Sherman General Sherman's Destructive Path Blazed a New Strategy

There is no doubt in my mind Grant supported this policy as the war raged on, but my question lay more in where the orders initiated, and it seems they came from Washington. Prior to that, my impression was that Grant made these decisions based on his role and responsibilities. It was new information to me.
Thanks for your response.
'Hard war' policy seems to have evolved. Early on, the prevailing attitude was that the rebellion was driven by a conspiracy of slaveholders and that most southerners- unless mistreated- would ultimately demand reconciliation. Only when Lincoln- and others- abandoned this viewpoint did 'hard war' begin to be sanctioned.
Perhaps the closest thing to a 'smoking gun' marking the beginning of 'hard war', or at least a shift toward 'hard war' is Pope's July 18, 1862, General Order Number 5, which directed his men to "subsist upon the country" and General Order Number 7, issued later that same month, which held civilians who lived in vicinity of guerrilla attacks responsible for the damages caused by those attacks.
 
In a strange twist of fate, I get to like my own post! Thanks @WJC :smile:

Edited: to add spoke too soon, but that is probably not a first!
 
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Still, addressing the Original Post in this thread, Grant's plans for the spring and summer campaigns of 1864 were the first to be based on a 'hard war' strategy, beginning in the Shenandoah Valley. If this is to be considered a "new strategy", then it ought to be credited to Grant, not Sherman.
 
Thanks for your response.
'Hard war' policy seems to have evolved. Early on, the prevailing attitude was that the rebellion was driven by a conspiracy of slaveholders and that most southerners- unless mistreated- would ultimately demand reconciliation. Only when Lincoln- and others- abandoned this viewpoint did 'hard war' begin to be sanctioned.
Perhaps the closest thing to a 'smoking gun' marking the beginning of 'hard war', or at least a shift toward 'hard war' is Pope's July 18, 1862, General Order Number 5, which directed his men to "subsist upon the country" and General Order Number 7, issued later that same month, which held civilians who lived in vicinity of guerrilla attacks responsible for the damages caused by those attacks.
So we find the beginnings of what ultimately became Sherman's March to the Sea in 1862 with the evolution of this type of thinking relating to 'hard war', and the Lieber Code eventually sanctioned it. I think this is what I understand from what has been said so far.
 
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Still, addressing the Original Post in this thread, Grant's plans for the spring and summer campaigns of 1864 were the first to be based on a 'hard war' strategy, beginning in the Shenandoah Valley.

No, they weren't. Sherman's Meridian Campaign was based on a hard war. Also, the Vicksburg Campaign held a hard war aspect of foraging on the enemy populace.
 
In a strange twist of fate, I get to like my own post! Thanks @WJC :smile:
You are welcome! Just another of our friendly services....
Since thus far I have not seen a document- say, a letter from Lincoln or Stanton- initiating the 'hard war' policy, was there an event that changed the view that a conciliatory policy would end the conflict?
Some claim that Lincoln changed his mind with the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation after the Battle of Antietam. Emancipation confirmed the worst fears of even moderate and pro-Union southerners. Further, as a war expedient, Emancipation was aimed directly at destroying the southern economy. It cleared the way for other efforts to destroy the economy by destroying infrastructure, manufacturing, and sources of food and supply: 'hard war'.
 
No, they weren't. Sherman's Meridian Campaign was based on a hard war. Also, the Vicksburg Campaign held a hard war aspect of foraging on the enemy populace.
Thanks for your response to my edited comment.
As we have seen in our discussion, foraging on was an established practice much earlier. But the campaigns of 1864 were specifically designed to destroy infrastructure, manufacturing, and agriculture and aimed directly at the southern civilian population with the intent of destroying their further support of the rebellion.
 
Some may be interested in the text of Pope's General Orders 5 and 7, As published in the New York Times, July 19, 1862, p. 1:

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA, WASHINGTON, July 18, 1862,

GENERAL ORDERS No. 5. -- Hereafter, as far as practinable, the troops of this command will subsist upon the country in which their operations are carried on. In all cases sepplies for this purpose will be taken by the officers to whose Department they properly belong, under the orders of the commanding officer of the troops for whose use they are intended. Vouchers will be given to the owners, stating on their face that they will be payable at the conclusion of the war, upon sufficient testimony being furnished that such owners have been loyal citizens of the United States since the date of the vouchers. Whenever it is known that supplies can be furnished in any district of the country where the troops are to operate, the use of trains for carrying subsistence will be dispensed with as far as possible.

By command of Maj.-Gen. POPE,

GEO. D. RUGGLES, Colonel, A.A.G. and Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF VIRGINIA,

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1862.

GENERAL ORDER No. 5. -- Hereafter, in any operations of the cavalry forces in this command, no supply or baggage trains of any description will be used, unless so stated specially in the order for the movement. Two days' cooked rations will be carried on the persons of the men, and all villages or neighborhoods through which they pass will be laid under contribution in the manner specified by General Order No. 5, current series, from these headquarters, for the subsistence of men and horses. Movements of cavalry must always be made with celerity and no delay. No such movements will be excused hereafter on any pretext. Whenever the order for the movement of any portion of this army emanates from these headquarters, the time of marching, and that to be consumed in the execution of the duty, will be expressly designated, and no departure therefrom will be permitted to pass unnoticed, without the gravest and most conclusive reasons. Commanding officers will be held responsible for strict and prompt compliance with every provision of this order.

By command of Major-Gen. POPE.

GEO. D. RUGGLES, Colonel, A.A.G., and Chief of Staff.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF VIRGINIA,

WASHINGTON, July 18, 1862,

GENERAL ORDERS No. 7. -- The people of the Valley of the Shenandoah and throughout the region of operations of this army, living along the lines of railroad and telegraph, and along the routes of travel in the rear of the United States forces, are notified that they will be held responsible for any injury [???] the track, line or road, or for any attacks upon trains on struggling soldiers by bands of guerrillas in their neighborhood.

No privileges or immunities of war can apply to lawless bands of individuals not forming part of the organized forces of the enemy, nor wearing the [???] of soldiers, who, seeking and obtaining safety on the pretext of being peaceful citizens, steal out in the rear of the army, attack and murder straggling soldiers, modest trains of supplies, destroy railroads, telegraph lines and bridges, and commit outrages disgraceful to civilized people, and revolting to humanity. Evil disposed persons in the rear of our armies, who not themselves engage directly in these lawless acts, encourage them by refusing to [???], or to give any information by which such acts can be prevented, or the perpetrators punished. Safety of the life and property of all persons living in the rear of our advancing army, depend upon the maintenance of peace and quiet among themselves, and upon the unmolested movement through their midst of all pertaining to the military service. They are all to understand distinctly that the security of travel is their only warrant of personal safety.

It is, therefore, ordered, that whenever a railroad, wagonroad or telegraph is injured by parties of guerrillas, the citizens living within five miles of the spot shall he turned out en masse, to repair the damage, and shall, besides, pay to the United States in money, or in property to be levied by military force, the full amount of the pay and subsistence of the whole force necessary to coerce the performance of the work during the time occupied in completing it. If a soldier, or legitimate follower of the army, be fired upon from any house, the house shall be razed to the ground, and the inhabitants sent prisoners to the headquarters of this army. If such an outrage occur at any place distant from settlements, the people within five miles around shall be held accountable, and made to pay an indemnity sufficient for the case.

Any persons detected in such outrages either during the act or at any time afterward, shall be shot without waiting civil process. No such acts can influence the result of this war, and they can only lead to heavy affliction to the population to no purpose. It is therefore enjoined upon all persons, both for the security of their property and the safety of their own persons, that they act rigorously and cordially together to prevent the perpetration of such outrages.

Whilst it is the wish of the General commanding this army that all peaceably-disposed persons who remain at their homes and pursue their accustomed avocations shall be subjected to no improper burthen of war, yet their own safety must of necessity depend upon the strict preservation of peace and order among themselves. And they are to understand that nothing will deter him from enforcing promptly, and to the full extent, every provision of this order.

By command of Major-Gen. POPE.

GEORGE D. RUGGLES, Colonel, Assistant Adjutant-General and Chief of Staff.
<https://www.nytimes.com/1862/07/19/...he-troops-to-subsist-upon-the-country-in.html>
 
Thanks for your response to my edited comment.
As we have seen in our discussion, foraging on was an established practice much earlier. But the campaigns of 1864 were specifically designed to destroy infrastructure, manufacturing, and agriculture and aimed directly at the southern civilian population with the intent of destroying their further support of the rebellion.

The Overland Campaign was not designed to destroy infrastructure, manufacturing, or agriculture. The Meridian Campaign was so designed.
 
The Overland Campaign was not designed to destroy infrastructure, manufacturing, or agriculture. The Meridian Campaign was so designed.
Thanks for your response.
Then we ought to be able to agree that the so-called "new strategy" was not "blazed" by Sherman's "destructive path" through Georgia....
 
You are welcome! Just another of our friendly services....
Since thus far I have not seen a document- say, a letter from Lincoln or Stanton- initiating the 'hard war' policy, was there an event that changed the view that a conciliatory policy would end the conflict?
Some claim that Lincoln changed his mind with the issuance of the Emancipation Proclamation after the Battle of Antietam. Emancipation confirmed the worst fears of even moderate and pro-Union southerners. Further, as a war expedient, Emancipation was aimed directly at destroying the southern economy. It cleared the way for other efforts to destroy the economy by destroying infrastructure, manufacturing, and sources of food and supply: 'hard war'.

"Conciliation was the primary policy from April 1861 until June 1862; pragmatism from July 1862 until about January 1864; and hard war from February 1864 until the war's end. Even then, the difference between the pragmatic policy and the subsequent hard war policy was never so clearly distinct as between conciliation and its competitors. Indeed in the western theater, where the pragmatic policy formed the crucible of subsequent hard war measures, the distinction tends to blur. It holds up better in the eastern theater, where commanders, particularly in the Army of the Potomac, clung to a conservative style of warfare much longer than did their western counterparts." [Mark Grimsley, The Hard Hand of War: Union Military Policy Toward Southern Civilians 1861-1865, p. 4]
 
The change in policy was arriving just as Grant was going to invade the Mississippi cotton area.
Several policy matters which influenced strategy and operations had to be clarified.
Halleck and Lieber were working on justifying what was going to look like a major escalation of the war, both domestically and internationally. :smile coffee:
 
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