Generals/Officers Who Were Ahead of Their Time

Any generals/officers who were ahead of their time in tactics? I know August Willich developed a tactic for firing while advancing which was used up until Chickamauga and then Thomas ordered him to stop using it since it was not in any manual. Any others?
Colonel Harrison commander of the 1st Arkansas Cavalry Union is credited by Mark Mowers author of "A question of command Counterinsurgency from the Civil War to Iraq" Yale Military Press for introducing the idea of an armed commune latter copied by Jewish settler's in Turkish Palestine which they called a Kibutzz. In latter conflicts this concept was called a " protected village.
What Col.Harrison did was clear out hostile local people and then form an armed commune. This way food could be denied to the Confederate guerrillas but given to Union troops and civilians. The Communes were to well fortified for the guerrillas to overcome. This tactic was very successful in diminishing Confederate guerrillas in Northern Arkansas. The Union troops and civilians were local people.
Another interesting officer and I don't have his name handy since I am not at home is the Union Admiral for the South Atlantic Blockade Squadron who established Unionist enclaves along the South East Florida Coast. These were in effect protected villages and the men would engage the Confederacy in guerrilla warfare. Latter the US Navy established the 2nd Florida Cavalry Union which played a major role in destroying Confederate salt works and intercepting cattle bound for the AnV.
Another interesting officer was Colonel George Kirk commanding officer 3rd North Carolina Mounted Infantry Union.
Kirk penetrated deep behind enemy lines and recruited Confederate deserter's. Kirk also conducted raids deep into Confederate Territory and one time used Confederate prisoners as human shields to get his men out of a tight spot.
Kirk is definitely an interesting ACW figure.
Another innovation very much used in modern counterinsurgency war is the concept of what the British called " counter gangs".
Union troops in Missouri definitely the 2nd Colorado would disguise themselves as Confederate guerrillas to gage the support of the local population. Once one counter gang was fired on by other 2nd Colorado troops.
Another innovation was part time indigenous troops to hunt guerrillas. This would be the Indian Home Guard regiments such has the Third Indian Home Guards that was sent to fight Confederate guerrillas in Missouri and Arkansas.
In Vietnam the French had a similar concept with the Group Mixed Army Commandos and the US Special Force's a few years later with the Civilian Irregular Defense Group.
Leftyhunter
 
Major Generals Patrick Cleburne and Robert E. Rodes (the latter with the help of Major Eugene Blackford) for their efforts in organizing sharpshooters and marksmanship training within their divisions. Rodes' and Blackford's method of organizing sharpshooter battalions was later taken up by Lee's entire army, or at least the Second and Third Corps.
 
General Longstreet recognized the changing technologies of the era. His defensive tactics are evidence of that. In my opinion, his strategies were light-years ahead of their time compared to the Napoleonic tactics that characterized the Civil War. :smile:

What tactics and strategies were those?

When I think of Longstreet I think of the heavy hitter of Second Bull Run, the second day at Gettysburg, Chickamauga and the Wilderness; the Bull of the Woods, not of any special defensive fighting ability or insights. He fought defensively at Antietam and Fredericksburg but because Lee chose to fight on the defense. Indeed, in his most important defensive job of the war, holding Lookout Valley, he failed.
 
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Brigadier General Emory Upton devised an innovative tactic during during the battle of Spotsylvania in which columns of massed infantry were to swiftly assault a small portion of the confederate line at the Mule Shoe salient. The infantry were not to pause to fire their weapons, the intent being to reach and breakthrough the enemy line. This tactic was carried out by Upton leading 12 regiments on May 10, 1864. The tactical assault was successful but Upton was forced to withdraw due to a lack of reinforcing support to hold the position. Nevertheless, Grant saw its value, and using Upton's tactic, ordered a more widespread assault by II Corps on May 12th, on what became known as the salient's "Bloody Angle". After the war, Upton wrote a treatise, The Military Policy of the United States, which analyzed American military policies and practices.
 
What tactics and strategies were those?
He fought defensively at Antietam and Fredericksburg but because Lee chose to fight on the defense.

Valid points indeed. It’s not my intention to remember General Longstreet solely as a defensive specialist. I certainly don't ascribe to Harold Knudsen's depiction of Longstreet as the Confederacy's most "modern soldier" where he alleges that General Longstreet was responsible for the invention of traverse trenches in North America. In my opinion, there’s no denying General Longstreet was the hammer to Jackson's anvil at Second Manassas. He was certainly masterful at skillfully handling large numbers of troops on the battlefield. No one should ever overlook his actions on the offensive. He was most definitely a heavy hitter.

However, General Longstreet seemed to learn the importance of the landscape in war - the ground being fought upon - from his service in Mexico. He used this knowledge to determine when to attack and when to wait. His understanding of defensive tactics certainly did pay off at Antietam where he recommended that General Lee form a good defensive line and allow McClellan to attack. They paid off again at Fredericksburg where he overruled his own engineers and told them to dig deep artillery embrasures. His actions there set a precedent for future defensive battles of the Army of Northern Virginia. These successes contributed to General Longstreet's reputation as a good defensive general.
 
I think there's an argument that General McClellan was ahead of his time, in a specific way - that is, his way of dealing with a defensive line.

McClellan's approach to dealing with a defensive line was to build up his own defences, locate an appropriate weak point or good approach route, build up a superiority of heavy artillery, and use the guns to "shoot" his forces onto the objective; then, if the line was deep, he would dig in on the new position and use it as the next artillery platform. (This was his plan at Yorktown and at Richmond.) Notably this didn't involve an offensive into prepared enemy works unless it was supported by the aforementioned heavy artillery.

This is basically correct WW1 tactics, and the times McClellan employed it (Yorktown, Richmond) he was dealing in both cases with a strong defensive line that could not be "turned" or flanked - which was the situation prevailing in the western front of WW1 all along the line.


Of course, it's equally possible to argue that McClellan wasn't ahead of his time at all here, and I think that's also pretty valid. This tactical mode was (AIUI) in keeping with the theories of the time about Active Defence.
 
I agree with Desert Kid that Forrest certainly was ahead of his time. His doctrine was also speed and surprise but to always make a concentrate the full weight of his attack on a small, precise point and overwhelm that sector causing the enemy to break and then take flight. He believed a smaller force could defeat a much larger one if this strategy was used and he demonstrated it did work well time and time again.
 
I agree with Desert Kid that Forrest certainly was ahead of his time. His doctrine was also speed and surprise but to always make a concentrate the full weight of his attack on a small, precise point and overwhelm that sector causing the enemy to break and then take flight. He believed a smaller force could defeat a much larger one if this strategy was used and he demonstrated it did work well time and time again.

That was where Forrest excelled - using his cavalry to not only find the weak point but to then throw everything he had at it with, as Sherman put it, "vehemence". That point would break or weaken further, needing to be supported and another point would weaken, then another. It was often mistaken for recklessness and the results luck, but it was calculated strategy. "Hit 'em where they ain't" was one of his most effective military maxims. He also used the dangerous tactic of double envelopment very deftly, first using it at the battle of Sacramento. He not only followed the given rule that cavalry were the eyes of the army but also the shock troops. He always attacked with great speed and agility, and believed numbers did not matter if used properly. This was demonstrated in his surprise attack at Fallen Timbers, where his force of 350 cavalrymen routed an entire brigade of Sherman's infantry. Had his men continued following him, he would also have seriously disrupted the second brigade while it was still forming behind the first.
 
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