Efficiency of Haley's Trace

RLowe

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Dec 19, 2019
First time post here on CivilWarTalk. Live in Chattanooga and currently working on my first book for Savas Beatie that captures Longstreet's journey from Gettysburg, through Chickamauga/Chattanooga and up into Knoxville. Would be curious on your thoughts regarding the efficiency of Haley's Trace when it came to resupplying Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland prior to Brown's Ferry? I know the 4th AL Sharpshooters took their toll on Union soldiers and mules/horses as they attempted to move across the narrow Haley's Trace. Would certainly welcome other views and any broader comments regarding the Confederate efforts (or lack thereof) to control Lookout Valley. Ed Lowe
 
First time post here on CivilWarTalk. Live in Chattanooga and currently working on my first book for Savas Beatie that captures Longstreet's journey from Gettysburg, through Chickamauga/Chattanooga and up into Knoxville. Would be curious on your thoughts regarding the efficiency of Haley's Trace when it came to resupplying Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland prior to Brown's Ferry? I know the 4th AL Sharpshooters took their toll on Union soldiers and mules/horses as they attempted to move across the narrow Haley's Trace. Would certainly welcome other views and any broader comments regarding the Confederate efforts (or lack thereof) to control Lookout Valley. Ed Lowe
Welcome to CivilWarTalk. Although I have been to Chickamauga/Chattanooga twice and have done a bit of reading on both,I can't say that I am familiar with the topic of Haley's Trace.
 
First time post here on CivilWarTalk. Live in Chattanooga and currently working on my first book for Savas Beatie that captures Longstreet's journey from Gettysburg, through Chickamauga/Chattanooga and up into Knoxville. Would be curious on your thoughts regarding the efficiency of Haley's Trace when it came to resupplying Rosecrans's Army of the Cumberland prior to Brown's Ferry? I know the 4th AL Sharpshooters took their toll on Union soldiers and mules/horses as they attempted to move across the narrow Haley's Trace. Would certainly welcome other views and any broader comments regarding the Confederate efforts (or lack thereof) to control Lookout Valley. Ed Lowe
I am reading the Cozzens book on the Chattanooga campaign and never realized just how pathetic the Confederate efforts were to permanently seal off the supply lines to the A. of the Cumberland. Why didn't they send a division to block off the route from Bridgeport? Better yet, send two divisions to capture Bridgeport? How about a real defense at Brown's Ferry? Maybe attack Geary at Wauhatchie with more than a single brigade? Bragg was depending on Longstreet to handle his left and was badly let down.
i look forward to reading your book.
 
Well, Haley’s Trace and the route over Signal Mountain to Jasper was a long hazardous route. Alabama sharpshooters shot across the TN River. Shot mules mostly.

Wheeler on one raid at what now is Powell’s Crossroads wrecked estimated between 600 and 800 wagons. Shot all the mules which were probably 6 to a wagon. The mules consumed a large portion of fodder during the trip. Took several days, maybe a week. Had to go up and down Signal Mountain. Thus wore out mules. Thousands of mules just fell over Dead during the trip. Just a rough mountainous trail.

At Browns Ferry Longstreet originally had 5 regiments defending. Hood had been wounded at Chickamauga. Law and Jenkins wanted Hoods position. Longstreet wanted Jenkins to have it. Law had been with the Corps longer and has seniority. So this was 1 of which will become several conflicts within Longstreets lieutenants during his vacation in the West. It was great difficulty to get provisions to the West side of lookout Mountain. Couple of days before the raid on Browns Ferry, Law decides to take a few days off and visit his good friend Hood, who is convalescing down in the Tunnel Hill GA area. So Jenkins is in charge. Jenkins thinks it is a good idea to send 3 regiments back over to the East side of Lookout Mountain. So the morning of the Federal Raid, there is only 2 Regiments defending. They are overwhelmed in a brisk, short fight.

Latter in the day, Hooker will come up. Bragg and Longstreet are actually at Sunset Rock, which is on the West Brow of Lookout, surveying the situation. Be nice to have a recording of that conversation. Long story short, Bragg tells Longstreet to get Lookout Valley back. Stress the importance of it. Offers Longstreet 2 Divisions, as I recall. So this sets up the infamous Night Attack. There is one problem with all this. The Federals have three Batteries on Stringers Ridge which is on Moccasin Bend. One of the Batteries is facing the North End of Lookout Mountain. They have Tactical Control of the North Face. About 1 mile from the Cravens House from that position. so there is no way to get a Division across to the West Side And sustain them for any length of time. Next improved crossing of Lookout is 18 miles south at Stevens Gap and Johnson’s Crook. So, 4 Brigades end up engaged in the Night assault. Errors, miscommunication, Longstreet tried to recall part of them. All of the Confederates make it back over to the East Side by morning. Little damage done.

At this point in time the Confederates can’t operate further than 12 miles from the RR. For a movement against Bridgeport. Material would probably had to be off loaded at Dalton. Moved by wagon to Stevens Gap. One day to get up Lookout another to get down. Then on to Bridgeport. They don’t have the mules and wagons to do it. So they are limited to Calvary Raids.

Longstreet gets a lot of criticism for his actions in Lookout Valley. He was new to the area. Didn’t know the limitations of the AOT. He sent Porter Alexander to Bridgeport to look for possible alternatives. Could he of made it harder for the Federals, yes. There were no good alternatives. Probably the best thing they could of done was to send Longstreet to Knoxville in October. Um, then he could of made it back before the Battle of Missionary Ridge. That’s what Bragg wanted. Federal Left Flank would of been threatened. Maybe that would of been the October Surprise.
 
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Welcome to CivilWarTalk. Although I have been to Chickamauga/Chattanooga twice and have done a bit of reading on both,I can't say that I am familiar with the topic of Haley's Trace.
Pretty much describes me as well.

However, our oldest daughter and family live on Signal Mountain and when visiting it allows me the chance to wander around seeking out of the way CW sights.

Coming from the Memphis area, we will vary the last stage of our trip our from I-24 into Chattanooga. Sometimes we will take the "back door" route by going up the Sequatchie Valley to Dunlap via Jasper and then on up the mountain.

We have also travelled the Suck Creek Rd, but I wouldn't recommend it.

In researching Haley's Trace, I found the following column in a Chattanooga paper:

Hodges: The sharpshooters of Raccoon Mountain​

July 27th, 2014 | by By Dr. Anthony Hodges

In this column I learned this:
"The next alternative to bring supplies north was from Bridgeport to Sequatchie Valley, then east using a road known as Haley's Trace (mostly today's Suck Creek Road) through the narrow gorge between Raccoon Mountain (now Elder Mountain) and Walden's Ridge..."

Hope that helps a bit with the geographic location of the Trace.

I also learned that what is known as Powell’s Crossroads is near by Whitwell; which is on the "back door" route by going up the Sequatchie Valley to Dunlap via Jasper.
 
Well, Haley’s Trace and the route over Signal Mountain to Jasper was a long hazardous route. Alabama sharpshooters shot across the TN River. Shot mules mostly.

Wheeler on one raid at what now is Powell’s Crossroads wrecked estimated between 600 and 800 wagons. Shot all the mules which were probably 6 to a wagon. The mules consumed a large portion of fodder during the trip. Took several days, maybe a week. Had to go up and down Signal Mountain. Thus wore out mules. Thousands of mules just fell over Dead during the trip. Just a rough mountainous trail.

At Browns Ferry Longstreet originally had 5 regiments defending. Hood had been wounded at Chickamauga. Law and Jenkins wanted Hoods position. Longstreet wanted Jenkins to have it. Law had been with the Corps longer and has seniority. So this was 1 of which will become several conflicts within Longstreets lieutenants during his vacation in the West. It was great difficulty to get provisions to the West side of lookout Mountain. Couple of days before the raid on Browns Ferry, Law decides to take a few days off and visit his good friend Hood, who is convalescing down in the Tunnel Hill GA area. So Jenkins is in charge. Jenkins thinks it is a good idea to send 3 regiments back over to the East side of Lookout Mountain. So the morning of the Federal Raid, there is only 2 Regiments defending. They are overwhelmed in a brisk, short fight.

Latter in the day, Hooker will come up. Bragg and Longstreet are actually at Sunset Rock, which is on the West Brow of Lookout, surveying the situation. Be nice to have a recording of that conversation. Long story short, Bragg tells Longstreet to get Lookout Valley back. Stress the importance of it. Offers Longstreet 2 Divisions, as I recall. So this sets up the infamous Night Attack. There is one problem with all this. The Federals have three Batteries on Stringers Ridge which is on Moccasin Bend. One of the Batteries is facing the North End of Lookout Mountain. They have Tactical Control of the North Face. About 1 mile from the Cravens House from that position. so there is no way to get a Division across to the West Side And sustain them for any length of time. Next improved crossing of Lookout is 18 miles south at Stevens Gap and Johnson’s Crook. So, 4 Brigades end up engaged in the Night assault. Errors, miscommunication, Longstreet tried to recall part of them. All of the Confederates make it back over to the East Side by morning. Little damage done.

At this point in time the Confederates can’t operate further than 12 miles from the RR. For a movement against Bridgeport. Material would probably had to be off loaded at Dalton. Moved by wagon to Stevens Gap. One day to get up Lookout another to get down. Then on to Bridgeport. They don’t have the mules and wagons to do it. So they are limited to Calvary Raids.

Longstreet gets a lot of criticism for his actions in Lookout Valley. He was new to the area. Didn’t know the limitations of the AOT. He sent Porter Alexander to Bridgeport to look for possible alternatives. Could he of made it harder for the Federals, yes. There were no good alternatives. Probably the best thing they could of done was to send Longstreet to Knoxville in October. Um, then he could of made it back before the Battle of Missionary Ridge. That’s what Bragg wanted. Federal Left Flank would of been threatened. Maybe that would of been the October Surprise.
I appreciate your points. I hadn't thought about the problem of supply on the west side of Lookout Mountain. I will study my maps further. Still, I think Longstreet should have tried a lot harder. And he should have given Law the division over Jenkins. When viewed along with the disastrous Knoxville campaign, Longstreet performed very poorly during this period.
 
I appreciate your points. I hadn't thought about the problem of supply on the west side of Lookout Mountain. I will study my maps further. Still, I think Longstreet should have tried a lot harder. And he should have given Law the division over Jenkins. When viewed along with the disastrous Knoxville campaign, Longstreet performed very poorly during this period.
Longstreet nor did anyone else bring wagons or animals with them when they re-enforced Bragg In September. Some officers brought their mounts. Hood says at Chickamauga he had only his bedroll, he had his horse. AOT had about 2 thousand wagons. The Army doubled. AOT was a different experience than the ANV. So it is estimated that the AOT couldn’t operate further than 12 miles from the RR. AOC brought 4 thousand wagons.

Longstreet thought that his threat would come from the top of Lookout Mountain. He thought the Federals would go up Lookout at Johnson’s Crook, 18 miles south of the Northern face of Lookout. Then follow the top of the ridge north. Confederates were forced to defend that gap because the 14 Corps used it in September. No discussion exactly why Longstreet came to that conclusion.
 
I appreciate your points. I hadn't thought about the problem of supply on the west side of Lookout Mountain. I will study my maps further. Still, I think Longstreet should have tried a lot harder. And he should have given Law the division over Jenkins. When viewed along with the disastrous Knoxville campaign, Longstreet performed very poorly during this period.
Made especially more challenging with the Union batteries on Moccasin Bend, moving practically anything west into the valley.
 
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