Forrest Forrest at Ft. Donelson

trice

Colonel
Joined
May 2, 2006
FEBRUARY 12-16, 1862.--Siege and Capture of Fort Donelson, Tennessee.
No. 71. -- Reports of Col. Nathan B. Forrest, Tennessee Cavalry.
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In the early gray of the morning I moved to the attack, the cavalry on the left and in the advance. I found the enemy prepared to receive us, and were again engaged with the sharpshooters till our infantry were formed for the attack, the first gun from the enemy killing a horse in my regiment. General B. R. Johnson commanded the left, which now moved to the front. An obstinate fight of two hours ended in the retreat of the enemy. The undergrowth was so thick that I could scarcely press my horses through it. Finding that the flank of the enemy in retreat was exposed across an open field to my front and left, I immediately led my cavalry to the field, but found the ground a marsh, and we were unable to pass it.

The enemy formed in the edge of a second field to our front and right, and flanking the left of our advancing line of infantry. We could not move to flank them, but by maneuvering to their front and right doubtless prevented their attempting a flank movement on our infantry. Finding that our advancing line of infantry would cut them off, while the cavalry prevented their flanking us, they commenced a retreat, accompanied by their cavalry, which we could now see in the distance, but not participating during the day in the fight. Our infantry had now driven them near a mile, they doggedly disputing the whole ground, leaving dead and wounded scattered through the woods and fields up in the ravine. The enemy, leaving their third position for the first time, retreated in haste, advancing by a road through a ravine. I here passed our line of infantry with my command in moving to the center.

I charged the enemy's battery of six guns, which had kept several of our regiments in check for several hours, killing and slaughtering a great many of our men. I captured the battery, killing most of the men and horses. I then immediately moved on the flank of the enemy, obstinately maintaining their position. They finally gave way, our infantry and cavalry both charging them at the same time, committing great slaughter. Moving still ****her to our right, I found a regiment of our infantry in confusion, which I relieved by charging the enemy to their front. Here 64 of the enemy were found in 40 yards square. General Pillow, coming up, ordered me to charge the enemy in a ravine. I charged by squadrons, filing the first company of each squadron to the right, and the second to the left, on reaching the ravine, firing and falling in the rear of the third squadron until the three squadrons had charged. We here completely routed the enemy, leaving some 200 dead in the hollow, accomplishing what three different regiments had failed to do. Seeing the enemy's battery to our right about to turn on us, I now ordered a charge on this battery, from which we drove the enemy, capturing two guns. Following down the ravine captured the third, which they were endeavoring to carry off, gunners and drivers retreating up the hill. In this charge I killed about 50 sharpshooters, who were supporting the guns. I ordered forward a number of scouts, who., returning, informed me that the enemy, with three guns and three regiments of infantry, were moving up by the road from Fort Henry. We had driven the enemy back without a reverse from the left of our intrenchments to the center, having opened three different roads by which we might have retired if the generals had, as was deemed best in the council the night before, ordered the retreat of the army. Informing General Pillow of the position the enemy had taken, he ordered two new regiments and one of the regiments in the field, with one piece of artillery, to attack the enemy.

The fight here ended about 2.30 p.m. without any change in our relative positions. We were employed the remainder of the evening in gathering up the arms, and assisting in getting off the wounded. I was three times over the battle-field, and late in the evening was 2 miles up the river on the road to the forge. There were none of the enemy in sight when dark came on. Saturday night our troops slept, flushed with victory, and confident they could drive the enemy back to the Tennessee River the next morning.
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Tim
 
FEBRUARY 12-16, 1862.--Siege and Capture of Fort Donelson, Tennessee.
No. 52. -- Reports of Brig. Gen. Simon B. Buckner, C. S. Army, commanding division, &c.
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In order to cover the advance of the infantry column I directed Captain Porter, with his artillerists, to serve Green's battery, which was already in position, and at the same time sent a request to Colonel Heiman to direct Maney's battery to open its fire, while he should deploy a line of skirmishers in advance of his position to cover the right of the valley. General Pillow was at this time, as I afterwards learned, on the heights to my right, occupied by Heiman. Maney's, Porter's, and Graves' batteries now opened a cross-fire upon the enemy's battery and position, soon crippling some of his guns and driving their supports, while the Third, Eighteenth, and Thirty-second Tennessee Regiments, under their brigade commander, Col. John C. Brown, moved steadily up the valley, preceded by their skirmishers, who soon became engaged with those of the enemy. This movement, combined with the brisk fire of three batteries, induced a rapid retreat of the enemy, who abandoned a section of his artillery. At the same time my infantry were thus penetrating the enemy's line of retreat Forrest, with a portion of his cavalry, charged upon their right, while General Pillow's division, under the orders of General B. R. Johnson and Colonel Baldwin, were pressing their extreme right about half a mile to the left of this position.
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Tim
 
Because of the notorious unreliability of reports (not pointing at Forrest as a particular example, but there are far too many generals who would have you believe they won a battle by their own efforts, so making sure this is, indeed, supported), some questions.

1)
Finding that our advancing line of infantry would cut them off, while the cavalry prevented their flanking us, they commenced a retreat, accompanied by their cavalry, which we could now see in the distance, but not participating during the day in the fight.

Asking more as someone who finds OOBs interesting than to question the report, what cavalry did Grant have at Donelson?

2)
I charged the enemy's battery of six guns, which had kept several of our regiments in check for several hours, killing and slaughtering a great many of our men. I captured the battery, killing most of the men and horses.

What battery? Were "most of the men and horses" casualties?

3)
Moving still ****her to our right, I found a regiment of our infantry in confusion, which I relieved by charging the enemy to their front.

What regiment?

4)
General Pillow, coming up, ordered me to charge the enemy in a ravine. I charged by squadrons, filing the first company of each squadron to the right, and the second to the left, on reaching the ravine, firing and falling in the rear of the third squadron until the three squadrons had charged. We here completely routed the enemy, leaving some 200 dead in the hollow, accomplishing what three different regiments had failed to do. Seeing the enemy's battery to our right about to turn on us, I now ordered a charge on this battery, from which we drove the enemy, capturing two guns. Following down the ravine captured the third, which they were endeavoring to carry off, gunners and drivers retreating up the hill. In this charge I killed about 50 sharpshooters, who were supporting the guns.

What enemy, what regiments, what batteries? And who are these "sharpshooters"?

None of this is meant to imply that Forrest personally cannot be trusted - most of it is "I don't know enough of the details of the battle to know what he's refering to". I know the strategic results, not the tactical details.

So I'd like to know specifically what Forrest is refering to and how accurate his statements are - even if trying to be scrupluous accurate and modest, he would be neither the first or the last officer to overestimate the damage done to the enemy by his command.

Nonetheless, it appears that he (had the evacuation been made) deserves much of the credit for its success - and the failure is in no way due to lack of effort on his part.

If judging by this alone (without any later deeds to use to weigh him one way or another), Forrest is an officer who can be counted on in a tight spot, who can keep control of his men (it would be entirely too easy for his regiment to become disorganized and ineffective otherwise), and who appears to have a good tactical eye.

In other words, if I was a superior reading this report, I'd put him down as "very promising" and make sure to put him where the fighting was hot.

Elennsar

P.S. I take it the italics are for my benefit, and not Forrest's.
 
FEBRUARY 12-16, 1862.--Siege and Capture of Fort Donelson, Tennessee.
No. 54. -- Report of Col. Roger W. Hanson, Second Kentucky Infantry (Confederate).
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I remained in rear or near Graves' battery, under the immediate supervision of General Buckner, until about noon, when Colonel Baldwin, of Mississippi, announced to me that he was out of ammunition, and stated that unless he could get ammunition and re-enforcements there was great danger of losing the ground which had been won. I had near by a wagon of ammunition, and with the perseverance of Quartermaster Estep and Lieutenant Semple the ammunition was soon supplied. Previous to this period some one mounted, purporting to be a staff officer, approached the regiment and ordered off two of the left companies to re-enforce Colonel Baldwin's command. These two companies, supposing it to be the order of Generals Pillow or Buckner, moved off at a double-quick, and were soon engaged with the enemy and against greatly superior numbers. Colonel McCausland, of Virginia, arrived, and said that unless they were re-enforced the enemy would retake what they had gained; that after four hours of hard fighting the enemy were bringing forward new troops and in overwhelming numbers. I examined the state of the contest. I saw Colonel Forrest make two gallant but unsuccessful charges. I saw that the enemy were gradually driving us back. My men were eager for the fight. I felt confident that I could dislodge the enemy and drive them from their position. I sent for General Buckner. He had gone to the right and was conducting another movement. There was no time for delay. I concluded to take the responsibility and make the effort. I marched the regiment across the abatis, a distance of more than a quarter of a mile. When I reached the little ravine where Forrest was with his cavalry I halted the regiment, and was joined by the two detached companies. In front of us was an open space, which had formerly been occupied as a camp. This space was about 200 yards in width. Beyond the space in the timber and thick undergrowth the enemy were posted. I directed the regiment, when the command was given, to march at quick-time across the space and not to fire a gun until they reached the woods in which the enemy were posted. The order was admirably executed, and although we lost 50 men in killed and wounded in crossing the space, not a gun was fired until the woods were reached. The enemy stood their ground until we were within 40 yards of them, when they fled in great confusion, under a most destructive fire. This was not, strictly speaking, a "charge bayonets," but it would have been one if the enemy had not fled. Graves' battery was then moved up, and my regiment moved forward several hundred yards. While Graves was moving up his ammunition and other preparations were being made to hold this position the order came from General Pillow to return to the trenches. Up to this period the success was complete.
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Tim
 
FEBRUARY 12-16, 1862.--Siege and Capture of Fort Donelson, Tennessee.
No. 62. -- Reports of Brig. Gen. Bushrod R. Johnson, C. S. Army, commanding division, &c.
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At early dawn the head of the column moved, under the orders of General Pillow, who led them, and very soon engaged the enemy with small-arms. Somewhat later Lieutenant Perkins opened fire upon the enemy from his artillery posted in the trenches. Colonel Baldwin's brigade formed the right of the attacking force and was first to open fire. Colonels Wharton's and McCausland's brigades formed a line on the left of Colonel Baldwin. Colonel Simonton's brigade was the next to advance, which it did in the following order from right to left, viz: Third Mississippi, Eighth Kentucky, Seventh Texas, and First Mississippi Regiments. When the head of this brigade had advanced about half way up the hill occupied by the enemy, the Third [Twenty-third] Mississippi Regiment was brought forward and put into action. The Eighth Kentucky Regiment was then met by a heavy fire, which caused it to form in line of battle under cover of [a] hollow to the right of the Third Mississippi Regiment, from which it moved into action under a heavy fire from the enemy. The regiments of Colonel Gregg and Lieutenant-Colonel Hamilton (the Seventh Texas and First Mississippi) moved forward together, and came into action on the right of the Eighth Kentucky Regiment. This brigade being heavily pressed by the enemy, the Thirty-sixth Virginia Regiment was brought up to its left and put into action, so as to take the enemy in [the] flank. The left brigade, commanded by Colonel Drake, I placed in position, forming a handsome line, and pressed it forward to the attack. In passing from the left towards the right of our trenches, as did our line of battle, our left had to traverse a much larger circle than our right, and as our right moved near the trenches our left was the only wing liable to be outflanked. I therefore found ample occupation in pressing forward the left wing, keeping a regular, well-directed line, and in guarding the left flank.

In the last of these duties I was greatly assisted by Colonel Forrest and his regiment of cavalry. Colonel Drake's brigade, under its very gallant, steady, and efficient commander, moved almost constantly under my eye, and, when necessary, at my command. It moved in admirable order, preserving in a perfect manner a regular, well-connected line, almost constantly under fire, driving the enemy slowly from hill to hill until about 1 p.m., when we reached a position nearly opposite the center of the left wing of our trenches. Here, observing the enemy in force in front and no troops supporting us on our right, I sent an aide-de-camp to ask for re-enforcements, and received an order to report in person to the commanding general within our defensive works. Upon hazarding the suggestion that the enemy in front of Colonel Drake's brigade should be attacked, it was, after slight discussion, ordered by General Floyd that this brigade should for a time be displayed before the enemy, and that the other brigades should take their positions in the rifle pits. Having duly disposed of Colonel Drake's brigade according to orders, I returned in person to the intrenchments, at about 800 yards distant. Very soon I found the enemy had advanced and engaged this brigade. After some personal examination of the enemy, and after learning that the right wing, under General Buckner, had called for re-enforcements from the left,, rendering it, perhaps, injudicious to send out more of the troops from the rifle pits, I directed Colonel Forrest, with a portion of his cavalry, to give aid to Colonel Drake, if necessary and practicable. Colonel Forrest soon returned and reported to me that he had advised Colonel Drake to fall back. Yet the enemy were finally driven back in gallant style by the brigade with heavy loss to them and without the loss of a single man on our side. Having nearly exhausted his ammunition, Colonel Drake fell back with his brigade into the rifle pits. Thus ended the conflict on the left wing on February 15, the enemy having been driven back at every point where we had engaged him with heavy losses.
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Tim
 
Because of the notorious unreliability of reports (not pointing at Forrest as a particular example, but there are far too many generals who would have you believe they won a battle by their own efforts, so making sure this is, indeed, supported), some questions.

Particularly early in the war, I assume all numbers involving the enemy are way too high, no matter which side.:smile:

1)
Asking more as someone who finds OOBs interesting than to question the report, what cavalry did Grant have at Donelson?

That is actually hard to say. It wasn't organized above the regiment level, and individual regiments, battalions and companies are scattered throughout the brigades, which are really forces of all arms in some cases.

For example, McClernand says his divison had this: "The cavalry attached to my division, consisting of a portion of Colonels Noble's and Dickey's regiments and four independent companies of cavalry, respectively commanded by Lieutenant King, Captains Carmichael, Dollins, and O'Harnett, all of which had during the march and investment performed gallant and valuable service, were posted in positions favorable for the pursuit of the enemy if the fate of the day should justify it." -- but he's wrong. That doesn't include 2 companies of Regulars he had.

Tim
 
Anniversary bump.

FEBRUARY 12-16, 1862.

FortDonelson900.jpg

http://www.johnpaulstrain.com/images/art/large/FortDonelson900.jpg
 
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