Grant Grant and "attrition"

Norm53

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"I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance; second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land."

https://civilwarhome.com/usgrantreport.html

Doesn't this quote settle the many arguments about Grant's attitude towards "attrition"?
 
I never understood the Argument. All Wars are about attrition. Whoever runs out of Money, Manpower or Will first, Loses.

Grant says these things, but Lincoln controlled the purse strings along with recruitment. Confederacy couldn’t borrow money or sustain a currency. That had more to do with losing the War than anything else.

Grant deserves Credit. However you can argument about his effectiveness. He don’t deserve all the Credit. Jay Cooke gets none!
 
by mere attrition, if in no other way

That is to say, attrition was his last choice, but he would use it if he had to.

Each step of the Overland campaign started with Grant attempting to maneuver to engage the ANV on favorable terms, but the Confederates always moved a bit too fast. When maneuver was frustrated, Grant was willing to engage in frontal assault.

His earlier campaigns featured innovative strategies and tactics, with no intent to fight a battle of attrition.
 
That is to say, attrition was his last choice, but he would use it if he had to.

Each step of the Overland campaign started with Grant attempting to maneuver to engage the ANV on favorable terms, but the Confederates always moved a bit too fast. When maneuver was frustrated, Grant was willing to engage in frontal assault.

His earlier campaigns featured innovative strategies and tactics, with no intent to fight a battle of attrition.

According to how you analyze it. Lincoln retained with financial incentives all of the Troops who‘s time was up. Set recruitment goals. Planned with Grant all of the facets of the Spring 64 Campaign. Sherman was to keep the West busy so they couldn’t send Troops East. Red River Campaign. Mobile Campaign. All of it was to isolate Lee. And to save Lincoln’s Election. Some of these campaigns were successful, some Not. All of it was Grant’s military stragety.

Grant’s campaign in the East. He did what he had to do to beat Lee. It was a brutal campaign from the start. He promised Lincoln he wouldn’t back up. Got Frustrated and changed Tactics. Whatever. Grant had a timeline, Lee was still in the Field on Election Day. You don’t think he wanted it done Sooner.
 
Grant and "attrition"
In the OR's there is no indication attrition was talked about. He did want to do everything possible to maintain 100,000 troops
and let the chips fall. In my view, from Petersburg to to Appomattox was for naught. IMO
 
"I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance; second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land."

https://civilwarhome.com/usgrantreport.html

Doesn't this quote settle the many arguments about Grant's attitude towards "attrition"?
I think the quote is referring to what he plans to do to Lee. So in that context, it would be the continual killing and wounding and reducing of Lee’s army.
 
I think its safe to say Lee , Longstreet , Jackson performed exceptionally and that Union commanders didn't understand that to take Richmond they needed to get rid of the field army protecting it first , Lincoln already knew this in Sept 1862 no grand strategy was ever going to defeat the South only using attrition tactics and unfortunately for Lincoln who could not find a commander likeminded.

Both Lincoln and Grant knew what it would take to defeat Lee , Grant takes the credit for defeating Lee and rightly so but Lincoln should also take a lot of credit as a non military man he soon understood what the Union needed to do to win in East.
 
"I therefore determined, first, to use the greatest number of troops practicable against the armed force of the enemy, preventing him from using the same force at different seasons against first one and then another of our armies, and the possibility of repose for refitting and producing necessary supplies for carrying on resistance; second, to hammer continuously against the armed force of the enemy and his resources, until by mere attrition, if in no other way, there should be nothing left to him but an equal submission with the loyal section of our common country to the constitution and laws of the land."

https://civilwarhome.com/usgrantreport.html

Doesn't this quote settle the many arguments about Grant's attitude towards "attrition"?
I never understood the arguments that Grant was a butcher especially has on a per capita basis he lost less men then Lee. Grant was a highly intelligent commander he made some mistakes but that happens in war. Grant had an excellent grasp of what it would take to win the ACW.
Leftyhunter
 
I never understood the arguments that Grant was a butcher especially has on a per capita basis he lost less men then Lee. Grant was a highly intelligent commander he made some mistakes but that happens in war. Grant had an excellent grasp of what it would take to win the ACW.
Leftyhunter

Fake news and anti Grant propaganda Lincoln was happy and that's all that counted.
 
I think its safe to say Lee , Longstreet , Jackson performed exceptionally and that Union commanders didn't understand that to take Richmond they needed to get rid of the field army protecting it first , Lincoln already knew this in Sept 1862 no grand strategy was ever going to defeat the South only using attrition tactics and unfortunately for Lincoln who could not find a commander likeminded.

Both Lincoln and Grant knew what it would take to defeat Lee , Grant takes the credit for defeating Lee and rightly so but Lincoln should also take a lot of credit as a non military man he soon understood what the Union needed to do to win in East.
The counter argument that our friends @Saphroneth and @67th Tigers make is had McCelllan received the troops Lincoln promised during the Overland Campaign McCelllan had an excellent chance of siezing Richmond.
It's a fair argument.
Leftyhunter
 
The term "attrition" in warfare seems to me to reflect static forces battling it out across some major geographic line without either side making noticeable advances. That is very different from Grant's Overland Campaign which was a continual war of movement from the Rappahanock to the James Rivers.
 
So fundamentally in warfare, per Citino, there are two types of warfare - the war of manoeuvre and the war of material.

The war of manoeuvre seeks to defeat the enemy without wearing them down first, because wearing down the enemy is costly to both sides; the war of material seeks to defeat the enemy by wearing them down, because their side is more able to endure the process.

Now, within the war of materiel there's the subsets of trying to win with equipment or with manpower, and of course there's more nuance to it.


I would characterize the generals in the East who got close to taking Richmond, or who had to defend it, as follows:


Lee - fundamentally engaged in attempting to fight a war of manoeuvre first. His state was the weaker in resource terms and he wanted to destroy an enemy army without having to wear them down because his own resources could not sustain such a conflict for as long.

McClellan - fundamentally engaged in attempting to fight a war of equipment first and manoeuvre second. His operations were predicated on using manoeuvre where possible, and he's certainly willing to attack where needed, but his end-game for the Richmond operations (and the Yorktown operations, when required) was based on the use of his artillery superiority to create a situation where the Confederates had to attack at heavy cost into his entrenchments - or face bombardment and abandon Richmond.

Grant - fundamentally engaged in attempting to fight a war of manpower first and manoeuvre second. His operations certainly include manoeuvres, but they don't really involve part of the main army operating independently, and his instinct on multiple occasions when reaching Lee's dug-in lines is not to manoeuvre first - it's to hit Lee with the biggest hammer blow he can muster, and on multiple occasions he sends for more troops to get a bigger hammer.


This is not to say that Grant making this decision is incorrect, per se. Lee's army is certainly smaller than his own and is vulnerable to attrition. But we should recognize that:

If Grant was aiming to manoeuvre around Lee and get in a position to besiege Richmond, then his heavy attacks were bad decisions.
If Grant was aiming to beat Lee in a single battle in the field, then he failed to do so.
If Grant was aiming to manoeuvre around Lee and cut him off from Richmond, then he failed to do so.
If Grant was aiming to beat Lee through attrition (i.e. his manoeuvres were to create a situation where the battles would cost Lee more than they cost Grant) then he failed to do so.
If Grant was mostly manoeuvering around to get in position to besiege Richmond, but made the attacks for opportunistic or political-support reasons (i.e. to "prove" that he was a tough minded general) then he was successful at maintaining that political support.
 
If Grant was aiming to manoeuvre around Lee and get in a position to besiege Richmond, then his heavy attacks were bad decisions.
If Grant was aiming to beat Lee in a single battle in the field, then he failed to do so.
If Grant was aiming to manoeuvre around Lee and cut him off from Richmond, then he failed to do so.
If Grant was aiming to beat Lee through attrition (i.e. his manoeuvres were to create a situation where the battles would cost Lee more than they cost Grant) then he failed to do so.
If Grant was mostly manoeuvering around to get in position to besiege Richmond, but made the attacks for opportunistic or political-support reasons (i.e. to "prove" that he was a tough minded general) then he was successful at maintaining that political support.
If Grant was employing both attack and maneuver, so as to beat him in the field or to drive him into a siege, as the opportunities were presented, until Lee and his army were defeated or made ineffective, then he was successful.
 
So fundamentally in warfare, per Citino, there are two types of warfare - the war of manoeuvre and the war of material.

The war of manoeuvre seeks to defeat the enemy without wearing them down first, because wearing down the enemy is costly to both sides; the war of material seeks to defeat the enemy by wearing them down, because their side is more able to endure the process.

Now, within the war of materiel there's the subsets of trying to win with equipment or with manpower, and of course there's more nuance to it.


I would characterize the generals in the East who got close to taking Richmond, or who had to defend it, as follows:


Lee - fundamentally engaged in attempting to fight a war of manoeuvre first. His state was the weaker in resource terms and he wanted to destroy an enemy army without having to wear them down because his own resources could not sustain such a conflict for as long.

McClellan - fundamentally engaged in attempting to fight a war of equipment first and manoeuvre second. His operations were predicated on using manoeuvre where possible, and he's certainly willing to attack where needed, but his end-game for the Richmond operations (and the Yorktown operations, when required) was based on the use of his artillery superiority to create a situation where the Confederates had to attack at heavy cost into his entrenchments - or face bombardment and abandon Richmond.

Grant - fundamentally engaged in attempting to fight a war of manpower first and manoeuvre second. His operations certainly include manoeuvres, but they don't really involve part of the main army operating independently, and his instinct on multiple occasions when reaching Lee's dug-in lines is not to manoeuvre first - it's to hit Lee with the biggest hammer blow he can muster, and on multiple occasions he sends for more troops to get a bigger hammer.


This is not to say that Grant making this decision is incorrect, per se. Lee's army is certainly smaller than his own and is vulnerable to attrition. But we should recognize that:

If Grant was aiming to manoeuvre around Lee and get in a position to besiege Richmond, then his heavy attacks were bad decisions.
If Grant was aiming to beat Lee in a single battle in the field, then he failed to do so.
If Grant was aiming to manoeuvre around Lee and cut him off from Richmond, then he failed to do so.
If Grant was aiming to beat Lee through attrition (i.e. his manoeuvres were to create a situation where the battles would cost Lee more than they cost Grant) then he failed to do so.
If Grant was mostly manoeuvering around to get in position to besiege Richmond, but made the attacks for opportunistic or political-support reasons (i.e. to "prove" that he was a tough minded general) then he was successful at maintaining that political support.
Would it be fair to say Grant waged an imperfect war of munavore ? After the battle of the Wilderness Grant tried and succeeded in outmunvoring Lee towards Richmond.
Grant did as he admitted made a major mistake by attacking Cold Harbor but did outmunvore Lee in reaching Petersburg with a superior force but his men reacted to cautiously and dug in instead of storming Petersburg when Confederate forces were weak and then waited to long giving the Confederate Army time to reinforce Petersburg ending in something akin to a WW1 battle.
Leftyhunter
 
If Grant was employing both attack and maneuver, so as to beat him in the field or to drive him into a siege, as the opportunities were presented, until Lee and his army were defeated or made ineffective, then he was successful.
While you could certainly argue that (and I think the idea of Grant manoeuvering while also being willing to exploit opportunities has merit) I think that if you hold that view you also must admit that Grant didn't actually pick opportunities which panned out.

Possibly that was bad luck - a 50% chance that doesn't pan out doesn't become invalid because you rolled a 2 - but it could also have been a judgement issue.
 
Would it be fair to say Grant waged an imperfect war of munavore ? After the battle of the Wilderness Grant tried and succeeded in outmunvoring Lee towards Richmond.
Grant did as he admitted made a major mistake by attacking Cold Harbor but did outmunvore Lee in reaching Petersburg with a superior force but his men reacted to cautiously and dug in instead of storming Petersburg when Confederate forces were weak and then waited to long giving the Confederate Army time to reinforce Petersburg ending in something akin to a WW1 battle.
I think the problem with arguing that Grant was going for a war of manoeuvre first is that Grant's course of action when he runs into an enemy defensive line is always to attack first - he doesn't manoeuvre and then attack when the opportunities for manoeuvre are gone, instead he attacks and then manoeuvres when the attack has failed.

It's also worth realizing that none of Grant's attacks really accomplished anything that couldn't have been done by marching. Once the dust has settled at the Wilderness Grant has more than 120,000 men PFD left; he could have marched on a series of outflanking movements which Lee couldn't block, which would have left Grant with an army larger than Lee's (once all the troops that joined Lee north of the James historically had been added in Lee would have less than 90,000 men, a picture complicated by the way Grant wouldn't have had to pull in Butler's force and so Lee couldn't have the forces facing Butler join him) and left Washington garrisoned by ~40,000 or so more men than the historical total.
 
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