2nd Alabama Cavalry
Sergeant
- Joined
- Jan 29, 2019
I just found this very informational article in the Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 8 (pages 49 - 61), which adds a lot of color to Forrest`s fight against Sooy Smith on 22 Feb 1864. It really goes into great detail regarding S. D. Lee`s part in that battle and gives insight into the defeat of Smith`s 7,000 man Federal cavalry at the hands of Forrest`s 3,500 man command during the battle of Okolona. Basically Lt. General S. D. Lee, after reading an account regarding Sherman`s Great Mississippi Expedition (Meridian Campaign) written by Chalmers, where he was praising Forrest but putting down Polk, provoked S. D. Lee to respond in rebuking Chalmers and coming to the defense of Polk. It is a very interesting read, I personally found it fascinating.
Here is what Lee was specifically responding to, written by Chalmers circa 1879:
"Thus ended Sherman's effort to crush Forrest and set free the large number of men required to hold him in check. Mississippi, with its immense stores of corn and beef, was still held, and the railroads soon repaired to feed our army in Georgia. But the student of military operations will be puzzled to understand how Sherman, with four divisions of infantry and a small force of cavalry, crossed such streams as the Big Black and Pearl rivers, and passed through the centre of Mississippi, in the face of two divisions of infantry and four splendid brigades of well-equipped and well-drilled cavalry, under West Point officers, almost without firing a shot, while a man who could not well drill a company, with three thousand (3,000) cavalry, one-half raw troops, saved the State by defeating General Grant's Chief of Cavalry with seven thousand (7,000) picked troops.”
Regarding his remarks; "In the face of two divisions of infantry and four splendid brigades of well-equipped and well-drilled cavalry, under West Point officers, almost without firing a shot," He was making reference to Lt. General Polk and Maj. General S. D. Lee and the four brigades of cavalry under them, which were Brig. General`s Samuel Wragg Ferguson, Wirt Adams, Lawrence S. Ross and Col. Peter B. Starke, all under the command of Brig. General William Hicks Jackson. Regarding his remarks; "while a man who could not well drill a company, with three thousand (3,000) cavalry, one-half raw troops, saved the State by defeating General Grant's Chief of Cavalry with seven thousand (7,000) picked troops.” He was making reference to Maj. General Nathan B. Forrest fighting and routing Brig. General Sooy Smith.
So Lt. General S. D. Lee felt compelled to respond and defend both his actions during that campaign as well as Lt. General Leonidas Polk, in addition to defending the reputations of both. Below is how he began his response to Chalmers:
"In the October number of the Southern Historical Society Papers of 1879 is the address of General Chalmers before the Society at the White Sulphur Springs in August, his theme being Forrest and his campaigns. This address is a valuable contribution, and paints, with a comrade's partiality, the character and deeds of Forrest. General Chalmers, however, makes some statements and draws certain conclusions from which I feel compelled to dissent, and I think I am sustained by the facts of the case.
Lieutenant-General Polk was killed in battle. Forrest is dead. Is it necessary, when General Chalmers desires to eulogize Forrest, that he should censure Polk? I think it a duty to give my version of Sherman's Meridian expedition to do General Polk justice. General Chalmers dwells almost entirely on the operations in which he personally took an active part. He forgets that while Forrest was encountering seven thousand (7,000) Federal troops another cavalry command, in the same State, at the same time, no larger than his own, was encountering twenty-six thousand (26,000) infantry; and that possibly General Polk, commanding the Department, and directing both bodies of troops, could see and comprehend more than was within the scope of his vision. General Polk being cognizant of all the surroundings, and General Chalmers having only a limited field of observation. The prominent position of General Chalmers will pass his utterances into history unless controverted."
What I found interesting in reading the article from S. D. Lee was his vantage point on the battle of Okolona and his affect on the outcome, even though he arrived too late to fight, just a scant few hours after Sooy Smith had been routed by Forrest and in the process of being chased back into Tennessee. S. D. Lee, along with the 4 cavalry brigades belonging to Samuel Wragg Ferguson, Wirt Adams, Lawrence S. Ross and Col. Peter B. Starke, all under the command of Brig. General William Hicks Jackson, had left Meridian on 18 Feb 1864, while Sherman was tearing up the place, to reinforce Forrest regarding his upcoming fight against Sooy Smith.
Below is what S. D. Lee wrote:
"On February 20th, at West Point, Forrest received a dispatch from Lee, saying he would arrive on the 22d. Smith, at West Point, the same day heard of this dispatch, and also had it confirmed from prisoners and deserters taken in the evening of that day, when Forrest was retiring across the Sookatouchie stream. He (General Smith) determined at once to retreat rapidly before Lee joined his forces with Forrest, and to draw Forrest after him. Forrest, with his usual perception and vigor, at once comprehended a change of program in Smith's plans, and commenced one of his headlong pursuits, following Smith to vicinity of Pontotoc. Considerable skirmishing took place in the pursuit, and at Okolona Forrest captured six guns."
S. D. Lee suggested that the whole reason that Sooy Smith fled from his strong position at West Point and was soon pursued by Forrest, which led to the rout on the 22nd, was because after hearing (20th) that S. D. Lee was coming up from Meridian with his 4 brigades of cavalry (3,500 troopers) to join with Forrest`s 3,500 troopers, that Smith would be trapped in-between Lee`s forces from the south and Forrest`s forces from the north and west of him at West Point. To add to Smith`s confusion and uncertainty, he also heard at the same time that Sherman was pulling out of Meridian on that day (20th) and returning to Vicksburg, since he had not heard from Smith who was supposed to meet him in Meridian and make up the entire left flank of Sherman`s 23,500 man army to move on from there to Selma and then possibly move on Mobile soon there after. So with the appearance of a "trap" and Sherman returning to Vicksburg from Meridian, that action countermanded Smiths orders to meet him at Meridian, so there was no need for him to continue in that direction.
Smith commenced his retreat before Forrest offered him any serious resistance, and because he knew of Lee's near approach and junction with Forrest. Below, in his official report, Smith says, of his retreating from West Point:
“Exaggerated reports of Forrest's strength reached me constantly, and it was reported that Lee was about to reinforce him with a portion or the whole of his command.” He also says: “Under these circumstances, I determined not to move my encumbered command into the trap set for me by the Rebels.” Again: “I would have lost my entire command, and of course could have rendered him (Sherman) no assistance.” Again: “Information since obtained fully justifies the decision to retire before Forrest's force from West Point. General Sherman's expeditionary force had withdrawn from Meridian before my arrival at West Point, on a line that could not have been known to me, cut off, as I was, from any communication with him. Forrest's force is ascertained to have been rather above than below my estimate. Chalmers was moving with two brigades by way of Houston to my rear, while Lee, with from three to four thousand men, was ordered up to join Forrest in front.” Again: “Our march [retreat] was so rapid that the enemy could not outstrip and intercept us, which he constantly endeavored to do.”
To substantiate this, Major S. L. Woodward, United States army, who was Adjutant-General on General Grierson's staff in this expedition, the General being second in command to General Smith, under date of March 20th, 1879, from Fort Davis, Texas, writes:
“When in the vicinity of West Point, Mississippi, or in the pocket formed by the junction of the Tombigbee, Houlka and Sookatouchie rivers, this brigade being in advance, met, engaged and repulsed a force which we supposed to be under General Forrest, driving them across Sookatouchie, when, being considerably ahead of General Smith and the rest of the command, and it being nearly dark, General Grierson halted, and immediately prepared a crossing of the stream to be used in the advance. General Smith soon arrived, and placed the whole command in camp. During the night considerable movement was heard in the enemy's camp on the opposite side of the river, and a number of prisoners and deserters were brought in. These were taken to General Smith, who questioned them. He (General Smith) was very sick during the night, his mind at times bordering on delirium, and he sent for General Grierson, and told him he was very sick, and that he (Grierson) would have to take command. He then asked General Grierson what he would do in the morning. The reply was that he would proceed towards Meridian. General Smith then said, ‘No! that will never do. General Stephen D. Lee is in front of us with his whole force, including infantry and artillery.’ He (Smith) immediately reassumed the direction of affairs, gave orders for a retrogade movement at dawn, and directed General Grierson to hold the rear with this brigade heretofore mentioned. There is no doubt that General Smith learned from the deserters, whom he interviewed, that you (S. D. Lee) had reinforced Forrest, and that his orders for the retreat were on that account. The engagement of the first day was but a sharp skirmish, in which only a part of one brigade was engaged; the opposing force was easily repulsed, and there was no reason whatever why we should have retreated before the force which was then in front of us. General Grierson's recollection of the affair coincides with mine, and I have from his own lips the report of the conversation herein related between himself and General Smith.”
In the official report of General S. D. Lee, dated Tuscaloosa, Alabama, April 18th, 1864, is the following, viz:
“The enemy, on reaching West Point, heard of my approach on the 21st, and immediately commenced their retreat. Forrest on the 22d, in the evening, commenced the pursuit, and caught up with the rear guard, inflicting severe punishment on them, capturing six pieces of artillery and many prisoners. My command was much disappointed at the result of this action, having anticipated a fight with their own arm of the service and with equal numbers.”
These extracts are given to show that Smith's retreat was caused by the movement of Lee to reinforce Forrest, in obedience to the orders of Lieutenant-General Polk, Department commander.
S. D. Lee then goes on further in responding to Chalmers claims that he (S. D. Lee) and his 4 brigades of cavalry "almost without firing a shot" during the whole Meridian Campaign in opposing Sherman`s march from Vicksburg to Meridian. When in fact while the two infantry divisions of Loring and French were in a constant state of general retreat back to Meridian, S. D. Lee`s 3,500 cavalry troopers alone opposed, fought and skirmished heavily every day against Sherman`s 23,500 man army being heavily comprised of infantry. They fought and skirmished against Sherman`s much larger army, day and night, along the roads and in every town and community that Sherman went through from the Big Black river to Meridian (4-14 Feb 1864), even though heavily out-numbered, out-manned and out-gunned the whole distance.
I felt that the article answered several key questions that I had about this campaign and specifically Lee`s role in the battle of Okolona. The article / letter is found in the Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 8 (pages 49 - 61). It is entitled; "Sherman`s Meridian Expedition and Sooy Smith`s Raid to West Point." If anyone is interested in reading it follow the link below:
Here is what Lee was specifically responding to, written by Chalmers circa 1879:
"Thus ended Sherman's effort to crush Forrest and set free the large number of men required to hold him in check. Mississippi, with its immense stores of corn and beef, was still held, and the railroads soon repaired to feed our army in Georgia. But the student of military operations will be puzzled to understand how Sherman, with four divisions of infantry and a small force of cavalry, crossed such streams as the Big Black and Pearl rivers, and passed through the centre of Mississippi, in the face of two divisions of infantry and four splendid brigades of well-equipped and well-drilled cavalry, under West Point officers, almost without firing a shot, while a man who could not well drill a company, with three thousand (3,000) cavalry, one-half raw troops, saved the State by defeating General Grant's Chief of Cavalry with seven thousand (7,000) picked troops.”
Regarding his remarks; "In the face of two divisions of infantry and four splendid brigades of well-equipped and well-drilled cavalry, under West Point officers, almost without firing a shot," He was making reference to Lt. General Polk and Maj. General S. D. Lee and the four brigades of cavalry under them, which were Brig. General`s Samuel Wragg Ferguson, Wirt Adams, Lawrence S. Ross and Col. Peter B. Starke, all under the command of Brig. General William Hicks Jackson. Regarding his remarks; "while a man who could not well drill a company, with three thousand (3,000) cavalry, one-half raw troops, saved the State by defeating General Grant's Chief of Cavalry with seven thousand (7,000) picked troops.” He was making reference to Maj. General Nathan B. Forrest fighting and routing Brig. General Sooy Smith.
So Lt. General S. D. Lee felt compelled to respond and defend both his actions during that campaign as well as Lt. General Leonidas Polk, in addition to defending the reputations of both. Below is how he began his response to Chalmers:
"In the October number of the Southern Historical Society Papers of 1879 is the address of General Chalmers before the Society at the White Sulphur Springs in August, his theme being Forrest and his campaigns. This address is a valuable contribution, and paints, with a comrade's partiality, the character and deeds of Forrest. General Chalmers, however, makes some statements and draws certain conclusions from which I feel compelled to dissent, and I think I am sustained by the facts of the case.
Lieutenant-General Polk was killed in battle. Forrest is dead. Is it necessary, when General Chalmers desires to eulogize Forrest, that he should censure Polk? I think it a duty to give my version of Sherman's Meridian expedition to do General Polk justice. General Chalmers dwells almost entirely on the operations in which he personally took an active part. He forgets that while Forrest was encountering seven thousand (7,000) Federal troops another cavalry command, in the same State, at the same time, no larger than his own, was encountering twenty-six thousand (26,000) infantry; and that possibly General Polk, commanding the Department, and directing both bodies of troops, could see and comprehend more than was within the scope of his vision. General Polk being cognizant of all the surroundings, and General Chalmers having only a limited field of observation. The prominent position of General Chalmers will pass his utterances into history unless controverted."
What I found interesting in reading the article from S. D. Lee was his vantage point on the battle of Okolona and his affect on the outcome, even though he arrived too late to fight, just a scant few hours after Sooy Smith had been routed by Forrest and in the process of being chased back into Tennessee. S. D. Lee, along with the 4 cavalry brigades belonging to Samuel Wragg Ferguson, Wirt Adams, Lawrence S. Ross and Col. Peter B. Starke, all under the command of Brig. General William Hicks Jackson, had left Meridian on 18 Feb 1864, while Sherman was tearing up the place, to reinforce Forrest regarding his upcoming fight against Sooy Smith.
Below is what S. D. Lee wrote:
"On February 20th, at West Point, Forrest received a dispatch from Lee, saying he would arrive on the 22d. Smith, at West Point, the same day heard of this dispatch, and also had it confirmed from prisoners and deserters taken in the evening of that day, when Forrest was retiring across the Sookatouchie stream. He (General Smith) determined at once to retreat rapidly before Lee joined his forces with Forrest, and to draw Forrest after him. Forrest, with his usual perception and vigor, at once comprehended a change of program in Smith's plans, and commenced one of his headlong pursuits, following Smith to vicinity of Pontotoc. Considerable skirmishing took place in the pursuit, and at Okolona Forrest captured six guns."
S. D. Lee suggested that the whole reason that Sooy Smith fled from his strong position at West Point and was soon pursued by Forrest, which led to the rout on the 22nd, was because after hearing (20th) that S. D. Lee was coming up from Meridian with his 4 brigades of cavalry (3,500 troopers) to join with Forrest`s 3,500 troopers, that Smith would be trapped in-between Lee`s forces from the south and Forrest`s forces from the north and west of him at West Point. To add to Smith`s confusion and uncertainty, he also heard at the same time that Sherman was pulling out of Meridian on that day (20th) and returning to Vicksburg, since he had not heard from Smith who was supposed to meet him in Meridian and make up the entire left flank of Sherman`s 23,500 man army to move on from there to Selma and then possibly move on Mobile soon there after. So with the appearance of a "trap" and Sherman returning to Vicksburg from Meridian, that action countermanded Smiths orders to meet him at Meridian, so there was no need for him to continue in that direction.
Smith commenced his retreat before Forrest offered him any serious resistance, and because he knew of Lee's near approach and junction with Forrest. Below, in his official report, Smith says, of his retreating from West Point:
“Exaggerated reports of Forrest's strength reached me constantly, and it was reported that Lee was about to reinforce him with a portion or the whole of his command.” He also says: “Under these circumstances, I determined not to move my encumbered command into the trap set for me by the Rebels.” Again: “I would have lost my entire command, and of course could have rendered him (Sherman) no assistance.” Again: “Information since obtained fully justifies the decision to retire before Forrest's force from West Point. General Sherman's expeditionary force had withdrawn from Meridian before my arrival at West Point, on a line that could not have been known to me, cut off, as I was, from any communication with him. Forrest's force is ascertained to have been rather above than below my estimate. Chalmers was moving with two brigades by way of Houston to my rear, while Lee, with from three to four thousand men, was ordered up to join Forrest in front.” Again: “Our march [retreat] was so rapid that the enemy could not outstrip and intercept us, which he constantly endeavored to do.”
To substantiate this, Major S. L. Woodward, United States army, who was Adjutant-General on General Grierson's staff in this expedition, the General being second in command to General Smith, under date of March 20th, 1879, from Fort Davis, Texas, writes:
“When in the vicinity of West Point, Mississippi, or in the pocket formed by the junction of the Tombigbee, Houlka and Sookatouchie rivers, this brigade being in advance, met, engaged and repulsed a force which we supposed to be under General Forrest, driving them across Sookatouchie, when, being considerably ahead of General Smith and the rest of the command, and it being nearly dark, General Grierson halted, and immediately prepared a crossing of the stream to be used in the advance. General Smith soon arrived, and placed the whole command in camp. During the night considerable movement was heard in the enemy's camp on the opposite side of the river, and a number of prisoners and deserters were brought in. These were taken to General Smith, who questioned them. He (General Smith) was very sick during the night, his mind at times bordering on delirium, and he sent for General Grierson, and told him he was very sick, and that he (Grierson) would have to take command. He then asked General Grierson what he would do in the morning. The reply was that he would proceed towards Meridian. General Smith then said, ‘No! that will never do. General Stephen D. Lee is in front of us with his whole force, including infantry and artillery.’ He (Smith) immediately reassumed the direction of affairs, gave orders for a retrogade movement at dawn, and directed General Grierson to hold the rear with this brigade heretofore mentioned. There is no doubt that General Smith learned from the deserters, whom he interviewed, that you (S. D. Lee) had reinforced Forrest, and that his orders for the retreat were on that account. The engagement of the first day was but a sharp skirmish, in which only a part of one brigade was engaged; the opposing force was easily repulsed, and there was no reason whatever why we should have retreated before the force which was then in front of us. General Grierson's recollection of the affair coincides with mine, and I have from his own lips the report of the conversation herein related between himself and General Smith.”
In the official report of General S. D. Lee, dated Tuscaloosa, Alabama, April 18th, 1864, is the following, viz:
“The enemy, on reaching West Point, heard of my approach on the 21st, and immediately commenced their retreat. Forrest on the 22d, in the evening, commenced the pursuit, and caught up with the rear guard, inflicting severe punishment on them, capturing six pieces of artillery and many prisoners. My command was much disappointed at the result of this action, having anticipated a fight with their own arm of the service and with equal numbers.”
These extracts are given to show that Smith's retreat was caused by the movement of Lee to reinforce Forrest, in obedience to the orders of Lieutenant-General Polk, Department commander.
S. D. Lee then goes on further in responding to Chalmers claims that he (S. D. Lee) and his 4 brigades of cavalry "almost without firing a shot" during the whole Meridian Campaign in opposing Sherman`s march from Vicksburg to Meridian. When in fact while the two infantry divisions of Loring and French were in a constant state of general retreat back to Meridian, S. D. Lee`s 3,500 cavalry troopers alone opposed, fought and skirmished heavily every day against Sherman`s 23,500 man army being heavily comprised of infantry. They fought and skirmished against Sherman`s much larger army, day and night, along the roads and in every town and community that Sherman went through from the Big Black river to Meridian (4-14 Feb 1864), even though heavily out-numbered, out-manned and out-gunned the whole distance.
I felt that the article answered several key questions that I had about this campaign and specifically Lee`s role in the battle of Okolona. The article / letter is found in the Southern Historical Society Papers, Volume 8 (pages 49 - 61). It is entitled; "Sherman`s Meridian Expedition and Sooy Smith`s Raid to West Point." If anyone is interested in reading it follow the link below:
Southern Historical Society papers. v.8 1880.
babel.hathitrust.org
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