Franklin Franklin's 149th

Was a frontal attack Hood's best option at Franklin?

  • Yes

    Votes: 3 33.3%
  • Other (give your opinion)

    Votes: 3 33.3%
  • He could have flanked them

    Votes: 3 33.3%

  • Total voters
    9
Joined
May 18, 2005
Location
Spring Hill, Tennessee
4 p.m. will mark the 149th anniversary of the bloody Battle of Franklin.

What some historians have led people to believe is it was a five hour battle. Perhaps the bullets were flying for five hours, but the vast majority of losses that took place occurred in only TWO hours. Over 7,000 Confederate casualties total and fully 80% or more in the first TWO hours.

Figure this.

The Confederates strike the Federal lines at about 4:15 p.m. - sunset at 4:30 and dusk at 5 p.m..

For only the first 45 minutes to an hour you can see your target. Needless to say it is much easier to hit a target when you can see it. So the first hour of the battle is by far the most deadly. The casualties that take place after that are more random than anything else. Imagine the brief, but horribly deadly field and ditches along the exterior of the main Federal line!

"And now the battle raged all along the lines. The first success of the Confederates proved their ruin, as it had been so easily gained that it led them to repeat the attack, pouring division after division upon the works, only to see them melt away under that terrible fire. After these terrific charges, came what was not less impressive—the lulls of the battle. First, there was a sound in the distance, as of a great multitude in motion, coupled with a fearful yell, which culminated in a rush and roar, as the living human wave struck upon the beach, and broke and rolled back again. Then for a few minutes there was a lull, as the enemy were gathering their forces to renew the onset—a comparative silence, broken only by the groans of the wounded and dying. One who was in the battle writes me that the charge itself was not so dreadful as these moments of expectation. Then rose the same terrific yell, and on they came again with the same desperate courage, but not with the same confidence: for they came, not with erect, martial air, but with heads bent low, as when facing a tempest, and caps drawn over their eyes, as if to shut from their sight the fate that awaited them."

"A Confederate officer tells me that the next morning he mounted his horse to ride to the front, but as he drew near the horse started back, affrighted at the smell of blood, and at the human figures that stared at him from the ground, with every look of agony in their faces; and he dismounted and endeavored to pick his way on foot, but so thick were the slain that he said, “I do not think it extravagant to say that for two hundred yards from the line of intrenchments, I could have walked on the dead, stepping from one body to another!”

Did Hood have any other good options that day? Think hard.
 
Schofield's center was his strongest position, both his flanks less so. His right flank was the weakest part of his line and Hood should have let Forrest roll that flank up.
 
Schofield's center was his strongest position, both his flanks less so. His right flank was the weakest part of his line and Hood should have let Forrest roll that flank up.

But the right flank was down river, harder to ford in the event of success. Not that they couldn't have broken the line there as many then and now believe, but there was limited daylight. So, based on the situation at hand... did Hood utilize the best option at hand?
 
Best option was to stay in front of Sherman instead of even attempt to reach Nashville in the first place; any major offensive so late in the war was pointless. If I were Hood and had to make a decision on the morning of the 30th, I would definitely allow a flanking movement by Forrest, even though it would have taken him some time to cross the Harpeth, if there is any opportunity in my favor I would take it.
 
Hood arrives at Franklin a little past 1pm and surveys the Federal positions . He is joined by Forrest who advises against a frontal attack as the strong Federal emplacements are in plain sight as well as yankee artillery positions north and east of the Harpeth River that would place any attacking force under deadly enflilade fire.
Forrest is aware that Schofield is vulnerable on the extreme eastern flank of the Federal line. Upstream from Franklin there were fords available for crossing. He begged Hood for the use of his own troopers and a single infantry division. He promised that with this force he would clear out Schofield's works on the south bank. Hood refused, and by 3pm had sealed the fate of the Army of Tennessee. Had Hood allowed Forrest to attack there was still plenty of daylight to make it a success. IMO Hood did not utilize his best option.
Hood believes that if he could defeat Schofield at Franklin Nashville will fall to the Confederates. He is completely unaware that Thomas is assembling a huge force at Nashville that could wipe out Hood without Schofields force at all.
 
Hood arrives at Franklin a little past 1pm and surveys the Federal positions . He is joined by Forrest who advises against a frontal attack as the strong Federal emplacements are in plain sight as well as yankee artillery positions north and east of the Harpeth River that would place any attacking force under deadly enflilade fire.
Forrest is aware that Schofield is vulnerable on the extreme eastern flank of the Federal line. Upstream from Franklin there were fords available for crossing. He begged Hood for the use of his own troopers and a single infantry division. He promised that with this force he would clear out Schofield's works on the south bank. Hood refused, and by 3pm had sealed the fate of the Army of Tennessee. Had Hood allowed Forrest to attack there was still plenty of daylight to make it a success. IMO Hood did not utilize his best option.
Hood believes that if he could defeat Schofield at Franklin Nashville will fall to the Confederates. He is completely unaware that Thomas is assembling a huge force at Nashville that could wipe out Hood without Schofields force at all.

True, they arrived at Franklin around 1 p.m. on Winstead Hill. But, the sun sets at 4:30. That leaves only three hours to accomplish forming the troops, force a crossing and defeat the majority of Wilson's Cavalry, Wood's division (which could have quickly been reinforced with more infantry) and all of this under the guns of Fort Granger.

Hood is supposed to attempt this with such little time when his brilliant movement the day before was thwarted by his subordinates? They just failed him the evening before, and he would attempt a similar movement only 18 miles from the steps of the state capital?

Hood didn't know the size of the forces in Nashville at that time, but any size force could threaten a flank attack from Nashville on his enveloping force - should he try it.

You know, as bloody as Franklin was.. it was only the insubordination of Colonel Opdycke looking out for his tired men's welfare that saved the day. The Confederate breakthrough was indeed a success, and had Opdycke been on that advanced line - Hood would have indeed crushed the Federal army there.
 
I'm hoping work on turning the old golf course into the new Battlefield Park over by Carnton and the Confederate Cemetery is complete in time for the Sesquicentennial of the battle next year. This May when I visited work was still very much "in progress" though it was looking good:

DSC01559A.JPG
 
Hood attacked Schofield with a large part of his infantry still on the road coming up from Columbia and except for 2 batteries all his artillery on the same trip. He chose not to wait for the rest of his army, and he chose to attack the strongest part of Schofields line. I'm no tactics wonder, but it seems to me he had two strikes against him at the very start and that isn't even counting the lateness of the hour.
 
Hood attacked Schofield with a large part of his infantry still on the road coming up from Columbia and except for 2 batteries all his artillery on the same trip. He chose not to wait for the rest of his army, and he chose to attack the strongest part of Schofields line. I'm no tactics wonder, but it seems to me he had two strikes against him at the very start and that isn't even counting the lateness of the hour.

No doubt, but given the situation and what had happened the day before...

Not justifying the attack up the gut, but in HIS shoes, given the situation and the close proximity of Nashville, did he make a justifiable decision?
 
No.....don't get me wrong General Hood is my hero, but I believe he was in no condition, mentally or physically, to make that attack. His orders were vague creating confusion among his subordinates, and he didn't see to it that the orders he did give were followed. In that climate, maybe Forrest, Stewart, Cheatham and Brown can be somewhat excused for sitting tight and doing little.
 
No.....don't get me wrong General Hood is my hero, but I believe he was in no condition, mentally or physically, to make that attack. His orders were vague creating confusion among his subordinates, and he didn't see to it that the orders he did give were followed. In that climate, maybe Forrest, Stewart, Cheatham and Brown can be somewhat excused for sitting tight and doing little.
I got ya.
 
Hood had no business being an Army commander. If Davis wanted him to remain in the army, give him command of somewhere nice to rest. This campaign should never have happened.
 
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