Griffin's battery

MikeyB

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I did a quick search for Griffin in this forum and didn't find a good post, so apologies in advance if I missed it.

But very simple question here- always read about Barry countermanding Griffin's order to fire on advancing blue uniforms. My question is - could this have made a difference to the ultimate outcome? Or were events already going against the Union at this point, that it probably wouldn't have mattered?

-Mike
 

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Hussar Yeomanry

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The short answer to your question is no I do not think it was too late to change the course of the battle but I'm afraid this isn't an easy question and therefore requires a more lengthy answer.

So, here goes. You speak of 'Griffin's Battery'. This of course is the 6 guns (4 x 10pdr Parrot Rifles and 2 x 12pdr Field Howitzers) of the Light Company D of the 5th US Artillery (sometimes called Battery D of the 5th US Artillery – though this appears to be an anachronistic title that it only gained later). As to who they are they are mostly former Dragoons rather than artillerymen and are sometimes called the West Point Battery/ West Point Light Artillery for that was where they were raised and indeed what they were originally termed (and now Captain Charles Griffin was West Point's artillery instructor - in much the same way that Jackson was the VMI's).

They will serve in the 1st Brigade (Colonel A. Porter) of the 2nd Division (Colonel D. Hunter) which appears to be the second brigade in the army's line of march as it attempts to outflank the Confederate left (Burnside's 2nd Brigade in the front, J. S Slocum's 2nd Rhode Island Regiment probably in the very lead). These troops will with difficulty and Sherman's First Division Brigade will push the Confederates off Matthews Hill and attempt to take Henry House Hill. Thus it will be these brigades that will be forced to do much of the initial fighting.

Now critically these troops have momentum. They are pressing the brigades of Evans (7th Demi- Brigade AoP), Bartow (2nd Brigade AoS) and Bee (3rd Brigade AoS). These troops are collapsing and as is well known the arrival of Jackson's 1st Brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah is required to save the day. As part of this is of course the incident you talk about for McDowell sees an opportunity to give the Confederate army one last push. One that will send them reeling for he has fresh troops arriving (Howard, Franklin and Wilcox). Therefore he pauses, moves Griffin's and Rickett's guns up and decides to bombard the enemy.

I would actually argue that the decisive moment is actually the pause. Without it Jackson won't have time to stabilise the line. It also means that the northern army loses what momentum it had. Then having some of these guns overrun does change things. After all the northern army only has at most 30 artillery pieces with the troops that will fight around Henry House Hill (and some of these are out of position/ haven't arrived yet). Therefore the loss of 6 guns will drop that to a maximum of 24 (likely quite a lot less) and Jackson has gathered 11 smoothbores (admittedly almost entirely 6pdrs – though there's definitely a 12pdr Field Howitzer as well) on a superior firing platform. (As a side note both sides are very light on artillery)

Further it is telling that rather than attacking elsewhere Franklin and his entire brigade is ordered to recover those guns. This results in a see saw action that at times is successful. It does however suck in troops from Wilcox, Howard and Sherman and the question is could these troops have been used more efficiently elsewhere? Whatever, they are now unavailable to McDowell and when fresh Confederate troops arrive the Union army will reel back in shock, leaving behind 3 of the 10pdr Parrott Rifles and both of the 12pdr Field Howitzers.

So having said that personally I do think it an important moment but perhaps not the most important one. It is also upon such little things that a battle can turn. Would things have been different without this happening? Maybe. Artillery support is very reassuring to the infantry (and this is an infantry heavy army that is in significant need of reassurance). Would this have been enough to change the day? With the Union army's focus elsewhere and not on recovering its guns and also without this blow to morale I think it perfectly possible that the Union army could have won.

They didn't.

And I don't think it would have been an easy fight but perhaps they could have. However other points were equally important. Hampton delaying Sherman's Brigade with a single regiment. Stuart's death charge of the Black Horse Cavalry – again to get a delay. To allow Jackson time to deploy and stabilise the line.
 
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The short answer to your question is no I do not think it was too late to change the course of the battle but I'm afraid this isn't an easy question and therefore requires a more lengthy answer.

So, here goes. You speak of 'Griffin's Battery'. This of course is the 6 guns (4 x 10pdr Parrot Rifles and 2 x 12pdr Field Howitzers) of the Light Company D of the 5th US Artillery (sometimes called Battery D of the 5th US Artillery – though this appears to be an anachronistic title that it only gained later). As to who they are they are mostly former Dragoons rather than artillerymen and are sometimes called the West Point Battery/ West Point Light Artillery for that was where they were raised and indeed what they were originally termed (and now Captain Charles Griffin was West Point's artillery instructor - in much the same way that Jackson was the VMI's).

They will serve in the 1st Brigade (Colonel A. Porter) of the 2nd Division (Colonel D. Hunter) which appears to be the second brigade in the army's line of march as it attempts to outflank the Confederate left (Burnside's 2nd Brigade in the front, J. S Slocum's 2nd Rhode Island Regiment probably in the very lead). These troops will with difficulty and Sherman's First Division Brigade will push the Confederates off Matthews Hill and attempt to take Henry House Hill. Thus it will be these brigades that will be forced to do much of the initial fighting.

Now critically these troops have momentum. They are pressing the brigades of Evans (7th Demi- Brigade AoP), Bartow (2nd Brigade AoS) and Bee (3rd Brigade AoS). These troops are collapsing and as is well known the arrival of Jackson's 1st Brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah is required to save the day. As part of this is of course the incident you talk about for McDowell sees an opportunity to give the Confederate army one last push. One that will send them reeling for he has fresh troops arriving (Howard, Franklin and Wilcox). Therefore he pauses, moves Griffin's and Rickett's guns up and decides to bombard the enemy.

I would actually argue that the decisive moment is actually the pause. Without it Jackson won't have time to stabilise the line. It also means that the northern army loses what momentum it had. Then having some of these guns overrun does change things. After all the northern army only has at most 30 artillery pieces with the troops that will fight around Henry House Hill (and some of these are out of position/ haven't arrived yet). Therefore the loss of 6 guns will drop that to a maximum of 24 (likely quite a lot less) and Jackson has gathered 11 smoothbores (admittedly almost entirely 6pdrs – though there's definitely a 12pdr Field Howitzer as well) on a superior firing platform. (As a side note both sides are very light on artillery)

Further it is telling that rather than attacking elsewhere Franklin and his entire brigade is ordered to recover those guns. This results in a see saw action that at times is successful. It does however suck in troops from Wilcox, Howard and Sherman and the question is could these troops have been used more efficiently elsewhere? Whatever, they are now unavailable to McDowell and when fresh Confederate troops arrive the Union army will reel back in shock, leaving behind 3 of the 10pdr Parrott Rifles and both of the 12pdr Field Howitzers.

So having said that personally I do think it an important moment but perhaps not the most important one. It is also upon such little things that a battle can turn. Would things have been different without this happening? Maybe. Artillery support is very reassuring to the infantry (and this is an infantry heavy army that is in significant need of reassurance). Would this have been enough to change the day? With the Union army's focus elsewhere and not on recovering its guns and also without this blow to morale I think it perfectly possible that the Union army could have won.

They didn't.

And I don't think it would have been an easy fight but perhaps they could have. However other points were equally important. Hampton delaying Sherman's Brigade with a single regiment. Stuart's death charge of the Black Horse Cavalry – again to get a delay. To allow Jackson time to deploy and stabilise the line.


Where do you all dig up your sources for such in depth summaries? This post is great and why people come to CWT.
 

Hussar Yeomanry

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Where do you all dig up your sources for such in depth summaries? This post is great and why people come to CWT.
Dang. Should have given my sources and didn't. Mostly this was based off Porter (and Burnside's) Official Report (along with information from memory from Jackson and Franklin's OR which I have read before but didnt reread to make this article). I also went to http://www.firstbullrun.co.uk/OOB/army-northeastern-virginia-oob.html which has stupid amounts of useful information if one delves deep enough - there's a heck of a lot of extraneous information - the issue is separating the wheat from the chaff - it was however incredibly helpful about the creation of Griffin's Battery. Beyond that I used some of the information gathered while writing the constituent parts of https://www.civilwartalk.com/threads/the-battle-of-the-three-armies-conclusion-to-the-investigations-of-the-army-of-northeastern-virginia-potomac-shenandoah.154719/. That's pretty much it I think...

EDIT - add in Howard and Wilcox to OR's that were previously read and that influenced my thinking but were not sprecifically reread
 

Hussar Yeomanry

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I did a quick search for Griffin in this forum and didn't find a good post, so apologies in advance if I missed it.

But very simple question here- always read about Barry countermanding Griffin's order to fire on advancing blue uniforms. My question is - could this have made a difference to the ultimate outcome? Or were events already going against the Union at this point, that it probably wouldn't have mattered?

-Mike
Interestingly I have just found Captain Griffin's own Official Report and that slightly contradicts this. He states Barry ordered him forward but then that 'an officer on the field' ordered Griffin not to fire for it was believed these were men from Heintzelman's 3rd Division. Surely if it was Barry, his immediate superior, he would have said so?
 

MikeyB

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Interestingly I have just found Captain Griffin's own Official Report and that slightly contradicts this. He states Barry ordered him forward but then that 'an officer on the field' ordered Griffin not to fire for it was believed these were men from Heintzelman's 3rd Division. Surely if it was Barry, his immediate superior, he would have said so?
Thanks for all of the good material on this subject.

Admittedly, the reference to Barry that I found was in the quick wikipedia article on Bull Run (which appeared to have legitimate citations), so I guess the question is - does wikipedia have it wrong, or was it correctly citing "good history" and its the historians who didn't read (or at least investigate) Griffin's OR?

By the by, what Confederate unit are we talking about that Griffin did not fire on? Were these Jackson's men?
 

Hussar Yeomanry

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Yes it was Jacksons men. 33rd Virginia (from memory - so treat that carefully!).

As to wiki - which also suggests it was the 33rd Virginia - now I've gone and looked - their reference appears to be McPherson's The First Battle of Bull Run - never having read it - a terrible admission I admit and its on my list of books to obtain - I can't really say any more than that. But personally I would go with Griffin who was there and writing but days later - over McPherson who wasn't and was writing a hundred or more years later.
 

Andy Cardinal

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The short answer to your question is no I do not think it was too late to change the course of the battle but I'm afraid this isn't an easy question and therefore requires a more lengthy answer.

So, here goes. You speak of 'Griffin's Battery'. This of course is the 6 guns (4 x 10pdr Parrot Rifles and 2 x 12pdr Field Howitzers) of the Light Company D of the 5th US Artillery (sometimes called Battery D of the 5th US Artillery – though this appears to be an anachronistic title that it only gained later). As to who they are they are mostly former Dragoons rather than artillerymen and are sometimes called the West Point Battery/ West Point Light Artillery for that was where they were raised and indeed what they were originally termed (and now Captain Charles Griffin was West Point's artillery instructor - in much the same way that Jackson was the VMI's).

They will serve in the 1st Brigade (Colonel A. Porter) of the 2nd Division (Colonel D. Hunter) which appears to be the second brigade in the army's line of march as it attempts to outflank the Confederate left (Burnside's 2nd Brigade in the front, J. S Slocum's 2nd Rhode Island Regiment probably in the very lead). These troops will with difficulty and Sherman's First Division Brigade will push the Confederates off Matthews Hill and attempt to take Henry House Hill. Thus it will be these brigades that will be forced to do much of the initial fighting.

Now critically these troops have momentum. They are pressing the brigades of Evans (7th Demi- Brigade AoP), Bartow (2nd Brigade AoS) and Bee (3rd Brigade AoS). These troops are collapsing and as is well known the arrival of Jackson's 1st Brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah is required to save the day. As part of this is of course the incident you talk about for McDowell sees an opportunity to give the Confederate army one last push. One that will send them reeling for he has fresh troops arriving (Howard, Franklin and Wilcox). Therefore he pauses, moves Griffin's and Rickett's guns up and decides to bombard the enemy.

I would actually argue that the decisive moment is actually the pause. Without it Jackson won't have time to stabilise the line. It also means that the northern army loses what momentum it had. Then having some of these guns overrun does change things. After all the northern army only has at most 30 artillery pieces with the troops that will fight around Henry House Hill (and some of these are out of position/ haven't arrived yet). Therefore the loss of 6 guns will drop that to a maximum of 24 (likely quite a lot less) and Jackson has gathered 11 smoothbores (admittedly almost entirely 6pdrs – though there's definitely a 12pdr Field Howitzer as well) on a superior firing platform. (As a side note both sides are very light on artillery)

Further it is telling that rather than attacking elsewhere Franklin and his entire brigade is ordered to recover those guns. This results in a see saw action that at times is successful. It does however suck in troops from Wilcox, Howard and Sherman and the question is could these troops have been used more efficiently elsewhere? Whatever, they are now unavailable to McDowell and when fresh Confederate troops arrive the Union army will reel back in shock, leaving behind 3 of the 10pdr Parrott Rifles and both of the 12pdr Field Howitzers.

So having said that personally I do think it an important moment but perhaps not the most important one. It is also upon such little things that a battle can turn. Would things have been different without this happening? Maybe. Artillery support is very reassuring to the infantry (and this is an infantry heavy army that is in significant need of reassurance). Would this have been enough to change the day? With the Union army's focus elsewhere and not on recovering its guns and also without this blow to morale I think it perfectly possible that the Union army could have won.

They didn't.

And I don't think it would have been an easy fight but perhaps they could have. However other points were equally important. Hampton delaying Sherman's Brigade with a single regiment. Stuart's death charge of the Black Horse Cavalry – again to get a delay. To allow Jackson time to deploy and stabilise the line.
I agree with you that the pause itself was the major turning point of the battle and not the loss of the guns themselves.

Question -- Let's say McDowell pushes forward before Jackson stabilizes the line on Henry Hill. Jackson never gets a chance to stand like a stone wall. McDowell's army seizes control of the hill. Does the Union army win the battle? Or do the still unused Confederate brigades turn the tide anyway?
 

Hussar Yeomanry

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I agree with you that the pause itself was the major turning point of the battle and not the loss of the guns themselves.

Question -- Let's say McDowell pushes forward before Jackson stabilizes the line on Henry Hill. Jackson never gets a chance to stand like a stone wall. McDowell's army seizes control of the hill. Does the Union army win the battle? Or do the still unused Confederate brigades turn the tide anyway?
I think they do. Henry House Hill is a good artillery platform and now McDowell has 3 fresh brigades and 5 brigades that have been engaged to varying degrees (in some cases not much - and even the somewhat shot up ones are at this point still in good order. Actually the brigade that seems in the most trouble is Howard's completely fresh brigade for by this point in the confusion of the battle and the march he has totally lost contact with 6 companies of one of his regiments... and he won't see them again for days). McDowell would also be finally able to transfer the 1st Division artillery that has been stuck on the other side of Bull Run. That's another 13 guns (including the 30pdr Parrott that shouldn't have been there) to bolster his line.

To counter this we have parts of 4th and 5th Brigade of the AoS as well as at most 7 brigades of the AoP. However bad (atrocious) staffwork plagued the AoP all day with units receiving contradictory or indeed in some cases no orders and so the chances of the 7 AoP brigades going in 'en masse' seem unlikely (further a brigade of Miles as well as Richardson's brigade with 2 extra 20pdr Parrotts are at Blackburn's Ford so at least one of these AoP brigades is needed to screen it). Only if this en masse attack could have happened would the Confederacy have then saved the day. Instead I think various heroic (and futile) piecemeal attacks would have been launched, further demoralising the southern soldiers.

Of course there are a thousand variables in there but that is my opinion.

And as it didn't happen we will never truly know.
 

MikeyB

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One that will send them reeling for he has fresh troops arriving (Howard, Franklin and Wilcox). Therefore he pauses, moves Griffin's and Rickett's guns up and decides to bombard the enemy.
This was a Napoleonic tactic, right? Is the thinking, you move your guns forward, bombard green troops, and they will flee? On the flip side, it seems pretty foolish to move forward batteries, unsupported by infantry. Won't a skirmish line drive them off pretty easily?
 

Hussar Yeomanry

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This was a Napoleonic tactic, right? Is the thinking, you move your guns forward, bombard green troops, and they will flee? On the flip side, it seems pretty foolish to move forward batteries, unsupported by infantry. Won't a skirmish line drive them off pretty easily?
Fairly Napoleonic yes. However the two batteries weren't unsupported. The 4 companies of the US Marines (Major J. G Reynolds) at a minimum had been specifically tasked to protect Griffin (EDIT - as per Porter's OR). I believe there were more supports but without looking I don't know whom.
 

Andy Cardinal

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This was a Napoleonic tactic, right? Is the thinking, you move your guns forward, bombard green troops, and they will flee? On the flip side, it seems pretty foolish to move forward batteries, unsupported by infantry. Won't a skirmish line drive them off pretty easily?
The tactic also worked well in Mexico I believe. Artillery was much less an offensive type weapon in the Civil War after Bull Run.
 

MikeyB

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The tactic also worked well in Mexico I believe. Artillery was much less an offensive type weapon in the Civil War after Bull Run.
Wasn't this also a component of Pickett's Charge (that wasn't executed)? And good thing, because if you tried advancing artillery and unlimbering, wouldn't you get butchered?
 

Andy Cardinal

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Wasn't this also a component of Pickett's Charge (that wasn't executed)? And good thing, because if you tried advancing artillery and unlimbering, wouldn't you get butchered?
Yes it was supposed to be. Alexander did something similar at the Peach Orchard on July 2.
 

Hussar Yeomanry

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Wasn't this also a component of Pickett's Charge (that wasn't executed)? And good thing, because if you tried advancing artillery and unlimbering, wouldn't you get butchered?
Sort of.

Though there is a difference here. At Gettysburg the guns are to be pushed forward in support of the attack. In the Griffin case at Bull Run the guns are pushed forward before the attack. Mostly it's a matter of timing.
 

Hussar Yeomanry

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This was a Napoleonic tactic, right? Is the thinking, you move your guns forward, bombard green troops, and they will flee? On the flip side, it seems pretty foolish to move forward batteries, unsupported by infantry. Won't a skirmish line drive them off pretty easily?
Further to my previous I have now looked at Major William F. Barry's OR as well. He states that the Eleventh (Fire Zouaves) and Fourteenth New York (Brooklyn) were also specifically tasked to protect the two batteries (Griffin and Ricketts). He also has a very different version of events. He states:

"a regiment of the enemy’s infantry, covered by a high fence, presented itself in line on the left and front of the two batteries at not more than sixty or seventy yards’ distance, and delivered a volley full upon the batteries and their supports. Lieutenant Ramsay, First Artillery, was killed, and Captain Ricketts, First Artillery, was wounded, and a number of men and horses were killed or disabled by this close and well-directed volley. The Eleventh and Fourteenth Regiments instantly broke and fled in confusion to the rear, and in spite of the repeated and earnest efforts of Colonel Heintzelman with the latter, and myself with the former, refused to rally and return to the support of the batteries. The enemy, seeing the guns thus abandoned by their supports, rushed upon them, and driving off the cannoneers, who, with their officers, stood bravely at their posts until the last moment, captured them, ten in number. These were the only guns taken by the enemy on the field."

His last statement though is what is known as a lie. Not only did the two batteries (Griffin and Ricketts) lose eleven guns between them (not ten as he claims) but the Rhode Island Battery also lost 5 James Rifles. Similarly the 30pdr Parrott Rifle was left upon the field, while 2nd US Artillery, Light Company E lost 2 James Rifles, a 12pdr Field Howitzer and a 6pdr smoothbore. Further despite him not me being the Chief or Artilllery I also disagree with some of what he says about the composition of the artillery composition of the army (due to having conflicting reports. Multiple conflicting reports in some cases). They aren't major but they exist.
 

MikeyB

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Further to my previous I have now looked at Major William F. Barry's OR as well. He states that the Eleventh (Fire Zouaves) and Fourteenth New York (Brooklyn) were also specifically tasked to protect the two batteries (Griffin and Ricketts). He also has a very different version of events. He states:

"a regiment of the enemy’s infantry, covered by a high fence, presented itself in line on the left and front of the two batteries at not more than sixty or seventy yards’ distance, and delivered a volley full upon the batteries and their supports. Lieutenant Ramsay, First Artillery, was killed, and Captain Ricketts, First Artillery, was wounded, and a number of men and horses were killed or disabled by this close and well-directed volley. The Eleventh and Fourteenth Regiments instantly broke and fled in confusion to the rear, and in spite of the repeated and earnest efforts of Colonel Heintzelman with the latter, and myself with the former, refused to rally and return to the support of the batteries. The enemy, seeing the guns thus abandoned by their supports, rushed upon them, and driving off the cannoneers, who, with their officers, stood bravely at their posts until the last moment, captured them, ten in number. These were the only guns taken by the enemy on the field."

His last statement though is what is known as a lie. Not only did the two batteries (Griffin and Ricketts) lose eleven guns between them (not ten as he claims) but the Rhode Island Battery also lost 5 James Rifles. Similarly the 30pdr Parrott Rifle was left upon the field, while 2nd US Artillery, Light Company E lost 2 James Rifles, a 12pdr Field Howitzer and a 6pdr smoothbore. Further despite him not me being the Chief or Artilllery I also disagree with some of what he says about the composition of the artillery composition of the army (due to having conflicting reports. Multiple conflicting reports in some cases). They aren't major but they exist.
So how big of an upgrade was Henry Hunt compared to this guy? When did Barry get replaced?
 

Hussar Yeomanry

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Barry was very highly thought of in the immediate pre war era. He (along with French and Hunt) had just written the Field Artillery Manual - Instruction for Field Artillery (1860).

He continues as Chief of Artillery until after Malvern Hill - which is usually considered a triumph for Henry Hunt! Hunt is not promoted to Chief of Artillery until the day after South Mountain (and there may have been a brief period where there was no Chief of Artillery)

Later in the war he becomes Sherman's Chief of Artillery (later Tennessee campaigns and on through to the end of the war) - which again says something about him and will end up as a Regular Army Colonel with the brevet rank of Major General. He also gets various field and training commands and appears to still be well respected.

Therefore I think Hunt may not have been a massive upgrade... though an upgrade for sure and one who seems more than happy to use what Barry has created (including the formation of the Horse Artillery Reserve)


[And thinking about Barry's report some more I can think of no high fence in the area...]
 

Hussar Yeomanry

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I think I have where the Barry attribution comes from.

P189, Battles and Leaders where J. B. Fry (an assistant Adjutant General on McDowell's staff at the battle) claims 'he [Griffin] was deterred by the assurance of Major Barry, the Chief of Artillery, that it "was a regiment sent by Colonel Heintzelman to support the battery."

As attribution for this he states "Griffin told me so as we rode together after leaving Centreville. He and I were classmates and warm friends."

Now this is a post war account. 1870's-80's though I don't have a precise date (it can be no later than 1884) which means it might well be true. However I wish to stress that this sort of runs counter to Griffin's own OR and I wonder if time has clouded his memories of who said what and when. Alternatively is Griffin trying to save his commander's blushes? Personally I don't think so for from the tone of his OR he seems rather (justifiably) aggrieved.
 
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I recently found this gem:

"About this time another Federal battery ["West Point Battery" Co. D, 5th US Artillery] of five pieces [issued: 4 10 pounder Parrott rifles 2.9" M1861 , & 2 12 pounder field howitzers, M1841] under Captain Griffin came up the hill and unlimbered between Ricketts and the Henry House. Griffin's position was now on the left of Ricketts. Both these batteries were shelling our artillery while we were taking our position, over the crest of the Henry hill. All this was almost within a hundred yards of us, but over the hill and out of our sight. After they had been firing for about half an hour. Captain Griffin decided to move two of his pieces [3rd Section, 12-pounder Howitzers ??] to the elevation on the right of Ricketts, [the right end of the Federal line] in order to give himself more room. They limbered up and came charging up the hill directly in our front. They did not see us, for their attention was directed toward the artillery on our right. When they got within 22 steps of our line and brought their horses half way around preparing to unlimber, Captain Anderson shouted ' 'Fire ! ' ' We rose up from the gulley and gave them a volley. Sam Emerson and I ran through the smoke to within 16 steps of them to see what had happened. Every horse had been killed and only one man was in sight. He was crouching behind a wheel of one of the caissons. I fired at him, but in the excitement of the battle I do not know whether I hit him or not. This was the first repulse the enemy had met with that day. Captain Griffin afterwards testified before a committee investigating the conduct of the war, that he had moved these two pieces up there and that they had been in position about five minutes and had been firing when they were shot down. In this he was mistaken. They did not even get unlimbered. Captain Griffin remained down the hill with the rest of his battery, and no mounted officer accompanied the two guns to the top of the hill. One of the caissons exploded a few minutes afterwards and shell flew through the air in every direction. The wheel horses were partly burned"

Co. J, 4th South Carolina Infantry at the First Battle of Manassas
A Letter Written by B. B. Breazeale [4th sergeant of Capt. William Anderson's Company J, 4th South Carolina Infantry, Col. J. B. E. Sloan] to His Son~
Belton, S. C, June 1, 1912


Source: https://ia800904.us.archive.org/24/items/coj4thsouthcarol00brea/coj4thsouthcarol00brea.pdf

Could Brezeale's 'gulley' be Hunt's 'high fence'?

And, lets face it, Griffin & Hunt lost guns in the battle, mortal sin for an artillerist. Personally, I have absolutely NO doubt each of their reports was very carefully crafted, er, written, to reflect the best possible light on their obvious defeat.

Thanks for allowing me to join the fun!!
 


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