Ewell and Cemetery Hill

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"Lee's headquarters tents were pitched in a field beside the Chambersburg Pike, on the western slope of Seminary Ridge When he rose from sleep, an hour before dawn--about the same time Meade drew rein beside the gate on Cemetery Hill--his intention, like his opponent's, was to attack on the right. He had arrived at this decision the previous evening, in the course of a twilight conference north of Gettysburg with Ewell, whom he found gripped by a strange paralysis of will, apparently brought on, or at any rate intensified, by Lee's stipulation that an assault on the bluecoats attempting a rally on the hilltop south of town, though much desired, not only could not be supported by troops outside his corps, as Ewell had requested, but also was to be attempted only if he found it 'practicable,' which Ewell interpreted as meaning that he must be certain of success. It occurred to him that in war few things were certain, least of all success; with the result that he refrained from taking any risk whatever." [Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, Vol 2, pp. 486-487]

Did Ewell err in not taking Cemetery Hill? Did he disobey Lee's orders?
 
Ewell did try to take Cemetery Hill , but not on July 1st. I think that if Allegheny Johnson's division had not been delayed for several hours in a huge traffic jam, Ewell would have tried to take the hill.
 
"Lee's headquarters tents were pitched in a field beside the Chambersburg Pike, on the western slope of Seminary Ridge When he rose from sleep, an hour before dawn--about the same time Meade drew rein beside the gate on Cemetery Hill--his intention, like his opponent's, was to attack on the right. He had arrived at this decision the previous evening, in the course of a twilight conference north of Gettysburg with Ewell, whom he found gripped by a strange paralysis of will, apparently brought on, or at any rate intensified, by Lee's stipulation that an assault on the bluecoats attempting a rally on the hilltop south of town, though much desired, not only could not be supported by troops outside his corps, as Ewell had requested, but also was to be attempted only if he found it 'practicable,' which Ewell interpreted as meaning that he must be certain of success. It occurred to him that in war few things were certain, least of all success; with the result that he refrained from taking any risk whatever." [Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, Vol 2, pp. 486-487]

Did Ewell err in not taking Cemetery Hill? Did he disobey Lee's orders?

You're a funny man, quoting Foote.
 
Ewell didn't disobey Lee's orders. I don't think he was used to receiving discretionary orders, something his former commander rarely, if ever, issued.

In hindsight, I would say he should have made an attempt at least. I would think some part of the line would have given way making it difficult to prepare defensive positions on Cemetery Hill.
 
"Lee's headquarters tents were pitched in a field beside the Chambersburg Pike, on the western slope of Seminary Ridge When he rose from sleep, an hour before dawn--about the same time Meade drew rein beside the gate on Cemetery Hill--his intention, like his opponent's, was to attack on the right. He had arrived at this decision the previous evening, in the course of a twilight conference north of Gettysburg with Ewell, whom he found gripped by a strange paralysis of will, apparently brought on, or at any rate intensified, by Lee's stipulation that an assault on the bluecoats attempting a rally on the hilltop south of town, though much desired, not only could not be supported by troops outside his corps, as Ewell had requested, but also was to be attempted only if he found it 'practicable,' which Ewell interpreted as meaning that he must be certain of success. It occurred to him that in war few things were certain, least of all success; with the result that he refrained from taking any risk whatever." [Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, Vol 2, pp. 486-487]

Wonder where Foote learned that Lee "found [Ewell] gripped by a strange paralysis of will, " ? If true why didn't Lee do something? Alas, we will never know the source of such a statement, if there was one.
 
Wonder where Foote learned that Lee "found [Ewell] gripped by a strange paralysis of will, " ? If true why didn't Lee do something? Alas, we will never know the source of such a statement, if there was one.

Less than a year later Ewell was relieved of Corps command. At Spotsylvania, Lee found Ewell berating and beating retreating soldiers across their backs with his sword. Lee said, "General Ewell, you must restrain yourself; how can you expect to control these men when you have lost control of yourself? If you cannot repress your excitement, you had better retire." Ewell's behavior on this occasion undoubtedly was the source of a statement made by Lee to his secretary, William Allan, after the war that on May 12 he "found Ewell perfectly prostrated by the misfortune of the morning, and too much overwhelmed to be efficient."[Pfanz- page 389]

That may have had something to do with why Lee felt compelled to lead the counterattack with Ewell's men at the Mule Shoe breakthrough.

dvrmte
 
Ewell did try to take Cemetery Hill , but not on July 1st. I think that if Allegheny Johnson's division had not been delayed for several hours in a huge traffic jam, Ewell would have tried to take the hill.
Lee bivouacked Johnson before Ewell's request for reinforcements were received by General Lee,which he refused. Williams division of the federal 12th corps was seen approaching from the East. General Lee is responsible for the battle lines at the end of day one. Baldy Ewell was not at fault here.
 
I agree with dvrmte that Ewell didn't disobey orders. They were discretionary, and Ewell wasn't used to that. In fact, I think only the most aggressive of generals (read Jackson) would have attempted to take Cemetery Hill under those circumstances. His command was scattered and tired from a long day of marching and fighting, Cemetery Hill was a naturally strong position, and Union forces were already fortifying it. Von Steinwehr had a fresh reserve brigade up there that had already dug gun emplacements and rifle pits, and served as a rallying point for the retreating First and Eleventh Corps. This is Hancock's account:

At 3 P.M. I arrived at Gettysburg and assumed the command. At this time the First and Eleventh corps were retiring through the town, closely pursued by the enemy. The cavalry of General Buford was occupying a firm position on the plain to the left of Gettysburg, covering the rear of the retreating corps. The Third Corps had not yet arrived from Emmitsburg. Orders were at once given to establish a line of battle on Cemetery Hill, with skirmishers occupying that part of the town immediately in our front. The position just on the southern edge of Gettysburg, overlooking the town and commanding the Emmitsburg and Taneytown roads and the Baltimore turnpike, was already partially occupied on my arrival by direction of Major General Howard. Some difficulty was experienced in forming the troops of the Eleventh Corps, but by vigorous efforts a sufficiently formidable line was established to deter the enemy form any serious assault on the position. They pushed forward a line of battle for a short distance east of the Baltimore turnpike, but it was easily checked by the fire of our artillery.

Source: Edward J. Stackpole, They Met at Gettysburg, p. 147

I think Jackson would probably have tried it, but there was no guarantee he would have succeeded.
 
Depends on which Jackson would have showed up - the Chancellorsville/Shenandoah Valley Jackson, or the Seven Days Jackson. Plus, Jackson was not foolhardy. With the Union entrenched on the high ground - and Howard was ensuring that was happening even before the retreating soldiers arrived - I'll bet Jackson might have also decided to wait for the next day.

Which might be the more interesting question, because the Day 2 strategy almost worked. Longstreet attacking the Union left, drawing Union troops away from Culp's Hill and East Cemetery Hill - Ewell nearly took the Hills on Day 2. Could it be that Jackson would have taken them on Day 2?
 
Early and Rodes, the two division commanders that Ewell would have used to try to take Cemetery Hill reported that their troops were exhausted and scattered. By the time order would be restored, the window of opportunity would have passed. Early, in particular, was very forceful in his refusal to attack the Federal position. Also, the streets would have channeled Ewell's troops into narrow columns rather than a broad line of battle, perfect targets for the 40 or so guns on the heights. The ground also prevented the deployment of Ewell's artillery to support any assault.

If Cemetery Hill was so crucial, I wonder why Lee wanted Ewell to leave the town and move closer to Hill's more open position?
 
On July 1st, T. J. Jackson would be somewhere on the other side of the Susquehanna River or possibly back in the area of Chancellorsville, rounding up the remnants of the AOP.
 
On July 1st, T. J. Jackson would be somewhere on the other side of the Susquehanna River or possibly back in the area of Chancellorsville, rounding up the remnants of the AOP.

Or quite possibly at a Federal prison camp. Instead, he was already in a state of decomposition.
 
"Lee's headquarters tents were pitched in a field beside the Chambersburg Pike, on the western slope of Seminary Ridge When he rose from sleep, an hour before dawn--about the same time Meade drew rein beside the gate on Cemetery Hill--his intention, like his opponent's, was to attack on the right. He had arrived at this decision the previous evening, in the course of a twilight conference north of Gettysburg with Ewell, whom he found gripped by a strange paralysis of will, apparently brought on, or at any rate intensified, by Lee's stipulation that an assault on the bluecoats attempting a rally on the hilltop south of town, though much desired, not only could not be supported by troops outside his corps, as Ewell had requested, but also was to be attempted only if he found it 'practicable,' which Ewell interpreted as meaning that he must be certain of success. It occurred to him that in war few things were certain, least of all success; with the result that he refrained from taking any risk whatever." [Shelby Foote, The Civil War: A Narrative, Vol 2, pp. 486-487]

Did Ewell err in not taking Cemetery Hill? Did he disobey Lee's orders?

Let me post the ORs, as I did in the other thread. In a word, no, he did not disobey orders. Here goes:

O.R.-- SERIESI--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]



JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The GettysburgCampaign.
No.506.--Report of Maj. Gen. R. E. Rodes, U.S. Army, commanding division.


In the pursuit, the division capturedabout 2,500 prisoners--so many as to embarrass its movements materially.

The troops, being greatly exhausted by their march and somewhat disorganized by the hot engagement and rapid pursuit,were halted and prepared for further action. I did not change their position materially, nor order another attack, for the following reasons: 1st, in the midst of the engagement just described, the corps commander informed me, through one of his officers, that the general commanding did not wish a general engagement brought on, and hence, had it been possible to do so then, I would have stopped the attack at once; but this, of course, it was impossible to do then; 2d, before the completion of his defeat before the town, the enemy had begun to establish a line of battle on the heights back of the town, and by the time my line was in a condition to renew the attack, he displayed quite a formidable line of infantry and artillery immediately in my front, extending smartly to my right, and as far as I could see to my left, in front of Early.To have attacked this line with my division alone, diminished as it had been by a loss of 2,500 men, would have been absurd. Seeing no Confederate troops at all on my right; finding that General Early, whom I encountered in the streets of the town within thirty minutes after its occupation by our forces, was awaiting further instructions, and, receiving no orders to advance, though my superiors were upon the ground, I concluded that the order not to bring on a general engagement was still in force, and hence placed my lines and skirmishers in a defensive attitude, and determined to await orders or further movements either on the part of Early or of the troops on my right.




O.R.-- SERIESI--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]



JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The GettysburgCampaign.
No.467.--Report of Lieut. Gen. Richard S. Ewell, C. S. Army, commanding SecondArmy Corps.


General Gordon mentions that 300 of the enemy's dead were left on the ground passed over by his brigade. The enemy had entirely abandoned the north end of the town, and Early entering by the York Railroad at the same time that Rodes came in on the Cashtown road, they togethercaptured over 4,000 prisoners and three pieces of artillery, two of which fell into the hands of Early's division. So far as I can learn, no other troops than those of this corps entered the town at all. My loss on this day was less than 2,900 killed, wounded, and missing.

The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position known as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town, I received a message from the commanding general to attack this hill, if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it, and all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnson's division (the only one of my corps that had not been engaged) was close to the town.

Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined, with Johnson's division, to take possession of a wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson got up, the enemy was reported moving to outflank our extreme left, and I could see that seemed to be his skirmishers in that direction.

Before this report could be investigated by Lieut. T. T. Turner, aide-de-camp of my staff, and Lieut. Robert D. Early,sent for that purpose, and Johnson placed in position, the night was far advanced.






O.R.-- SERIESI--VOLUME XXVII/2 [S# 44]



JUNE 3-AUGUST 1, 1863.--The GettysburgCampaign.
No.426.--Reports of General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army, commanding Army of NorthernVirginia.


It was ascertained from the prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the remainder of that army, under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg. Without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if hefound it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival ofthe other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward. He decided to await Johnson's division, which had marched from Carlisle by theroad west of the mountains to guard the trains of his corps, and consequentlydid not reach Gettysburg until a late hour.[/QUOTE]

Ewell had excellent reasons for not capturing Cemetery Hill, many of which were stated by the men themselves above.
 
Wonder where Foote learned that Lee "found [Ewell] gripped by a strange paralysis of will, " ? If true why didn't Lee do something? Alas, we will never know the source of such a statement, if there was one.

Sounds like Foote was "gripped by a strange paralysis of will" brought on by too much Freeman.
 
Early and Rodes, the two division commanders that Ewell would have used to try to take Cemetery Hill reported that their troops were exhausted and scattered. By the time order would be restored, the window of opportunity would have passed. Early, in particular, was very forceful in his refusal to attack the Federal position. Also, the streets would have channeled Ewell's troops into narrow columns rather than a broad line of battle, perfect targets for the 40 or so guns on the heights. The ground also prevented the deployment of Ewell's artillery to support any assault.

If Cemetery Hill was so crucial, I wonder why Lee wanted Ewell to leave the town and move closer to Hill's more open position?

Simply to make his line as compact as he could and to connect the corps. I think he thought the ANV would be more flexible and easier to handle that way. He still would have been stuck with exterior lines, though.
 
Ewell didn't disobey Lee's orders. I don't think he was used to receiving discretionary orders, something his former commander rarely, if ever, issued.

In hindsight, I would say he should have made an attempt at least. I would think some part of the line would have given way making it difficult to prepare defensive positions on Cemetery Hill.

Look at the ORs I posted below. Who would he have made the attempt with?
 
I agree with dvrmte that Ewell didn't disobey orders. They were discretionary, and Ewell wasn't used to that. In fact, I think only the most aggressive of generals (read Jackson) would have attempted to take Cemetery Hill under those circumstances. His command was scattered and tired from a long day of marching and fighting, Cemetery Hill was a naturally strong position, and Union forces were already fortifying it. Von Steinwehr had a fresh reserve brigade up there that had already dug gun emplacements and rifle pits, and served as a rallying point for the retreating First and Eleventh Corps. This is Hancock's account:



I think Jackson would probably have tried it, but there was no guarantee he would have succeeded.

Jackson wasn't always so aggressive, though. He was also not very good with fluid situations.
 
Depends on which Jackson would have showed up - the Chancellorsville/Shenandoah Valley Jackson, or the Seven Days Jackson. Plus, Jackson was not foolhardy. With the Union entrenched on the high ground - and Howard was ensuring that was happening even before the retreating soldiers arrived - I'll bet Jackson might have also decided to wait for the next day.

Which might be the more interesting question, because the Day 2 strategy almost worked. Longstreet attacking the Union left, drawing Union troops away from Culp's Hill and East Cemetery Hill - Ewell nearly took the Hills on Day 2. Could it be that Jackson would have taken them on Day 2?

In one word, Yup!
 
The Blaming Ewell Game

Ewell was blamed because the Confederacy lost at Gettysburg. Others were also blamed for defeat. All accept Lee, who took little blame for defeat in the war. Defeat that Lee undoubtedly suffered.

Of course, it's easy for the armchair detractors, in their air conditioned quarters. Ewell's troops were spread out only a day before the battle of Gettysburg. Some of Ewell's force had to march in the July heat from York. Some had to march from Carlisle. As soon as they arrived they went into battle. No time to rest the troops.

True, Ewell won on the first day, but they also had to fight and march after a fleeing Union corps. By the time they arrived at the hill south of Gettysburg, Cemetery Hill was well fortified. Since early in the day, a defensive position was manned by artillery and a division of XI Corps. Added were Union soldiers retreating from the first day's battle, to this defensive position.

Cemetery Hill was never a walk over military situation. Ewell had no prior knowledge as to how well it was defended. Even after the successful and moving battle, Ewell was still missing a significant part of his corps. An entire division was still marching to Gettysburg, together with his artillery reserve. Ewell wasn't prepared to move from one battle to another. He had won the first day of battle. Ewell found it impossible to switch gears, and now assault a prepared Union defensive position on a hill overlooking his own offensive troops.
 
Had Ewell taken Cemetery Hill on July1 Meade would have been forced retreat his existing forces and consolidate further south. Most likely that place would have been Big Pipe Creek, Maryland, where trenches were being dug. Gettysburg would have been a minor brush won by the ANV, but the main battle of that campaign would have come elsewhere. Of course Lee could have pressed further north, destroying the rail bridge at Harrisburg and even attacking Philadelphia, but he would have risked having his thin supply line cut. Besides that New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania had called up their 100 day regiments. Defending Philadelphia would have been a dug in army well in excess of a hundred thousand men. Lee would have been facing vastly superior numbers with the powerful AOP in his rear. He could have also moved south and attacked Washington but he would have had to defeat Meade in Maryland, or he could have sidestepped Meade only to face the fearful defenses of Washington with the AOP in his rear. Whatever he did he could not have sustained his raid into the north for very long.

The Confederate invasion of Pennslyvania in the summer of 1863 was never meant to be an invasion to take and hold ground. It was raid meant to draw the AOP north where the ANV would consolidate, win big, and force a politcal settlement.

What Lee knew was that Jefferson Davis and the Confederate War cabinet had determined that the war had to be won in 1863. They knew the blockade was strangeling the Confederacy to death and the situation was becoming critical at Vicksburg. The pressure was on Lee to force a deciding victory in the east which would cause the fall of the Lincoln government and bring the US to the conference table. So even if Ewell had taken Cemetery hill the pressure was Lee to force battle elsewhere on enemy ground where the odds where greatly stacked against him.

To this day much is made that the south lost the war at Gettysburg, ( Read Confedertaes in the attic by Tony Horwitz) Some believe it absolutely, and Ewells failure on the evening of July 1 is one of the sighted factors. The fact remains that the Eastern theater was a bloody stalemate right up to the very last days of the war. The campaigns that determined the wars outcome were in the west.
 
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