Gettysburg: Was A.P. Hill to blame for the Battle?

Archer and Davis were probing Buford's Cavalry when they were hit by surprise by Reynold's infantry and eventually fell back. Rodes made the next attack. Am I missing something but that seems to me to be the point where the engagement became "General"?
 
Archer and Davis were probing Buford's Cavalry when they were hit by surprise by Reynold's infantry and eventually fell back. Rodes made the next attack. Am I missing something but that seems to me to be the point where the engagement became "General"?
Well pretty close ill stand corrected but the rest of Heth's division attacked after Archer and Davis so that would be Pettigrew and Brockenbrough and them some of Pender's Division I think it was Lane , Perrin , Scales and then Rode's so pretty much 3x Divisions.
 
Just a quick general timeline for refererence:

1030: Davis begins pushing Cutler.
1045: Iron Brigade hits Archer; Davis routs the 147th New York and Hall's Battery and begins to turn to the south and the Cut.
1100: Archer withdraws; 6th Wisconsin, 95th New York, and 14th Brooklyn move to the Chambersburg Pike
1115: Attack against the Cut
1130: Confederates are returning to Herr's Ridge
1345: Rodes has arrived and Blackford's Sharpshooters are skirmishing with elements of the Eleventh Corps
1400: O'Neal attacks
1430: Pettigrew attacks; Iverson attacks
1445: Pettigrew crosses Willoughby Run
1500: Baxter charges Iverson; Daniel attacks the Chambersburg Pike and in support of Iverson's survivors
1515: Iron Brigade retreats; Pettigrew attacks Biddle; Brockenbrough "attacks" Stone; Gordon attacks Blocher's Knoll
1545: Union rallies on Seminary Ridge; Pender is crossing Willougby Run
1600: Pender crosses McPherson's Ridge and begins the attack on Seminary Ridge
1615: Rodes' final attack against Robinson and his line begins to withdraw
1620: Eleventh Corps line collapses
1645: Seminary Ridge line collapses; Brickyard fight

Ryan
 
Just a quick general timeline for refererence:

1030: Davis begins pushing Cutler.
1045: Iron Brigade hits Archer; Davis routs the 147th New York and Hall's Battery and begins to turn to the south and the Cut.
1100: Archer withdraws; 6th Wisconsin, 95th New York, and 14th Brooklyn move to the Chambersburg Pike
1115: Attack against the Cut
1130: Confederates are returning to Herr's Ridge
1345: Rodes has arrived and Blackford's Sharpshooters are skirmishing with elements of the Eleventh Corps
1400: O'Neal attacks
1430: Pettigrew attacks; Iverson attacks
1445: Pettigrew crosses Willoughby Run
1500: Baxter charges Iverson; Daniel attacks the Chambersburg Pike and in support of Iverson's survivors
1515: Iron Brigade retreats; Pettigrew attacks Biddle; Brockenbrough "attacks" Stone; Gordon attacks Blocher's Knoll
1545: Union rallies on Seminary Ridge; Pender is crossing Willougby Run
1600: Pender crosses McPherson's Ridge and begins the attack on Seminary Ridge
1615: Rodes' final attack against Robinson and his line begins to withdraw
1620: Eleventh Corps line collapses
1645: Seminary Ridge line collapses; Brickyard fight

Ryan
Thanks RP it was off the top of my head i get a bit confused with the order.
 
Regardless of whether Hill knew exactly what he was doing, why didn't he feel a need to shake out a skirmish line before proceeding instead of leading with his artillery? Do we know of any similar circumstance in the Civil War where artillery led the infantry? Admittedly, the skirmishers would have made the same contact with Buford but perhaps Hill would've recalled Lee's orders to not bring on an engagement and backed off. Leading with artillery indicates to me Hill had no intention of avoiding an engagement.

That's on Heth not Hill. Heth's first time in division command and it showed.
 
I think you are on the right track. Hill was new to corps command and thus under emotional stress.
Corp command is a high pressure posting.

I think it's more likely that Gettysburg is the first we see of Hill's physical decline. If i remember correctly, when Lee comes up on July 1 and inquires of Hill the situation, Hill looks physically ill and is not really able to tell Lee what is going on. On July 2 and 3, Hill is basically MIA from the battle and his divisions are working under Longstreet's attacks on those days.
 
I think it's more likely that Gettysburg is the first we see of Hill's physical decline. If i remember correctly, when Lee comes up on July 1 and inquires of Hill the situation, Hill looks physically ill and is not really able to tell Lee what is going on. On July 2 and 3, Hill is basically MIA from the battle and his divisions are working under Longstreet's attacks on those days.

On July 2, Hill's divisions were to act in conjunction with Longstreet but were not under his command. For example, Major General Richard Anderson was told to continue the attack after McLaws' Division advanced with Pender on his left continuing on after Anderson went in. Unfortunately for the AoNV, the normally excellent Anderson performed terribly at Gettysburg and his attack petered out as darkness fell and Pender was mortally wounded, rendering his division leaderless at the most inopportune time.

Ryan
 
General Lee is responsible for the onset of the battle. He knew that he did not know what was before him. He knew that General Hill had not prevented the advance toward Gettysburg into the unknown. He knew that he did not know the location of every unit of his command. He knew that he did not know when the units would be united. He consented to the afternoon attacks. It was General Lee who, despite writing that it was his intention to avoid battle unless he was attacked, attacked for three days. It was General Lee's battle from start to finish.
 
General Lee is responsible for the onset of the battle. He knew that he did not know what was before him. He knew that General Hill had not prevented the advance toward Gettysburg into the unknown. He knew that he did not know the location of every unit of his command. He knew that he did not know when the units would be united. He consented to the afternoon attacks. It was General Lee who, despite writing that it was his intention to avoid battle unless he was attacked, attacked for three days. It was General Lee's battle from start to finish.
He knew just how unready he was to face a Union army at full strength, so he possibly was right since the AOP hadn't united it's forces.
Lubliner.
 
Some blame has to be put on A.P Hill, though it also has to be placed on Lee as well. Hill was a new corps commander, Lee must have recognized that he might have needed some extra attention. Hill was to attack at the sound of Longstreet's guns. While Longstreet corps was in the heat of battle, Hill's corps was not fully engaged. This created an advantage for Meade to use his interior lines and shuffle troops from the Union right, to the Union left, where Longstreet was making progress. When Longstreet's attack was at its highpoint on July 2nd, it may have succeeded if Hill's, and Ewell's for that matter, were fully engaged to keep the Federals from reinforcing against Longstreet. During the battle, Longstreet sent Lee a message indicating that "we are doing well". Whether Lee took that as a victory was imminent, I'm not sure, but if Hill fully committed his corps, and more specifically, Anderson's division, the charge on the second day may have been victorious.
 
I am glad that I came across this thread. I am actually beginning the research for my Master's thesis which will be the failures in command of the Confederate Army during the first day of the battle which will focus primarily on the railroad cut. I am planning on covering the failures from Joe Davis to Bobby Lee. There are faults at each level that played a significant part in the first day. I honestly think that there is a strong possibility if the commanders actually talked to one another and read each other's reports, Gettysburg may not have happened the way it did.
 
I see your point here, but it raises a question in my work addled brain. If Heth, and presumably by extension Hill, expect little to no resistance, why send in two full brigades of infantry (Archer and Davis) plus artillery (Pegram)? Isn't that a fair amount of overkill, even for a reconnaissance in force?
One thing to consider is that the 11th Mississippi was in the rear with the gear. This would bump Davis's numbers up by almost 400. It is not possible to determine if the absence is a logical thesis as to the capture of the 2nd MS in the cut, though it entertains the mind to think what would have happened if Davis had the extra rifles. I also often wonder why the Arty was sent forward first followed by a Brigade of raw troops with a commander who has never seen battle either. The only logical explanation is that Heth and Hill were going to allow these raw troops to get a taste of action against some "dismounted Cavalry and the local militia."
 
Just a quick note about Martin's book: get the later editions if possible. The first edition has A LOT of typographical errors which later versions cleaned up. There wasn't anything terribly wrong but it killed the editor in me to read.

Ryan
 
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