Grant Grant: Not a fan of the Red River campaign

Stephen Terry

Private
Joined
Apr 24, 2012
CULPEPER COURT-HOUSE, VA., April 28, 1864-11 p. m.

(Received 1 a. m., 29th.)

Major General H. W. HALLECK,

Chief of Staff:

General Banks' dispatch of the 17th received. I do not see that better orders can be given than those a few days ago. If General Banks has not advanced on Shreveport and beaten the enemy then Steele will be exposed to a superior force as to make it necessary to re-enforce him. I would order in this event A. J. Smith's whole force to General Steele. General Banks, by his failure, has absorbed 10,000 veteran troops that should now be with General Sherman and 30,000 of his own that would have been moving toward Mobile, and this without accomplishing any good result.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.
 
I believe the thread title refers to Grant's view that Banks' stalled campaign was taking up men and resources better used by more aggressive commanders.
 
But.....I like the Red River Campaign! :smile: Taylor was just awesome! "Chute 'em! 'Chute 'em!" Oh. Wait. That was Dr. Frazier. But Richard Taylor would have said it if he'd thought of it.
 
"I look upon such an expedition as is proposed as of the greatest importance" -- Grant to Sherman, February 18

"I regard the success of your present move as of great importance in reducing the number of troops necessary for protecting the navigation of the Mississippi River. It is also important that Shreveport should be taken as soon as possible." -- Grant to Banks, March 18

"It is of the first importance that we should hold Red River." -- Grant to Hunter, April 17

"Lieutenant-General Grant directs that orders heretofore given be so modified that no troops be withdrawn from operations against Shreveport and on Red River, and that operations there be continued under the senior officer in command until further orders.” -- Halleck to Banks and Steele, April 30


Grant was a fan of the idea of the campaign.
He was not a fan of how it turned out.
But who was.
 
Oh, here we go again. Grant was not a fan of the proposal but supported it because then-General in Chief Halleck wanted it. His acquiesence was in deference to his boss. The message in the OP from now-General in Chief Grant says, "I told you so."
 
"I look upon such an expedition as is proposed as of the greatest importance" -- Grant to Sherman, February 18

"I regard the success of your present move as of great importance in reducing the number of troops necessary for protecting the navigation of the Mississippi River. It is also important that Shreveport should be taken as soon as possible." -- Grant to Banks, March 18

"It is of the first importance that we should hold Red River." -- Grant to Hunter, April 17

"Lieutenant-General Grant directs that orders heretofore given be so modified that no troops be withdrawn from operations against Shreveport and on Red River, and that operations there be continued under the senior officer in command until further orders.” -- Halleck to Banks and Steele, April 30


Grant was a fan of the idea of the campaign.
He was not a fan of how it turned out.
But who was.

Taylor. And Texas.
 
Oh, here we go again. Grant was not a fan of the proposal but supported it because then-General in Chief Halleck wanted it. His acquiesence was in deference to his boss. The message in the OP from now-General in Chief Grant says, "I told you so."

I stand by Grant's own words written to Sherman in February that expressed his view of the proposal.
I will add that after the part I quoted he wrote "I regret that any force has to be taken from east of the Mississippi for it." So he was not a fan of drawing forces from the east to the west side of the river.

Of course once the campaign went poorly, everyone wanted to deny having been in favor of it at all.
 
Grant wanted those troops to operate against Mobile, not Shreveport. That was part of his original proposal for the 1864 spring campaign.

"I have not fully determined upon a plan of campaign for this spring, but will do so before the return of our veteran troops to the field. ... It may be a part of the plan for the spring campaign to move against Mobile. It certainly will be if troops enough can be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements." -- Grant to Banks, March 18th.

So as of the start of the Red River campaign, Grant had not yet made a proposal to operate against Mobile.
 
I suppose a more accurate title would have been Grant: Not a fan of sending his troops on the Red River campaign. Here is more of that Feb. 18 letter to Sherman:

NASHVILLE, February 18, 1864.

Major General W. T. SHERMAN,

Commanding Expedition against Meridian:

Inclosed I send you copy of dispatches between General Halleck and myself relative to a movement up Red River on your return from your present expedition. Whilst I look upon such an expedition as is proposed as of the greatest importance, I regret that any force has to be taken from east of the Mississippi for it.

Your troops will want rest for the purpose of preparing for a spring campaign, and all the veterans should be got off on furlough at the very earliest moment. This latter I would direct even if you have to spare troops to go up Red River.

Unless you go in command of the proposed expedition, I fear any troops you may send with it will be entirely lost from further service in this command. This, however, is not the reason for my suggestion that you be sent; your acquaintance with the country, and otherwise fitness were the reasons. I can give no positive orders that you send no troops up Red River, but what I do want is their speedy return if they do go, and that the minimum number necessary be sent. I have never heard a word from Steele since his department has been placed in the military division. Do not know what he proposes nor the means he has for executing.

He also later gave orders to Banks to capture Shreveport ASAP and immediately send his troops against Mobile.

Washington March 31st 1864
Maj. Gen. N. P. Banks Comd.g Dept. of the Gulf,
General:
In addition to the directions sent you by Lieut. Towner, for immediate concentration at New Orleans of all the forces you can spare from the defence of your Dept. preparatory to a move against Mobile, I would now add the following:

First. If successful in your expedition against Shreveport, that you turn over the defense of the Red River to General Steele and the navy.

Second. That you abandon Texas entirely, with the exception of your hold upon the Rio Grande. This can be held with 4,000 men, if they will turn their attention immediately to fortifying their positions. At least one-half of the force required for this service might be taken from the colored troops.

Third. By properly fortifying on the Mississippi River, the force to guard it from Port Hudson to New Orleans can be reduced to 10,000 men, if not to a less number. Six thousand more would then hold all the rest of the territory necessary to hold until active operations can again be resumed west of the river. According to your last returns, this would give you a force of over 30,000 effective men with which to move against Mobile. To this I expect to add 5,000 men from Missouri. If, however, you think the force here stated too small to hold the territory regarded as necessary to hold possession of, I would say concentrate at least 25,000 men of your present command for operations against Mobile. With these, and such additions as I can give you from elsewhere, lose no time in making a demonstration, to be followed by an attack upon Mobile. Two or more iron-clads will be ordered to report to Admiral Farragut. This gives him a strong naval fleet with which to cooperate. you can made your own arrangements with the admiral for his co-operation, and select you own line of approach. My own idea of the matter is that Pascagoula should be your base; but, form your long service in the Gulf Department, you will know best about the matter. It is intended that your movements shall be co-operative with movements elsewhere, and you cannot now start too soon. all I would now add is that you commence the concentration of your forces at once. Preserve a profound secrecy of what you intend doing, and start at the earliest possible moment.

U. S. GRANT,

Lieutenant-General.

So in other words, it's of the greatest importance, but don't use any of my men and get it over with quick so the real work can begin. :D

I think that Grant thought it was a distraction from the beginning, but he knew that the Lincoln administration was behind it, so he didn't want to publicly oppose it.

Edit: I'll add that Grant had been proposing a move against Mobile since Vicksburg. He may not have made a definite statement about it by then, but he always intended for Banks to move against Mobile.
 
Without any special knowledge, it would fit Grant's style to attack inward, towards the center of the Confederacy, rather than outward, whatever the benefits might be.
 
I suppose a more accurate title would have been Grant: Not a fan of sending his troops on the Red River campaign. Here is more of that Feb. 18 letter to Sherman:



He also later gave orders to Banks to capture Shreveport ASAP and immediately send his troops against Mobile.



So in other words, it's of the greatest importance, but don't use any of my men and get it over with quick so the real work can begin. :D

I think that Grant thought it was a distraction from the beginning, but he knew that the Lincoln administration was behind it, so he didn't want to publicly oppose it.

Edit: I'll add that Grant had been proposing a move against Mobile since Vicksburg. He may not have made a definite statement about it by then, but he always intended for Banks to move against Mobile.

The Lincoln administration was not behind it.

I think Grant explained his support. He wrote to Banks the campaign was important because taking Shreveport would reduce need for men along the mississipppi. He also wrote that he would plan a mobile campaign if he could get extra men Thus success on Red River = extra men for Mobile.
 
Lincoln had written Grant earlier and explicitly gave the importance of Texas as a reason against moving against Mobile.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, Washington, D. C., August 9, 1863.

Major General U. S. GRANT:

I see by a dispatch of yours that you incline quite strongly toward an expedition against Mobile. This would appear tempting to me also, were it not that, in view of recent events in Mexico, I am greatly impressed with the importance of re-establishing the national authority in Western Texas as soon as possible. I am not making an order, however; that I leave, for the present at least, to the General-in-Chief.

He also wrote Gen. Banks around the same time.

Executive Mansion, Washington,
My dear General Banks August 5, 1863.
Being a poor correspondent is the only apology I offer for not having sooner tendered my thanks for your very successful, and very valuable military operations this year. The final stroke in opening the Mississippi never should, and I think never will, be forgotten.

Recent events in Mexico, I think, render early action in Texas more important than ever. I expect, however, the General-in-Chief, will address you more fully upon this subject.
 
Those messages are from many months before the red river campaign and Lincoln desire for a presence in Texas had already been accomplished by the end of 1863.
Lincoln had written Grant earlier and explicitly gave the importance of Texas as a reason against moving against Mobile.



He also wrote Gen. Banks around the same time.[/QUO
 
Ludwell Johnson's Red River Campaign explains the politics and motivations behind the whole thing. To boil it down, it was done simply to shut people up who'd designs on Texas. There was no strategic, military justification for any of it. At least not put forth by thinking persons.
 
Ludwell Johnson's Red River Campaign explains the politics and motivations behind the whole thing. To boil it down, it was done simply to shut people up who'd designs on Texas. There was no strategic, military justification for any of it. At least not put forth by thinking persons.

Halleck seems to have agreed. On Jan. 8 he wrote to Grant,

In regard to General Banks' campaign against Texas, it is proper to remark that it was undertaken less for military reasons than as a matter of State policy. As a military measure simply, it perhaps presented less advantages than a movement on Mobile and the Alabama River, so as to threaten the enemy's interior lines and effect a diversion in favor of our armies at Chattanooga and in East Tennessee. But, however this may have been, it was deemed necessary as a matter of political or State policy, connected with our foreign relations, and especially with France and Mexico, that our troops should occupy and hold at least a portion of Texas. The President so ordered, for reasons satisfactory to himself and his cabinet, and it was, therefore, unnecessary for us to inquire whether or not the troops could have been employed elsewhere with greater military advantage.

I allude to this matter here, as it may have an important influence on your projected operations during the present winter.

Keeping in mind the fact that General Banks' operations in Texas, either on the gulf coast or by the Louisiana frontier, must be continued during the winter, it is to be considered whether it will not be better to direct our efforts for the present to the entire breaking up of the rebel forces west of the Mississippi River, rather than to divide them by also operating against Mobile and Alabama. If the forces of Smith, Price, and Magruder could be so scattered or broken as to enable Steele and Banks to occupy Red River as a line of defense, a part of their armies would probably become available for operations elsewhere.

This is what Grant had to say in his Memoirs:

General Banks had gone on an expedition up the Red River long before my promotion to general command. I had opposed the movement strenuously, but acquiesced because it was the order of my superior at the time.
 
Back
Top