Grant Grant as a Soldier - 1887

Status
Not open for further replies.
This particular writer had lived through the Civil War period. But he never had military training, and he never was engaged in combat. Therefore this writer was probably less qualified to write about the Civil War than the Prussian, Carl von Clausewitz.

I do not believe that an author has to go toe to toe with Clausewitz as a qualifier. It matters not what era the authors lived in, what training they had, whether they served in the military, or graduated from an academy. What matters is how they evaluate the evidence at hand (keeping in mind that as time passes, more evidence becomes available) and whether their conclusions are supported by the evidence. When cross checked, it has been proven that Alexander's book does not line up with multiple sources. This is what disqualifies the book as a legitimate resource on the topic.
 
The author begins the book by criticizing the military profession in general.

We conclude, then, that whatever the merit of the military character in ancient times, and afterwards in mediaeval times, to-day the profession of arms is the lowest among the professions ; that military education goes for little ; that the profession as a rule are ignorant; that the art is one requiring neither learning nor genius; that while the military intellect is of the average sort only, military character and manners, formed under factitious and unfavorable circumstances, are not to be commended ; that it is impossible rightly to estimate military merit, and that the customary laudations are absurd.

He writes that the affluent send their brightest sons to be lawyers, and send their dullest sons "to the church or the army." He writes:

The profession of arms lost its luster. It now ranks below all the others, and has ceased to be an intellectual profession. It can be called a profession only by courtesy.

So before even evaluating Grant, he lays the premise that professional soldiers are in a lower status than lawyers such as himself and McClernand.
Just to play devil's advocate at least until WW2 being a military office even if a graduate of West Point or Annapolis was not exactly a lucrative profession.
On the other hand a fifteen year old cadet Georgia McCellen was very bright and was very successful as a civilian.
So no Alexander was wrong many military academy graduates were very bright. Many entered service academies because there were few ways low income youth could afford going to a university.
Leftyhunter
 
I do not believe that an author has to go toe to toe with Clausewitz as a qualifier. It matters not what era the authors lived in, what training they had, whether they served in the military, or graduated from an academy. What matters is how they evaluate the evidence at hand (keeping in mind that as time passes, more evidence becomes available) and whether their conclusions are supported by the evidence. When cross checked, it has been proven that Alexander's book does not line up with multiple sources. This is what disqualifies the book as a legitimate resource on the topic.
You are writing about something else. The process you describe is the academic process of documenting the work, and having the documentation reviewed, which is academic equivalent of determining whether the results are replicable.
This particular person did not complete that process. He is neither an eyewitness, nor an expert. His writing is advocacy by a two bit local attorney. It is entitled to no significant weight and dropping it on the internet is as appraised above, nothing more than trolling.
 
You are writing about something else. The process you describe is the academic process of documenting the work, and having the documentation reviewed, which is academic equivalent of determining whether the results are replicable.
This particular person did not complete that process. He is neither an eyewitness, nor an expert. His writing is advocacy by a two bit local attorney. It is entitled to no significant weight and dropping it on the internet is as appraised above, nothing more than trolling.

I describe the work as not being a product of fact. Evidence is created from the moment an event occurs.
 
I do not believe that an author has to go toe to toe with Clausewitz as a qualifier. It matters not what era the authors lived in, what training they had, whether they served in the military, or graduated from an academy. What matters is how they evaluate the evidence at hand (keeping in mind that as time passes, more evidence becomes available) and whether their conclusions are supported by the evidence. When cross checked, it has been proven that Alexander's book does not line up with multiple sources. This is what disqualifies the book as a legitimate resource on the topic.
As to your suggestion that a 21st century writer may have access to sources that this person Alexander did not have available, it it worthy of exposition.
The question becomes was there a change in strategy and change in tactics after July 31, 1864? A person could explore whether there was a re-commitment to finishing the blockade, to cutting all trading through the lines, at least in Virginia, and to forming large, well equipped cavalry units, employing Forrest's tactics on a magnified scale and other changes to make an economic war?
One should be asking, did Grant convince the administration that soldiers should not be dying while cotton is being purchased and shipped to make people happy in old England and New England?
Which makes Alexander's concerns about tactics and land battles almost irrelevant.
 
As to your suggestion that a 21st century writer may have access to sources that this person Alexander did not have available, it it worthy of exposition.
The question becomes was there a change in strategy and change in tactics after July 31, 1864? A person could explore whether there was a re-commitment to finishing the blockade, to cutting all trading through the lines, at least in Virginia, and to forming large, well equipped cavalry units, employing Forrest's tactics on a magnified scale and other changes to make an economic war?
One should be asking, did Grant convince the administration that soldiers should not be dying while cotton is being purchased and shipped to make people happy in old England and New England?
Which makes Alexander's concerns about tactics and land battles almost irrelevant.

See post #85
 
but if the writer has numerous basic factual mistakes in his work, that indicates he was not self-taught well.

Woo... That is the question to be answered, the facts of Alexander's day may not be the facts we have today...

As to your suggestion that a 21st century writer may have access to sources that this person Alexander did not have available, it it worthy of exposition.

Wooo... A Truth! Yes, Alexander had access to a set of information that most likely differs from the set of information we use today.

The ney says need to compare the facts in Alexander's book with books from the same era...EDITED by MATT MCKEON. Less noise and more light, please.
 
Last edited by a moderator:
This person was not an eyewitness to the events he was commenting on. In a courtroom, the court would most likely rely on the opinions of people who had fought battles and won them, as opposed to people who have never been in a war. A court would also be looking to people who had studied military history, and written peer reviewed articles, and had testified in a useful way in previous cases.
With respect to military matters, Mr. Alexander does not meet any of those criteria.
Does history apply a softer standard to credibility?
Compare this person's writing to that of JFC Fuller. Fuller had experienced what stubborn ignorance had done to the armies on the Western Front. Was his comparison to of Grant and Lee to what happened in World War I enlightening?
 
If I was the one who compared history, evidence, and court cases....I regret it.

1. The original statement in the OP was fine. It mentioned a book and left it at that.

2. It is true that Grant had his detractors than, as he does now

3. We go off track when the book is used as an example of support in re-evaluating Grant

4. The study of history is not static, what may have stood up in 1870, can be proven wrong later on: Hood was not stoned on the job, Stuart was not on a joyride, and Grant was not stumbling drunk at command.

Turn the page....
 
Last edited:
An interesting book from 1887 examining Grant's abilities as a soldier:

https://archive.org/stream/grantassoldier00alex#page/n7
Wouldn't it be more objective to compare Grant to other generals and if we compare Grant to say Lee we get a mixed record.Some times they won some times they lost. Some times they wasted manpower i.e. Malvern Hill vs Cold Harbor.
War is a messy business and mistakes will be made.
Leftyhunter
 
So in your opinion, McClernand was the real genius of the western theater, not Grant and McClernand was responsible for Donelson, Shiloh, Iuka, Vicksburg . . etc. Oh, and I dismiss the book because, having held my lunch down while finishing it, I found it ridiculous in 100% of its conclusions and that it has precisely zero historical merit.

I said no such thing. However, going through your 4 examples:

1. Donelson

Yes, McClernand sustained most of the fighting. During Grant's long absence he was the senior officer present, although handicapped by Grant's orders. When Grant returned he came to McClernand and Wallace and issued an order to retreat. In the ensuing discussion Grant caved in to McClernand and authorised a counterattack instead, and then soonafter sent Col Webster (who was the lone aide riding with Grant) back to reiterate his retreat order directly to Wallace, who also refused it.

Grant frankly wrote at the time that the attack he ordered by Smith was only "to save appearances". The later demand from unconditional surrender came from Smith.

Now, given the available facts I think Grant wanted to let the garrison escape via the Nashville Road. He personally believed he was outnumbered;

"Matters here look favourable in one sense. We have the works of the enemy invested and they do not seem inclined to come out. They are very strong however being well fortified and hav-ing not less than 30,000 troops. All statements places their numbers much higher."

Letting them out would give Grant an easy victory that would give him the second star he was angling for. It would also avoid the siege he wanted to avoid.

2. Shiloh

McClernand was ranking general on the field for the first six hours and not enough attention has been paid to his actions. It is McClernand who co-ordinates the initial response and constructs the first defensive lines. There is a great deal of nonsense talked about Brigadier-General Sherman commanding Major-General McClernand.

McClernand and Buell conduct the majority of the morning counterattack on the second day.

3. Iuka

McClernand wasn't at Iuka. He was in Washington.

4. Vicksburg

Of course it was McClernand's idea and execution to turn the rebel defenses south of Vicksburg. Champion's Hill is a good example of Grant dysfunctioning as a commander - McClernand did exactly what he was told, but Grant's inefficient staff system and placing himself too far forward meant he could not issue prompt orders to McClernand. The same happened in the Vicksburg assault.
 
McClernand and Buell conduct the majority of the morning counterattack on the second day.
Under Grant's command.
McClernand did exactly what he was told, but Grant's inefficient staff system and placing himself too far forward meant he could not issue prompt orders to McClernand.
No matter what McClernand did it was Grant's fault.
Now, given the available facts I think Grant wanted to let the garrison escape via the Nashville Road
:bounce: Which completely explains Grant's "Unconditional Surrender" message - "Excuse me, I really want you to escape, but if you'd like to surrender to me it will be OK." Don't make me laugh.
 
The Vicksburg assault where McClernand flat-out lied to his commanding officer in announcing a non-existent breakthrough? That the one you mean?

It was a "break-in", and it was successful. If support had been promptly sent it could have been converted to a break-through.

Under Grant's command.

Apparently not. Buell appears to have attacked off his own hook and McClernand joined in. Grant's sector is quite quiet.

No matter what McClernand did it was Grant's fault.

McClernand promptly and correctly obeyed Grant's orders as he received them. The criticism of McClernand is based around the idea that he should have disobeyed Grant and attacked during a period where the forces in front of him were weak in spite of orders from Grant inhibiting such a move. There are lessons to be learnt, but not the ones you think.

:bounce: Which completely explains Grant's "Unconditional Surrender" message - "Excuse me, I really want you to escape, but if you'd like to surrender to me it will be OK." Don't make me laugh.

That was CF Smith. When Major Cheairs was walked into CF Smith's HQ and offered to surrender, Smith stated that he'd only accept unconditional surrender. Smith then walked Cheair's to Grant's HQ and woke Grant up. The sleepy and still addled Grant asked Smith what to do and Smith basically dictated to Grant what to write. (see Brinton's memoirs)

The surrender offer surprised everyone, Grant included.
 
Grant's sector is quite quiet.
It is all Grant's sector. He is in overall command.
Smith then walked Cheair's to Grant's HQ and woke Grant up. The sleepy and still addled Grant asked Smith what to do and Smith basically dictated to Grant what to write

So, according to you, Grant never actually did one single thing for which history has given him credit and these other geniuses (McClellan, McClernand and Buell et. al.) actually won the war without him. I'm beginning to doubt if he was even there. If I listen to you and your patron saint, Augustus W. Alexander, any longer, I will start to doubt that Ed Bearss and Bruce Catton and Steven Woodworth and Stephen Sears and Gordon Rhea or any of the historians I've been reading for fifty or more years had any idea what they were talking about. Heck, you've saved me from my delusions. McClellan, who didn't serve a day after 1862 won in the east. And Buell and McClernand who were both gone from the scene by mid-1863 won the west. Who would have thought it, except you and Alexander?
 
When Grant returned he came to McClernand and Wallace and issued an order to retreat.

Not according to McClernand:

"While little or no loss was sustained on our part in this second engagement, it served to discourage the enemy and relieve us from any further attack. We rested upon our arms until about 1.30 o'clock p.m., when your arrival gave promise that the general wish to advance would soon be gratified. In reply to my suggestion, urging a simultaneous assault at all points, I was gratified to receive an order to that effect. My command was put in readiness to move while you returned to put the Second Division in motion. Sending Major Mudd, of the Second Illinois Cavalry, to reconnoiter to the right and front, he hastened forward through thick woods and across a field covered with snow in that direction, and, finding a detached body of the enemy, he reported the fact. About the same the Eighth Missouri and Eleventh Indiana came up, and, forming on the right of General Wallace's line, advanced in the same direction."

Or Lew Wallace:

"About 3 o'clock General Grant rode up the hill and ordered an advance and attack on the enemy's left, while General Smith attacked their right. At General McClernand's request I undertook the proposed assault. "

Or Grant:

"About the close of this action the ammunition in cartridge-boxes gave out, which, with the loss of many of the field officers, produced great confusion in the ranks, and, seeing that the enemy did not take advantage of it, convinced me that equal confusion and possibly greater demoralization existed with him. Taking advantage of this fact, I <ar7_160> ordered a charge upon the left (enemy's right) with the division under General C. F. Smith, which was most brilliantly executed, and gave to our arms full assurance of victory. The battle lasted until dark, giving us possession of part of the intrenchments. An attack was ordered from the other flank after the charge by General Smith was commenced by the divisions under Generals McClernand and Wallace, which, notwithstanding the hours of exposure to a heavy fire in the forepart of the day, was gallantly made, and the enemy further repulsed. At the points thus gained, night having come on, all the troops encamped for the night, feeling that a complete victory would crown their labors at an early hour in the morning."
 
I said no such thing. However, going through your 4 examples:

1. Donelson

Yes, McClernand sustained most of the fighting. During Grant's long absence he was the senior officer present, although handicapped by Grant's orders. When Grant returned he came to McClernand and Wallace and issued an order to retreat. In the ensuing discussion Grant caved in to McClernand and authorised a counterattack instead, and then soonafter sent Col Webster (who was the lone aide riding with Grant) back to reiterate his retreat order directly to Wallace, who also refused it.

Grant frankly wrote at the time that the attack he ordered by Smith was only "to save appearances". The later demand from unconditional surrender came from Smith.

Now, given the available facts I think Grant wanted to let the garrison escape via the Nashville Road. He personally believed he was outnumbered;

"Matters here look favourable in one sense. We have the works of the enemy invested and they do not seem inclined to come out. They are very strong however being well fortified and hav-ing not less than 30,000 troops. All statements places their numbers much higher."

Letting them out would give Grant an easy victory that would give him the second star he was angling for. It would also avoid the siege he wanted to avoid.

2. Shiloh

McClernand was ranking general on the field for the first six hours and not enough attention has been paid to his actions. It is McClernand who co-ordinates the initial response and constructs the first defensive lines. There is a great deal of nonsense talked about Brigadier-General Sherman commanding Major-General McClernand.

McClernand and Buell conduct the majority of the morning counterattack on the second day.

3. Iuka

McClernand wasn't at Iuka. He was in Washington.

4. Vicksburg

Of course it was McClernand's idea and execution to turn the rebel defenses south of Vicksburg. Champion's Hill is a good example of Grant dysfunctioning as a commander - McClernand did exactly what he was told, but Grant's inefficient staff system and placing himself too far forward meant he could not issue prompt orders to McClernand. The same happened in the Vicksburg assault.
All of this is either wrong or a misrepresentation. Except number 3. No doubt McClernand was in Washington then.

A recent article posted on the forum claimed that Grant was successful because he was "lucky." One of the examples given of Grants good luck was the actions of the inept confederate commanders at Donelson. Actually, I think Grant suffered from bad luck at Donelson, having amateurs as 2 of his 3 division commanders. Professional officers on the center and right of the army would have understood their orders and worked together to maintain their position.

It's clear that the author of the book was associated with McClernand in some way, and tried to twist the facts in McClernands favor.
 
Last edited:
All of the above is either wrong or a misrepresentation. Except number 3. No doubt McClernand was in Washington then.

A recent article posted on the forum claimed that Grant was successful because he was "lucky." One of the examples given of Grants good luck was the actions of the inept confederate commanders at Donelson. Actually, I think Grant suffered from bad luck at Donelson, having amateurs as 2 of his 3 division commanders. Professional officers on the center and right of the army would have understood their orders and worked together to maintain their position.

It's clear that the author of the book was associated with McClernand in some way, and tried to twist the facts in McClernands favor.
In this thread we’ve heard accusations tha Alexander was a Rebel, had syphillis, and now was in collusion with McClernand, not to mention swipes at fellow members. Edited.
 
Status
Not open for further replies.
Back
Top