Grant Grant on George Thomas

trice

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General Grant in his Personal Memoirs, Chapter LXIX
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As my official letters on file in the War Department, as well as my remarks in this book, reflect upon General Thomas by dwelling somewhat upon his tardiness, it is due to myself, as well as to him, that I give my estimate of him as a soldier. The same remark will apply also in the case of General Canby. I had been at West Point with Thomas one year, and had known him later in the old army. He was a man of commanding appearance, slow and deliberate in speech and action; sensible, honest and brave. He possessed valuable soldierly qualities in an eminent degree. He gained the confidence of all who served under him, and almost their love. This implies a very valuable quality. It is a quality which calls out the most efficient services of the troops serving under the commander possessing it.

Thomas’s dispositions were deliberately made, and always good. He could not be driven from a point he was given to hold. He was not as good, however, in pursuit as he was in action. I do not believe that he could ever have conducted Sherman’s army from Chattanooga to Atlanta against the defences and the commander guarding that line in 1864. On the other hand, if it had been given him to hold the line which Johnston tried to hold, neither that general nor Sherman, nor any other officer could have done it better.

Thomas was a valuable officer, who richly deserved, as he has received, the plaudits of his countrymen for the part he played in the great tragedy of 1861–5.
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Tim
 
Wasn't Grant trying to relieve Thomas just prior to the Nashville battle? Iirc, once Grant found out that Thomas had smashed Hood, he was very magnanimous in his praise of Thomas and his victory. I don't believe there was anything personal Grant had against Thomas, just different styles of command that led to some misunderstandings.

Excellent thread topic btw. Love reading about the interactions between the various generals, North and South.:thumbsup:
 
Wasn't Grant trying to relieve Thomas just prior to the Nashville battle? Iirc, once Grant found out that Thomas had smashed Hood, he was very magnanimous in his praise of Thomas and his victory. I don't believe there was anything personal Grant had against Thomas, just different styles of command that led to some misunderstandings.

Excellent thread topic btw. Love reading about the interactions between the various generals, North and South.:thumbsup:

Grant and Thomas had an awkward relationship, going back to the days after Shiloh when Grant was in the doghouse and Grant thought Thomas was trying to take over Grant's Army. The two were always rather distant and at Chattanooga their staffs were skirmishing constantly. Even though Sherman's performance at Chattanooga is poor and Thomas' is good, Grant then picked Sherman to command in the Atlanta Campaign.

At Nashville, Grant certainly was getting ready to remove Thomas if he could not get him to move. (Schofield certainly wasn't doing anything to make Thomas look good in Grant's eyes while this tense situation was unfolding.) From the outside, the situation looked really bad and might be a very stinky disaster. Then Thomas attacked, won one of the most smashing victories of the war. Now it looks like Grant was over-reacting, but before that, not so much.

Grant sidelined Thomas after that and post-war wrangling pitted Grant/Sherman against Thomas -- and then Thomas died in 1870. Grant is writing in 1885. Grant was possibly trying to gloss over the problems, or trying to be fair, or trying to be objective despite his awkward history with Thomas. With one dead and the other dying, it is in effect Grant's last word on the topic.

Tim
 
Grant and Thomas had an awkward relationship, going back to the days after Shiloh when Grant was in the doghouse and Grant thought Thomas was trying to take over Grant's Army. The two were always rather distant and at Chattanooga their staffs were skirmishing constantly. Even though Sherman's performance at Chattanooga is poor and Thomas' is good, Grant then picked Sherman to command in the Atlanta Campaign.

At Nashville, Grant certainly was getting ready to remove Thomas if he could not get him to move. (Schofield certainly wasn't doing anything to make Thomas look good in Grant's eyes while this tense situation was unfolding.) From the outside, the situation looked really bad and might be a very stinky disaster. Then Thomas attacked, won one of the most smashing victories of the war. Now it looks like Grant was over-reacting, but before that, not so much.

Grant sidelined Thomas after that and post-war wrangling pitted Grant/Sherman against Thomas -- and then Thomas died in 1870. Grant is writing in 1885. Grant was possibly trying to gloss over the problems, or trying to be fair, or trying to be objective despite his awkward history with Thomas. With one dead and the other dying, it is in effect Grant's last word on the topic.

Tim
In Thomas's defence on the delay in the attack on Hood at Nashville, they had an unprecedented ice storm that delayed the battle. It was said men nor beast could stand even on level ground.
 
In Thomas's defence on the delay in the attack on Hood at Nashville, they had an unprecedented ice storm that delayed the battle. It was said men nor beast could stand even on level ground.


Sure thing. But Nashville is a few hundred miles away from Grant in Virginia, and Grant (under political pressure) had heard a lot of excuses for inaction during the war. He wasn't in the mood for any more. Soon enough, in April, he was willing to let Sheridan sack Warren (the hero of Gettysburg). Butler was going to go soon enough. Generals who wouldn't act were on Grant's chopping block in late 1864 and early 1865. From a distance, Thomas looked like he might be one.

Tim
 
Sure thing. But Nashville is a few hundred miles away from Grant in Virginia, and Grant (under political pressure) had heard a lot of excuses for inaction during the war. He wasn't in the mood for any more. Soon enough, in April, he was willing to let Sheridan sack Warren (the hero of Gettysburg). Butler was going to go soon enough. Generals who wouldn't act were on Grant's chopping block in late 1864 and early 1865. From a distance, Thomas looked like he might be one.

Tim
I agree on the pressure. Warren got a raw deal in my opinion. He won his greivence years later, but that didn't have to happen. Politics then in the military were bad and not much has changed in that regard today.
 
I agree on the pressure. Warren got a raw deal in my opinion. He won his greivence years later, but that didn't have to happen. Politics then in the military were bad and not much has changed in that regard today.

On Warren: his actions that day do not justify his removal as specified by Sheridan -- but there was a larger issue involved. In war, a commander in the field needs to make snap judgements and have the authority to relieve a subordinate. Grant had given it to Sheridan that day -- and Warren was exactly the type of officer that could slow an operation down by substituting his own judgement for that of a superior.

That's the reason the Warren decision took so long to handle. While Grant and Sheridan had their reputations involved, just as Warren did, there actually was an important military principle involved that needed to be upheld.

On the details of the day, Sheridan was impetuous and often wrong, while Warren was probably correct in much of what he did. Yet Sheridan's frustration with Warren is also somewhat justified by Warren's placing himself out-of-reach and acting as a division commander when he commanded a 3-division Corps. In addition, Warren's removal is largely related to the difficulties he had made for himself over the last year (he wasn't an easy subordinate or fellow-commander to deal with). By April of 1865, Grant wasn't in a mood to deal with anyone who put sand in the gears, and Sheridan wasn't the sort to forget grudges or reconsider decisions.

As part of this, take a look at the performance of Union corps commanders over the next ten days. A shiver went through the command chain: Grant was firing Corps commanders. Now was the moment to end the war, and nothing less than all-out effort was going to be acceptable. The assault went in all along the line, and the Union forces pursued Lee like bats out of Hell.

Tim
 
Wasn't Grant trying to relieve Thomas just prior to the Nashville battle? Iirc, once Grant found out that Thomas had smashed Hood, he was very magnanimous in his praise of Thomas and his victory. I don't believe there was anything personal Grant had against Thomas, just different styles of command that led to some misunderstandings.

Excellent thread topic btw. Love reading about the interactions between the various generals, North and South.:thumbsup:
Grant had actually dispatched John Logan with orders replacing Thomas if Thomas still had not moved on Hood. Grant, himself hwas planning to follow to oversee. IIRC Logan had reached Louisville and Grant was in D.C. when word was received of the Battle of Nashville.
 
I wish some of my supervisors put this much thought into evaluations. I wish that I could.

Some personalities never fit and when people rise to the top each acquires partisans to fan any flames. Considering some of the failures of commanders in the AoP Thomas's record is still pretty strong. As for Sherman's point of view I reserve judgement. I will say that Sherman, by his own admission, was wrong about a number of things. Sherman wanted to fall back from Shiloh, but it was Grant who told him, "Like 'em tomorrow."

This is just one of the topics that makes the ACW so compelling. Pull these people out of the situation and you have combination of individuals trying to run a political campaign, a business, or a government agency. You can't make this stuff up.
 
... Even though Sherman's performance at Chattanooga is poor and Thomas' is good, Grant then picked Sherman to command in the Atlanta Campaign. ...

Seems to me that this evaluation of performance at Chattanooga is superficial armchair-quarterbacking.
IMO there is nothing particularly good about Thomas' individual performance at Chattanooga and the charge that Sherman's individual performance was poor is IMO also somewhat questionable. Even if you personally think that it was that way, I don't see evidence that Grant saw it the same.
 
Seems to me that this evaluation of performance at Chattanooga is superficial armchair-quarterbacking.
IMO there is nothing particularly good about Thomas' individual performance at Chattanooga and the charge that Sherman's individual performance was poor is IMO also somewhat questionable. Even if you personally think that it was that way, I don't see evidence that Grant saw it the same.

At Chattanooga, the assault on Missonary Ridge tended to give Grant a poor opinion of Thomas. Grant kept suggesting that Thomas commit his army in support of Sherman's efforts, but Thomas demured - he didn't want anything to do with the attack on what seemed like an impregnable position until after both Sherman (on the Union left) and Hooker (on the Union right) were fully engaged. Grant was irritated that one of Thomas division commanders spent time personally aiming a battery when he should have been better engaged.

But when Thomas finally sent his men into the rifle pits at the base of the mountain, they found a strange situation - some Confederate regiments tried to withdraw up the base of the hill, some tried to stand their ground, and when Thomas forces entered the rifle pits they found it safer to keep going than to stay where they were. Thus Thomas "stumbled" upon the attack on the center of the Confederate line on Missionary Ridge.

Such are the events which make history, and tend to support commanders' opinions of their subordinates.
 
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There are different versions of what occurred at the command center that day but whichever version one goes with, there is some communication issue from Grant through Thomas to the subordinate commanders of the Army of the Cumberland.

At Chattanooga, the assault on Missonary Ridge tended to give Grant a poor opinion of Thomas. Grant kept suggesting that Thomas commit his army in support of Sherman's efforts, but Thomas demured - he didn't want anything to do with the attack on what seemed like an impregnable position until after both Sherman (on the Union left) and Hooker (on the Union right) were fully engaged. Grant was irritated that one of Thomas division commanders spent time personally aiming a battery when he should have been better engaged.

But when Thomas finally sent his men into the rifle pits at the base of the mountain, they found a strange situation - some Confederate regiments tried to withdraw up the base of the hill, some tried to stand their ground, and when Thomas forces entered the rifle pits they found it safer to keep going than to stay where they were. Thus Thomas "stumbled" upon the attack on the center of the Confederate line on Missionary Ridge.

Such are the events which make history, and tend to support commanders' opinions of their subordinates.
 
Seems to me that this evaluation of performance at Chattanooga is superficial armchair-quarterbacking.
IMO there is nothing particularly good about Thomas' individual performance at Chattanooga and the charge that Sherman's individual performance was poor is IMO also somewhat questionable. Even if you personally think that it was that way, I don't see evidence that Grant saw it the same.

I'd agree with you on Thomas, I suppose; he was very marginalized by Grant's presence. However, the Wauhatchie and Orchard Knob operations were carried out by Thomas' troops and certainly went off well, as did the surprisingly successful assault up the ridge. Sherman's attack on the north end of the ridge was a flop by any objective study, but Grant clearly didn't think so.

Of course here is what Grant actually says about Chattanooga in his Personal Memoirs:
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My recollection is that my first orders for the battle of Chattanooga were as fought. Sherman was to get on Missionary Ridge, as he did; Hooker to cross the north end of Lookout Mountain, as he did, sweep across Chattanooga Valley and get across the south end of the ridge near Rossville. When Hooker had secured that position the Army of the Cumberland was to assault in the centre. Before Sherman arrived, however, the order was so changed as that Hooker was directed to come to Chattanooga by the north bank of the Tennessee River. The waters in the river, owing to heavy rains, rose so fast that the bridge at Brown’s Ferry could not be maintained in a condition to be used in crossing troops upon it. For this reason Hooker’s orders were changed by telegraph back to what they were originally
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That may bear a resemblance to what actually happened if viewed from a distance, but it does not stand up well under close historical examination.

Tim
 
Sherman's problems at Missionary Ridge can always be excused by a friend and commander as an attack designed to get the enemy to send reinforcements to the area, from which other portions of the army might benefit. On the other hand, a suspicious commander might view slowness to attack by commanders in other areas as an attempt to make his favored subordinate look bad.

Motives are hard to nail down. From Grant's memoirs it seems that the attack on Missionary Ridge went according to his plans, although that's clearly not the case.
 
Sherman's problems at Missionary Ridge can always be excused by a friend and commander as an attack designed to get the enemy to send reinforcements to the area, from which other portions of the army might benefit. On the other hand, a suspicious commander might view slowness to attack by commanders in other areas as an attempt to make his favored subordinate look bad.

Motives are hard to nail down. From Grant's memoirs it seems that the attack on Missionary Ridge went according to his plans, although that's clearly not the case.


There are two general areas of Grant's account of the Civil War that should be taken with a grain of salt, IMHO: anything to do with Shiloh, and anything to do with Chattanooga. Grant was very sensitive about any criticism on those two, and his accounts of both seem designed to avoid saying "Well, that wasn't so good."

Sherman, for example, never made it onto Missionary Ridge during the battle. Pat Cleburne gave one of the war's best performances there with a division and a half against Sherman's four. Sherman first thought he was already on it, only to discover he was well short. Then he attacked in disjointed fashion, mismanaging the attack, being consistently beaten piece by piece.

Tim
 
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