Grant Grant and Lincoln, July 31 1864 Meeting

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I was going to PM this to @Saphroneth but thought it would make an interesting thread.

In the book "Lincoln's Generals" (amazon link) the collator of the Grant papers, John Y. Simon, wrote an article about the 31st July 1864 meeting between Grant and Lincoln.

As a background, on 16th July Sherman received two telegraphic messages, one from Grant and one from Halleck, thus:

"Major-General SHERMAN:
The attempted invasion of Maryland having failed to give the enemy a firm foothold North, they are now returning, with possibly 25,000 troops. All the men they have here, beyond those sufficient to hold their strong fortifications, will be an element of weakness to eat up their supplies. It is not improbable, therefore, that you will find in the next fortnight re-enforcements in your front to the number indicated above. I advise, therefore, that if you get to Atlanta you set about destroying the railroads as far to the east and south of you as possible. Collect all the stores of the country for your own use, and select a point that you can hold until help can be had. I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men. If successful, I can detach from here for other enterprises, looking as much to your assistance as anything else.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General." - Lt Gen US Grant to Maj Gen WT Sherman, 16th July 1864

"Entre nous. I fear Grant has made a fatal mistake in putting himself south of James River. He cannot now reach Richmond without taking Petersburg, which is strongly fortified, crossing the Appomattox and recrossing the James. Moreover, by placing his army south of Richmond he opens the capital and the whole North to rebel raids. Lee can at any time detach 30,000 or 40,000 men without our knowing it till we are actually threatened. I hope we may yet have full success, but I find that many of Grant's general officers think the campaign already a failure. Perseverance, however, may compensate for all errors and overcome all obstacles. So mote it be. " - Maj Gen Henry Halleck to Maj Gen WT Sherman, 16th July 1864

Incredibly (as Castel pointed out in Decision in the West, ca. pg 359) this is Grant admitting failure to Sherman, and Halleck telling Sherman Grant has failed. Grant proposes to essentially go completely defensive and detach forces to Sherman. He is unconcerned with the Shenandoah valley, and that's the crux of the issue. He ignores Early completely.

On 30th July the Battle of the Crater was fought. Lincoln has already decided to meet with Lincoln and on that same day boards USS Baltimore to travel down to Fort Monroe. Lincoln meets with Grant at 1000 hrs on the 31st, and at 1500 hrs the Baltimore is heading back to Washington.

Simon's paper is the only examination of what probably happened at this meeting which Grant refused to acknowledge even happened in later life. This refusal to acknowledge tells us that it was not a pleasant meeting for Grant. Essentially Lincoln had let Grant run free for three months, and now Grant had not produced the results and Lincoln reimposed himself on his errant general. Grant was ordered to make major detachments from Richmond to the Valley, and 2 divisions of the Cavalry Corps, the whole of the 6th Corps and 2 divisions of 19th Corps Grant had already summoned from the Gulf for Richmond were went to Washington.

The Crater was the last serious attempt to break the rebel fortifications until the beginning of April 1865. Some movements attempting to probe the enemy flanks were undertaken, but nothing serious. In April '65 the catalyst for Grant returning to action seems to be the return of Sheridan with the cavalry and 6th Corps.

When discussing Petersburg it is perhaps worth noting that by July it was considered a failure, and only when the Federal army was able to reconcentrate eight months later did the serious attempt to take Richmond resume.
 
I was going to PM this to @Saphroneth but thought it would make an interesting thread.

In the book "Lincoln's Generals" (amazon link) the collator of the Grant papers, John Y. Simon, wrote an article about the 31st July 1864 meeting between Grant and Lincoln.

As a background, on 16th July Sherman received two telegraphic messages, one from Grant and one from Halleck, thus:

"Major-General SHERMAN:
The attempted invasion of Maryland having failed to give the enemy a firm foothold North, they are now returning, with possibly 25,000 troops. All the men they have here, beyond those sufficient to hold their strong fortifications, will be an element of weakness to eat up their supplies. It is not improbable, therefore, that you will find in the next fortnight re-enforcements in your front to the number indicated above. I advise, therefore, that if you get to Atlanta you set about destroying the railroads as far to the east and south of you as possible. Collect all the stores of the country for your own use, and select a point that you can hold until help can be had. I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men. If successful, I can detach from here for other enterprises, looking as much to your assistance as anything else.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General." - Lt Gen US Grant to Maj Gen WT Sherman, 16th July 1864

"Entre nous. I fear Grant has made a fatal mistake in putting himself south of James River. He cannot now reach Richmond without taking Petersburg, which is strongly fortified, crossing the Appomattox and recrossing the James. Moreover, by placing his army south of Richmond he opens the capital and the whole North to rebel raids. Lee can at any time detach 30,000 or 40,000 men without our knowing it till we are actually threatened. I hope we may yet have full success, but I find that many of Grant's general officers think the campaign already a failure. Perseverance, however, may compensate for all errors and overcome all obstacles. So mote it be. " - Maj Gen Henry Halleck to Maj Gen WT Sherman, 16th July 1864

Incredibly (as Castel pointed out in Decision in the West, ca. pg 359) this is Grant admitting failure to Sherman, and Halleck telling Sherman Grant has failed. Grant proposes to essentially go completely defensive and detach forces to Sherman. He is unconcerned with the Shenandoah valley, and that's the crux of the issue. He ignores Early completely.

On 30th July the Battle of the Crater was fought. Lincoln has already decided to meet with Lincoln and on that same day boards USS Baltimore to travel down to Fort Monroe. Lincoln meets with Grant at 1000 hrs on the 31st, and at 1500 hrs the Baltimore is heading back to Washington.

Simon's paper is the only examination of what probably happened at this meeting which Grant refused to acknowledge even happened in later life. This refusal to acknowledge tells us that it was not a pleasant meeting for Grant. Essentially Lincoln had let Grant run free for three months, and now Grant had not produced the results and Lincoln reimposed himself on his errant general. Grant was ordered to make major detachments from Richmond to the Valley, and 2 divisions of the Cavalry Corps, the whole of the 6th Corps and 2 divisions of 19th Corps Grant had already summoned from the Gulf for Richmond were went to Washington.

The Crater was the last serious attempt to break the rebel fortifications until the beginning of April 1865. Some movements attempting to probe the enemy flanks were undertaken, but nothing serious. In April '65 the catalyst for Grant returning to action seems to be the return of Sheridan with the cavalry and 6th Corps.

When discussing Petersburg it is perhaps worth noting that by July it was considered a failure, and only when the Federal army was able to reconcentrate eight months later did the serious attempt to take Richmond resume.
What failure was Grant admitting to? I don't see it.
 
I was going to PM this to @Saphroneth but thought it would make an interesting thread.

In the book "Lincoln's Generals" (amazon link) the collator of the Grant papers, John Y. Simon, wrote an article about the 31st July 1864 meeting between Grant and Lincoln.

As a background, on 16th July Sherman received two telegraphic messages, one from Grant and one from Halleck, thus:

"Major-General SHERMAN:
The attempted invasion of Maryland having failed to give the enemy a firm foothold North, they are now returning, with possibly 25,000 troops. All the men they have here, beyond those sufficient to hold their strong fortifications, will be an element of weakness to eat up their supplies. It is not improbable, therefore, that you will find in the next fortnight re-enforcements in your front to the number indicated above. I advise, therefore, that if you get to Atlanta you set about destroying the railroads as far to the east and south of you as possible. Collect all the stores of the country for your own use, and select a point that you can hold until help can be had. I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men. If successful, I can detach from here for other enterprises, looking as much to your assistance as anything else.
U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General." - Lt Gen US Grant to Maj Gen WT Sherman, 16th July 1864

"Entre nous. I fear Grant has made a fatal mistake in putting himself south of James River. He cannot now reach Richmond without taking Petersburg, which is strongly fortified, crossing the Appomattox and recrossing the James. Moreover, by placing his army south of Richmond he opens the capital and the whole North to rebel raids. Lee can at any time detach 30,000 or 40,000 men without our knowing it till we are actually threatened. I hope we may yet have full success, but I find that many of Grant's general officers think the campaign already a failure. Perseverance, however, may compensate for all errors and overcome all obstacles. So mote it be. " - Maj Gen Henry Halleck to Maj Gen WT Sherman, 16th July 1864

Incredibly (as Castel pointed out in Decision in the West, ca. pg 359) this is Grant admitting failure to Sherman, and Halleck telling Sherman Grant has failed. Grant proposes to essentially go completely defensive and detach forces to Sherman. He is unconcerned with the Shenandoah valley, and that's the crux of the issue. He ignores Early completely.

On 30th July the Battle of the Crater was fought. Lincoln has already decided to meet with Lincoln and on that same day boards USS Baltimore to travel down to Fort Monroe. Lincoln meets with Grant at 1000 hrs on the 31st, and at 1500 hrs the Baltimore is heading back to Washington.

Simon's paper is the only examination of what probably happened at this meeting which Grant refused to acknowledge even happened in later life. This refusal to acknowledge tells us that it was not a pleasant meeting for Grant. Essentially Lincoln had let Grant run free for three months, and now Grant had not produced the results and Lincoln reimposed himself on his errant general. Grant was ordered to make major detachments from Richmond to the Valley, and 2 divisions of the Cavalry Corps, the whole of the 6th Corps and 2 divisions of 19th Corps Grant had already summoned from the Gulf for Richmond were went to Washington.

The Crater was the last serious attempt to break the rebel fortifications until the beginning of April 1865. Some movements attempting to probe the enemy flanks were undertaken, but nothing serious. In April '65 the catalyst for Grant returning to action seems to be the return of Sheridan with the cavalry and 6th Corps.

When discussing Petersburg it is perhaps worth noting that by July it was considered a failure, and only when the Federal army was able to reconcentrate eight months later did the serious attempt to take Richmond resume.
Grant never attempted to take Richmond. He attempted (and succeeded) to bottle Lee up and take him out of the war. Lee was Grant's only target - not Richmond. And you'll note the incompetent Halleck is referring to failure, not Grant.
 
What failure was Grant admitting to? I don't see it.

Taking Richmond/ Petersburg. He essentially had decided to give up against Richmond and shift forces to Sherman, although they ended up in the Shenandoah.

"I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men." writes Grant then "If successful, I can detach from here for other enterprises, looking as much to your assistance as anything else.".

That's Grants thinking as of mid-July.
 
Taking Richmond/ Petersburg. He essentially had decided to give up against Richmond and shift forces to Sherman, although they ended up in the Shenandoah.

"I shall make a desperate effort to get a position here which will hold the enemy without the necessity of so many men." writes Grant then "If successful, I can detach from here for other enterprises, looking as much to your assistance as anything else.".

That's Grants thinking as of mid-July.
Once again, Grant never attempted to or meant to attempt to take Richmond. He meant to fight Lee and keep fighting him 'til the end.
 
Grant never attempted to take Richmond. He attempted (and succeeded) to bottle Lee up and take him out of the war. Lee was Grant's only target - not Richmond. And you'll note the incompetent Halleck is referring to failure, not Grant.

That's a backwards reading of history.

Grant ideally wanted to destroy Lee in order to get to Richmond. He failed at that. Now whilst he did manage to tie up 50,000 of Lee's men at Richmond, they removed Grant's larger force equally as effectively. The war played out in the Shenandoah and around Atlanta. Grant was satisfied with simply holding his position.
 
That's a backwards reading of history.

Grant ideally wanted to destroy Lee in order to get to Richmond. He failed at that. Now whilst he did manage to tie up 50,000 of Lee's men at Richmond, they removed Grant's larger force equally as effectively. The war played out in the Shenandoah and around Atlanta. Grant was satisfied with simply holding his position.
Grant wanted to destroy Lee to end the war. Period. Remember his admonition to Meade about objectives.
 
Halleck and Stanton are the problem, had been the problem and were the problem. After the election, Ulysses Grant took the war away from Halleck and Stanton and the war ended in 3 and 1/4 months.
They were all worried about all kinds of contingencies that could occur. However Wright and Sheridan protected Washington, and it was Early's attempt to hold out in Maryland that failed. Schofield and McPherson were able to get to the railroads east of Atlanta, so if Lee had detached southward those troops would have had trouble getting to Atlanta, being supplied there, and getting away to the North and East.
 
Everyone in Washington knew what were the problems facing the United States, what the did not see was that the Confederacy was breaking down and civil order was dissolving.
Early in Shenandoah Valley could still take the United States army by surprise, and get nothing from it.
 
One suspects that, perhaps ironically, McClellan and Grant could console one another in later life for being blamed about not winning the war in three months. (And for that matter about everyone seeing the James as a bad route.)
 
One suspects that, perhaps ironically, McClellan and Grant could console one another in later life for being blamed about not winning the war in three months. (And for that matter about everyone seeing the James as a bad route.)
Grant and McClellan started the war with similar views. Grant stated in writing that had he voted in 1860 it would have been for Stephen A. Douglas. He also revealed his sense of humor, by stating in 1856 that he voted for James Buchanan, because he knew John C. Fremont.
However Grant changed his views during 1862-1863. If the war is going to include battles like Shiloh, the issue of slavery probably should be settled absolutely and finally, in Grant's view.
 
Grant and McClellan started the war with similar views. Grant stated in writing that had he voted in 1860 it would have been for Stephen A. Douglas. He also revealed his sense of humor, by stating in 1856 that he voted for James Buchanan, because he knew John C. Fremont.
However Grant changed his views during 1862-1863. If the war is going to include battles like Shiloh, the issue of slavery probably should be settled absolutely and finally, in Grant's view.
I... don't think any of that was relevant to what I said, but whatever.
 
Simon's paper is the only examination of what probably happened at this meeting which Grant refused to acknowledge even happened in later life. This refusal to acknowledge tells us that it was not a pleasant meeting for Grant.

This meeting is covered in several standard biographies, and Simon's examination is a speculation of a few paragraphs. See Catton or Simpson. Why you would claim otherwise is bizarre.

As for why Grant didn't mention it, we take your assertion as speculation. As you follow Simon, however, your conclusion is not surprising.

Did McClellan ever talk about the time he reportedly snubbed Lincoln? Should we assume he was hiding something, too?
Grant was ordered to make major detachments from Richmond to the Valley, and 2 divisions of the Cavalry Corps, the whole of the 6th Corps and 2 divisions of 19th Corps Grant had already summoned from the Gulf for Richmond were went to Washington.

Now you're making stuff up. What's your authority for this statement?
 
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In the book "Lincoln's Generals" (amazon link) the collator of the Grant papers, John Y. Simon, wrote an article about the 31st July 1864 meeting between Grant and Lincoln.

Another person who fell into the pitfall of this John Y Simon essay. I missed this earlier, but, I will say that there are other mischaracterizations that are contained that essay -- enough that I have now discounted it altogether as a useful source. Concurrent to this thread, was another thread in which I quoted this passage from the essay:

General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck, now outranked by his former subordinate, had forced Grant's hand by requesting to be relieved. Higher rank required Grant to assume overall command.Grant resolved the problem by arranging Halleck's appointment as chief of staff, leaving him in Washington to coordinate orders, freeing Grant to establish headquarters wherever he wished. Halleck's new post separated strategic command from administration, a crucial innovation in modern warfare. Grant avoided the role of military advisor to Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton, a role congenial to Halleck, but intolerable to Grant, who intended to remain a commander, rather than a courtier, and to distance himself from politicians. Lincoln's Generals, Grant, Lincoln, and Unconditional Surrender, John Y. Simon, [pg 165-6]
Further investigation reveals that the article was not only grossly oversimplified in its overview of Grant and the Lt Generalship, but also flat out wrong. The duties of the Lt. General and that of General-in-Chief/Chief of Staff were separate entities from the onset -- not some desperate slight-of-hand maneuver for Grant to "secure" the field position that he preferred. It was understood from the onset that Grant would command his armies where he saw fit. Another point: It was not the Happily-Ever-After relationship with Halleck after he and Grant settled into their duties. By August of 1864, the relationship was strained due to Halleck's constant meddling. https://www.c-span.org/video/?305846-3/lincoln-congress-grant-lieutenant-general-act

Grant was very astute politically (Read Let Us Have Peace) and his handling of Washington was masterful in light of those who came before him. Regarding speculation of what went on in that July 31st meeting: It is as good as a "What If" thread full of smoke, mirrors, and plenty of conjecture.
 
Halleck was the Chief-of-Staff to Stanton, not Grant. Grant had his own CoS, John Rawlins.

Due to the chain of command, Halleck remained in practical control, if not nominal command, of all armies except Grant's SE Va army. Grant is of course still suborned to the civilian government, and his immediate boss is Stanton. Halleck, as Stanton's CoS is between Stanton and Grant.

The deal with Grant was that he was told he would take command of the Virginia army, and leave the control of the war in Halleck's hands. Grant had a great deal of latitude, as long as he adopted the instructed line. This lasted until he crossed the James and Early went up the Valley. The Grant-Lincoln meeting is Lincoln withdrawing this unconditional support, and it shows in future events.
 
What a little **** Halleck is being in his telegram to Sherman. "Entre nous" indeed, retailing gossip. Nervous in the service about Confederate raids while sitting behind the elaborate fortifications and thousands of men. Gen. Lee might attack him! Staunton, for all his considerable ability, usually lost his nerve if he thought some rebs were a comin' as well. The two of them were best suited to office work, well out of danger.

I don't know this, but Halleck must have ground his teeth when Grant accepted Lee's surrender. I'm a not just a footnote!
 
Halleck was the Chief-of-Staff to Stanton, not Grant. Grant had his own CoS, John Rawlins.

Due to the chain of command, Halleck remained in practical control, if not nominal command, of all armies except Grant's SE Va army. Grant is of course still suborned to the civilian government, and his immediate boss is Stanton. Halleck, as Stanton's CoS is between Stanton and Grant.

The deal with Grant was that he was told he would take command of the Virginia army, and leave the control of the war in Halleck's hands. Grant had a great deal of latitude, as long as he adopted the instructed line. This lasted until he crossed the James and Early went up the Valley. The Grant-Lincoln meeting is Lincoln withdrawing this unconditional support, and it shows in future events.

What a novel interpretation.
 
This meeting occurred shortly before Grant took things firmly in hand following another Union defeat in the Shenandoah Valley at Second Kernstown on July 24, about which I wrote in my thread on that battle https://civilwartalk.com/threads/cr...cond-battle-of-kernstown.125887/#post-1361997 :

The importance of the battle as summed up on the Civil War Trails marker at the stone wall: The victorious Confederates swept up Pritchard's Hill and through Winchester, driving back the entire Union army in confusion to Bunker Hill, West Virginia. The Union army lost 1,200 men, while Early suffered only 200 casualties. A Virginia veteran summed up the second Battle of Kernstown as "the most easily won battle of the war." More ominously, this humiliation to Union arms was directly responsible for the meeting which occurred August 5, 1864, at the Thomas House on the old Monocacy battlefield, below, in which an exasperated Ulysses S. Grant confronted Hunter, Wright, and Crook. Turning to the senior Hunter, Grant asked the whereabouts of Early and his Army of the Valley, whereupon Hunter answered "I have no idea." Grant's own solution to the problem of Early had been penned less than a week before to the authorities in Washington: "I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death."
 
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