Fixing the Western Theater

Luke Freet

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After perusing many a book on the many campaigns in the Western (personally I prefer referring to it as the Central theater because there's a more western Transmississippi theater), and many a "What if" thread on the actions of the Army of Tennessee in one situation or another, it seems the Confederate armies in the West lacked solid leadership at the upper levels of command. Men like Braxton Bragg, Joe Johnston, John Bell Hood, even P. G. T. Beauregard and Albert Sidney Johnston all seem to come up short in many regards. Their failings were only exasperated by the wide front they needed to protect (in essence, from 1862-1863, the Confederates pretty much divided their Western armies in two; Bragg's remaining in Central Tennessee, and the other Operating close to the Mississippi under the likes of Van Dorn, Pemberton, and Joe Johnston).
The question I pose is: could these problems have been overcome? If so, how, and by whom? Would it require folks like Bragg and Polk and other troublesome combatative officers cooperating better and with less outward antagonism? Or would that not be enough to save the whole situation?
 
For starters, the Davis administration never gave the west the resources and/or attention it deserved, while initially favoring a flawed cordon strategy in which all areas and borders of the Confederacy needed to be defended. So AS Johnston was confronted with defending an immense line stretching from the Mississippi River across Kentucky and Tennessee without sufficient manpower. On top of which, Johnston took command right after General Polk had foolishly occupied Columbus, Kentucky, thereby tilting that state into the Union column. Grant's subsequent occupation of Paducah, and assaults at Belmont, and Forts Henry and Donelson, with George Thomas' defeat of Zollicoffer at Mill Springs, doomed the Confederate defensive line and forced its evacuation southward to Corinth. Johnston and Beauregard's force concentration was a good move to possibly stanch the bleeding at that point, but the botched execution against Pittsburg Landing and the turning of Confederate strongpoints along the Mississippi from Island No. 10 to Memphis basically ended any hope of southern victory in the west.
 
Pretty much everything that could go wrong did. First off the geography works against the Confederacy. This is a large area to defend and it is bounded on the west and south by water that is controlled by Union boats. The east/west rivers allow those boats to get into the middle of this vast area as well.

Davis administration policy at the start of the war was to defend all the way to the TN/KY border without any consideration of the manpower available to do this. Davis was concerned about losing local support if he bailed on large areas early, even if they were not militarily important. There was no cooperation amount the multiple sizable Confederate armies in the area for 62 and 63.

Leadership. Been talked about over and over. Army level command was definitely wanting, and for most of the war the subordinates are openly feuding with the army commaner (bragg) more than their focus on fighting the enemy. Also keep in mind Lee often jettisoned his undesirables out west that he didn't want in the ANV. Many of them were undesirable for a reason.

The only thing that could have probably have helped the Confederacy in the west is if the Union had employed more conservative commanders for longer such as Buell and Halleck and even to some extint Rosecrans. But in Grant, the Union had a commander that was aggressive and going to get where he wanted his army to be one way or the other.
 
Pretty much everything that could go wrong did. First off the geography works against the Confederacy. This is a large area to defend and it is bounded on the west and south by water that is controlled by Union boats. The east/west rivers allow those boats to get into the middle of this vast area as well.

Davis administration policy at the start of the war was to defend all the way to the TN/KY border without any consideration of the manpower available to do this. Davis was concerned about losing local support if he bailed on large areas early, even if they were not militarily important. There was no cooperation amount the multiple sizable Confederate armies in the area for 62 and 63.

Leadership. Been talked about over and over. Army level command was definitely wanting, and for most of the war the subordinates are openly feuding with the army commaner (bragg) more than their focus on fighting the enemy. Also keep in mind Lee often jettisoned his undesirables out west that he didn't want in the ANV. Many of them were undesirable for a reason.

The only thing that could have probably have helped the Confederacy in the west is if the Union had employed more conservative commanders for longer such as Buell and Halleck and even to some extint Rosecrans. But in Grant, the Union had a commander that was aggressive and going to get where he wanted his army to be one way or the other.
It's really hard to separate the problems created by the geographic expanse, the importance of the rivers and the lack of CSA strengths in that aspect of warfare, the policies dictated by Davis (including his Virginia-centric focus which was at odds with securing the much larger western theater), and the leadership issues (including Johnston). For example, the last category was clearly deficient but it's almost impossible to say that improvement there could have overcome the other hurdles. You make a good point that the Rebels may have benefited from less aggressive Union leadership but even then it's difficult to project that making a material difference (unless the Union leadership was simply incompetent).
 
It's really hard to separate the problems created by the geographic expanse, the importance of the rivers and the lack of CSA strengths in that aspect of warfare, the policies dictated by Davis (including his Virginia-centric focus which was at odds with securing the much larger western theater), and the leadership issues (including Johnston). For example, the last category was clearly deficient but it's almost impossible to say that improvement there could have overcome the other hurdles. You make a good point that the Rebels may have benefited from less aggressive Union leadership but even then it's difficult to project that making a material difference (unless the Union leadership was simply incompetent).


Correct. I am not sure that changing one of these variables makes a large difference in the outcomes. Even if you have someone like a Lee or Jackson out west, they still face being heavily outnumbered across the theater and too much ground to cover.
 
Correct. I am not sure that changing one of these variables makes a large difference in the outcomes. Even if you have someone like a Lee or Jackson out west, they still face being heavily outnumbered across the theater and too much ground to cover.
I agree. The geographic composition of the CSA may have doomed the venture from the outset. No doubt lots of other issues played their roles in the outcome but the Union was already eroding it as early as Spring 1862.
 
Also keep in mind Lee often jettisoned his undesirables out west that he didn't want in the ANV. Many of them were undesirable for a reason.
That is true, but just to be fair about it, Lee didn't take those steps until he took over the ANV in the summer of 1862. By then, the war in the west was already lost. Many of the main southern commanders during the crucial period between September 1861 to April 1862 were capable in and of themselves including AS Johnston, Beauregard, Buckner, Forrest, and even Bragg at that point. But there were also in-effectives such as Polk, Pillow, and Floyd.
 
A large benefit that the Confederacy had in the east was that it operated in a relatively small geographic area, with favorable riverine defense lines, and with an army that was derived from a strong Virginia militia and officer corps who were also familiar with the terrain. Almost none of those factors were present in the west.
 
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