George G. Meade at Gettysburg

Nobody is arguing Meade's competence as Div. and Corps commander. The case for Meade being a better Divsiion or Corps commander than Army, is pretty clear.
He performed well enough with Grant looking over his shoulder and willing to accept responsibility for command decisions. Not beng responsible i.e., under a higher commander, relieved Meade of a crippling handicap.
 
Good point Opn, on a different note...do you think McClellan would have benefitted from being under a Grant or would his ego not have handled that
 
Meade was lucky. The initial commanders, Buford, Reynolds and Hancock, fought to keep the high ground until the other Corps could be brought on line. Had Buford or Reynolds not held the CS advance and the CS troops had gained the high ground the battle would have been much different and Meade would not have been able to deal with Lee.
 
Given the short period of time prior to the battle that Meade was actually in charge of the AoP he did a great job, sometimes the hardest thing to do is to get out of the way and trust your subordinates do their job, which he did when he had to (with Reynolds, Hancock). Yes the argument can be made that he didn't follow up after the battle in an aggressive pursuit of ANV, but given the vacuum created by losses at the battle, that is also understandable.
I disagree strongly with what OPN said about Meade being too defensive and cast in a McClellan mould. It was the aggressive actions taken by Meade that led to a partial breakthrough of Jackson's line at Fredericksburg.
While I don't think that Meade was as aggressive as Grant, I believe he was competent enough to have (eventually) won the war, but I don't think he would have been as aggressive on the pursuit (like Grant in the Overland Campaign).
JMHO
+1. Good post.
 
Ref. Post #42; 'Little Mac' was totally self-centered, there was nobody whom he believed was worthy of his trust or loyalt;' at least not in any official position of real authority.


P.S. The Meade in command in Northern Va. was the same Meade during the Pursuit phase.
 
So true, it's amazing how somebody like McClellan could be so beloved by his troops and be so lacking as a battlefield commander.
 
Given the short period of time prior to the battle that Meade was actually in charge of the AoP he did a great job, sometimes the hardest thing to do is to get out of the way and trust your subordinates do their job, which he did when he had to (with Reynolds, Hancock). Yes the argument can be made that he didn't follow up after the battle in an aggressive pursuit of ANV, but given the vacuum created by losses at the battle, that is also understandable.
I disagree strongly with what OPN said about Meade being too defensive and cast in a McClellan mould. It was the aggressive actions taken by Meade that led to a partial breakthrough of Jackson's line at Fredericksburg.
While I don't think that Meade was as aggressive as Grant, I believe he was competent enough to have (eventually) won the war, but I don't think he would have been as aggressive on the pursuit (like Grant in the Overland Campaign).
JMHO

What pursuit? Grant continually moved away from Lee once he got stung in the Wilderness. He must have forgot what he told Meade, "Wherever Lee goes, there you will go also." You could call it moving for a better position but it wasn't a pursuit. Persistence would better describe his actions against Lee.

Shiloh or Chattanooga would be better examples of Grant's pursuit. Meade done much better against a very dangerous Lee after Gettysburg than did Grant when he pursued a beaten, routed, and demoralized foe.
 
Really? What pursuit?

The Wilderness was May 5th through 7th 1864, followed by Spottsylvania May 8-21, followed by North Anna May 23-26, followed by Bethesda Church May 28-30, followed by Cold Harbor May 31- June 12, ending shortly after crossing the James River leading to the siege of Petersburg...with several other battles in the same time frame (including Yellow Tavern) it was a continuous pursuit towards Richmond, it was Grant's tactical error at Cold Harbor that caused him to forego Richmond for Petersburg.

I don't think that it was a movement for position as much as it was a death of a thousand cuts. Grant could readily replace casualties lost in battle (some 55,000 total in the Overland Campaign) that the ANV couldn't.

It was the aggressive actions Grant took following The Wilderness that ultimately led to Appomattox. Whereas the AoP went back and licked their wounds following most of the major actions up to The Wilderness; Grant actively pursued Lee to Spottsylvania, turned Sheridan loose to find JEB Stuart against Meade's wishes, and continued pressing the issue to Petersburg.

All things being equal though, as I said earlier, IMHO Meade was a heck of a battlefield leader at all levels.
 
Meade was lucky. The initial commanders, Buford, Reynolds and Hancock, fought to keep the high ground until the other Corps could be brought on line. Had Buford or Reynolds not held the CS advance and the CS troops had gained the high ground the battle would have been much different and Meade would not have been able to deal with Lee.
No,Meade is not lucky,Meade is good. Meade is an energetic,details oriented commander,unlike Lee's "All in God's Hands",style. Meade,does not,inherit Hancock. Meade promotes Hancock,to take over the command after,Reynolds is killed. Sickles and Howard,are senior to Hancock,but Meade uses his special power of appointment,from Halleck,to appoint Hancock,over Sickles and Howard. That's why Sickles hates Meade. Meade,Hancock,Reynolds,and Gibbon,are personal friends,and Meade has confidence in them and they have confidence in Meade. Meade has no confidence in Sickles,and,simply,does not know Howard. This is not "Luck"....Meade is orchestrating this battle from beginning to end. Meade is shuffling his generals like a deck of cards,and he knows,exactly,what he is doing. Look at the Results.
 
Meade was lucky. The initial commanders, Buford, Reynolds and Hancock, fought to keep the high ground until the other Corps could be brought on line. Had Buford or Reynolds not held the CS advance and the CS troops had gained the high ground the battle would have been much different and Meade would not have been able to deal with Lee.

Meade already had contingency plans for a defense of the Pipe Creek should Buford, Reynolds or Howard not be able to hold at Gettysburg, or should the terrain not be to Meade's preference. If the Confederates grab the hills, the Federal army would fall back to Pipe Creek and hold there. It may actually have been much more formidable defensive position than Gettysburg.
 
Meade at Gettysburg, is about all that one could rationally expect, considering the circumstances leading to his assumption of command until Day 3, and he did it, by ignoring his natural defensive inclinationations and responded with strategically offensive movement and trusting his own tactcal competence for the battle itself.
Although just as mesmerized by Lee's mythos as McClellan, he did not let that fact lead him to doubt his professional competence. As I have already noted, Meade was the only Senior officer produced within the AoP, that took and maintained the measure of Lee.
 
Meade at Gettysburg, is about all that one could rationally expect, considering the circumstances leading to his assumption of command until Day 3, and he did it, by ignoring his natural defensive inclinationations and responded with strategically offensive movement and trusting his own tactcal competence for the battle itself.
Although just as mesmerized by Lee's mythos as McClellan, he did not let that fact lead him to doubt his professional competence. As I have already noted, Meade was the only Senior officer produced within the AoP, that took and maintained the measure of Lee.

By being the one to defeat Lee, he also ended Lee's mythos, much like the Battle of Midway ended the myth of Japanese invincibility.
 
Good point jgoodguy, Gettysburg did shatter the growing myth of Lee's invincibility and it was Meade(and the AoP) who did it.
 
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