First United States Army observers of military conflicts in post Napoleonic Europe (1855-1871)

USS ALASKA

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Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; First United States Army observers of military conflicts in post Napoleonic Europe (1855-1871).
Author; Harden, Jesse Lee
Branch/Country; United States Army

Abstract; During the period of 1855-1871, the United States Army commissioned two formal observations of foreign conflict: the Delafield commission to the Crimean War and the Sheridan expedition to the Franco-Prussian War. The first U.S. Army observers of foreign military conflict, both groups were poised to improve the Army much by observing the great military contemporaries of their time. Several observations and recommendations would bear fruit for the U.S. Army; however, many seemingly simple observations and recommendations were not made by the commission. The Delafield commission and Sheridan expedition to Europe were appropriate and deliberate strides towards the professionalization of the United States Army. Their influence on the Army is discussed in the details of this report.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Focus Program; General Studies
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 2015-06-12
Date; Digital 2015-06-12
Release statement; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2015-09-30

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

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Sheridan's letter probably did not influence Sherman very much. Sherman was the driving force in establishing a professional military school.
Sheridan did heavily influence US foreign policy. Since he wrote the French soldiers would not stand and fight for Napoleon III, there was no evidence to contradict Grant's extremely negative view of Napoleon III.
The amount of back and forth communication between Germany and the US between the end of the Civil War and 1890 is under recorded. Thanks for another great post. :smile coffee:
 
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And there it is, in Russia. Sitting are Maj. Alfred Mordecai Sr. (1804-1887), who resigned when the civil war began, and Maj. Richard Delafield (1798-1873), who´d become a Brigadier General and eventually Chief of Engineers during the last year of the war. Standing on the right is Captain George B. McClellan. The Russian officer in the center is their escort, Lt. Col. Obrescoff.
 
Delafield seemed to have very little respect for Prussia's vaunted "Dreyse Needle gun" and breechloading guns in general, but a healthy respect for rifled guns. Seems a little short sighted on his part, heck he seemed to not care much for the Prussian military too much.

As for Sheridan in France, I'll agree with his assertion on Remington Rolling-Blocks being superior to the Chassepot and Dreyse, but I think Bavaria's Werder "Blitzgewehr" is a better gun than all the above, plus the French were using some Rolling-Blocks along with Winchesters in their Army to the South.

Getting back to Sheridan's military vacation, I've always enjoyed his relating of being taken prisoner by the Prussians by mistake, during the Battle of Gravelotte, where he was wearing his Lieutenant General's uniform, which looked a little too French:

"I thought I would ride into the village to find, if possible, some water for my horse. Just as I entered the chief street however, I was suddenly halted by a squad of soldiers, who taking me for a French officer (my coat and forage cap resembling those of the French), leveled their pieces at me. They were greatly excited, so much so, indeed that I thought my hour had come, for they could not understand English, and I could not speak German, and dare not utter explanations in French. Fortunately a few German words came to me in the emergency. With these I managed to delay my execution, and one of the party ventured to come up to examine the "suspect" more closely. The first thing he did was to take off my cap, and looking it over carefully, his eyes rested on the three stars above the visor, and pointing to them he emphatically pronounced me French. Then of course they all became excited again, more so than before even, for they thought I was to trying to practice a ruse, and I question whether I should lived to recount the adventure had not an officer belonging to the King's headquarters had been passing by just then, when hearing the threatening's and imprecations rode up to learn the cause of the hubbub, and immediately recognized and released me. When he told my wrathy captors who I was, they were much mortified of course, and made the most profuse apologies, promising that no such mistake should occur again, and so on; but not being wholly reassured , for my uniform was still liable to misread, I was careful to return to headquarters in the company of my deliverer. There I related what had occurred, and after a good laugh all round, the King provided me with a pass which he said would preclude any such mishap in the future, and would also permit me to go wherever I pleased-a favor rarely bestowed."

I've always wondered if the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, and maybe along with this was why US uniforms seemed to become a little less Frenchy.
(I realize this incident probably didn't have anything to do with it, I just like to say it for fun.)
 
Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; First United States Army observers of military conflicts in post Napoleonic Europe (1855-1871).
Author; Harden, Jesse Lee
Branch/Country; United States Army

Abstract; During the period of 1855-1871, the United States Army commissioned two formal observations of foreign conflict: the Delafield commission to the Crimean War and the Sheridan expedition to the Franco-Prussian War. The first U.S. Army observers of foreign military conflict, both groups were poised to improve the Army much by observing the great military contemporaries of their time. Several observations and recommendations would bear fruit for the U.S. Army; however, many seemingly simple observations and recommendations were not made by the commission. The Delafield commission and Sheridan expedition to Europe were appropriate and deliberate strides towards the professionalization of the United States Army. Their influence on the Army is discussed in the details of this report.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Focus Program; General Studies
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 2015-06-12
Date; Digital 2015-06-12
Release statement; Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2015-09-30

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
I haven't read the whole article but a few interesting facts stick out. Colonel? Thayer was the first US military observer of a foreign conflict in 1815 in France. Military officers had to pay their own way overseas at a time when travel was costlier then today in relative spending. US military officers were not well paid until arguably after WW2.
Militaries do send observers to various conflicts. How much the US and other militaries gain in knowledge is debatable.
Leftyhunter
 
How much the US and other militaries gain in knowledge is debatable.
Leftyhunter

The value obtained, and historically obtained, from military attaches is enormous. In the U.S. case, you just don't read about them because they work for the Defense Intelligence Agency, and their reports are classified.

A British example from our period of interest is Colonel Charles Wright Younghusband, Royal Artillery. Despite the efforts of Minister Resident [ambassador] Henry S. Sanford in Brussels to conceal his arms acquisition activities for the Federal Army, the British intelligence services were well aware of his arms purchases and shipments; information which would have been of significant value in the event the Trent affair had led to war or if the British had decided to support the Confederacy by providing the information to its commerce raiders operating in European waters. In addition to his own purchases, Sanford was also supporting Böker and Company and Colonel Schuyler, leading to the acquisition of more than 300,000 desperately needed European arms for the Federal Army. The acquisition of the information for the British illustrated the value of having a military attaché on the ground. Colonel Younghusband had been assigned to Belgium and Germany in 1857 to supervise the British War Office’s contracts with Continental vendors for small arms, swords, and bayonets; a mission which continued until the Belgian contracts for Enfield pattern rifle muskets ended in 1863. Using his contacts in the Liege arms industry, Younghusband assembled a detailed list of Sanford’s contracts and shipments which he dispatched to the War Office and to British Prime Minister Lord Russell through Howard de Walden, the British Minister in Brussels. Younghusband would go on to supervise the Royal Gunpowder and Gun Cotton Factory at Waltham Abbey [1868-75], and the Royal Gun Factories [1875-80]. He retired as a lieutenant general and died in 1899.

The members of the Delafield Commission are regarded as the first U.S. military attaches. Illustrating the U.S.'s total lack of sophistication in international affairs, the U.S. did not establish a program to diplomatically accredit military attaches until 1877, when officers were sent to Russia, Turkey, and the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Prior to that time, when it dispatched officers like MAJ Delafield, MAJ Mordecai and CPT McClellan, they went out under official passports, which gave them no diplomatic cover for their intelligence collection activities.

Regards,
Don Dixon
 
I've always wondered if the French defeat in the Franco-Prussian War, and maybe along with this was why US uniforms seemed to become a little less Frenchy.

From the Revolutionary War until the Franco Prussian War the U.S. Army studied French Army doctrine and modeled itself on the French Army. After the Franco-Prussian War, until WWI, it modeled itself on the Prussian Army, to include a half assed attempt to copy the Prussian general staff system and putting spikes on its dress helmets. From WWI until WWII, the Army copied the British. So much for originality.

Regards,
Don Dixon
 
From the Revolutionary War until the Franco Prussian War the U.S. Army studied French Army doctrine and modeled itself on the French Army. After the Franco-Prussian War, until WWI, it modeled itself on the Prussian Army, to include a half assed attempt to copy the Prussian general staff system and putting spikes on its dress helmets. From WWI until WWII, the Army copied the British. So much for originality.

Regards,
Don Dixon
or Imitate the best.
 
From the Revolutionary War until the Franco Prussian War the U.S. Army studied French Army doctrine and modeled itself on the French Army. After the Franco-Prussian War, until WWI, it modeled itself on the Prussian Army, to include a half assed attempt to copy the Prussian general staff system and putting spikes on its dress helmets. From WWI until WWII, the Army copied the British. So much for originality.

Regards,
Don Dixon

Oh don't worry, I'm well aware. Just funnin.

As for the dress helmets, I'd say they had more in common with the British Pith Helmet, and they went to a spike on the dress versions themselves, eventually, depending on the regiment. I've always enjoyed looking at the 1880's US dress uniform, Prussian and British similarities galore. I think 1871 the US just realized the French Army wasn't what it was cracked up to be, a lot of formerly French-influenced countries did.

The Prussians and Imperial Germans did become the folks to imitate after 1871, unless you were French, then they were to be hated more than ever before.
 
Oh don't worry, I'm well aware. Just funnin.

As for the dress helmets, I'd say they had more in common with the British Pith Helmet, and they went to a spike on the dress versions themselves, eventually, depending on the regiment. I've always enjoyed looking at the 1880's US dress uniform, Prussian and British similarities galore. I think 1871 the US just realized the French Army wasn't what it was cracked up to be, a lot of formerly French-influenced countries did.

The Prussians and Imperial Germans did become the folks to imitate after 1871, unless you were French, then they were to be hated more than ever before.
Which is about the time that Graham's published translation of Carl von Clausewitz began to replace all the informal and piecemeal translations. The fortunate or unfortunate consequence is that rational analysis of an essentially irrational process began.
Sherman in particular began to describe the US Civil War as a response to the questions posed by von Clausewitz. However the heavy intellectual influence of the Prussians and Germans shows even while the war was ongoing.
The Americans noticed a critical fact about Napoleonic war, the British and Prussians won in the end.
 
The Americans noticed a critical fact about Napoleonic war, the British and Prussians won in the end.

America certainly noticed that, but I would like to point out, (much to the chagrin of many Wellington fans I'm sure), that the British got creamed at Waterloo. Napoleon was defeated not by the British but by the Prussians. If it hadn't been for the timely arrival of Von Blucher's Prussian Army at the worst place for Napoleon, it would have been a catastrophic defeat for the Brits and other smaller Allied contingents. Too many folks even in the CW era didn't realize that, probably through the glory hunting mechanizations of Wellington himself. But that's outside of the purview of CWT I believe.

(Look up when some fella was building a diorama of the battle in the 1830's, he carefully researched the battle and put a lot of work into it, and Wellington threw a fit and launched a smear campaign against him because it made it look like the British would have lost if not for the Prussians. In the end the fell had to cut out a lot of Prussians in it and make it look like Wellington's forces were the only victors of Waterloo, no matter that most of the evidence even back then said otherwise. Wellington was a vindictive glory hunter.)
 
The were many Americans observing the Franco/Prussian War, including Elihu Washburn, the diplomatic officer in Paris.
Thus the need for a detailed report by Sheridan was less than compelling. Peter Osterhaus and one of the Seligman brothers come to mind.
 
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