attack.
As noted, if Longstreet continues on his original projected line of march he will end up doing an echelon attack, albeit not a very well handled one because they won't know that's what they're doing until contact happens. As far as I can tell in order to expose his flank to Sickles he would need to actively swerve left from his original conception, in order to launch an attack on troops he can see are not there (and to expose his flank to troops he can see are there).True, but this is also dependent on him correctly recognizing the actual Union deployment and successful redirecting his men accordingly. It's also possible he recognizes the situation too late and unwittingly gets hit in the right flank by Sickles.
Leaving both of his flanks open by good margins, more than doubling the length of his line, uncovering LRT, creating a sharp angle in his line subject to converging fire, and creating a relatively hollow spot in the middle of his line, are all fundamental defects which have little or nothing to do with the timing. He had 10,000 troops to man the extended line he created - far below what was needed to adequately defend that area. As the Powell article also shows, even Sickles' perception of an elevation disadvantage in his original placement was an overestimate. As Branch Rickey said, "luck is the residue of design". "Bad" design yields "bad" luck.While I know Longstreet had bad intel on the original Union line, my understanding is that (and quite by accident) Longstreet's projected route of march would have the effect of forming an attack en echelon on the actual Union positions.
I made this diagram for the last time this came up:
View attachment 398267
Dark blue: Lee's assumption of Union positions
Light blue: true (initial) line of 2nd and 3rd Corps
Red-yellow-orange: progression of Longstreet's line over time on original route of march
Green circled: areas where Longstreet would be able to either not see Union forces he expected to see, or see Union forces in their true positions.
To mount an echelon attack masked by LRT there's not actually much about Longstreet's dispositions that need to be changed - just what they're to do as they advance. He needs to replan when he reaches the yellow marked position, but he has enough time to do so because he doesn't immediately need to change the directions of his divisions for them to become an echelon attack.
I'd also argue that a big part of what made Sickles' decision have the negative outcome it did was the timing of the move. If Sickles had moved a little earlier (an hour would suffice or more than suffice) then he'd have been better established on the new positions, and that's practically bad luck as much as anything.
For sure, there are enough ineffective commanders to go around, such as the 3 you mentioned. I guess the more interesting question is which effective commanders were beset by controversy.I agree. “Who wasn’t?” is the real question; this was/is democratic, opinionated, and vociferous America after all - there doesn’t seem to be a military decision that one can’t put a good or bad spin on if one is in the mood.
(So maybe... Floyd and Pillow at Fort Donelson and Dixon Miles at Harper’s Ferry weren’t controversial commanders - they just sucked. )
Which is why Sickles first spends hours trying to persuade Meade to at least come and have a look. We know that Sickles thought that his current position was untenable, and we also know that Hunt agreed, while it doesn't seem like anybody at the battlefield at the time actually disagreed with Sickles after examining the position.Leaving both of his flanks open by good margins, more than doubling the length of his line, uncovering LRT, creating a sharp angle in his line subject to converging fire, and creating a relatively hollow spot in the middle of his line, are all fundamental defects which have little or nothing to do with the timing. He had 10,000 troops to man the extended line he created - far below what was needed to adequately defend that area. As the Powell article also shows, even Sickles' perception of an elevation disadvantage in his original placement was an overestimate. As Branch Rickey said, "luck is the residue of design". "Bad" design yields "bad" luck.
"Of course, the line Sickles adopted with his force was one that was too long for him to man*, but then again he doesn't have the authority to have 2nd Corps adopt the same line, and nobody else does either except Meade (because there's no wing commander assigned); Sickles can only move his own corps."Which is why Sickles first spends hours trying to persuade Meade to at least come and have a look. We know that Sickles thought that his current position was untenable, and we also know that Hunt agreed, while it doesn't seem like anybody at the battlefield at the time actually disagreed with Sickles after examining the position.
Of course, the line Sickles adopted with his force was one that was too long for him to man*, but then again he doesn't have the authority to have 2nd Corps adopt the same line, and nobody else does either except Meade (because there's no wing commander assigned); Sickles can only move his own corps.
* though not necessarily much too long; 10,000 men in a continuous two-deep line should be able to cover about a mile and a half. 3rd Corps is listed as 12,600 officers and men PFD on 30 June, so a two-deep line with a small reserve should be able to cover about two miles.
I agree. Say what you will about Chancellorsville, Hooker was a competent, solid corp commander. He was also the first Army level commander who saw the value of cavalry as serious troops in their own right.Hooker was ok. My opinion of him has changed, at least as far as a corps commander.