General Hood's Performance During the Atlanta Campaign

I always felt Gen. Hood was trying to teach his commanders a lesson for allowing the union to sneak by. Kind of harsh but he did claim them for allowing it to happen it is man would've stopped Schofield they might have done some damage I don't know about winning but they certainly could have slowed Sherman up and maybe forced him to come back. Not to mention they could always use some of those supplies.
Hood should have left the army while his reputation as a great divisional commander was intact or not taken command .
While Davis can be criticized for his decisions as commander-in-chief, he was under both political and military considerations. War are not fought under entirely tactical and military considerations. If Clausewitz is right and war is just an extension of politics, then Davis was probably right to fire Johnston, who seemed about to abandon Atlanta without a fight. This was politically unfeasible to Davis.

Lee did no such thing. Davis asked him what he thought about the situation. Lee responded in two communications, a telegram and a letter. He essentially stated that he regretted a change in commanders when the Army of Tennessee was facing a major battle and that Hood while a good combat officer who was careless off the battlefield, this was not a negative endorsement.
One question: How do you hold a city or a fort that you have the intellegence to realize that you will not be able to defend.against the force that are advancing against your limited resorces and they can matain a siege for a length of time? Johnston could not defend Atlanta with his army.Could he have wanted to find area outside more open to battle Sherman.Could he have thought of the general population of Atlanta in his decestion ? If one knows that he is in a indefensible position would it not be wise to seek a position where you might be more adverse for you.Atlanta would have fallen even with LEE.. PETERSBURG
 
Hood should have left the army while his reputation as a great divisional commander was intact or not taken command .

Unfortunately, the Peter Principle usually involves the person in question reaching their level of incompetence. Because of circumstances, Hood was made an army commander. He tried to delay taking command until after the Battle of Atlanta (as an engagement at Peachtree Creek was imminent) was fought, but Davis and Cooper insisted that the change of command take place immediately.

One question: How do you hold a city or a fort that you have the intellegence to realize that you will not be able to defend.against the force that are advancing against your limited resorces and they can matain a siege for a length of time? Johnston could not defend Atlanta with his army.Could he have wanted to find area outside more open to battle Sherman.Could he have thought of the general population of Atlanta in his decestion ? If one knows that he is in a indefensible position would it not be wise to seek a position where you might be more adverse for you.Atlanta would have fallen even with LEE.. PETERSBURG

Except did Johnston argue that Atlanta was indefensible? He had no plan at all. At least no plan that he would communicate to his superiors or his subordinates and that has survived.

In an ideal war, the commander is supplied with enough resources and manpower to accomplish his objective and maintain the initiative. However, war are from ideal. Johnston had an objective (hold Atlanta until November) which he had to make do with the army he had (and helped to shape). It is noteworthy that Lee, in a much smaller theater of operations, held Grant in check for much longer while facing greater odds (despite Johnston's claims to the contrary). It is noteworthy that Lee managed to hold Petersburg for so long in part because he aggressively checked attempts to cut the various railroads into Petersburg (Globe Tavern and Weldon Railroad come to mind) and even launched numerous small tactical offensives. Hood tried a similar approach with Atlanta and failed, bloodily in some cases.

There are plenty of explanations for this. The Army of Tennessee was not the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee's men were confident in his proven generalship and even revered him. The rank and file of the Army of Tennessee had endured Bragg, was concerned at Johnston's constant retreating, and even more concerned at Hood's replacement of Johnston. Even late in the war, Lee could count on Gordon, Mahone, Heth, Field, and a returning Longstreet to manage field tactics. Who did the Army of Tennessee have? Hardee, who was so frustrated at Hood's promotion over his head that his performance suffered and he may have disobeyed orders at Peach Tree Creek and Bald Hill. Cleburne and Cheatham excelled on the defensive, and there were a few talented and capable officers like Walthall, but there wasn't really more than a handful of officers who could coordinate offensive tactics in the army. By contrast, the list of officers incapable of tactical articulation at higher levels is much longer at starts with corps commander S.D. Lee. By late 1864 the worst thing you could say about a division commander in Lee's army was that he was only competent and not brilliant (with the exception of Pickett, perhaps). In Hood's army, Stevenson and Bate were not fit to command divisions while Walker and Loring were troublesome off the battlefield. That's more than a third of the infantry commanders.

It is also worth noting that the Army of the Tennessee and Army of the Cumberland were not the Armies of the Potomac and the James. Except for Chickasaw Bayou and Chickamauga, these men had never known defeat and, to paraphrase Pope, were pretty used to seeing the back of the Army of Tennessee as it retreated. While Sherman may not have been good at tactical articulation (very few army and army group commanders were or are), he was an excellent operations chief and he had Thomas and company for tactics. I have never intimated that defending Atlanta was easy. With this opposition it was going to be hard. But wars are never easy.

If Atlanta were indefensible as you claim, then Johnston's best chance at defending Atlanta was to fight the battles as far north as possible. While an offensive into Tennessee may not have been advisable or logistically probable, Johnston may have held Sherman in check if he changed base into Alabama and moved to threaten Chattanooga and Sherman's communications and supplies while keeping a holding force to Sherman's front. But Johnston did not do that. He retreated from Rocky Face Ridge to Resaca, to Adairsville, to Allatoona Pass to Dallas-New Hope to Marietta and then to the Chattahoochee. And when he retreated across the Chattahoochee, there was no more ground left to give aside from Atlanta itself. And if he abandoned Atlanta, he might have avoided the 12,000 plus casualties Hood suffered, but he would have likely suffered desertions (especially in the Georgia troops) to add to the 16,000 casualties and desertions he lost on the retreat to Atlanta.
 
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Lee talked Davis into appointing Johnston. Davis fired him because he asked him for specifics on his plans to defeat Sherman and hold Atlanta. Johnston kept saying i have a plan..and Davis asked what is it and Johnston said...I have a plan.

Fired!

Davis had no alternative to Johnston when Hardee turned it down unless he wanted Bearegard - and he had even less trust in Bearegard than he did Johnston.
 
Hood should have left the army while his reputation as a great divisional commander was intact or not taken command .

One question: How do you hold a city or a fort that you have the intellegence to realize that you will not be able to defend.against the force that are advancing against your limited resorces and they can matain a siege for a length of time? Johnston could not defend Atlanta with his army.Could he have wanted to find area outside more open to battle Sherman.Could he have thought of the general population of Atlanta in his decestion ? If one knows that he is in a indefensible position would it not be wise to seek a position where you might be more adverse for you.Atlanta would have fallen even with LEE.. PETERSBURG
the city of Atlanta was very political for both sides North and South you might say it gave Lincoln the presidency
 
Unfortunately, the Peter Principle usually involves the person in question reaching their level of incompetence. Because of circumstances, Hood was made an army commander. He tried to delay taking command until after the Battle of Atlanta (as an engagement at Peachtree Creek was imminent) was fought, but Davis and Cooper insisted that the change of command take place immediately.



Except did Johnston argue that Atlanta was indefensible? He had no plan at all. At least no plan that he would communicate to his superiors or his subordinates and that has survived.

In an ideal war, the commander is supplied with enough resources and manpower to accomplish his objective and maintain the initiative. However, war are from ideal. Johnston had an objective (hold Atlanta until November) which he had to make do with the army he had (and helped to shape). It is noteworthy that Lee, in a much smaller theater of operations, held Grant in check for much longer while facing greater odds (despite Johnston's claims to the contrary). It is noteworthy that Lee managed to hold Petersburg for so long in part because he aggressively checked attempts to cut the various railroads into Petersburg (Globe Tavern and Weldon Railroad come to mind) and even launched numerous small tactical offensives. Hood tried a similar approach with Atlanta and failed, bloodily in some cases.

There are plenty of explanations for this. The Army of Tennessee was not the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee's men were confident in his proven generalship and even revered him. The rank and file of the Army of Tennessee had endured Bragg, was concerned at Johnston's constant retreating, and even more concerned at Hood's replacement of Johnston. Even late in the war, Lee could count on Gordon, Mahone, Heth, Field, and a returning Longstreet to manage field tactics. Who did the Army of Tennessee have? Hardee, who was so frustrated at Hood's promotion over his head that his performance suffered and he may have disobeyed orders at Peach Tree Creek and Bald Hill. Cleburne and Cheatham excelled on the defensive, and there were a few talented and capable officers like Walthall, but there wasn't really more than a handful of officers who could coordinate offensive tactics in the army. By contrast, the list of officers incapable of tactical articulation at higher levels is much longer at starts with corps commander S.D. Lee. By late 1864 the worst thing you could say about a division commander in Lee's army was that he was only competent and not brilliant (with the exception of Pickett, perhaps). In Hood's army, Stevenson and Bate were not fit to command divisions while Walker and Loring were troublesome off the battlefield. That's more than a third of the infantry commanders.

It is also worth noting that the Army of the Tennessee and Army of the Cumberland were not the Armies of the Potomac and the James. Except for Chickasaw Bayou and Chickamauga, these men had never known defeat and, to paraphrase Pope, were pretty used to seeing the back of the Army of Tennessee as it retreated. While Sherman may not have been good at tactical articulation (very few army and army group commanders were or are), he was an excellent operations chief and he had Thomas and company for tactics. I have never intimated that defending Atlanta was easy. With this opposition it was going to be hard. But wars are never easy.

If Atlanta were indefensible as you claim, then Johnston's best chance at defending Atlanta was to fight the battles as far north as possible. While an offensive into Tennessee may not have been advisable or logistically probable, Johnston may have held Sherman in check if he changed base into Alabama and moved to threaten Chattanooga and Sherman's communications and supplies while keeping a holding force to Sherman's front. But Johnston did not do that. He retreated from Rocky Face Ridge to Resaca, to Adairsville, to Allatoona Pass to Dallas-New Hope to Marietta and then to the Chattahoochee. And when he retreated across the Chattahoochee, there was no more ground left to give aside from Atlanta itself. And if he abandoned Atlanta, he might have avoided the 12,000 plus casualties Hood suffered, but he would have likely suffered desertions (especially in the Georgia troops) to add to the 16,000 casualties and desertions he lost on the retreat to Atlanta.
Thank you for your responce to the questions.. For this I offer a book on Bragg "Braxton Bragg,the Most Hated Man in the Confedercey"author Hess.With Lee ,he knew that he could not hold back Grant.Davis thought that Johston then Hood could hold Atlanta.Was there anyone to tell Davis it was time to retire,at least to save the army by leaving Atlanta. Atlanta would have been saved and in the end prehabs aided in the reconstrution of Georgia by avoiding harsh feelings as a result of leaveing Atlanta an open city.Where was Gov,Brown and where was the state milita,did he ever release them to serve?
 
Thank you for your responce to the questions.. For this I offer a book on Bragg "Braxton Bragg,the Most Hated Man in the Confedercey"author Hess.With Lee ,he knew that he could not hold back Grant.Davis thought that Johston then Hood could hold Atlanta.Was there anyone to tell Davis it was time to retire,at least to save the army by leaving Atlanta. Atlanta would have been saved and in the end prehabs aided in the reconstrution of Georgia by avoiding harsh feelings as a result of leaveing Atlanta an open city.Where was Gov,Brown and where was the state milita,did he ever release them to serve?

Yes sir, I've read Mr. Hess's work: https://civilwartalk.com/threads/the-bragg-men.131938/

While Johnston claims to believed that the war was lost since 1863, he held little sway over Davis. Davis, as commander-in-chief, had the obligation to defend Atlanta as long as possible, especially for political reasons. Abandoning Atlanta without a fight was not politically feasible, given the what he considered the inglorious fates of Memphis, Nashville, New Orleans, and others. Gov. Brown was already not pleased with the Confederacy, and there were thoughts in the Lincoln administration that he could be coaxed away from the rebels.

Brown released the state militia, an infantry division of four brigades and batteries under Maj. Gen. Gustavus Smith, to the Army of Tennessee when Johnston at the Kennesaw Line. Smith's division operated with the Army of Tennessee (seeing action in particular at Bald Hill) until after Atlanta's fall, when they were used to resist Sherman's march.
 
Just to add my opinion in a very short post here;

Hood did what he was expected of him, attack! He did not have the luxury of planning a complete battle plan with the full knowledge of his total strength, layout of his army, the strengths of each Corp commander, Division commander and on down.

His orders were to attack and he did.

Now, if you want to discuss Hood's ability in the Franklin, Nashville area, completely different story, which isn't in my opinion too kind toward Hood.
 
Yes sir, I've read Mr. Hess's work: https://civilwartalk.com/threads/the-bragg-men.131938/

While Johnston claims to believed that the war was lost since 1863, he held little sway over Davis. Davis, as commander-in-chief, had the obligation to defend Atlanta as long as possible, especially for political reasons. Abandoning Atlanta without a fight was not politically feasible, given the what he considered the inglorious fates of Memphis, Nashville, New Orleans, and others. Gov. Brown was already not pleased with the Confederacy, and there were thoughts in the Lincoln administration that he could be coaxed away from the rebels.

Brown released the state militia, an infantry division of four brigades and batteries under Maj. Gen. Gustavus Smith, to the Army of Tennessee when Johnston at the Kennesaw Line. Smith's division operated with the Army of Tennessee (seeing action in particular at Bald Hill) until after Atlanta's fall, when they were used to resist Sherman's march.
Do you say that because of politics and Davis glorious fates ?What is glorious about saving a city that you know can not be saved? Why sacrifice a army unless you see it as some heroic sacrifice?You know that the Whirlwind is coming what do you do when there is no shelter? Suggestion ; you load every vital thing you can, then you seek a area of protection or at least an area of that will offer a better chance for suvival.
 
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Do you say that because of politics and it was Davis you choose to defend Atlanta against the Whirlwind of Sherman? Was that you or Davis with inglorious fates of those cities?

Could you clarify those questions?

That was Davis and his political realities. I'd recommend a translation of Clausewitz's On War for a continued discussion in this area.
 
Atlanta was perhaps the single most important city in the Confederacy in 1864 in terms of both its military as well as its political importance. Whatever the fate of the CSA was to be, Atlanta was arguably the last key to it. By every reasonable measure available to Davis, Johnston was going to yield Atlanta virtually unfought. For better or worse, Hood was next man up.
 
Could you clarify those questions?

That was Davis and his political realities. I'd recommend a translation of Clausewitz's On War for a continued discussion in this area.
Question; Did Davis allow politices to determin which cities were to be fought for and which were not? Atlanta was loss the day that Sherman started his march.The Confedercey could not fight a two war front.The only thing that saved Frederick the Great was that the boy caz of Russia,a idol to Fred., took the Russian army out of the war just before Berlin.But Davis was in a desperate mood ,which to save ,the army or Atlanta .What politics beside not wanting to be the President who ALLOW Atlanta to fall.Atlanta would have been better off after the war if Davis had choosen more wisely.Davis must have skipped class on the day of the lecture on Fred.?
 
Unfortunately, the Peter Principle usually involves the person in question reaching their level of incompetence. Because of circumstances, Hood was made an army commander. He tried to delay taking command until after the Battle of Atlanta (as an engagement at Peachtree Creek was imminent) was fought, but Davis and Cooper insisted that the change of command take place immediately.



Except did Johnston argue that Atlanta was indefensible? He had no plan at all. At least no plan that he would communicate to his superiors or his subordinates and that has survived.

In an ideal war, the commander is supplied with enough resources and manpower to accomplish his objective and maintain the initiative. However, war are from ideal. Johnston had an objective (hold Atlanta until November) which he had to make do with the army he had (and helped to shape). It is noteworthy that Lee, in a much smaller theater of operations, held Grant in check for much longer while facing greater odds (despite Johnston's claims to the contrary). It is noteworthy that Lee managed to hold Petersburg for so long in part because he aggressively checked attempts to cut the various railroads into Petersburg (Globe Tavern and Weldon Railroad come to mind) and even launched numerous small tactical offensives. Hood tried a similar approach with Atlanta and failed, bloodily in some cases.

There are plenty of explanations for this. The Army of Tennessee was not the Army of Northern Virginia. Lee's men were confident in his proven generalship and even revered him. The rank and file of the Army of Tennessee had endured Bragg, was concerned at Johnston's constant retreating, and even more concerned at Hood's replacement of Johnston. Even late in the war, Lee could count on Gordon, Mahone, Heth, Field, and a returning Longstreet to manage field tactics. Who did the Army of Tennessee have? Hardee, who was so frustrated at Hood's promotion over his head that his performance suffered and he may have disobeyed orders at Peach Tree Creek and Bald Hill. Cleburne and Cheatham excelled on the defensive, and there were a few talented and capable officers like Walthall, but there wasn't really more than a handful of officers who could coordinate offensive tactics in the army. By contrast, the list of officers incapable of tactical articulation at higher levels is much longer at starts with corps commander S.D. Lee. By late 1864 the worst thing you could say about a division commander in Lee's army was that he was only competent and not brilliant (with the exception of Pickett, perhaps). In Hood's army, Stevenson and Bate were not fit to command divisions while Walker and Loring were troublesome off the battlefield. That's more than a third of the infantry commanders.

It is also worth noting that the Army of the Tennessee and Army of the Cumberland were not the Armies of the Potomac and the James. Except for Chickasaw Bayou and Chickamauga, these men had never known defeat and, to paraphrase Pope, were pretty used to seeing the back of the Army of Tennessee as it retreated. While Sherman may not have been good at tactical articulation (very few army and army group commanders were or are), he was an excellent operations chief and he had Thomas and company for tactics. I have never intimated that defending Atlanta was easy. With this opposition it was going to be hard. But wars are never easy.

If Atlanta were indefensible as you claim, then Johnston's best chance at defending Atlanta was to fight the battles as far north as possible. While an offensive into Tennessee may not have been advisable or logistically probable, Johnston may have held Sherman in check if he changed base into Alabama and moved to threaten Chattanooga and Sherman's communications and supplies while keeping a holding force to Sherman's front. But Johnston did not do that. He retreated from Rocky Face Ridge to Resaca, to Adairsville, to Allatoona Pass to Dallas-New Hope to Marietta and then to the Chattahoochee. And when he retreated across the Chattahoochee, there was no more ground left to give aside from Atlanta itself. And if he abandoned Atlanta, he might have avoided the 12,000 plus casualties Hood suffered, but he would have likely suffered desertions (especially in the Georgia troops) to add to the 16,000 casualties and desertions he lost on the retreat to Atlanta.
THANK YOU ! THANK YOU! This was vey informative on the issue of Atlanta.Johnston as long been the goat for Atlanta when the real issue should have been Davis's interference with military stragery.There seems to have been a bit of personal antimostiy in the Western Theater.
 
Question; Did Davis allow politices to determin which cities were to be fought for and which were not? Atlanta was loss the day that Sherman started his march.The Confedercey could not fight a two war front.The only thing that saved Frederick the Great was that the boy caz of Russia,a idol to Fred., took the Russian army out of the war just before Berlin.But Davis was in a desperate mood ,which to save ,the army or Atlanta .What politics beside not wanting to be the President who ALLOW Atlanta to fall.Atlanta would have been better off after the war if Davis had choosen more wisely.Davis must have skipped class on the day of the lecture on Fred.?

Well, it is both politics and a number of military realities.
In the beginning, Davis sought to defend as much territory as possible to prove and defend the sovereignty and legitimacy of the Confederacy. This backfired and saw the fall of New Orleans, Nashville, and Memphis. The Confederacy was forced to concentrate on the defense of a few cities - in the East: Richmond (and the cities that supported the defense of Richmond like Petersburg and Wilmington), and Charleston. In the West; Corinth, Jackson, Chattanooga, Atlanta, Columbus, Mobile, and Selma were all points to be defended as manufacturing or transportation hubs. Vicksburg and Port Hudson were symbolic of the connection between the Trans-Mississippi and the rest of the Confederacy as well as to deny the Mississippi River to Midwestern merchants who wished to use New Orleans as a port for export. Likewise, in the Trans-Mississippi, Little Rock and Shreveport were politically and industrially important as controlling tributaries into the Mississippi. The latter in particular also served as the gateway to the cotton fields and potential Unionist cells in Texas.

Now as for Atlanta in particular, politics are an important consideration. Davis had lost Jackson, Mississippi, and Little Rock, Arkansas, without major battles. The governor of Arkansas, Harris Flanagin, had written to Davis that more than 1,500 men of 7,700 effectives had deserted the Confederate army defending Little Rock in the aftermath of the abandonment of that city. Flanagin sincerely believed that a battle for the city would not have been as damaging to Price's army as the pure number of men who simply abandoned the cause in the face of what he considered futile martial efforts.

Particularly, many Confederates were hoping that to stall Sherman outside of Atlanta might propel the Democrats to victory in the Presidential election. Now, this is significant as a plank of the Democratic Platform was a negotiated peace with the South. At this point, well outside of European intervention, placing Peace Democrats in power in the north was the only rebel hope of anything more than a total defeat. If Atlanta fell, that was for naught. Ergo, Atlanta must be defended as long as possible.

There were other considerations for defending Atlanta outside of political considerations. Mainly that Atlanta represented the line of communications to the farms in the bread basket of Alabama as well as the small industries in Selma and the port of Mobile. If this were severed, then Lee would be forced to rely only on the stricken Virginia countryside, the Carolinas, and Wilmington to feed his army. Outside of Alabama were the cannon and uniform manufactories at Columbus (as well as the ironclad being constructed there), which would be in the path of the Federals once Atlanta was taken.

There also existed, especially in the Georgia brigades of the Army of Northern Virginia and Army of Tennessee, the strong possibility of increased desertions if Atlanta fell without a fight.
 
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