Gettysburg: the Ultimate "what if"...

From my point of view, Holly Springs exemplified everything that was wrong with the Southern raider doctrine. While it did inconvenience Grant, it also convinced him that conventional book solutions had their limits. It was that experience that drew his attention to successful ways to live off the land

What??? You have spent the majority of this thread trying to demonstrate that Gn Lee could not possibly operate in PA for more than 15 minutes but now you have Grant "living off the land" while laying siege.
 
What??? You have spent the majority of this thread trying to demonstrate that Gn Lee could not possibly operate in PA for more than 15 minutes but now you have Grant "living off the land" while laying siege.
Indeed, a major limiting factor on the duration of 18th and 19th century sieges was the amount of time an army could successfully operate through forage.
 
What??? You have spent the majority of this thread trying to demonstrate that Gn Lee could not possibly operate in PA for more than 15 minutes but now you have Grant "living off the land" while laying siege.
Where, exactly is the equivalent of the Mississippi River & the flotilla of supply boats in Lee's plan? The Vicksburg operation was a campaign of conquest. Move fast, disorient Pemberton & bottle him up inside fortifications, reconnect with the fleet, hang in there until he starved to death was Grant's goal. He lived off the land for a short period of time. The siege was supplied by steamboats. Lee's Campaign was a raid, pure & simple. As Gettysburg so vividly demonstrates, a raiding army cannot stop moving. The last raid of the Black Prince & hundreds of years later General Wheeler met exactly the fate that haunted General Lee's dreams.

In France, the Prince besieged a town, his army ate out the local farms & he had no choice but to raid. Every time he paused, the French snapped up his forragers. In the end, a reminant of his force walked into friendly territory. Lee was ten times too smart to suffer that fate.

When Wheeler stopped to loot Shelbyville, Tennessee on his last great raid, it allowed the pursuing Federal cavalry to concentrate. Wheeler barely made it across the Tennesse with a reminant of his force & none of the Shelbyville loot. Both he & the Black Prince suffered the same fate. Their horses were dead, their men on foot, scattered across enemy country. Neither of them ever raided again.

I don't think you grasp the true extent of Lee's logistical challenge. He needed ten rail cars of rations, a mountain of forrage for his animals & regular remounts in the hundreds every day just to keep from starving. Raiding a few farms in July when the corn is green, no hay stacked, pigs just starting to grow wouldn't provide much more than an appetizer to the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee knew that & acted accordingly.

Take the time to learn about Civil War logistics. The cavalry volume of the ten volume photographic history of the Civil War is an excellent source. The photos of the Union remount establishment is eye opening. The copy was written by experienced Civil War officers. It is excellent. You can access it online. Read that & you won't be saying that Lee could have subsisted his army off the countryside in July.
 
Where, exactly is the equivalent of the Mississippi River & the flotilla of supply boats in Lee's plan? The Vicksburg operation was a campaign of conquest. Move fast, disorient Pemberton & bottle him up inside fortifications, reconnect with the fleet, hang in there until he starved to death was Grant's goal. He lived off the land for a short period of time.
That's just flying column supply - transfer from one base of supplies to another. It's nothing new or different and indeed the Army of the Potomac was doing it in October-November 1862 - they operated out of supply for ten days during the Loudoun Valley campaign.

However, Grant did not actually "reconnect with the fleet" so much as he never detached from the fleet in the first place. His supply base was Grand Gulf for the whole of the siege period.

Read that & you won't be saying that Lee could have subsisted his army off the countryside in July.
Question. How exactly did Lee get up to Gettysburg and then back down to the Potomac?

He crossed the river on June 15 and didn't cross back for about a month; unless he was carrying three thousand rail cars of rations and thirty mountains of forage he clearly sourced much of his required supplies from the countryside.
If the core of your thesis is that supply is extremely difficult, that's certainly a valid viewpoint - but past a certain point you're asserting that the actual historical course of events is fundamentally impossible.

In France, the Prince besieged a town, his army ate out the local farms & he had no choice but to raid. Every time he paused, the French snapped up his forragers. In the end, a reminant of his force walked into friendly territory. Lee was ten times too smart to suffer that fate.
I can't find the campaign to which you're referring. Would you be so kind as to elucidate? As far as I can tell the second and last Chevauchée of the Black Prince ended in the capture of the French King and a great victory.


(ED: corrected spelling mistake regarding supply from "different" to "difficult")
 
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That's just flying column supply - transfer from one base of supplies to another. It's nothing new or different and indeed the Army of the Potomac was doing it in October-November 1862 - they operated out of supply for ten days during the Loudoun Valley campaign.

However, Grant did not actually "reconnect with the fleet" so much as he never detached from the fleet in the first place. His supply base was Grand Gulf for the whole of the siege period.


Question. How exactly did Lee get up to Gettysburg and then back down to the Potomac?

He crossed the river on June 15 and didn't cross back for about a month; unless he was carrying three thousand rail cars of rations and thirty mountains of forage he clearly sourced much of his required supplies from the countryside.
If the core of your thesis is that supply is extremely different, that's certainly a valid viewpoint - but past a certain point you're asserting that the actual historical course of events is fundamentally impossible.


I can't find the campaign to which you're referring. Would you be so kind as to elucidate? As far as I can tell the second and last Chevauchée of the Black Prince ended in the capture of the French King and a great victory.
I am afraid you are going to have to pass Military History 101 on your own.
 
If the core of your thesis is that supply is extremely different, that's certainly a valid viewpoint - but past a certain point you're asserting that the actual historical course of events is fundamentally impossible.
I am afraid you are going to have to pass Military History 101 on your own.
Well after the treatise on the ANV's PA campaign, and Grant's campaigns, the least you could so is enlighten us on the Prince's medieval exploits...........:smile:
 
I am afraid you are going to have to pass Military History 101 on your own.
There are two options as to what you're referring to here, and those are the method by which Lee supplied himself and the point when the Black Prince's army was captured.

As to the first, popular history abounds with the idea that Lee sustained himself by levying food from the countryside and from the towns through which he passed; as just one example we have the rules of the Long Road To Gettysburg module from Grand Campaigns of the American Civil War, which explicitly lay out how the Army of Northern Virginia may resupply itself by means of sourcing food from the towns through which it passed.

It's also supported in the literature.
Specifically to quote Coddington:

"The Cumberland Valley in Maryland and Pennsylvania was so rich in agricultural produce that by June 23, within a week after the first units of Ewell's corps had crossed the Potomac, they had accumulated enough supplies to feed all of his corps until June 30, as well as 1,700 barrels of flour for the rest of the army".

This means in other words that Ewell's corps was able to procure food significantly faster than they were consuming it.


As to the second point, the Reims Campaign was a success. It's harder still to tell what you mean - the Siege of Limoges was a success and that was the Black Prince's last campaign - and this hardly seems like a "basic, easily understood" topic if so!
 
It may be worth at this point a quick elaboration of the German Way of War, because this way of fighting could often produce spectacular results.

The fundamental concept involved is the war of manoeuvre, intended to concentrate forces on one enemy from multiple directions and to catch them in an encirclement battle followed by concentric attacks to quickly destroy them. This style of fighting did not actually require any significantly greater fighting power on the part of the manoeuvering force, and it was also surprisingly tolerant of supply problems (at least in so far as the German forces in various battles and campaigns did quite well despite appalling supply problems which they institutionally refused to contemplate). It's a style of warfare essentially designed for a "poor" state to fight a "rich" one.

As it happens, simply by chance the Confederates already had some of the elements required for one of these during the Gettysburg campaign. We can hypothesize that if Lee's scouting had been functioning better then it would have been possible to amplify this effect to some extent - and if Lee can catch the Day One Gettysburg forces and destroy them (where "destroy" means forcing the shattering or surrender of both 1st and 11th Corps, for example, so they have no further ability to take part in the campaign) then he's already won a major victory that leaves Meade's remaining forces with two options.

Option one is that Meade gives up and forms a fall back line, possibly around Pipe Creek as was his original plan, but this fall back line is inevitably weaker than his original plans and Pipe Creek already has some issues with how it's too wide to be mutually supporting. If Meade places a corps at Middleburg, Frizzelburg, Union Mills, Manchester and Westminster he's run out of corps, and the corps frontage is something like four miles each - which isn't enough for a period Union corps to hold against a major Confederate attack.
However, if Lee decides the Pipe Creek line is too strong for him to attack, or simply that he doesn't want to risk it, he can just keep gathering forage in Pennsylvania until he's good and ready and then withdraw behind the Potomac. The result is a major Union defeat on Northern soil, and the Army of the Potomac has now been defeated three times in a row.

Option two is that Meade instead piles in his forces to Gettysburg, but this invokes the danger of being defeated in detail. Meade's forces are now weaker numerically than Lee's are and at the actual Gettysburg Meade's men turned out to need the benefit of breastworks etc. to equalize matters against attacking Confederates. This runs the risk of the outright crippling of the Army of the Potomac.
 
It may be worth at this point a quick elaboration of the German Way of War, because this way of fighting could often produce spectacular results.

The fundamental concept involved is the war of manoeuvre, intended to concentrate forces on one enemy from multiple directions and to catch them in an encirclement battle followed by concentric attacks to quickly destroy them. This style of fighting did not actually require any significantly greater fighting power on the part of the manoeuvering force, and it was also surprisingly tolerant of supply problems (at least in so far as the German forces in various battles and campaigns did quite well despite appalling supply problems which they institutionally refused to contemplate). It's a style of warfare essentially designed for a "poor" state to fight a "rich" one.

As it happens, simply by chance the Confederates already had some of the elements required for one of these during the Gettysburg campaign. We can hypothesize that if Lee's scouting had been functioning better then it would have been possible to amplify this effect to some extent - and if Lee can catch the Day One Gettysburg forces and destroy them (where "destroy" means forcing the shattering or surrender of both 1st and 11th Corps, for example, so they have no further ability to take part in the campaign) then he's already won a major victory that leaves Meade's remaining forces with two options.

Option one is that Meade gives up and forms a fall back line, possibly around Pipe Creek as was his original plan, but this fall back line is inevitably weaker than his original plans and Pipe Creek already has some issues with how it's too wide to be mutually supporting. If Meade places a corps at Middleburg, Frizzelburg, Union Mills, Manchester and Westminster he's run out of corps, and the corps frontage is something like four miles each - which isn't enough for a period Union corps to hold against a major Confederate attack.
However, if Lee decides the Pipe Creek line is too strong for him to attack, or simply that he doesn't want to risk it, he can just keep gathering forage in Pennsylvania until he's good and ready and then withdraw behind the Potomac. The result is a major Union defeat on Northern soil, and the Army of the Potomac has now been defeated three times in a row.

Option two is that Meade instead piles in his forces to Gettysburg, but this invokes the danger of being defeated in detail. Meade's forces are now weaker numerically than Lee's are and at the actual Gettysburg Meade's men turned out to need the benefit of breastworks etc. to equalize matters against attacking Confederates. This runs the risk of the outright crippling of the Army of the Potomac.
I get it, you are fixated on a particular what if. I have too much trouble keeping what actually happened & why straight to indulge in much int the way of what ifs, so I will leave you to this one.
 
I get it, you are fixated on a particular what if. I have too much trouble keeping what actually happened & why straight to indulge in much int the way of what ifs, so I will leave you to this one.
Then this thread ("Gettysburg - the ultimate 'What If'") in this forum ("What if...") may not be a good fit for you.

Personally I think that the exploration of alternative paths through history is functionally essential for any good understanding of history itself, because it aids so much in understanding cause and effect.
For example, if your view is that living off the land in the Cumberland Valley is fundamentally impractical then it raises the question of why (and how) the entire Gettysburg campaign happened at all.

Similarly one might ask "why did Lee do X?" and the answer is incomplete without considering what his other options were. Even if they're all terrible ones that at least answers the question for us!
 
Well after the treatise on the ANV's PA campaign, and Grant's campaigns, the least you could so is enlighten us on the Prince's medieval exploits...........:smile:
Barbara Tuchman's book wonderful book
Well after the treatise on the ANV's PA campaign, and Grant's campaigns, the least you could so is enlighten us on the Prince's medieval exploits...........:smile:
Barbara Tuchman's wonderful book A Distant Mirror would be my suggestion. For narrative history, she has no peer. I had the previledge of hearing her speak,, once. Mark Twain's remark came to mind. It was a wonder she didn't have to use a wheel barrow to haul her brains around.
 
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Barbara Tuchman's book wonderful book

Barbara Tuchman's wonderful book A Distant Mirror would be my suggestion. For narrative history, she has no peer. I had the previledge of hearing her speak,, once. Mark Twain's remark came to mind. It was a wonder she didn't have to use a wheel barrow to haul her brains around.
I read bits and pieces of that book many years ago, I was in my early teens and it was a bit much for me then but I agree, she is a masterful author and the book and subject is fascinating. I’m glad you reminded me, I am going to have to search for that and read it in its entirety.
 
I read bits and pieces of that book many years ago, I was in my early teens and it was a bit much for me then but I agree, she is a masterful author and the book and subject is fascinating. I’m glad you reminded me, I am going to have to search for that and read it in its entirety.
It is still in print. I recently bought a copy. I did something that a very clever friend does with books like that. I taped a piece of paper in the back. When I come on a word I do not know, I fold the paper out & write it down. I can then look it up & write it down. One of my granddaughters begged my old hardcover copy off me & was the envy of a college class because of the definitions with drawings it came with. In 2014, I reread her Guns of August. Like the Civil War, everybody had a 90 day plan to win the war. George W's invasion of Iraq falls into that category. Apparently, we never learn.
 
Out of curiosity, do you in fact have the example you're thinking of for the degradation of the Black Prince's army before the walls of a fortress?


Like the Civil War, everybody had a 90 day plan to win the war. George W's invasion of Iraq falls into that category. Apparently, we never learn.
There are basically four options for a military campaign.
Plan with the intent to win quickly.
Plan with the intent to win slowly.
Don't plan it but launch it anyway.
Don't launch it.


Of the four of these, assuming you feel you need to launch it, planning to win quickly is the superior option. I'm not saying you shouldn't do a proper analysis of alternatives, and your "win quickly" plan should certainly be well founded and rigourous, but there you go.
 
Out of curiosity, do you in fact have the example you're thinking of for the degradation of the Black Prince's army before the walls of a fortress?



There are basically four options for a military campaign.
Plan with the intent to win quickly.
Plan with the intent to win slowly.
Don't plan it but launch it anyway.
Don't launch it.


Of the four of these, assuming you feel you need to launch it, planning to win quickly is the superior option. I'm not saying you shouldn't do a proper analysis of alternatives, and your "win quickly" plan should certainly be well founded and rigourous, but there you go.
Memory is not kind to generals & political leaders with 90 day wonder plans. An iron clad certainty is that the only thing guaranteed is when violence is resorted to is when it is initiated.
 
Memory is not kind to generals & political leaders with 90 day wonder plans. An iron clad certainty is that the only thing guaranteed is when violence is resorted to is when it is initiated.
While this is certainly true in general, it doesn't actually help when it comes to the act of planning and executing warfare. The professional role of a general is to generate tactics, operational plans and strategic approaches which produce victory or avoid defeat, and since the ideal way for things to work is for imperatives to flow downhill from the high level of grand strategy then the generals often don't have much of a choice.

Let's take McDowell, where he had a 90 day "wonder plan" as you put it.
The thing is, he really didn't. McDowell didn't go into the Bull Run campaign going "here is how we will win the war and it will only take ninety days" - what happened instead was that most of McDowell's forces had been mustered under the Militia Act of 1795. This act specifically stated:


That the militia employed in the service of the United States, shall receive the same pay and allowances, as the troops of the United States, And that no officer, non-commissioned officer or private of the militia shall be compelled to serve more than three months in any one year, nor more than in due rotation with every other able-bodied man of the same rank in the battalion to which be belongs.

The critical passage there is the point about three months - which, naturally, is about 90 days. The initial call-out took place on April 15 and there was a delay in getting the first formations organized, but at the time of the planning of the First Bull Run campaign (the fighting happened in the second half of July) large amounts of the new US army were about to expire through mustering out and the second volunteer call was only just beginning to muster in.

This meant that there was a major dilemma stemming ultimately from the politics. Either the "75,000 volunteers" army was ready to fight now after three months of training (which McDowell thought was not the case) or it took more than three months to train volunteers up to the point they could fight - which would mean the Union could take no major offensive action until October (which was getting towards being too late for campaigning anyway).
There was thus a political pressure towards a battle within 90 days of the callout, and indeed Lincoln made it a political imperative - that's where "All Green Alike" comes from, he was trying to pressure McDowell that while McDowell's forces weren't ready to fight nor were the Confederates ("You are green, it is true, but they are green also; you are all green alike.")

McDowell's judgement was not to fight, but he was persuaded to by pressure from Lincoln.


Now consider what it looks like if the Union doesn't fight for the whole summer...
 
To be clear about this - there's nothing wrong with a general determining that he is best served by a strategy that involves waiting or delaying, deferring action until the force ratio or other events have moved in their favour. There's also nothing wrong with a general deciding that a certain operation means too high a cost in casualties and it would be best to avoid it. But a general's job is to find a route to victory which leads to a successful outcome.

The analogy between the CSA and Prussia/Germany holds up well because in both cases the main strategic approach of the weaker power that could best result in success is one where they attempt to string together a long sequence of operational victories, gaining a battlefield ascendancy and provoking the other side to come to terms. It's not a foolproof approach but it does at least offer a route to victory, and historically Lee got pretty close on a couple of occasions - after Second Bull Run Union soldiers were hoping they'd have the courage to desert to escape another such shameful defeat, for example, which isn't far from damaging the Union army badly enough that it can't effectively fight until rebuilt.
Antietam broke the streak, but as of June 1863 Lee's winning streak is back up to two victories...
 
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