Hardee takes over AoT in Atlanta Campaign

Luke Freet

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When Joe Johnston was removed from command, Hardee should have been given the spot. It was mostly due to the machinations of Bragg that the position was given to Hood instead, according to Chastel. I know Hardee was a competent, if not spectacular, commander. I doubt he would have made such a terrible job organizing an assault as Hood did on the Battle of 22nd July. He also wouldn't be sitting in a town house all the time, and could have made more affect on the battles if he led from the front. Hood, due to his injuries, could not do that, which results in 22nd July, Ezra Church, and Spring Hill. I also could imagine him putting Cleburne in a Corps command, as he was his protege.
 
I generally agree, but I don't think the final result would have been different. Given the situation in mid July, I doubt even Lee or Jackson could have saved Atlanta. It was lost when Johnston allowed Sherman to pass from Tunnell Hill to Peachtree Creek with little delay and relatively few casualties.
The underlying blunder occurred after Chattanooga when Hood was given a corps command instead of Cleburne. If Cleburne had performed well as a corps commander in May-June 1984, he might have been a better option to take command of the Army. But the Confederacy did a very poor job of developing leaders above the division level.
 
We all know how Hood's command of the AOT turned out, so any other commander such as Hardee could hardly have done worse. I am not all that familiar with Hardee's command history and style, but by the summer of 1864, the Confederacy (or rather Jeff Davis) should probably have stuck with Joe Johnston in command. Davis' dislike of Johnston, combined with what Davis perceived to be the lack of aggressiveness and consequent slow withdrawal of the AOT to the outskirts of Atlanta, was not going to turn around no matter who took over at that point.
 
Atlanta was already lost by July 1864 when Hood took over. The main objective to me was to keep Sherman from taking Atlanta before the elections.
Hardee wasn't going to be type commander that pushed back as Hood did. Hardee would have just been another Johnston with a different name.
Hood was an unknown as a army commander, he was a good brigade then division commander. I personally never thought Hood was that good of a Corp commander.
No other Corp commander was what I consider the fighting type. Hood brought that to J. Davis attention along with Bragg. You had Hardee of course, you had Hood then you had a brand new Corp commander in Stewart, which replaced Polk. It would never have been Cheatham of Cleburne. They would have been way over their head for this type command. Plus the other Corp commander would not have fought with either of them in command being they were divsion commanders and bypassed all the Corp commander in rank.
The best of the pickings if you had to choose from the A.O.T. ...was Hood. He would fight and he would play along with what Davis and Bragg wanted all along. Attack and not fall back.
I regress to my first thought here, Atlanta was going to fall, but hold on until after the elections in the North and hopefully have Lincoln defeated and hope for peace. That was the only hope!
 
The best of the pickings if you had to choose from the A.O.T. ...was Hood.
I agree with all your points except this one. Yes, prior to his elevation to Corps command, he had been a stellar commander with a keen eye for knowing where and when it was best to attack. But in 1864, he is a cripple. He was in severe pains, often on stimulants and would set up in houses far behind the lines, rather than lead effectively from the front. He showed timidity at Cassville (one of the few time Johnston ever had the chance to get the pounce on Sherman throughout the entire campaign; and his other offensive operations, most notably Kolb's Farm, were poorly conceived and bloodily repulsed. All the signs point to him having lost his luster as a commander. Not even accounting his actions afterwords, he was by and far the least capable person in the army (of seniority) one could have picked in July of '64.
 
I agree with all your points except this one. Yes, prior to his elevation to Corps command, he had been a stellar commander with a keen eye for knowing where and when it was best to attack. But in 1864, he is a cripple. He was in severe pains, often on stimulants and would set up in houses far behind the lines, rather than lead effectively from the front. He showed timidity at Cassville (one of the few time Johnston ever had the chance to get the pounce on Sherman throughout the entire campaign; and his other offensive operations, most notably Kolb's Farm, were poorly conceived and bloodily repulsed. All the signs point to him having lost his luster as a commander. Not even accounting his actions afterwords, he was by and far the least capable person in the army (of seniority) one could have picked in July of '64.
Who do you think would have been chosen as a better commander? Atlanta needed to be held, not just held but somehow pushing Sherman away some to prevent him from cutting off the railroads from the city.
Not only was Atlanta needing to be held with Lee in Virgina standing toe to toe in and around Petersburg to somehow bring about the loss of Lincoln being reelected.
I can't see a General from the A.N.V. being sent down to acclimate himself to the A.O.T quick enough and to gain the respect from the Corp commanders or the fighting men to take bold maneuvers to gain any ground against Sherman's armies in and around Atlanta.
I agree with you assessments which you presented against Hood. But what choice did Davis have? Johnston was giving time to respond as to what his plans were and he pretty much didnt say or do anything that he would attempt that would differ than what he had done since May. Davis, Bragg was hoping that Johnston had a plan of attack since the next fallback would leave Atlanta in the hands of the Union army.
Again, Atlanta was going to be loss but the only hope was hold on and hope a new president was to be elected and they would end the massive bloodshed that was happening in Virgina and now a stalemate around Atlanta.
 
It's worth pointing out that Lee not so subtly said to Davis that, if Johnston was to be replaced at all, it would be better to replace him with Hardee rather than Hood. Lee had not served with Hardee during the war but knew him well from the pre-war army, when both men served in the 2nd Cavalry Regiment. And, of course, he knew Hood's abilities firsthand from their experiences in the Army of Northern Virginia.

Hardee would certainly have done a better job than Hood. Of course, that's a little like saying that one's flight went better than that of the Hindenburg.
 
When Joe Johnston was removed from command, Hardee should have been given the spot. It was mostly due to the machinations of Bragg that the position was given to Hood instead, according to Chastel. I know Hardee was a competent, if not spectacular, commander. I doubt he would have made such a terrible job organizing an assault as Hood did on the Battle of 22nd July. He also wouldn't be sitting in a town house all the time, and could have made more affect on the battles if he led from the front. Hood, due to his injuries, could not do that, which results in 22nd July, Ezra Church, and Spring Hill. I also could imagine him putting Cleburne in a Corps command, as he was his protege.

Its hard to know if Hardee would have done as good as Hood, as Hardee was known as cautious

Yes I said as good as Hood......the fact is Hood did exactly what was expected of him, which was roll the dice and fight before Atlanta, that he was at a disadvantage and that losing was a distinct possibility was well known, however the powers that be realized doing nothing and abandoning the city without even attempting to hold it would also have been as much a defeat. Note Hood isnt replaced after the battles of Atlanta.......because he did what he was expected to, not fighting at all would have been the failure to his superiors who felt the chance had to be taken, and he took it as was expected. One mark one must have to be considered a good commander is actually doing what your superiors expect you to do.

Some argue well if they continued to retreat as JJ was doing, they would have saved the army.......For what? Saving an army that your admitting cant defend anything, is rather like tits on a boar..........They took a slim chance and lost, however not taking a chance at all simply leaves one with no chance at all...…..

Edit-added- Trading space or resources is only viable strategy if one has space/resources to trade. Personally find it hard to disagree with Davis's assessment that at this point of the war, they were running out of both, and couldn't afford to continue, which necessitated making a stand.
 
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He was in severe pains, often on stimulants

It has now been proven that Hood did not take laudanum for his injury.

He showed timidity at Cassville (one of the few time Johnston ever had the chance to get the pounce on Sherman throughout the entire campaign

Hood's right stumbled into two Union cavalry divisions on the Canton Road east of Cassville. His decision to abort the attack was prudent.

and his other offensive operations, most notably Kolb's Farm, were poorly conceived and bloodily repulsed.

Historian Larry Daniel says: "There is indeed evidence to suggest that Johnston saw the engagement at Kolb's Farm as a success - Hood had driven the Federals until he was stopped by artillery. Johnston did not criticize Hood..."
 
Hood's right stumbled into two Union cavalry divisions on the Canton Road east of Cassville. His decision to abort the attack was prudent.
He could have detached a large brigade to guard the Canton road. Thus far in the war, cavalry had never successfully pushed a body of infantry, and I especially doubt Stoneman would have made a first, given how badly handled Sherman's cavalry was throughout the campaign. But instead of doing that, he completely called off the assault.
 
Some argue well if they continued to retreat as JJ was doing, they would have saved the army.......For what? Saving an army that your admitting cant defend anything, is rather like tits on a boar..........They took a slim chance and lost, however not taking a chance at all wasnt going to work out better

Edit-added- Trading space or resources is only viable strategy if one has space/resources to trade. Personally find it hard to disagree with Davis's assessment that at this point of the war, they were running out of both, and couldn't afford to continue, which necessitated making a stand.
It seems there is much confusion here. Let me make myself clear: I see Johnston's desire to give up Atlanta as the terrible idea it is. This is why this thread is about his replacement rather than his retention. I argue that Hardee, if it is made clear by Davis himself to hold on to Atlanta at all cost, would have done just that. If he were to make an assault like the Eastern Battle, I bet he would have been able to better coordinate his forces. I doubt he would send Sherman packing, but I do believe he could have held Atlanta, and not retreat after the first battle.
 
Of course we have the advantage of seeing the aftermath of what happened. Try to put yourself in Davis shoes in July 1864. I personally think Hardee was a very good general in certain aspects. But..and it is what Davis had to ponder and choose from. Hardee is a somewhat clone of Johnston. Hood was the only Corp commander who had the trait of fighting and attacking. Hood did have success in his days with Lee.
No doubt Hardee was mentioned but also remember Hardee did turn this command down when Bragg was relieved from command. Davis needed a fighting general, he needed to have one to plan to attack and carry it through. Johnston I am sure made plans to attack but always found something to sway him from doing so.
I pose this question again, then who? Who would have been a better choice to lead the A.O.T. in pushing Sherman maybe back across the Chattahoochee and preventing Sherman to capture Atlanta before the elections?
 
He could have detached a large brigade to guard the Canton road. Thus far in the war, cavalry had never successfully pushed a body of infantry, and I especially doubt Stoneman would have made a first, given how badly handled Sherman's cavalry was throughout the campaign. But instead of doing that, he completely called off the assault.

He didn't know it was cavalry. Hood didn't have any cavalry of his own to protect his flank. Colonel Taylor Beattie stated that "a dark line" of troops appeared on the right of Hood's corps. Hood halted his corps, recalled the staff officers, and ordered Hindman to send out skirmishers to identify the unknown body of men. Major J.E. Austin stated that there was a "short and severe engagement" with enemy troops that had unexpectedly appeared "in force in my front, with artillery and infantry." Hood's actions at Cassville were prudent based on the information at hand.
 
Of course we have the advantage of seeing the aftermath of what happened. Try to put yourself in Davis shoes in July 1864. I personally think Hardee was a very good general in certain aspects. But..and it is what Davis had to ponder and choose from. Hardee is a somewhat clone of Johnston. Hood was the only Corp commander who had the trait of fighting and attacking. Hood did have success in his days with Lee.
No doubt Hardee was mentioned but also remember Hardee did turn this command down when Bragg was relieved from command. Davis needed a fighting general, he needed to have one to plan to attack and carry it through. Johnston I am sure made plans to attack but always found something to sway him from doing so.
I pose this question again, then who? Who would have been a better choice to lead the A.O.T. in pushing Sherman maybe back across the Chattahoochee and preventing Sherman to capture Atlanta before the elections?


It is hard to envision if your going to fight a risky battle out of necessity, going with someone who as much said they didn't want the command.
 
Atlanta was lost when Davis wouldn't allow the transfer of Forrest out of Mississippi to operate on Sherman's lifeline back to Chattanooga. Wheeler wasn't going to do it even though that's what Hood detached him for. So it doesn't matter who replaces Johnston. The result is the same...maybe sooner...maybe a bit later, but Atlanta is lost.
 
When Joe Johnston was removed from command, Hardee should have been given the spot. It was mostly due to the machinations of Bragg that the position was given to Hood instead, according to Chastel. I know Hardee was a competent, if not spectacular, commander. I doubt he would have made such a terrible job organizing an assault as Hood did on the Battle of 22nd July. He also wouldn't be sitting in a town house all the time, and could have made more affect on the battles if he led from the front. Hood, due to his injuries, could not do that, which results in 22nd July, Ezra Church, and Spring Hill. I also could imagine him putting Cleburne in a Corps command, as he was his protege.
General Hardee counted the fight of July 22 a victory- "The engagement of the 22nd of July, one of the most desperate and bloody of the war, and which won the only decided success achieved by the army at Atlanta" -which Hardee was primarily responsible for.

Whatever the case, Hardee would have remained in front of Sherman instead of marching off to Tennessee.
 
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