Longstreet Early and Longstreet Fued

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I will post this info as I haven't found it in it's entire form. If it is redundant just ignore it.
 
The Post-War Confederate Controversy
Surrounding the Battle of Gettysburg



The reasons for the Confederate defeat at the Battle of Gettysburg continue to this day to fuel one of the largest and most acrimonious controversies generated by the Civil War. The argument was taken up in earnest shortly after Lee's death, by various members of the Confederate high command and it remains a source of contention between the supporters of the various principles involved.

James Longstreet, as commander of the 1st Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia, was branded a traitor to the memory of the Lost Cause after the war. By renewing his pre-war friendship with Ulysses S. Grant and by joining the Republican Party, he incurred the wrath of many of his former comrades-in-arms. Furthermore, he provided information to William Swinton, a New York Times reporter, who was in the midst of writing a book about the Army of the Potomac, that came across as being critical of Lee's strategy during the Gettysburg Campaign and of his conduct of the battle itself.

Following General Lee's death in October of 1870 the accusations began to fly thick and fast. Jubal Early started the verbal fireworks with a speech that he gave at Washington and Lee University on January 19th, 1872, commemorating Lee's birthday. He used the occasion to accuse Longstreet of disobeying Lee's orders at Gettysburg. The extracts quoted immediately below are from:

The Campaigns of Gen. Robert E. Lee.
An Address by Lieut. General Jubal A. Early,
before Washington and Lee University,
January 19th, 1872


Early's first contention was that Longstreet had been ordered to attack on the morning of the 2nd day of the battle.

That corps was not in readiness to make the attack until four o'clock in the afternoon of the next day. By that time, Meade's whole army had arrived on the field and taken its position. Had the attack been made at daylight, as contemplated, it must have resulted in a brilliant and decisive victory, as all of Meade's army had not then arrived, and a very small portion of it was in position. A considerable portion of his army did not get up until after sun-rise, one corps not arriving until 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and a prompt advance to the attack must have resulted in his defeat in detail. The position which Longstreet attacked at four, was not occupied by the enemy until late in the afternoon, and Round Top Hill, which commanded the enemy's position, could have been taken in the morning without a struggle. The attack was made by two divisions, and though the usual gallantry was displayed by the troops engaged in it, no very material advantage was gained. When General Lee saw his plans thwarted by the delay on our right, he ordered an attack to be made also from our left, to be begun by Johnson's division on Culp's Hill, and followed up by the rest of Ewell's corps, and also by Hill's.

Early's second reason for blaming Longstreet for the loss of the battle was that through his (Longstreet's) sulky attitude on the 3rd day of the battle, and his failure to provide the proper enthusiasm and support for Lee's plan of attack, he caused the attack to miscarry and fail, thus ensuring the loss of the battle (and by extension the war itself).

Contending against such odds as we did, it was necessary, always, that there should be the utmost dispatch, energy and undoubting confidence in carrying out the plans of the commanding General. A subordinate who undertakes to doubt the wisdom of his superior's plans, and enters upon their execution with reluctance and distrust, will not be likely to ensure success…

If Mr. Swinton has told the truth, in repeating in his book what is alleged to have been said to him by General Longstreet, there was at least one of General Lee's corps commanders at Gettysburg who did not enter upon the execution of his plans with that confidence and faith necessary to success, and hence, perhaps, it was that it was not achieved. Some have thought that General Lee did wrong in fighting at Gettysburg, and it has been said that he ought to have moved around Meade's left, so as to get between him and Washington…

I then thought, and still think, that it was right to fight the battle of Gettysburg, and I am firmly convinced that if General Lee's plans had been carried out in the spirit in which they were conceived, a decisive victory would have been obtained, which perhaps would have been secured our independence.

Early proceeds to condemn those who would dare to criticize Lee's strategy (Longstreet) as renegades to be shunned.

And to you, my comrades, survivors of that noble army of which I have spoken, followers of Lee and Jackson, I desire to say a few parting words. I trust it is not necessary for me to urge you to remain true to the memory of your venerated leaders, and the principles for which you fought along with them. If there be any, in all the land, who have proved renegade to their comrades and our holy cause, let them go out from among us with the brand of Cain upon them!

William N. Pendleton, the former Chief of Artillery of the Army of Northern Virginia, essentially repeated Early's charges in a speech a year later.

Longstreet sought to reply through the medium of the Northern Press. An article attributed to him (but ghost written under his direction) was published in the Philadelphia Times in November of 1876. It was republished in the Southern Historical Society Papers in the January - February, 1877 issue. In it, Longstreet layed much of the blame for the failure at Gettysburg on Lee, but Stuart's absence with the cavalry and Ewell's failure to take Culp's Hill on the evening of the July 1st were also criticized.

This brought an indignant rebuttal from General Early which appeared in the December, 1877 issue of the Southern Historical Society Papers. In it he reiterates more forcefully his contention that Lee meant for Longstreet to attack early on the 2nd Day rather than at about 4:00 p.m.


Longstreet fired back through the Philadelphia Times in order to, in his own words, “correct an apparent injustice to a very worthy officer; and, last and least, to make some allusion to the ill natured and splenetic attacks provoked by that paper from certain wordy soldiers”, clearly Early and Pendleton. He countered Early's claims that Lee had ordered an attack to commence at sunrise on the 2nd Day by citing extracts from letters written by members of Lee's staff which stated that they had no knowledge of Lee's order for such an attack.

Early was back again with an article entitled “Reply to General Longstreet's Second Paper”, which appeared in the Southern Historical Society Papers issue of June, 1878. In it he states the “General Longstreet is of the opinion that he is a very deeply aggrieved man, because he has not been permitted, without question, to pronounce that General Lee's strategy in the Gettysburg campaign was very defective;” and proceeds to take Longstreet to task once again for his criticism of Lee's strategies. He further accuses Longstreet of seeking to take full credit for the Confederate success at 2nd Manassas.


Longstreet repeated his position in subsequent articles that appeared in the Century Magazine in 1883. These articles have since been collected and published in book form as the Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, which is readily available today.

One more interesting article concerning the controversy appeared in the Richmond Dispatch on March 5, 1899. This article was subsequently republished in Volume XXVII of the Southern Historical Society Papers (January - December - 1899). It deals further with the controversy, and reaches the startling conclusion that Early was wrong about Lee having ordered a dawn attack. The author of the article, Henry Alexander White, went on to conclude that Longstreet committed “two separate acts in this disobedience. Neither of these was committed in Lee's presence. Both were perpetrated when Lee and Longstreet were far apart. Longstreet countermanded the Order for the early march before he reached Lee's headquarters; later in the day he bade his divisions pause and wait for Laws' brigade, after Lee's departure to another post upon the field. In both cases Longstreet could advance the nominal excuse that he was only exercising the discretion usually accorded to a corps commander in the absence of the general-in-chief. His use of that alleged discretion, together with the improvident use of the same prerogative on the part of Stuart, A. P. Hill and Ewell, combined together to inscribe Gettysburg in the annals of the Southern Confederacy as a lost field.” In other words, Lee's habit of giving wide discretion in the interpretation of discretionary orders was largely to blame for the failure of the Confederate army's failure to secure victory at Gettysburg.
 
James Longstreet's 1st Article About
the Gettysburg Campaign
for the Philadelphia Times
Longstreet sought to reply to post-war charges that he disobeyed Lee's orders at the Battle of Gettysburg, leveled at him by Jubal Early and others, through this article that was published in the Philadelphia Times in November of 1876. It was republished in the Southern Historical Society Papers in the January - February, 1877 issue.

In the article Longstreet layed much of the blame for the failure at Gettysburg on Lee, but Stuart's absence with the cavalry and Ewell's failure to take Culp's Hill on the evening of the July 1st were also criticised.

Southern Historical Society Papers
Vol. V. Richmond, Virginia, January - February, 1877. No. 1-2.
Leading Confederates On The Battle Of Gettysburg.

General James Longstreet's
Account Of The Campaign And Battle.

(The following paper is not properly one of our “Gettysburg Series,” and was not called forth by our enquiry for detailed narratives by active participants, nor by anything; which we have published.

In the early part of last year the Philadelphia Times announced that it had engaged General Longstreet to prepare his account of Gettysburg, and his article appeared in that paper on the 3d of November last. But we have no hesitancy in republishing the paper, although it was not written for our pages, and we are under no obligation to copy an article which has first appeared elsewhere. General Longstreet's position as second in command at Gettysburg, the important part be bore in the great battle, his unquestionable gallantry, and the fact that he commanded as noble a corps as ever fought for any cause - all demand that, in addition to his official report (which our Society published for the first time), we shall put into permanent form the narrative which he now gives of these great events. We, therefore, print the paper in full.)


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It has been my purpose for some years to give to the public a detailed history of the campaign of Gettysburg, from its inception to its disastrous close. The execution of this task has been delayed by reason of a press of personal business, and by reason of a genuine reluctance that I have felt against anything that might, even by implication, impugn the wisdom of my late comrades in arms. My sincere feeling upon this subject is best expressed in the following letter, which was written shortly after the battle of Gettysburg, when there was a sly under current of misrepresentation of my course, and in response to an appeal from a respected relative that I would make some reply to my accusers:

Camp, Culpepper Courthouse,
July 24, 1863.

My Dear Uncle: Your letters of the 13th and 14th were received on yesterday. As to our late battle, I cannot say much. I have no right to say anything, in fact, but will venture a little for you alone. If it goes to aunt and cousins, it must be under promise that it will go no further. The battle was not made as I would have made it. My idea was to throw ourselves between the enemy and Washington, select a strong position, and force the enemy to attack us. So far as is given to man the ability to judge, we may say with confidence that we should have destroyed the Federal army, marched into Washington, and dictated our terms, or, at least, held Washington and marched over as much of Pennsylvania as we cared to, had we drawn the enemy into attack upon our carefully chosen position in his rear. General Lee chose the plans adopted; and he is the person appointed to choose and to order. I consider it a part of my duty to express my views to the Commanding General. If he approves and adopts them, it is well; if he does not, it is my duty to adopt his views, and to execute his orders as faithfully as if they were my own. I cannot help but think that great results would have been obtained had my views been thought better of; yet I am much inclined to accept the present condition as for the best. I hope and trust that it is so. Your programme would all be well enough, had it been practicable; and was duly thought of, too. I fancy that no good ideas upon that campaign will be mentioned at any time that did not receive their share of consideration by General Lee. The few things that he might have overlooked himself were, I believe, suggested by myself. As we failed, I must take my share of the responsibility. In fact, I would prefer that all the blame should rest upon me. As General Lee is our commander, he should have the support and influence we can give him. If the blame (if there is any) can be shifted from him to me, I shall help him and our cause by taking it. I desire, therefore, that all the responsibility that can be put upon me shall go there and shall remain there. The truth will be known in time, and I leave that to show how much of the responsibility of Gettysburg rests on my shoulders. ...

Most affectionately yours,

J. Longstreet

To: A. B. Longstreet, LL. D., Columbus, Ga.

I sincerely regret that I cannot still rest upon that letter. But I have been so repeatedly and so rancorously assailed by those whose intimacy with the Commanding General in that battle gave an apparent importance to their assaults, that I feel impelled by a sense of duty to give to the public a full and comprehensive narration of the campaign from its beginning to its end; especially when I reflect that the publication of the truth cannot now, as it might have done then, injure the cause for which we fought the battle. The request that I furnish this history to the Times comes opportunely, for the appeal just made through the press by a distinguished foreigner for all information that will develop the causes of the failure of that campaign has provoked anew its partisan and desultory discussion, and renders a plain and logical recital of the facts both timely and important.

After the defeat of Burnside at Fredericksburg in December, it was believed that active operations were over for the winter, and I was sent with two divisions of my corps to the eastern shore of Virginia, where I could find food for my men during the winter, and send supplies to the Army of Northern Virginia. I spent several months in this department, keeping the enemy close within his fortifications, and foraging with little trouble and great success. On May 1st I received orders to report to General Lee, at Fredericksburg. General Hooker had begun to throw his army across the Rappahannock, and the active campaign was opening. I left Suffolk as soon as possible, and hurried my troops forward. Passing through Richmond, I called to pay my respects to Mr. Seddon, the Secretary of War. Mr. Seddon was at the time of my visit deeply considering the critical condition of Pemberton's army at Vicksburg, around which Gen. Grant was then decisively drawing his lines. He informed me that he had in contemplation a plan for concentrating a succoring army at Jackson, Miss., under the command of General Johnston, with a view of driving Grant on before Vicksburg by a direct issue at arms. He suggested that possibly my corps might be needed to make the army strong enough to handle Grant, and asked me my views. I replied that there was a better plan, in my judgment, for relieving Vicksburg than by a direct assault upon Grant. I proposed that the army then concentrating at Jackson, Miss., be moved swiftly to Tullahoma, where General Bragg was then located with a fine army, confronting an army of about equal strength, under General Rosecranz, and that at the same time the two divisions of my corps be hurried forward to the same point. The simultaneous arrival of these reinforcements would give us a grand army at Tullahoma. With this army General Johnston might speedily crush Rosecranz, and that he should then turn his force toward the north, and with his splendid army march through Tennessee and Kentucky, and threaten the invasion of Ohio. My idea was, that in the march through those States the army would meet no organized obstruction; would be supplied with provisions, and even reinforcements, by those friendly to our cause, and would inevitably result in drawing Grant's army from Vicksburg to look after and protect his own territory. Mr. Seddon adhered to his original views; not so much, I think, from his great confidence in them as from the difficulty of withdrawing the force suggested from General Lee's army. I was very thoroughly impressed with the practicability of the plan, however, and when I reached General Lee I laid it before him with the freedom justified by our close personal and official relations. The idea seemed to be a new one to him, but he was evidently seriously impressed with it. We discussed it over and over, and I discovered that his main objection to it was that it would, if adopted, force him to divide his army. He left no room to doubt, however, that he believed the idea of an offensive campaign was not only important but necessary. At length, while we were discussing the idea of a western forward movement, he asked me if I did not think an invasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania by his own army would accomplish the same result, and I replied that I did not see that it would, because this movement would be too hazardous, and the campaign in thoroughly Union States would require more time and greater preparation than one through Tennessee and Kentucky. I soon discovered that he had determined that he would make some forward movement, and I finally assented that the Pennsylvania campaign might be brought to a successful issue if he could make it offensive in strategy, but defensive in tactics. This point was urged with great persistency. I suggested that, after piercing Pennsylvania and menacing Washington, we should choose a strong position and force the Federals to attack us, observing that the popular clamor throughout the North would speedily force the Federal General to attempt to drive us out. I recalled to him the battle of Fredericksburg as an instance of a defensive battle, when, with a few thousand men, we hurled the whole Federal army back, crippling and demoralizing it, with trifling loss to our own troops; and Chancellorsville as an instance of an offensive battle, where we dislodged the Federals, it is true, but at such a terrible sacrifice that half a dozen such victories would have ruined us. It will be remembered that Stonewall Jackson once said that “we sometimes fail to drive the enemy from a position; they always fail to drive us.” I reminded him, too, of Napoleon's advice to Marmont, to whom he said, when putting him at the head of an invading army, “Select your ground and make your enemy attack you.” I recall these points simply because I desire to have it distinctly understood that, while I first suggested to General Lee the idea of an offensive campaign, I was never persuaded to yield my argument against the Gettysburg campaign, except with the understanding that we were not to deliver an offensives battle, but to so maneuver that the enemy should be forced to attack us or, to repeat that our campaign should be one of offensive strategy, but defensive tactics. Upon this understanding my assent was given, and General Lee, who had been kind enough to discuss the matter with me patiently, gave the order of march.

Coninued.......
 
James Longstreet's 1st Article About
the Gettysburg Campaign
for the Philadelphia Times continued

The movement was begun on the 3d of June. McLaws' division of my corps moved out of Fredericksburg for Culpeper Courthouse, followed by Ewell's corps on the 4th and 5th of June. Hood's division and Stuart's cavalry moved at the same time. On the 8th we found two full corps (for Pickett's division had joined me then) and Stuart's cavalry concentrated at Culpeper Courthouse. In the meantime a large force of the Federals, cavalry and infantry, had been thrown across the Rappahannock and sent to attack General Stuart. They were encountered at Brandy Station on the morning of the 9th, and repulsed. General Lee says of this engagement: “On the 9th a large force of Federal cavalry, strongly supported by infantry, crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly's Ford and attacked General Stuart. A severe engagement ensued, continuing from early in the morning until late in the afternoon, when the enemy was forced to recross the river with heavy loss, leaving four hundred prisoners, three pieces of artillery, and several colors in our hands.” The failure of General Lee to follow up his advantage, by pouring the heavy force concentrated at Culpeper Courthouse upon this detachment of the Federals, confirmed my convictions that he had determined to make a defensive battle, and would not allow any casual advantage to precipitate a general engagement. If he had had any idea of abandoning the original plan of a tactical defensive, then, in my judgment, was the time to have done so. While at Culpeper, I sent a trusty scout (who had been sent to me by Secretary Seddon while I was at Suffolk) with instructions to go into the Federal lines, discover his policy, and bring me all the information he could possibly pick up. When this scout asked me, very significantly, where he should report, I replied: “Find me, wherever I am, when you have the desired information.” I did this because I feared to trust him with a knowledge of our future movements. I supplied him with all the gold he needed, and instructed him to spare neither pains nor money to obtain full and accurate information. The information gathered by this scout led to the most tremendous results, as will soon be seen.

General A. P. Hill, having left Fredericksburg as soon as the enemy had retired from his front, was sent to follow Ewell, who had marched up the Valley and cleared it of the Federals. My corps left Culpeper on the 15th, and, with a view of covering the march of Hill and Ewell through the Valley, moved along the east side of the Blue Ridge and occupied Snicker's and Ashby's Gaps, and the line of the Blue Ridge. General Stuart was in my front and on my flank, reconnoitering the movements of the Federals. When it was found that Hooker did not intend to attack, I withdrew to the west side and marched to the Potomac. As I was leaving the Blue Ridge, I instructed General Stuart to follow me, and to cross the Potomac at Shepherdstown, while I crossed at Williamsport, ten miles above. In reply to these instructions, Gen. Stuart informed me that he had discretionary powers; whereupon I withdrew. General Stuart held the Gap for awhile, and then hurried around beyond Hooker's army, and we saw nothing more of him until the evening of the 2d of July, when he came down from York and joined us, having made a complete circuit of the Federal army. The absence of Stuart's cavalry from the main body of the army during the march is claimed to have been a fatal error, as General Lee says: “No report had been received (on the 27th) that the enemy had crossed the Potomac, and the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information.” The army, therefore, moved forward as a man might walk over strange ground with his eyes shut. General Lee says of his orders to Stuart: “General Stuart was left to guard the passes of the mountains and to observe the movements of the enemy, whom he was instructed to harass and impede as much as possible, should he attempt to cross the Potomac. In that event, General Stuart was directed to move into Maryland, crossing the Potomac on the east or west of the Blue Ridge, as in his judgment should be best, and take position on the right of our column as it advanced.”

My corps crossed the Potomac at Williamsport, and General A.P. Hill crossed at Shepherdstown. Our columns were joined together at Hagerstown, and we marched thence into Pennsylvania, reaching Chambersburg on the evening of the 27th. At this point, on the night of the 29th, information was received by which the whole plan of the campaign was changed. We had not heard from the enemy for several days, and Gen. Lee was in doubt as to where he was; indeed, we did not know that he had yet left Virginia. At about 10 o'clock that night Colonel Sorrell, my chief of staff, was waked by an orderly, who reported that a suspicious person had just been arrested by the provost marshal. Upon investigation, Sorrell discovered that the suspicious person was the scout, Harrison, that I had sent out at Culpeper. He was dirt stained, travel worn, and very much broken down. After questioning him sufficiently to find that he brought very important information, Colonel Sorrell brought him to my headquarters and awoke me. He gave the information that the enemy had crossed the Potomac, marched northwest, and that the head of his column was at Frederick City, on our right. I felt that this information was exceedingly important, and might involve a change in the direction of our march. General Lee had already issued orders that we were to advance toward Harrisburg. The next morning I at once sent the scout to General Lee's headquarters, and followed him myself early in the morning. I found General Lee up, and asked him if the information brought by the scout might not involve a change of direction of the head of our column to the right. He immediately acquiesced in the suggestion, possibly saying that he had already given orders to that effect. The movement toward the enemy was begun at once. Hill marched toward Gettysburg, and my corps followed, with the exception of Pickett's division, which was left at Chambersburg by General Lee's orders. Ewell was recalled from above - he having advanced as far as Carlisle. I was with General Lee most of that day (the 30th). At about noon the road in front of my corps was blocked by Hill's corps and Ewell's wagon train, which had cut into the road from above. The orders were to allow these trains to precede us. and that we should go into camp at Greenwood, about ten miles from Chambersburg. My infantry was forced to remain in Greenwood until late in the afternoon of the 1st. My artillery did not get the road until 2 o'clock on the morning of the 2d.

General Lee spent the night with us, establishing his headquarters, as he frequently did, a short distance from mine. General Lee says of the movements of this day: “Preparation had been made to advance upon Harrisburg; but on the night of the 29th information was received from a scout that the enemy had crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of his column had already reached South Mountain. As our communications with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his further progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east side of the mountains.” On the morning of the 1st General Lee and myself left his headquarters together, and had ridden three or four miles when we heard heavy firing along Hill's front. The firing became so heavy that General Lee left me and hurried forward to see what it meant. After attending to some details of my march, I followed. The firing proceeded from the engagement between our advance and Reynolds' corps, in which the Federals were repulsed. This reconnoitre was totally unexpected on both sides. As an evidence of the doubt in which General Lee was enveloped, and the anxiety that weighed him down during the afternoon, I quote from General R.H. Anderson the report of a conversation had with him during the engagement. General Anderson was resting with his division at Cashtown, awaiting orders. About 10 o'clock in the morning he received a message notifying him that General Lee desired to see him. He found Gen. Lee intently listening to the fire of the guns, and very much disturbed and depressed. At length he said, more to himself than to General Anderson: “I cannot think what has become of Stuart; I ought to have heard from him long before now. He may have met with disaster, but I hope not. In the absence of reports from him, I am in ignorance as to what we have in front of us here. It may be the whole Federal army, or it may be only a detachment. If it is the whole Federal force we must fight a battle here; if we do not gain a victory those defiles and gorges through which we passed this morning will shelter us from disaster.”

When I overtook General Lee at 5 o'clock that afternoon, he said, to my surprise, that he thought of attacking General Meade upon the heights the next day. I suggested that this course seemed to be at variance with the plan of the campaign that had been agreed upon before leaving Fredericksburg. He said: “If the enemy is there tomorrow, we must attack him.” I replied: “If he is there, it will be because he is anxious that we should attack him - a good reason in my judgment for not doing so.” I urged that we should move around by our right to the left of Meade and put our army between him and Washington, threatening his left and rear, and thus force him to attack us in such position as we might select. I said that it seemed to me that if, during our council at Fredericksburg, we had described the position in which we desired to get the two armies, we could not have expected to get the enemy in a better position for us than that he then occupied. I said, further, that he was in strong position and would be awaiting us, which was evidence that he desired that we should attack him. I said, further, that his weak point seemed to be his left; hence I thought that we should move around to his left, that we might threaten it if we intended to maneuver, or attack it if we were determined upon a battle. I called his attention to the fact that the country was admirably adapted for a defensive battle, and that we should surely repulse Meade with crushing loss if we would take position so as to force him to attack us, and suggested that even if we carried the heights in front of us, and drove Meade out, we should be so badly crippled that we could not reap the fruits of victory; and that the heights of Gettysburg were in themselves of no more importance to us than the ground we then occupied, and that the mere possession of the ground was not worth a hundred men to us. That Meade's army, not its position, was our objective. General Lee was impressed with the idea that by attacking the Federals he could whip them in detail. I reminded him that if the Federals were there in the morning it would be proof that they had their forces well in hand, and that with Pickett in Chambersburg and Stuart out of reach, we should be somewhat in detail. He, however, did not seem to abandon the idea of attack on the next day. He seemed under a subdued excitement which occasionally took possession of him when "the hunt was up," and threatened his superb equipoise. The sharp battle fought by Hill and Ewell on that day had given him a taste of victory. Upon this point I quote General Fitzhugh Lee, who says, speaking of the attack on the 3d: “He told the father of the writer (his brother) that he was controlled too far by the great confidence he felt in the fighting qualities of his people who begged simply to be 'turned loose,' and by the assurances of most of his higher officers.” I left General Lee quite late on the night of the 1st. Speaking of the battle on the 2d, General Lee says in his official report: “It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base unless attacked by the enemy; but finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our large trains.”

When I left General Lee on the night of the 1st, I believed he had made up his mind to attack, but was confident that he had not yet determined as to when the attack should be made. The assertion first made by General Pendleton, and echoed by his confederates, that I was ordered to open the attack at sunrise, is totally false. Documentary testimony upon this point will be presented in the course of this article. Suffice it to say at present that General Lee never in his life gave me orders to open an attack at a specific hour. He was perfectly satisfied that when I had my troops in position and was ordered to attack, no time was ever lost. On the night of the 1st I left him without any orders at all. On the morning of the 2d I went to General Lee's headquarters at daylight and renewed my views against making an attack. He seemed resolved, however, and we discussed the probable results. He observed the position of the Federals and got a general idea of the nature of the ground. About sunrise General Lee sent Colonel Venable, of his staff, to General Ewell's headquarters, ordering him to make a reconnaissance of the ground in his front, with a view of making the main attack on his left. A short time afterwards he followed Colonel Venable in person. He returned at about 9 o'clock and informed me that it would not do to have Ewell to open the attack. He finally determined that I should make the main attack on the extreme right. It was fully 11 o'clock when General Lee arrived at this conclusion and ordered the movement. In the meantime, by General Lee's authority: Law's brigade, which had been put upon picket duty, was ordered to rejoin my command, and upon my suggestion that it would be better to await its arrival, General Lee assented. We awaited about forty minutes for these troops and then moved forward. A delay of several hours occurred in the march of the troops. The cause of this delay was that we had been ordered by General Lee to proceed cautiously upon the forward movement so as to avoid being seen by the enemy. General Lee ordered Colonel Johnson, of his engineer corps, to lead and conduct the head of the column. My troops, therefore, moved forward under guidance of a special officer of General Lee, and with instructions to follow his directions. I left General Lee only after the line was stretched out on the march, and rode along with Hood's division, which was in the rear. The march was necessarily slow, the conductor frequently encountering points that exposed the troops to the view of the signal station on Round Top. At length the column halted. After waiting some time supposing that it would soon move forward, I sent to the front to inquire the occasion of the delay. It was reported that the column was awaiting the movements of Colonel Johnson, who was trying to lead it by some route by which it could pursue its march without passing under view of the Federal signal station. Looking up toward Round Top I saw that the signal station was in full view and as we could plainly see this station, it was apparent that our heavy columns was seen from their position, and that further efforts to conceal ourselves would be a waste of time.

I became very impatient at this delay, and determined to take upon myself the responsibility of hurrying the troops forward. I did not order General McLaws forward because, as the head of the column, he had direct orders from General Lee to follow the conduct of Colonel Johnson.

Therefore I sent orders to Hood, who was in the rear and not encumbered by these instructions, to push his division forward by the most direct route so as to take position on my right. He did so, and thus broke up the delay. The troops were rapidly thrown into position and preparations were made for the attack. It may be proper just here to consider the relative strength and position of the two armies. Our army was 52,000 infantry, Meade's was 95,000; these are our highest figures and the enemy's lowest. We had learned on the night of the 1st, from some prisoners captured near Seminary Ridge, that the First, Eleventh, and Third corps had arrived by the Emmettsburg road and had taken position on the heights in front of us and that reinforcements had been seen coming by the Baltimore road just after the fight of the 1st. From an intercepted dispatch we learned that another corps was in camp about four miles from the field. We had every reason, therefore, to believe that the Federals were prepared to renew the battle. Our army was stretched in an elliptical curve, reaching from the front of Round Top around Seminary Ridge, and enveloping Cemetery Heights on the left; thus covering a space of four or five miles. The enemy occupied the high ground in front of us, being massed within a curve of about two miles, nearly concentric with the curve described by our forces. His line was about 1,400 yards from ours. Any one will see that the proposition for this inferior force to assault and drive out the masses of troops upon the heights was a very problematical one. My orders from General Lee were “to envelop the enemy's left and begin the attack there, following up as near as possible the direction of the Emmetsburg road.”

My corps occupied our right, with Hood on our extreme right and McLaws next. Hill's corps was next to mine, in front of the Federal centre, and Ewell was on our extreme left. My corps, with Pickett's division absent, numbered hardly 13,000 men. I realized that the fight was to be a fearful one; but being assured that my flank would be protected by the brigades of Wilcox, Perry, Wright, Posey, and Mahone moving en echelon, and that Ewell was to cooperate by a direct attack on the enemy's right, and Hill to threaten his centre and attack if opportunity offered and thus prevent reinforcements from being launched either against myself or Ewell, it seemed that we might possibly dislodge the great army in front of us. At half past 3 o'clock the order was given General Hood to advance upon the enemy, and, hurrying to the head of McLaw's division, I moved with his line. Then was fairly commenced what I do not hesitate to pronounce the best three hours' fighting ever done by any troops on any battle field. Directly in front of us, occupying the peach orchard, on a piece of elevated ground that General Lee desired me to take and hold for his artillery, was the Third corps of the Federals, commanded by General Sickles. My men charged with great spirit and dislodged the Federals from the peach orchard with but little delay, though they fought stubbornly. We were then on the crest of Seminary Ridge. The artillery was brought forward and put into position at the peach orchard. The infantry swept down the slope and soon reached the marshy ground that lay between Seminary and Cemetery Ridges, fighting their way over every foot of ground and against overwhelming odds; at every step we found that reinforcements were pouring into the Federals from every side. Nothing could stop my men, however, and they commenced their heroic charge up the side of Cemetery Ridge. Our attack was to progress in the general direction of the Emmetsburg road, but the Federal troops, as they were forced from point to point, availing themselves of the stone fences and boulders near the mountain as rallying points, so annoyed our right flank that General Hood's division was obliged to make a partial change of front so as to relieve itself of this galling flank fire. This drew General McLaws a little further to the right than General Lee had anticipated, so that the defensive advantages of the ground had enabled the Federals to delay our purposes until they could occupy Little Round Top, which they just then discovered was the key to their position. The force thrown upon this point was so strong as to seize our right, as it were, in a vise.

Still the battle on our main line continued to progress. The situation was a critical one. My corps had been fighting over an hour, having encountered and driven back line after line of the enemy. In front of them was a high and rugged ridge, on its crest the bulk of the Army of the Potomac, numbering six to one, and securely resting behind strong positions. My brave fellows never hesitated, however. Their duty was in front of them and they met it. They charged up the hill in splendid style, sweeping everything before them, dislodging the enemy in the face of a withering fire. When they had fairly started up the second ridge, I discovered that they were suffering terribly from a fire that swept over their right and left flanks. I also found that my left flank was not protected by the brigades that were to move en echelon with it. McLaws' line was consequently spread out to the left to protect its flank, and Hood's line was extended to the right to protect its flank from the sweeping fire of the large bodies of troops that were posted on Round Top.

The importance of Round Top as a point d'appui was not appreciated until after my attack. General Meade seems to have alluded to it as a point to be occupied “if practicable,” but in such slighting manner as to show that he did not deem it of great importance. So it was occupied by an inadequate force. As our battle progressed, pushing the Federals back from point to point, subordinate officers and soldiers, seeking shelter, as birds flying to cover in a tempest, found behind the large boulders of its rock bound sides not only protection, but rallying points. These reinforcements to the troops already there, checked our advance on the right and some superior officer arriving just then, divined from effect the cause, and threw a force into Round Top that transformed it, as if by magic, into a Gibraltar.

These two movements of extension so drew my forces out that I found myself attacking Cemetery Hill with a single line of battle against not less than 50,000 troops.

My two divisions at that time were cut down to eight or nine thousand men, four thousand having been killed or wounded. We felt at every step the heavy stroke of fresh troops - the sturdy regular blow that tells a soldier instantly that he has encountered reserves or reinforcements. We received no support at all, and there was no evidence of cooperation on any side. To urge my men forward under these circumstances would have been madness, and I withdrew them in good order to the peach orchard that we had taken from the Federals early in the afternoon. It may be mentioned here as illustrative of the dauntless spirit of these men, that when General Humphreys (of Mississippi) was ordered to withdraw his troops from the charge, he thought there was some mistake, and retired to a captured battery near the swale between the two ridges, where he halted, and when ordered to retire to the next line a second time, he did so under protest. Our men had no thought of retreat. They broke every line they encountered. When the order to withdraw was given a courier was sent to General Lee informing him of the result of the day's work.

Before pursuing this narrative further, I shall say a word or two concerning this assault. I am satisfied that my force, numbering hardly 13,000 men, encountered during that three and a half hours of bloody work not less than 65,000 of the Federals, and yet their charge was not checked nor their line broken until we ordered them to withdraw. Mr. Whitelaw Reid, writing a most excellent account of this charge to the Cincinnati Gazette, says: “It was believed from the terrific attack that the whole rebel army, Ewell's corps included, was massed on our centre and left, and so a single brigade was left to hold the rifle pits on the right and the rest hurried across the little neck of land to strengthen our weakening lines.” He describes, too, the haste with which corps after corps was hurried forward to the left to check the advance of my two thirds of one corps. General Meade himself testifies (see his official report) that the Third, the Second, the Fifth, the Sixth, and the Eleventh corps, all of the Twelfth except one brigade and part of the First corps, engaged my handful of heroes during that glorious but disastrous afternoon. I found that night that 4,529 of my men, more than one third of their total number, had been left on the field. History records no parallel to the fight made by these two divisions on the 2d of July at Gettysburg. I cannot refrain from inserting just here an account of the battle of the 2d taken from a graphic account in the New York World. I t will be seen that the correspondent treats the charge of my 13,000 men as if it were the charge of the whole army. The account is as follows:

“He then began a heavy fire on Cemetery Hill. It must not be thought that this wrathful fire was unanswered. Our artillery began to play within a few moments, and hurled back defiance and like destruction upon the rebel lines. Until 6 o'clock the roar of cannon, the rush of missiles and the bursting of bombs filled all the air. The clangor alone of this awful combat might well have confused and awed a less cool and watchful commander than General Meade. It did not confuse him. With the calculation of a tactician and the eye of an experienced judge, he watched from his headquarters on the hill whatever movement under the murky cloud which enveloped the rebel lines might first disclose the intention which it was evident this artillery firing covered. About 6 o'clock P.M., silence, deep, awfully impressive but momentary, was permitted) as if by magic to dwell upon the field. Only the groans - unheard before - of the wounded and dying, only a murmur, a warning memory of the breeze through the foliage; only a low rattle of preparation of what was to come embroidered this blank stillness. Then as the smoke beyond the village was lightly borne to the eastward, the woods on the left were seen filled with dark masses of infantry, three columns deep, who advanced at a quick step. Magnificent! Such a charge by such a force - full forty five thousand men, under Hill and Longstreet - even though it threatened to pierce and annihilate the Third corps, against which it was directed, drew forth cries of admiration from all who beheld it. General Sickles and his splendid command withstood the shock with a determination that checked but could not fully restrain it. Back, inch by inch, fighting, falling, dying, cheering, the men retired. The rebels came on more furiously, halting at intervals, pouring volleys that struck our troops down in scores. General Sickles, fighting desperately, was struck in the leg and fell. The Second corps came to the aid of his decimated column. The battle then grew fearful. Standing firmly up against the storm, our troops, though still outnumbered, gave back shot for shot, volley for volley, almost death for death. Still the enemy was not restrained. Down he came upon our left with a momentum that nothing could check. The rifled guns that lay before our infantry on a knoll were in danger of capture. General Hancock was wounded in the thigh, General Gibbon in the shoulder. The Fifth corps, as the First and Second wavered anew, went into the breach with such shouts and such volleys as made the rebel column tremble at last. Up from the valley behind another battery came rolling to the heights, and flung its contents in an instant down in the midst of the enemy's ranks. Crash! crash! with discharges deafening, terrible, the musketry firing went on. The enemy, reforming after each discharge with wondrous celerity and firmness still pressed up the declivity. What hideous carnage filled the minutes between the appearance of the Fifth corps and the advance to the support of the rebel columns of still another column from the right, I cannot bear to tell. Men fell, as the leaves fall in autumn, before those horrible discharges. Faltering for an instant the rebel columns seemed about to recede before the tempest. But their officers, who could be seen through the smoke of the conflict galloping and swinging their swords along the lines, rallied them anew, and the next instant the whole line sprang forward, as if to break through our own by mere weight of numbers. A division from the Twelfth corps, on the extreme right, reached the scene at this instant, and at the same time Sedgwick came up with the Sixth corps, having finished a march of nearly thirty six consecutive hours. To what rescue they came their officers saw and told them. Weary as they were, barefooted, hungry, fit to drop for slumber, as they were, the wish for victory was so blended with the thought of exhaustion that they cast themselves, in turn, en masse into line of battle, and went down on the enemy with death in their weapons and cheers on their lips. The rebel's camel's back was broken by this 'feather.' His line staggered, reeled and drifted slowly back, while the shouts of our soldiers lifted up amid the roar of musketry over the bodies of the dead and wounded, proclaimed the completeness of their victory.”

It may be imagined that I was astonished at the fact that we received no support after we had driven the Federals from the peach orchard and one thousand yards beyond. If General Ewell had engaged the army in his front at that time (say 4 o'clock) he would have prevented their massing their whole army in my front, and while he and I kept their two wings engaged Hill would have found their centre weak, and should have threatened it while I broke through their left and dislodged them. Having failed to move at 4 o'clock, while the enemy was in his front, it was still more surprising that he did not advance at 5 o'clock with vigor and promptness, when the trenches in front of him were vacated or rather held by one single brigade (as General Mead's' testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War states). Had he taken these trenches and scattered the brigade that held them, he would have found himself in the Federals' flank and rear His attack in the rear must have dislodged the Federals, as it would have been totally unexpected - it being believed that he was in front with me. Hill charging upon the centre at the same time would have increased their disorder and we should have won the field. But Ewell did not advance until I had withdrawn my troops, and the First corps, after winning position after position, was forced to withdraw from the field with two corps of their comrades within sight and resting upon their arms. Ewell did not move until about dusk (according to his own report). He then occupied the trenches that the enemy had vacated (see General Meade's report).

The real cause of Ewell's non compliance with General Lee's orders was that he had broken his line of battle by sending two brigades off on some duty up the York road. General Early says that my failure to attack at sunrise was the cause of Ewell's line being broken at the time I did attack. This is not only absurd but impossible. After sunrise that morning Colonel Venable and General Lee were at Ewell's headquarters discussing the policy of opening the attack with Ewell's corps. They left Ewell with this definite order: that he was to hold himself in readiness to support my attack when it was made. It is silly to say that he was ready at sunrise, when he was not ready at 4 o'clock when the attack was really made. His orders were to hold himself in readiness to co-operate with my attack when it was made. In breaking his line of battle he rendered himself unable to support me when he would have been potential. Touching the failure of the supporting brigades of Anderson's division to cover McLaws' flank by echelon movements, as directed, there is little to be said. Those brigades acted gallantly, but went astray early in the fight. General Anderson in his report says: “A strong fire was poured upon our right flank, which had become detached from McLaws' left.” General Lee, alluding to the action of these two brigades, says: “But having become separated from McLaws, Wilcox's and Wright's brigades advanced with great gallantry, breaking successive lines of the enemy's infantry and compelling him to abandon much of his artillery. Wilcox reached the foot and Wright gained the crest of the ridge itself, driving the enemy down the opposite side; but having become separated from McLaws, and gone beyond the other two brigades of the division they were to attack in front and on both flanks, and compelled to retire, being unable to bring off any of the captured artillery, McLaws' left also fell back, and it being now nearly dark General Longstreet determined to await the arrival of Pickett.” So much for the action of the first day.

I did not see General Lee that night. On the next morning he came to see me, and fearing that he was still in his disposition to attack, I tried to anticipate him by saying: “General, I have had my scouts out all night, and I find that you still have an excellent opportunity to move around to the right of Meade's army and maneuver him into attacking us.” He replied, pointing with his fist at Cemetery Hill: “The enemy is there, and I am going to strike him.” I felt then that it was my duty to express my convictions; I said: “General, I have been a soldier all my life. I have been with soldiers engaged in fights by couples, by squads, companies, regiments, divisions and armies, and should know as well as any one what soldiers can do. It is my opinion that no 15,000 men ever arrayed for battle can take that position,” pointing to Cemetery Hill. General Lee in reply to this ordered me to prepare Pickett's division for the attack. I should not have been so urgent had I not foreseen the hopelessness of the proposed assault. I felt that I must say a word against the sacrifice of my men; and then I felt that my record was such that General Lee would or could not misconstrue my motives. I said no more, however, but turned away. The most of the morning was consumed in waiting for Pickett's men and getting into position. The plan of assault was as follows: Our artillery was to be massed in a wood from which Pickett was to charge, and it was to pour a continuous fire upon the cemetery. Under cover of this fire, and supported by it, Pickett was to charge. Our artillery was in charge of General E. P. Alexander, a brave and gifted officer. Colonel Walton was my chief of artillery, but Alexander being at the head of the column, and being first in position, and being besides an officer of unusual promptness, sagacity and intelligence, was given charge of the artillery. The arrangements were completed about one o'clock. General Alexander had arranged that a battery of seven 11 pound howitzers, with fresh horses and full caissons, were to charge with Pickett, at the head of his line, but General Pendleton, from whom the guns had been borrowed, recalled them just before the charge was made, and thus deranged this wise plan. Never was I so depressed as upon that day. I felt that my men were to be sacrificed, and that I should have to order them to make a hopeless charge. I had instructed General Alexander, being unwillingly to trust myself with the entire responsibility, to carefully observe the effect of the fire upon the enemy, and when it began to tell to notify Pickett to begin the assault. I was so much impressed with the hopelessness of the charge that I wrote the following note to General Alexander: “If the artillery fire does not have the effect to drive off the enemy or greatly demoralize him, so as to make our efforts pretty certain, I would prefer that you should not advise General Pickett to make the charge. I shall rely a great deal on your judgment to determine the matter, and shall expect you to let Pickett know when the moment offers.”

To my note the General replied as follows: “I will only be able to judge the effect of our fire upon the enemy by his return fire, for his infantry is but little exposed to view, and the smoke will obscure the whole field. If, as I infer from your note, there is an alternative to this attack, it should be carefully considered before opening our fire, for it will take all of the artillery ammunition we have left to test this one thoroughly, and if the result is unfavorable, we will have none left for another effort, and even if this is entirely successful it can only be so at a very bloody cost.” I still desired to save my men and felt that if the artillery did not produce the desired effect l would be justified in holding Pickett off. I wrote this note to Colonel Walton at exactly 1:30 P.M.: “Let the batteries open. Order great precision in firing. If the batteries at the peach orchard cannot be used against the point we intend attacking, let them open on the enemy at Rocky Hill.” The cannonading which opened along both lines was grand. In a few moments a courier brought a note to General Pickett (who was standing near me) from Alexander, which, after reading, he handed to me. It was as follows: “If you are coming at all you must come at once, or I cannot give you proper support; but the enemy's fire has not slackened at all; at least eighteen guns are still firing from the Cemetery itself.” After I had read the note Pickett said to me “General shall I advance?” My feelings had so overcome me that I would not speak for fear of betraying my want of confidence to him. I bowed affirmation and turned to mount my horse. Pickett immediately said: “I shall lead my division forward, sir.” I spurred my horse to the wood where Alexander was stationed with artillery. When I reached him he told me of the disappearance of the seven guns which were to have led the charge with Pickett, and that his ammunition was so low that he could not properly support the charge. I at once ordered him to stop Pickett until the ammunition had been replenished. He informed me that he had no ammunition with which to replenish. I then saw that there was no help for it, and that Pickett must advance under his orders. He swept past our artillery in splendid style, and the men marched steadily and compactly down the slope. As they started up the ridge over one hundred cannon from the breastworks of the Federals hurled a rain of canister, grape and shell down upon them; still they pressed on until half way up the slope, when the crest of the hill was lit with a solid sheet of flame as the masses of infantry, rose and fired. When the smoke cleared away Pickett's division was gone. Nearly two thirds of his men lay dead on the field, and the survivors were sullenly retreating down the hill. Mortal man could not have stood that fire. In half an hour the contested field was cleared and the battle of Gettysburg was over.

When this charge had failed I expected that of course the enemy would throw himself against our shattered ranks and try to crush us. I sent my staff officers to the rear to assist in rallying the troops, and hurried to our line of batteries as the only support that I could give them, knowing that my presence would impress upon every one of them the necessity of holding the ground to the last extremity. I knew if the army was to be saved those batteries must check the enemy. As I rode along the line of artillery I observed my old friend Captain Miller, Washington Artillery, of Sharpsburg record, walking between his guns and smoking his pipe as quietly and contentedly as he could at his campfire. The enemy's skirmishers were then advancing and threatening assault. For unaccountable reasons the enemy did not pursue his advantage. Our army was soon in compact shape, and its face turned once more toward Virginia. I may mention here that it has been absurdly said that General Lee ordered me to put Hood's and McLaws' divisions in support of Pickett's assault. General Lee never ordered any such thing. After our troops were all arranged for assault General Lee rode (*) with me twice over the lines to see that everything was arranged according to his wishes. He was told that we had been more particular in giving the orders than ever before; that the commanders had been sent for and the point of attack had been carefully designated, and that the commanders had been directed to communicate to their subordinates, and through them to every soldier in the command, the work that was before them, so that they should nerve themselves for the attack and fully understand it. After leaving me he again rode over the field once, if not twice, so that there was really no room for misconstruction or misunderstanding of his wishes. He could not have thought of giving any such an order. Hood and McLaws were confronted by a largely superior force of the enemy on the right of Pickett's attack. To have moved them to Pickett's support would have disengaged treble their number of Federals, who would have swooped down from their rocky fastnesses against the flank of our attacking column and swept our army from the field. A reference to any of the maps of Gettysburg will show from the position of the troops that this would have been the inevitable result. General Lee and myself never had any deliberate conversation about Gettysburg. The subject was never broached by either of us to the other. On one occasion it came up casually and he said to me (alluding to the charge of Pickett on the 3d), “General, why didn't you stop all that thing that day.” I replied that I could not under the circumstances assume such a responsibility, as no discretion had been left me.

Before discussing the weak points of the campaign of Gettysburg, it is proper that I should say that I do so with the greatest affection for General Lee and the greatest reverence for his memory. The relations existing between us were affectionate, confidential, and even tender, from first to last. There was never a harsh word between us. It is then with a reluctant spirit that I write a calm and critical review of the Gettysburg campaign, because that review will show that our Commanding General was unfortunate at several points. There is no doubt that General Lee, during the crisis of that campaign, lost the matchless equipoise that usually characterized him, and that whatever mistakes were made were not so much matters of deliberate judgment as the impulses of a great mind disturbed by unparalleled conditions. General Lee was thrown from his balance (as is shown by the statement of General Fitzhugh Lee) by too great confidence in the prowess of his troops and (as is shown by General Anderson's statement) by the deplorable absence of General Stuart and the perplexity occasioned thereby. With this preface I proceed to say that the Gettysburg campaign was weak in these points adhering, however, to my opinion that a combined movement against Rosecranz in Tennessee and a march toward Cincinnati would have given better results than could possibly have been secured by the invasion of Pennsylvania: First, the offensive strategical but defensive tactical plan of the campaign as agreed upon should never have been abandoned after we entered the enemy s country. Second, if there ever was a time when the abandonment of that plan could have promised decisive results, it was at Brandy Station, where, after Stuart had repulsed the force thrown across the river, we might have fallen on that force and crushed it, and then put ourselves in position, threatening the enemy's right and rear, which would have dislodged him from his position at Fredericksburg and given us the opportunity for an effective blow. Third, General Stuart should not have been permitted to leave the general line of march, thus forcing us to march blindfolded into the enemy s country; to this may be attributed, in my opinion, the change of the policy of the campaign. Fourth, the success obtained by the accidental reconnoitre on the 1st should have been vigorously prosecuted and the enemy should have been given no time to fortify or concentrate. Fifth, on the night of the 1st the army should have been carried around to Meade's right and rear, and posted between him and his capitol, and we could have maneuvered him into an attack. Sixth, when the attack was made on the enemy's left on the 2d by my corps, Ewell should have been required to cooperate by a vigorous movement against his right and Hill should have moved against his centre. Had this been done his army would have been dislodged beyond question. Seventh, on the morning of the 3d it was not yet too late to move to the right and maneuver the Federals into attacking us. Eighth, Pickett's division should not have been ordered to assault Cemetery Ridge on the 3d, as we had already tested the strength of that position sufficiently to admonish us that we could not dislodge him. While the cooperation of Generals Ewell and Hill, on the 2d, by vigorous assault at the moment my battle was in progress, would in all probability have dislodged the Federals from their position, it does not seem that such success would have yielded the fruits anticipated at the inception of the campaign. The battle as it was fought would, in any result have so crippled us that the Federals would have been able to make good their retreat, and we should soon have been obliged to retire to Virginia with nothing but victory to cover our waning cause.

The morale of the victory might have dispirited the North and aroused the South to new exertions, but it would have been nothing in the game being played by the two armies at Gettysburg. As to the abandonment of the tactical defensive policy that we had agreed upon, there can be no doubt that General Lee deeply deplored it as a mistake. His remark, made just after the battle, “It is all my fault”, meant just what it said.

It adds to the nobility and magnanimity of that remark when we reflect that it was the utterance of a deep felt truth rather than a mere sentiment. In a letter written to me by General Lee in January, 1864, he says: Had I taken your advice at Gettysburg instead of pursuing the course I did, how different all might have been. Captain T.J. Gorier of Houston, Texas, a gentleman of high position and undoubted integrity, writes to me upon this same point as follows: “Another important circumstance which I distinctly remember was in the winter of 1864, when you sent me from East Tennessee to Orange Courthouse with dispatches for General Lee. Upon my arrival there General Lee asked me in his tent, where he was alone with two or three Northern papers on his table He remarked that he had just been reading the Northern official report of the Battle of Gettysburg; that he had become satisfied from reading those reports that if he had permitted you to carry out your plans on the third day, instead of making the attack on Cemetery Hill, we would have been successful.” I cannot see, as has been claimed, why the absence of General Lee's cavalry should have justified his attack on the enemy. On the contrary, while they may have perplexed him, I hold that it was additional reason for his not hazarding an attack. At the time the attack was ordered we were fearful that our cavalry had been destroyed. In case of a disaster, and a forced retreat, we should have had nothing to cover our retreat. When so much was at stake as at Gettysburg the absence of the cavalry should have prevented the taking of any chances.

Continued
 
James Longstreet's 1st Article About
the Gettysburg Campaign
for the Philadelphia Times continued

As to the failure of Stuart to move with the army to the west side of the Blue Ridge, I can only call attention to the fact that General Lee gave him discretionary orders. He doubtless did as he thought best. Had no discretion been given him he would have known and fallen into his natural position - my right flank. But authority thus given a subordinate general implies an opinion on the part of the commander that something better than the drudgery of a march along our flank might be open to him, and one of General Stuart's activity and gallantry should not be expected to fail to seek it. As to Ewell's failure to prosecute the advantage won on the 1st, there is little to be said, as the Commanding General was on the field. I merely quote from his (General Ewell's) official report. He says: “The enemy had fallen back to a commanding position that was known to us as Cemetery Hill, south of Gettysburg, and quickly showed a formidable front there. On entering the town I received a message from the Commanding General to attack the hill, if I could do so to advantage. I could not bring artillery to bear on it; all the troops with me were jaded by twelve hours' marching and fighting, and I was notified that General Johnson was close to the town with his division, the only one of my corps that had not been engaged, Anderson's division of the Third corps, having been halted to let them pass. Cemetery Hill was not assailable from the town, and I determined with Johnson's division to take possession of a wooded hill to my left, on a line with and commanding Cemetery Hill. Before Johnson got up the Federals were reported moving to our left flank - our extreme left - and I could see what seemed to be his skirmishers in that direction. Before this report could be investigated by Lieutenant T.T. Turner, of my staff, and Lieutenant Robert Early, sent to investigate it, and Johnson placed in position, the night was far advanced.” General Lee explains his failure to send positive orders to Ewell to follow up the flying enemy as follows: “The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops. Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and in the meantime every effort was made to ascertain the numbers and positions of the enemy and find the most favorable point to attack.”

Pursuit “pell-mell” is sometimes justified in a mere retreat. It is the accepted principle of action in a rout. General Early, in his report of this day's work, says “the enemy had been routed.” He should, therefore, have been followed by everything that could have been thrown upon his heels, not so much to gain the heights, which were recognized as the rallying point, but to prevent his rallying at all in time to form lines for another battle. If the enemy had been routed this could and should have been done. In the “Military Annals of Louisiana,” (Napier Bartlett, Esq.,) in the account of this rout, he says: “Hays had received orders through Early from General Ewell (though Lee's general instructions were subsequently the reverse) to halt at Gettysburg and advance no further in case he should succeed in capturing that place. But Hays now saw that the enemy were coming around by what is known as the Baltimore road, and were making for the heights-the Cemetery Ridge. This ridge meant life or death, and for the possession of it the battles of the 2d and 3d were fought. .... Owing to the long detour the enemy was compelled to make, it was obvious that he could not get his artillery in position on the heights or one or two hours. The immediate occupation of the heights by the Confederates, who were in position to get them at the time referred to, was a matter of vital importance. Hays recognized it as such and presently sent for Early. The latter thought as Hays, but declined to disobey orders. At the urgent request of General Hays, however, he sent for General Ewell. When the latter arrived many precious moments had been lost. But the enemy, who did not see its value until the arrival of Hancock, had not yet appeared in force.” General Hays told me ten years after the battle that he “could have seized the heights without the loss of ten men.” Here we see General Early adhering to orders when his own convictions told him he should not do so, and refusing to allow General Hays to seize a point recognized by him as of vast importance, because of technical authority, at a moment when he admitted and knew that disregard of the order would only have made more secure the point at issue when the order was given.

Before closing this article I desire to settle finally and fully one point concerning which there has been much discussion, viz: the alleged delay in the attack upon the 2d. I am moved to this task not so much by an ambition to dissolve the cloud of personal misrepresentation that has been settled about my head, as by a sense of duty which leads me to determine a point that will be of value to the historian. It was asserted by General Pendleton, with whom the carefulness of statement or deliberateness of judgment has never been a characteristic, but who has been distinguished for the unreliability of his memory, that General Lee ordered me to attack the enemy at sunrise on the 2d.

General J. A. Early has, in positive terms, endorsed this charge, which I now proceed to disprove. I have said that I left General Lee late in the night of the 1st, and that he had not then determined when the attack should be made; that I went to his headquarters early the next morning and was with him for some time; that he left me early after sunrise and went to Ewell's headquarters with the express view of seeing whether or not the main attack should be made then, and that he returned at about 9 o'clock; and that after discussing the ground for some time he determined that I should make the main attack, and at 11 o'clock gave me the order to prepare for it. I now present documents that sustain these assertions.

The first letter that I offer is from Colonel W. H. Taylor, of General Lee's staff. It is as follows:

Norfolk, Va., April 28, 1875.

Dear General: I have received your letter of the 20th instant. I have not read the article of which you speak, nor have I ever seen any copy of General Pendleton's address; indeed, I have read little or nothing of what has been written since the war. In the first place, because I could not spare the time; and in the second of those of whose writings I have heard I deem but very few entitled to any attention whatever. I can only say that I never before heard of 'the sunrise attack' you were to have made as charged by General Pendleton. If such an order was given you I never knew of it, or it has strangely escaped my memory. I think it more than probable that if General Lee had had your troops available the evening previous to the day of which you speak, he would have ordered an early attack, but this does not touch the point at issue. I regard it as a great mistake on the part of those who, perhaps, because of political differences, now undertake to criticise and attack your war record. Such conduct is most ungenerous, and I am sure meets the disapprobation of all good Confederates with whom I have had the pleasure of associating in the daily walks of life.

Yours, very respectfully,

W.H. Taylor.

To: General Longstreet

The next letter is from Colonel Charles Marshall, of General Lee's staff, who has charge of all the papers left by General Lee. It is as follows:

Baltimore, Md., May 7, 1875.

Dear General: Your letter of the 20th ult. was received and should have had an earlier reply but for my engagements preventing me from looking at my papers to find what I could on the subject. I have no personal recollection of the order to which you refer. It certainly was not conveyed by me, nor is there anything in General Lee's official report to show the attack on the 2d was expected by him to begin earlier, except that he notices that there was not proper concert of action on that day.

Respectfully,

Charles Marshall.

To General Longstreet, New Orleans.

Then a letter from General A.L. Long, who was General Lee's military secretary:

Big Island, Bedford, Va., May 31, 1875.

Dear General: Your letter of the 20th ult., referring to an assertion of General Pendleton's, made in a lecture delivered several years ago, which was recently published in the Southern Historical Society Magazine substantially as follows: 'That General Lee ordered General Longstreet to attack General Meade at sunrise on the morning of the 2d of July,' has been received. I do not recollect of hearing of an order to attack at sunrise, or at any other designated hour, pending the operations at Gettysburg during the first three days of July, 1863. ...

Yours truly,

A.L. Long.

To General Longstreet.

I add the letter of Colonel Venable, of General Lee's staff, which should of itself be conclusive. I merely premise it with the statement that it was fully 9 o'clock before General Lee returned from his reconnaissance of Ewell's lines:

University of Virginia, May 11, 1875.

General James Longstreet:
Dear General: Your letter of the 25th ultimo. with regard to Gen. Lee's battle order on the 1st and 2d of July at Gettysburg, was duly received. I did not know of any order for attack on the enemy at sunrise on the 2d, nor can believe any such order was issued by General Lee. About sunrise on the 2d of July I was sent by General Lee to General Ewell to ask him what he thought of the advantages of an attack on the enemy from his position. (Colonel Marshall had been sent with a similar order on the night of the 1st). General Ewell made me ride with him from point to point of his lines, so as to see with him the exact position of things. Before he got through the examination of the enemy's position General Lee came himself to General Ewell's lines. In sending the message to General Ewell, General Lee was explicit in saying that the question was whether he should move all the troops around on the right and attack on that side. I do not think that the errand on which I was sent by the Commanding General inconsistent with the idea of an attack at sunrise by any portion of the army.

Yours, very truly,

S. Venable.

I add upon this point the letter of Dr. Cullen, medical director of the First corps:

Richmond, Va., May 18, 1875.

General James Longstreet:
Dear General: Yours of the 16th ult. should have received my immediate attention but before answering it I was desirous of refreshing my memory of the scenes and incidents of the Gettysburg campaign by conversation with others who were with us and who served in different corps of the command. It was an astounding announcement to the survivors of the First army corps that the disaster and failure at Gettysburg was alone and solely due to its commander, and that had he obeyed the orders of the commander in chief that Meade's army would have been beaten, before its entire force had assembled, and its final discomfiture thereby made certain. It is a little strange that these charges were not made while General Lee was alive to substantiate or disprove them, and that seven years or more were permitted to pass by in silence regarding them. You are fortunate in being able to call upon the Adjutant General and the two confidential officers of General Lee's staff or their testimony in the case, and I do not think that you will have any reason to fear their evidence. They knew every order that was issued for that battle, when and where attacks were to be made, who were slow in attacking, and who did not make attacks that were expected to be made. I hope, for the sake of history and for your brave military record, that a quietus will at once be put on this subject. I distinctly remember the appearance in our headquarters camp of the scout who brought from Frederick the first account that General Lee had of the definite whereabouts of the enemy; of the excitement at General Lee's headquarters among couriers, quartermasters, commissaries, etc., all evoking some early movement of the commands dependent upon the news brought by the scout. That afternoon General Lee was walking with some of us in the road in front of his headquarters and said: “Tomorrow, gentlemen, we will not move to Harrisburg as we expected, but will go over to Gettysburg and see what General Meade is after.” Orders had then been issued to the corps to move at sunrise on the morning of the next day, and promptly at that time the corps was put on the road. The troops moved slowly a short distance when they were stopped by Ewell's wagon trains and Johnson's division turning into the road in front of them, making their way from some point north to Cashtown or Gettysburg. How many hours we were detained I am unable to say, but it must have been many, for I remember eating a lunch or dinner before moving again. Being anxious to see you I rode rapidly by the troops (who, as soon as they could get into the road, pushed hurriedly by us also), and overtook you about dark at the hill this side of Gettysburg, about half a mile from the town. You had been at the front with General Lee and were returning to your camp, a mile or two back. I spoke very exultingly of the victory we were thought to have obtained that day, but was surprised to find that you did not take the same cheerful view of it that I did, and presently you remarked that it would have been better had we not fought than to have left undone what we did. You said that the enemy were left occupying a position that it would take the whole army to drive them from and then at a great sacrifice. We soon reached the camp, three miles, perhaps, from Gettysburg, and found the column near by. Orders were issued to be ready to march at 'daybreak' or some earlier hour, next morning. About 3 o'clock in the morning, while the stars were shining, you left your headquarters and rode to General Lee's, where I found you sitting with him after sunrise looking at the enemy on Cemetery Hill. I rode then into Gettysburg and was gone some two hours, and when I returned found you still with General Lee. At 2 or 3 o'clock in the day I rode with you toward the right, when you were about to attack, and was with you in front of the peach orchard when Hood began to move towards Round Top. General Hood was soon wounded and I removed him from the field to a house near by. ...

I am yours, very truly, J.S.D. Cullen.

I submit next an extract from the official report of General R.H. Anderson:

Upon approaching Gettysburg I was directed to occupy the position in line of battle which had first been vacated by Pender's division, and to place one brigade and battery of artillery a mile or more on the right. Wilcox's brigade and Captain Ross' battery, of Lane's battalion, were posted in the detached position, while the other brigades occupied the ground from which Pender's division had first been moved. We continued in position until the morning of the 2d, when I received orders to take up a new line of battle on the right of Pender's division, about a mile and a half further forward. In taking the new position the Tenth Alabama regiment, Wilcox's brigade, had a sharp skirmish with the body of the enemy who had occupied a wooded hill on the extreme right of my line. Shortly after the line had been formed I received notice that Lieutenant General Longstreet would occupy the ground on my right, and that his line would be in a direction nearly at right angles with mine, and that he would assault the extreme left of the enemy and drive him toward Gettysburg.

From a narrative of General McLaws, published in 1873, I copy the following:

On the 30th of June, I had been directed to have my division in readiness to follow General Ewell's corps. Marching toward Gettysburg, which it was intimated we would have passed by 10 o'clock the next day (the first of July), my division was accordingly marched from its camp and lined along the road in the order of march by 8 o'clock the 1st of July. When the troops of Ewell's corps - it was Johnston's division in charge of Ewell's wagon trains, which were coming from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains - had passed the head of my column, I asked General Longstreet's staff officer, Major Fairfax, if my division should follow. He went off to inquire, and returned with orders for me to wait until Ewell's wagon train had passed, which did not happen until after 4 o'clock P.M. The train was calculated to be fourteen miles long, when I took up the line of march and continued marching until I arrived within three miles of Gettysburg where my command camped along a creek.

This was far into the night. My division was leading Longstreet's corps and of course the other divisions come up later I saw Hood's division the next morning, and understood that Pickett had been detached to guard the rear. While on the march, at about 10 o'clock at night, I met General Longstreet and some of his staff coming from the direction of Gettysburg and had a few moments conversation with him. He said nothing of having received an order to attack at daylight the next morning. Here I will state that until General Pendleton mentioned it about two years ago when he was on a lecturing tour, after the death of General Lee, l never heard it intimated even that any such order had ever been given.

I close the testimony on this point by an extract from a letter from General Hood. He writes

I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of July. My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, when the troops were allowed to stack arms and rest until further orders A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of the same morning, we were both engaged in company with Generals A P. Hill and Lee in observing the position of the Federals. General Lee; with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre belt around his waist and field glasses pending at his side, walked up and down in the shade of large trees near us, halting now and then to observe he enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet at times buried in deep thought. (Colonel Freemantle of England, was ensconced in the forks of a tree not far off with glasses in constant use examining the lofty position of the Federal army. General Lee was seemingly anxious that you should attack that morning. He remarked to me: 'The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him he will whip us.' You thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett's divisions at that time still in the rear, in order to make the attack and you said to me subsequently, while we were seated together near the trunk of a tree: 'General Lee is a little nervous this morning. He wishes me to attack. I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into a battle with one boot off.'

Having thus disproved the assertions of Messrs. Pendleton and Early in regard to this rumored order for a sunrise attack, it appears that they are worthy of no further recognition; but it is difficult to pass beyond them without noting the manner in which, by their ignorance, they marred the plans of their chief on the field of battle. Mr. Pendleton robbed Pickett's division of its most important adjunct, fresh field artillery, at the moment of its severest trial, and thus frustrated the wise and brilliant programme of assault planned by General Alexander, and without the knowledge of that officer. (See narrative of General Alexander in the Southern Historical Papers for September, 1877.) General Early broke up General Lee's line of battle on the 2d of July by detaching part of his division on some uncalled for service, in violation of General Lee's orders, and thus prevented the cooperative attack of Ewell ordered by General Lee.

It is proper to discuss briefly, at this point, the movements of the third day. The charge of that day as made by General Pickett was emphatically a forlorn hope. The point designated by General Lee as the point of attack seemed to be about one mile from where he and I stood when he gave his orders. I asked him if the distance that we had to overcome under a terrific fire was not more than a mile. He replied: “No; it is not more than fourteen hundred yards.” So that our troops, when they arose above the crest, had to advance this distance under the fire of about half of the Federal army, before they could fire a shot. Anything less than thirty thousand fresh veterans would have been vainly sacrificed in this attempt. The force given me for this work was Pickett's division (or rather a part of it), about 5,500 men, fresh and ready to undertake anything. My supporting force of probably 8,000 men had bloody noses and bruised heads from the fight of the previous day, and were not in physical condition to undertake such desperate work. When fresh they were the equals of any troops on earth; but every soldier knows that there s a great difference between fresh soldiers and those who have just come out of a heavy battle. It has been charged that the delay of the attack on the third was the cause of the failure of Ewell to cooperate with Pickett's attack. Colonel Taylor says that Ewell was ordered to attack at the same time with me, mine being the main attack. He says:

General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as soon as was expected. ... General Ewell, who had orders to cooperate with General Longstreet, and who was, of course, not aware of any impediment to the main attack, having reinforced General Johnson during the night of the 2d, ordered him forward early the next morning. In obedience to these instructions, General Johnson became hotly engaged before General Ewell could be informed of the halt that had been called upon our right.

Let us look at the facts of this. Instead of “making this attack at daylight,” General Ewell says: “Just before the time fixed for General Johnson's advance the enemy attacked him to regain the works captured by Stuart the evening before.” General Meade in his official report, says: “On the morning of the 3d, General Geary, having returned during the night, attacked at early dawn the enemy, and succeeded in driving him back and reoccupying his former position. A spirited contest was maintained along his portion of the line all the morning, and General Geary, reinforced by Wharton's brigade of the Sixth corps, maintained his position and inflicted very severe loss upon the enemy.” Now to return to my end of the line. At about sunrise General Lee came to me and informed that General Picket would soon report to me, and then ordered that his troops were to be used as a column of assault, designating the point of assault, and that portions of the Third corps were to be used in support. About 7 o'clock General Pickett rode forward and stated that his troops would soon be upon the field and asked to be assigned his position. Colonel W. W. Wood, of Pickett's division, in his account of the day, says: “If I remember correctly, Pickett's division and the artillery were all in position by 11 A.M.” Hence we see that General Geary attacked General Ewell at least one hour before I had received my orders for the day; that at the very moment of my receiving these instructions General Ewell was engaged in a “spirited contest;” that this contest had continued several hours before General Pickett's troops came upon the field, and that the contest was virtually over before General Pickett and the artillery were prepared for the battle. When these arrangements were completed and the batteries ordered to open, General Ewell had been driven from his position and not a footstep was made from any other part of the army in my support. That there may have been confusion of orders on the field during the second and third days I am not prepared to deny, but there was nothing of the kind about the headquarters of the First corps.

General Wilcox steps forward as a willing witness in all concerning the battle of Gettysburg, and seems to know everything of General Lee's wishes and the movements of the First corps, and in fact everything else except his own orders. His brigade was the directing brigade for the echelon movement that was to protect McLaws' flank. He went astray at the opening of the fight, either through ignorance of his orders or a misapprehension or violation of them. Had he but attended to his own brigade instead of looking to the management of the general battle, the splendid exhibition of soldiery given by his men would have given better results.

I have not seen the criticism of the Comte de Paris upon the campaign, but gather from quotations that he adduced as one of the objections to the invasion of Pennsylvania that the Federals would do superior fighting upon their own soil. The Confederates, whom I have read after, deny that this is true. Although not technically correct, the Comte is right in the material point. The actual fighting on the field of Gettysburg by the army of the Potomac was not marked by any unusual gallantry, but the positions that it occupied were held with much more than the usual tenacity of purpose.

There is little to say of the retreat of General Lee's army to the Potomac. When we reached South Mountain, on our retreat, we learned that the Federal cavalry was in strong force threatening the destruction of our trains then collecting at Williamsport, and that it was also intercepting our trains on the road and burning some of our wagons. Upon the receipt of this intelligence, General Lee ordered me to march as rapidly as possible to the relief of our trains. By a forced march we succeeded in clearing the road and reached Williamsport in time to save our supply trains. We then took position covering the crossing there and at Falling Water, a short distance below. As the other corps arrived they were assigned positions and we went to work, as rapidly as possible to strengthen our line with field works. On the 13th General Lee informed me that the river had fallen sufficiently at Williamsport to allow us to ford, and that the bridge at Falling Water had been repaired, and that he would that night recross the river with his entire army. I suggested as a matter of convenience and to avoid confusion, that it might be better to pass the trains over that night, with everything not essential to battle, and let his troops remain in position until the night of the 14th; that if the rest of his line was as strong as mine we could easily repulse any attack that might be made, and thus recover some of the prestige lost by the discomfiture at Gettysburg. After we crossed the Potomac we soon found that the Federals were pushing along the west side of the Blue Ridge with the purpose of cutting off our retreat to Richmond. General Lee again sent my corps forward to prevent this effort on the part of General Meade, and we succeeded in clearing the way, and holding it open for the Third corps that followed us. General Ewell, however, was cut off, and was obliged to pass the mountains further south. The First corps reached Culpeper Courthouse on the 24th.

In the month of August, 1863, while lying along the Rapidan, I called General Lee's attention to the condition of our affairs in the West, and the progress that was being made by the army under General Rosecranz, in cutting a new line through the State of Georgia, and suggesting that a successful march, such as he had started on would again bisect the Southern country, and that when that was done the war would be virtually over. I suggested that he should adhere to his defensive tactics upon the Rapidan, and reinforce from his army the army lying in front of Rosecranz so that it could crush that army and then push on to the West. He seemed struck with these views, but was as much opposed to dividing his army as he was in the spring when I first suggested it. He went down to Richmond to arrange for another offensive campaign during the fall. While there several letters passed between us, only two of which I have preserved in connected form. The result of this correspondence was, however, that I was sent with two divisions - Hood's and McLaws' - to reinforce our army then in Georgia. The result of this movement was the defeat of Rosecranz at Chickamauga, when the last hope of the Confederacy expired with the failure of our army to prosecute the advantage gained by this defeat. The letters are appended herewith:

(Copy.) (Confidential.)

Richmond, August 31, 1863.

Lieutenant General J. Longstreet,
Headquarters Army Northern Virginia:

General: I have wished for several days past to return to the army, but have been detained by the President. He will not listen to my proposition to leave to-morrow.

I hope you will use every exertion to prepare the army for offensive operations, and improve the condition of men and animals. I can see nothing better to be done than to endeavor to bring General Meade out and use our efforts to crush his army while in the present condition.

The Quartermaster's Department promise to send up 3,000 bushels of corn per day, provided the cars can be unloaded and returned without delay. I hope you will be able to arrange it so that the cars will not be detained. With this supply of corn, if it can be maintained, the condition of our animals should improve.

Very respectfully and truly yours,

(Signed) "R.E. Lee, General.


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(Copy.)

Headquarters, September 2, 1863.

General: Your letter of the 31st is received. I have expressed to Generals Ewell and Hill your wishes, and am doing all that can be done to be well prepared with my own command. Our greatest difficulty will be in preparing our animals.

I don't know that we can reasonably hope to accomplish much here by offensive operations, unless we are strong enough to cross the Potomac. If we advance to meet the enemy on this side he will in all probability go into one of his many fortified positions. These we cannot afford to attack.

I know but little of the condition of our affairs in the West, but am inclined to the opinion that our best opportunity for great results is in Tennessee. If we could hold the defensive here with two corps and send the other to operate in Tennessee with that army, I think that we could accomplish more than by an advance from here.

The enemy seems to have settled down upon the plan of holding certain points by fortifying and defending, while he concentrates upon others. It seems to me that this must succeed, unless we concentrate ourselves and at the same time make occasional show of active operations at all points.

I know of no other means of acting upon that principle at present, except to depend upon our fortifications in Virginia, and concentrate with one corps of this army and such as may be drawn from others in Tennessee and destroy Rosecrans's army.

I feel assured that this is practicable, and that greater advantages will be gained than by any operations from here.

I remain, General, very respectfully,Your obedient servant,

(Signed) James Longstreet, Lieut. General.

General R.E. Lee, Commanding, etc.

It will be noticed by those who have watched the desultory controversy maintained upon this subject, that after I had proved the fallacy of Gen. Pendleton's and General Early's idea of a sunrise attack, they fall back upon the charge that I delayed bringing my troops into action, waiving all question of an order from General Lee. I have shown that I did not receive orders from General Lee to attack until about 11 o'clock on the 2d; that I immediately began my dispositions for attack; that I waited about forty minutes for Laws' brigade, by General Lee's assenting authority; that by especial orders from General Lee my corps marched into position by a circuitous route, under the direction and conduct of Col. Johnson of his staff of engineers; that Colonel Johnson's orders were to keep the march of the troops concealed, and that I hurried Hood's division forward in the face of these orders, throwing them into line by a direct march, and breaking up the delay occasioned by the orders of Gen. Lee. I need only add that every movement or halt of the troops on that day was made in the immediate presence of General Lee, or in his sight - certainly within reach of his easy and prompt correction I quote in this connection the order that I issued to the heads of departments in my corps on the 1st. I present the order issued to Colonel Walton of the artillery, similar orders having been issued to the division commanders:

(Order.)

Headquarters First Army Corps,
Near Gettysburg, July 18, 5:30 P.M.

Colonel: The Commanding General desires you to come on tonight as fast as you can without distressing your men or animals. Hill and Ewell have sharply engaged the enemy and you will be needed for tomorrow's battle. Let us know where you will stop tonight. ....

Respectfully,

G.M. Sorrell, A.A. General.

To Colonel J.B. Walton, Chief of Artillery."

I offer also a report made by General Hood touching this march. He says:

While lying in camp near Chambersburg information was received that Hill and Ewell were about to come into contact with the enemy near Gettysburg. My troops, together with McLaws' division, were at once put in motion upon the most direct road to that point, which we reached after a hard march at or before sunrise on July the 2d. So imperative had been our orders to hasten forward with all possible speed that on the march my troops were allowed to halt and rest only about two hours during the night from the 1st to the 2d of July.

It appears to me that the gentlemen who made the above mentioned charges against me have chosen the wrong point of attack. With their motives I have nothing to do; but I cannot help suggesting that if they had charged me with having precipitated the battle instead of having delayed it, the records might have sustained them in that my attack was made about four hours before General Ewell's. I am reminded in this connection of what a Federal officer, who was engaged in that battle, said to me when we were talking over the battle and the comments it had provoked. He said: “I cannot imagine how they can charge you with being late in your attack, as you were the only one that got in at all. I do not think their charge can be credited.”

In conclusion I may say that it is unfortunate that the discussion of all mooted points concerning the battle was not opened before the death of General Lee. A word or two from him would have settled all points at issue. As it is, I have written an impartial narrative of the facts as they are, with such comments as the nature of the case seemed to demand.
 
Jubal Early's reply to Longstreet's First
Philadelphia Times Article about
the Gettysburg Campaign

In this article for the Southern Historical Society Papers, Jubal Early replies to Longstreet's first article for the Philadelpha Times. In that article Longstreet layed much of the blame for the failure at Gettysburg on Lee, but Stuart's absence with the cavalry and Ewell's failure to take Culp's Hill on the evening of the July 1st were also criticised. General Early raises detailed objections to each of Longstreet's criticisms.


Southern Historical Society Papers
Vol. IV. Richmond, Virginia, December, 1877. No. 6.
Causes of Lee's Defeat at Gettysburg

Supplement To General Early's Review
Reply To General Longstreet.

(We had intended to have published in this No. of our Papers General Longstreet's letter to the Philadelphia Times. For while we are, of course, under no obligation to copy what is published elsewhere, we are desirous of getting at the whole truth, and wish to give every side a fair hearing. But the great length of General Longstreet's article compels us to postpone it for another issue. Meantime, General Longstreet's paper has been widely circulated, and it is due to fairness and a proper desire to aid the search for truth that we should give, as we do without note or comment of our own, the following rejoinder of General Early.)


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After the foregoing review was in the hands of the printer, an article entitled “The campaign of Gettysburg,” purporting to be by General James Longstreet, appeared in the Philadelphia Weekly Times of November the 3rd, which requires some notice at my hands. That article is not from General Longstreet's own pen, as is very apparent to those who are familiar with his style of writing, and of the fact I have the assurance from a quarter that leaves no doubt on the subject. The data and material for the article, however, were furnished by him and put in form by another. He is therefore responsible for its statements and utterances. The excuse for the appearance of the article is stated as follows:

After giving a letter, written on the 24th of July, 1863, to his uncle, he says:

I sincerely regret that I cannot still rest upon that letter. But I have been so repeatedly and so rancorously assailed by those whose intimacy with the Commanding General in that battle gives an apparent importance to their assaults, that I feel impelled by a sense of duty to give to the public a full and comprehensive narration of the campaign from its beginning to its end; especially when I reflect that the publication of the truth cannot now, as it might have done then, injure the cause for which we fought.

The temper towards General Lee in which the article was written, or rather procured to be written, is shown by the following extract from an editorial notice of some additions to the article received after it was in print, contained in the same number of the Times: The editor says:

The letter from General Longstreet which accompanies these enclosures dwells particularly upon a point which he wishes to have his readers understand, as the justification of his present narrative. It is that while General Lee on the battlefield assumed all the responsibility for the result, he afterwards published a report that differs from the report he made at the time while under that generous spirit. General Longstreet and other officers made their official reports upon the battle shortly after its occurrence, and while they were impressed with General Lee's noble assumption of all the blame; but General Lee having since written a detailed and somewhat critical account of the battle - and the account from which General Longstreet's critics get all their points against him - Longstreet feels himself justified in discussing the battle upon its merits. It is in recognition of his soldiery modesty that the substance of his letter is given here; the article is its own sufficient justification.

This is a direct imputation upon the motives that governed General Lee in writing his detailed report, if it does not impeach his veracity, and place him among General Longstreet's assailants.

General Longstreet ranks me among the assailants whose attacks call for this vindication of himself and criticism of General Lee, and in that connection he says:

It was asserted by General Pendleton, with whom the carefulness of statement or deliberateness of judgment has never been a characteristic, but who has been distinguished by the unreliability of his memory, that General Lee ordered me to attack the enemy at sunrise on the 2nd. General J.A. Early has, in positive terms, endorsed this charge, which I now proceed to disprove.

General Longstreet is exceedingly careless in his statements, as I have had occasion before to demonstrate, and, while to some it may be a matter of surprise when I assert that there is no foundation whatever for the statement that I endorsed either General Pendleton's or anybody else's assertion that the order was given by General Lee to General Longstreet to attack at sunrise on the morning of the 2d of July at Gettysburg, those familiar with the controversy that arose out of a bitter assault by General Longstreet on myself will not be at all astonished. In my official report, dated in the month of August, 1863, after giving an account of the operations of the 1st of July, I say:

Having been informed that the greater portion of the rest of our army would move up during the night, and that the enemy's position would be attacked on the right and left flanks very early next morning, I gave orders to General Hays to move his brigade, under cover of the night, from the town into the field on the left of it, where it would not be exposed to the enemy's fire, and would be in position to advance on Cemetery Hill when a favorable opportunity should occur. This movement was made, and Hays formed his brigade on the right of Avery, and just behind the extension of the low ridge on which a portion of the town is located. The attack did not begin in the morning of next day, as was expected, and in the course of the morning I rode with General Ewell to examine and select a position for artillery.

Here is a statement of a fact while its recollection was fresh in my memory, and it can not surely be said that it was made for the purpose of attacking General Longstreet's war record “because of political differences,” or from any other motive.

On the l9th of January, 1872, the anniversary of General Lee's birth, I delivered an address at Washington and Lee University, by invitation of the faculty, and in that address, after speaking of the fight on the 1st at Gettysburg, I said:

General Lee had ordered the concentration of his army at Cashtown, and the battle on this day, brought on by the advance of the enemy's cavalry, was unexpected to him. When he ascertained the advantage that had been gained, he determined to press it as soon as the remainder of his army arrived. In a conference with General Ewell, General Rodes and myself, when he did reach us, after the enemy had been routed, he expressed his determination to assault the enemy's position at daylight on the next morning, and wished to know whether we could make the attack from our flank - the left - at the designated time. We informed him of the fact that the ground immediately in our front, leading to the enemy's position, furnished much greater obstacles to a successful assault than existed at any other point, and we concurred in suggesting to him that, as our corps (Ewell's) constituted the only troops then immediately confronting the enemy, he would manifestly concentrate and fortify against us during the night, as proved to be the case, according to subsequent information. He then determined to make the attack from our right on the enemy's left, and left us for the purpose of ordering up Longstreet's corps in time to begin the attack at dawn next morning. That corps was not in readiness to make the attack until 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day. By that time Meade's whole army had arrived on the field and taken its position. Had the attack been made at daylight, as contemplated, it must have resulted in a brilliant victory, as all of Meade's army had not then arrived, and a very small portion of it was in position. A considerable portion of his army did not get up until after sunrise, one corps not arriving until 2 o'clock in the afternoon; and a prompt advance to the attack must have resulted in his defeat in detail. The position which Longstreet attacked at four was not occupied by the enemy until late in the afternoon, and Round Top Hill, which commanded the enemy's position, could have been taken in the morning without a struggle. The attack was made by two divisions, and though the usual gallantry was displayed by the troops engaged in it, no material advantage was gained.

This constituted my sole criticism on Longstreet's operations on the 2nd day. In speaking of the assault on the 3rd day, I said:

On the next day, when the assault was made by Pickett's division in such gallant style, there was again a miscarriage in not properly supporting it according to the plan and orders of the Commanding General. You must recollect that a Commanding General cannot do the actual marching and fighting of his army. These must, necessarily, be entrusted to his subordinates, and any hesitation, delay, or miscarriage in the execution of his orders may defeat the best devised schemes. Contending against such odds as we did, it was necessary, always, that there should be the utmost dispatch, energy, and undoubting confidence in carrying out the plans of the Commanding General. A subordinate who undertakes to doubt the wisdom of his superior's plans, and enters upon their execution with reluctance and distrust, will not be likely to ensure success. It was General Jackson's unhesitating confidence and faith in the chances of success that caused it so often to perch on his banners, and made him such an invaluable executor of General Lee's plans. If Mr. Swinton has told the truth, in repeating in his book what is alleged to have been said to him by General Longstreet, there was at least one of General Lee's corps commanders at Gettysburg who did not enter upon the execution of his plans with that confidence and faith necessary to success, and hence, perhaps, it was not achieved.

The foregoing constituted all the criticisms I had made on General Longstreet's operations at Gettysburg, or on any other theatre during the war, previous to the controversy before alluded to. The views in regard to the delay in the attack on the 2nd had been repeated more succinctly in notes to my own report, which was published in the September and October numbers of the Southern Magazine for the year 1872. No where do I assert that General Lee had ordered General Longstreet to make the attack at sunrise, or at any other specific time. I merely state that he had announced to Generals Ewell, Rodes, and myself his purpose to attack at dawn on the morning of the 2nd, and that he had left us for the purpose of ordering up Longstreet's troops to begin the attack at that time. I do not know what were the specific orders given to Longstreet, and in that respect I am as good a witness for him as either of those he has produced, who simply do not know what were the orders given, nor when they were given. These others were manifestly given in person, and no living man can say precisely what they were, except General Longstreet, if he indeed recollects them.

I was prompted to make the remarks I did make in my address at the Washington and Lee University from the fact that I had read Mr. Swinton's “Campaigns of the Army of the Potomac,” and discovered that his criticisms on General Lee's conduct of the battle of Gettysburg, which are amplified in those now made in General Longstreet's name with a great similarity of expression in several respects, was based on information given by the latter to Mr. Swinton after the war. I here give some extracts from Swinton's book:

On page 340 he says:

Indeed, in entering on the campaign, General Lee expressly promised his corps commanders that he would not assume a tactical offensive, but force his antagonist to attack him. Having, however, gotten a taste of blood in the considerable success of the first day, the Confederate commander seems to have lost that equipoise in which his faculties commonly moved, and he determined to give battle.

There is a foot note to this statement as follows:

This and subsequent revelations of the purposes and sentiments of Lee I derive from General Longstreet, who, in a full and free conversation with the writer after the close of the war, threw much light on the motives and conduct of Lee during this campaign.

On pages 340-1, he says:

Longstreet, holding the right of the Confederate line, had one flank securely posted on the Emmetsburg road, so that he was really between the Army of the Potomac and Washington, and by marching towards Frederick would undoubtedly have maneuvered Meade out of the Gettysburg position. This operation General Longstreet, who foreboded the worst from an attack on the army in position, and was anxious to hold General Lee to his promise, begged in vain to be allowed to execute.

To this there is a foot note as follows:

The officer named is my authority for this statement.

On page 358 there is this foot note:

The absence of Pickett's division on the day before made General Longstreet very loth to make the attack; but Lee, thinking the Union force was not all up, would not wait. Longstreet urged in reply that this advantage (or supposed advantage, for the Union force was all up) was countervailed by the fact that he was not all up either, but the Confederate commander was not minded to delay. My authority is again General Longstreet.

These uncontradicted statements by Swinton, the genuineness of which is now verified by similar statements under General Longstreet's direct authority, not only justified me in the remarks I made, but imperatively demanded a defence of General Lee against the severe criticisms based on them, in the address delivered on the occasion referred to, which necessarily involved a review of his military career. When General Longstreet had thus thrown down the gauntlet, he had no right to complain that a friend of General Lee took it up.

After he had begun to muddy the stream at as early a period as twenty days after the battle of Gettysburg, by his letter to his uncle, and when he resumed the work then begun immediately after the war by his communications to Mr. Swinton, his complaint now of being “rancorously assailed by those whose intimacy with the Commanding General in that battle gives an apparent importance to their assaults,” brings to mind very forcibly the fable of the wolf and the lamb.

In February, 1876, he made a bitter assault on myself, among others, in a long article published in a New Orleans paper, the gravimen of his complaint against me being the remarks about Gettysburg contained in my address which I have given.

I replied to him, and I think I demonstrated beyond all question that he was responsible for the loss of the battle of Gettysburg.

I did not in either of my articles in reply to him assert that an order was given him to attack at sunrise on the 2nd. As before stated, I do not know what orders were given him, nor when they were given. I only know the declared purpose of General Lee, and I cannot believe that he did not take every step necessary to carry that purpose into effect, as every consideration required the attack on the morning of the 2nd to be made at the very earliest hour practicable.

The testimony General Longstreet has adduced is very far from establishing the fact that General Lee did not direct the attack to be made by him at a much earlier hour than that at which it was made.

Before referring to that testimony, I desire to say that the statement contained in the article in the Times, that the information of the crossing of the Potomac by the Federal army was received from a scout on the night of the 29th of June is erroneous. General Longstreet's own report, as well as General Lee's detailed one, show that the information was received on the night of the 28th. If it had not been received until the night of the 29th, it would have been impossible for the order to return to reach me at York by the way of Carlisle in time for me to begin my march back early enough on the 30th to reach Gettysburg in time for the fight on the 1st of July. The fact was that I received the order on the morning of the 29th at York, with the information that the enemy had crossed the Potomac and was moving north.

The statements of Colonel Taylor and Marshall, and of General Long, as given by General Longstreet, that they knew nothing of an order to attack at “sunrise,” amount to nothing. They had no personal knowledge of the orders that were given, or of the time when they were given. That is all their testimony amounts to. But General Longstreet omits a very important and significant part of General Long's letter. That letter, a copy of which I have, goes on to say, immediately after the part given by General Longstreet:

As my memory now serves me, it was General Lee's intention to attack the enemy on the second of July as early as practicable; and it is my impression that he issued orders to that effect. I inferred that such was the case from the instructions that General Lee gave me on the evening of the first and very early on the morning of the second of July.

See also General Long's letter to me in the August number of the Southern Historical Society Papers. The letter of Colonel Venable is as follows:

University of Virginia, May 11, 1875.

General James I. Longstreet:

Dear Sir: Your letter of the 25th ultimo, with regard to General Lee's battle order on the 1st and 2nd of July at Gettysburg, was duly received. I did not know of any order for an attack on the enemy at sunrise on the 2nd, nor can I believe any such order was issued by General Lee. About sunrise on the 2nd of July I was sent by General Lee to General Ewell to ask him what he thought of the advantages of an attack on the enemy from his position. (Colonel Marshall had been sent with a similar order on the night of the 1st.) General Ewell made me ride with him from point to point of his lines, so as to see with him the exact position of things. Before he got through the examination of the enemy's position General Lee came himself to General Ewell's lines. In sending the message to General Ewell, General Lee was explicit in saying that the question was whether he should move all the troops around on the right and attack on that side. I do not think that the errand on which I was sent by the Commanding General is consistent with the idea of an attack at sunrise by any portion of the army.

Yours, very truly,

Charles S. Venable.

Can Colonel Venable or any one else believe that General Lee had formed no definite opinion as to how he should attack the enemy until after his return at 9 A.M. on the 2nd from Ewell's line? That, in fact, he did not make up his mind how to begin to begin the attack until 11 A.M., when General Longstreet says the peremptory order was given to him? If that was the case, then he exhibited a remarkable degree of indecision and vacillation, and the responsibility for the procrastination and delay that occurred must rest on him, and on him alone.
 
Jubal Early's reply to Longstreet's First
Philadelphia Times Article about
the Gettysburg Campaign continued:

That Colonel Venable is sincere in his opinions I do not doubt, but I think his reasoning is illogical and his deductions erroneous.

That General Lee made up his mind promptly to attack the enemy in his position on the Gettysburg heights, there can be no doubt.

General Longstreet says:

When I overtook General Lee at 5 o'clock that afternoon, he said, to my surprise, that he thought of attacking General Meade upon the heights the next day. I suggested that this course seemed to be at variance with the plan of the campaign that had been agreed upon before leaving Fredericksburg. He said: 'If the enemy is there tomorrow we must attack him.'

He then goes on to give a long list of the reasons he urged against the attack, and says of General Lee:

He, however, did not seem to abandon the idea of attack on the next day. He seemed under a subdued excitement which occasionally took possession of him when “the hunt was up,” and threatened his superb equipoise. The sharp battle fought by Hill and Ewell on that day had given him a taste of victory ~

Is this Swinton, or Longstreet, or the writer for the Times?

It is very clear to my mind that when General Lee found Longstreet so averse to an attack, he rode over to see Ewell, and then ensued that conference of which I have given an account. I can now fully understand the import of his expressions in regard to Longstreet, and his anxiety for the attack to be made by Ewell's corps.

When he rode back from that conference he found Longstreet for the latter says: “I left General Lee quite late on the night of the first.” And he further says: “When I left General Lee on the night of the first, I believe that he had made up his mind to attack, but was confident that he had not yet determined as to when the attack should be made.”

Now, General Lee had announced to Ewell, Rodes, and myself his purpose to attack at daylight or as soon thereafter as practicable, and asked whether we could not attack with our corps at that time. No man knew better than he the value of time, and the supreme necessity of attacking before Meade's whole army was up, and is it credible that in talking to Longstreet about the attack he did not once intimate that he desired to attack as early as practicable on the morning of the 2nd, before Meade's army should all be up? Swinton says: “The absence of Pickett's division on the day before made General Longstreet very loth to make the attack; but Lee thinking the Union force was not all up, would not wait.” This information he says he got from Longstreet. Is it not very certain, then, that General Lee was determined to make the attack before Meade's army was all up, and discussed with Longstreet the necessity of making the attack before Meade had time to concentrate? Longstreet's continued reluctance to make the attack, manifested no doubt on General Lee's return from Ewell's line, must have caused the sending of Colonel Marshall to Ewell on the night of the first, after the conference I have spoken of. Longstreet says:

On the morning of the 2nd I went to General Lee's headquarters at daylight and renewed my views against making an attack. He seemed resolved, however, and we discussed the results.

General Lee had been firmly resolved for near twelve hours to attack the enemy, and to attack him before all of his troops had been concentrated, and is it to be credited for a moment that he had not then made up his mind when he should attack, nor where, nor how? Is it not palpable that, finding Longstreet so persistently averse to the attack, and so loth to take the steps necessary to begin it, he again sent Colonel Venable to Ewell to see whether, after viewing the position by daylight, he could not make the attack from his flank. Let us see what General Hood says in his letter to Longstreet. He says:

I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of July. My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, where the troops were allowed to stack arms and rest until further orders. A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of that same morning, we were both engaged, in company with Generals Lee and A.P. Hill, in observing the position of the Federals. General Lee - with coat buttoned to the throat, sabre hilt buckled around the waist, and field glasses pending at his side - walked up and down in the shade of large trees near us, halting now and then to observe the enemy. He seemed full of hope, yet at times buried in deep thought.

Colonel Freemantle, of England, was ensconced in the forks of a tree not far off, with glass in constant use, examining the lofty position of the Federal army.

General Lee was seemingly anxious that you should attack that morning. He remarked to me: 'The enemy is here, and if we don't whip him he will whip us.' You thought it best to await the arrival of Pickett's division - at that time still in the rear - in order to make the attack; and you said to me subsequently, whilst we were seated together near the trunk of a tree: 'The General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off.'

Thus passed the forenoon of that eventful day when in the afternoon, about 3 o'clock, it was decided to no longer await Pickett's division, but to proceed to our extreme right and attack up the Emmettsburg road.

Can there longer be any question that General Lee wanted Longstreet to begin the attack very early in the morning - as early as possible, and that the latter threw every obstacle in the way? Doubtless, after sending Colonel Venable to Ewell, General Lee's impatience at Longstreet's opposition to the attack and the delay in the movement of his troops caused him to ride over to Ewell's line to see for himself if it was not practicable to make the attack from that flank. Upon being satisfied that it could not be made to advantage there he rode back and gave the peremptory order - which, Longstreet says, was given at 11 A.M., though he did not begin the attack until about 4 P.M. If, as Colonel Venable supposes, General Lee had been undecided or vacillating as to how, when, and by whom the attack should be made, from 5 P.M. the day before until 11 A.M. of the 2d, when Longstreet acknowledges the receipt of the order, then Longstreet's opinion that “there is no doubt that General Lee during the crisis of that campaign lost the matchless equipoise that usually characterized him, and that whatever mistakes were made were not so much matters of deliberate judgment as the impulses of a great mind disturbed by unparalleled conditions” - that is, in plain English, that General Lee had lost his senses - has some foundation to rest on.

All who know General Lee's mode of giving directions to his subordinates, can well understand how he indicated his purposes and wishes, without resorting to a technical order, and doubtless he indicated to General Longstreet in that way his desire for him to make the attack, and make it at the earliest practicable moment, and did not resort to the peremptory order until the time indicated by General Longstreet. To rely on that is standing upon a mere technicality. But when the order was given at 11 A.M., as acknowledged, why was it that it required until 4 P.M. to begin? The pretense that he made the attack with great promptness, because he attacked before any one else on that day, is simply ridiculous. Every one else was waiting for him to begin, as the orders required them to do. General Ewell, in his report, in speaking of a contemplated movement by Johnson on our extreme left, says:

Day was now breaking, and it was too late for any change of plans. Meantime orders had come from the General Commanding for me to delay my attack until I heard General Longstreet's guns open on the right.

He is here speaking of the morning of the 2d; and would Colonel Venable have us believe that General Lee had not then made up his mind that Longstreet should open the attack, or communicated his intention to the latter?

There is one thing very certain, and that is that either General Lee or General Longstreet was responsible for the remarkable delay that took place in making the attack. I choose to believe that it was not General Lee, for if any one knew the value of promptness and celerity in military movements he did. It is equally certain that the delay which occurred in making the attack lost us the victory.

It was very natural that Longstreet's corps should be selected to assume the initiative on the 2nd day at Gettysburg. Neither of his divisions had been at the recent battles at Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg, except McLaws', and that division, with the exception of Barksdale's brigade, had not been as heavily engaged there as the other troops. Ewell's corps had captured Winchester and cleared the valley on its advance into Pennsylvania, and two of its divisions, as well as two of Hill's, had been heavily engaged on the first.

Can it be that General Longstreet apprehended that if the advantage gained on the first day was promptly and vigorously prosecuted the chief glory of the battle would devolve on the two corps which had first encountered the enemy and brought him to bay, and hence desired to change the theatre of the battle that was inevitable?

A careful study of the testimony of Meade and his officers, contained in the 1st volume, 2nd series, of the Congressional Report on the Conduct of the War, will satisfy any one that the bulk of the Federal army that was up was massed on the right, confronting Ewell's corps, all the forenoon of the 2nd, and that the Round Tops, the key to the position on the enemy's left were unoccupied until Longstreet's movement began at 4 P.M. The distance which Longstreet's corps had to march from its camp of the night of the 30th, to reach the town of Gettysburg itself, could not have exceeded 15 miles, and it had the whole day of the 1st to make it, though it was somewhat delayed by Johnson's division of Ewell's corps, which got the road first, by moving more promptly it is presumed. The Fifth corps of Meade's army was 23 miles from Gettysburg at the close of the fight on the first day, and the Sixth corps was 36 miles away, yet the former reached the field on the morning of the 2nd, and the latter at 2 P.M.

To show that a great opportunity to inflict a crushing defeat on Meade's army was lost by the failure to make the attack in the morning, I here reproduce what I said on that point in the discussion with General Longstreet which has been mentioned, as follows.

That General Lee was correct in selecting the enemy's left for his attack, there can be no question, for that was the weakest and most assailable part of the enemy's line. That the possession of Round Top by us would have rendered the position at Gettysburg untenable by the enemy, is proved by the testimony of Meade himself, contained in the same volume of Reports on the Conduct of the War from which l have already quoted, and to which I will refer hereafter by page alone, to prevent unnecessary repetition. On page 332, in describing the attack on Sickles, Meade says: 'At the same time that they threw immense masses on Sickles' corps, a heavy column was thrown upon the Round Top Mountain, which was the key point of my whole position. If they had succeeded in occupying that, it would have prevented me from holding any of the ground which I subsequently held to the last.' That Sickles did not occupy the position assaulted by General Longstreet until late in the afternoon, is proved by the testimony of Hancock and others. On page 406, Hancock says: 'Every thing remained quiet, except artillery firing and engagements with pickets on our front, until about four o'clock that afternoon, when General Sickles moved out to the front.' After stating that he had made a reconnaissance to ascertain whether an attack could be made on our left, Warren on page 377, says: 'Soon afterwards I rode out with General Meade to examine the left of our line, where General Sickles was. His troops could hardly be said to be in position.' On page 332, Meade says he arrived on the ground where Sickles was, 'a few minutes before 4 o'clock in the afternoon.' That Round Top was unoccupied until after Longstreet's attack began, is proved by the testimony of Warren, who says, on page 377: 'I then went, by General Meade's direction, to what is called Bald Top, and from that point I could see the enemy's lines of battle. I sent word to General Meade that we would at once have to occupy that place very strongly. He sent as quickly as possible a division of General Sykes' corps; but before they arrived the enemy's line of battle - I should think a mile and a half long - began to advance, and the battle became very heavy at once. The troops under General Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top Hill, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it.' During all the forenoon the bulk of Meade's troops which had arrived were massed on the right (enemy's), as Meade contemplated an attack from that flank - Hancock's corps connected with Howard's, and Sickles was on the left of Hancock, but he did not go into position until the afternoon. On page 405, Hancock says: 'I was placed on the line connecting Cemetery Hill with Little Round Top Mountain, my line, however, not extending to Round Top, probably only about half way. General Sickles was directed to connect with my left and the Round Top Mountain, thus forming a continuous line from Cemetery Hill (which was held by General Howard) to Round Top Mountain.'

These arrangements were not made until the morning was considerably advanced.

On page 331, Meade after stating his purpose to make an attack from his right says:

Major General Slocum, however, reported that the character of the ground in front was unfavorable to making an attack; and the Sixth corps having so long a distance to march, and leaving at nine o'clock at night, did not reach the scene until about two o'clock in the afternoon. Under these circumstances I abandoned my intention to make an attack from my right, and as soon as the Sixth corps arrived, I directed the Fifth Corps then in reserve on the right, to move over and be in reserve on the left.

It was a division of the Fifth corps (General Sykes') that rescued the Round Top from the grasp of our assaulting column. Does not this show how weak the left was in the morning, and how easy it would have then been for our troops on the right to have gotten possession of the key to the position? That General Lee's plans were thwarted by the delay on the right, can any man doubt? On the occasion of the dedication of the Cemetery for the Federal soldiers killed at Gettysburg, Edward Everett, in the presence of President Lincoln, some of his cabinet, many members of Congress and officers of the army, and an immense concourse of citizens, delivered an address, in which he thus graphically describes the effect of the delay that took place:

And here I cannot but remark on the Providential inaction of the rebel army. Had the conflict been renewed by it at daylight on the 2nd of July, with the First and Eleventh corps exhausted by battle, the Third and Twelfth weary from their forced march, and the Second, Fifth, and Sixth not yet arrived, nothing but a miracle could have saved the army from a great disaster. Instead of this the day dawned, the sun rose, the cool hours of the morning passed, and a considerable part of the afternoon wore away without the slightest aggressive movement on the part of the enemy. Thus time was given for half of oar forces to arrive and take their places in the lines, while the rest of the army enjoyed a much needed half day's repose.

It is to be presumed that before preparing an address that was to assume a historical character, Mr. Everett had obtained accurate knowledge of all that transpired within the Federal lines from the most authentic sources, and doubtless he presents a true picture of the actual condition of things.

If General Lee was responsible for the delay the effects of which were so graphically described by Mr. Everett, if, in fact, his mind was undecided and vacillating as to when, where, and how he should begin, then his conduct on that occasion was at war with his whole character and history. Who can believe it? I repeat here a remark I have made on another occasion when vindicating General Lee against a charge of want of decision and boldness in action: “There is another reason, which to me is a most potent one; and that is, because I know that the boldest man in his strategic movements and his tactics on the field of battle, in all the Army of Northern Virginia, Stonewall Jackson not excepted, was General Robert E. Lee.” I cannot believe, therefore, that he omitted to do anything necessary to carry out his avowed purpose of attacking the enemy at a very early hour on the morning of the 2nd, which every consideration so imperatively demanded, except to supersede General Longstreet with another commander of the First corps; and then the question arises: Where could one of sufficient rank have been found?

General Longstreet, or his annalist, has copied from the “Military Annals of Louisiana,” a book I never heard of before, an absurd story about General Hays' having sent for me at the close of the fight on the 1st and urged an immediate advance on the heights, in which it is said that, though I agreed with Hays, I refused to allow him to seize those heights, because orders had been received from General Lee through Ewell to advance no further than Gettysburg, if we succeeded in capturing that place. As I have shown in my “Review,” I received no orders whatever on that day from either General Ewell or General Lee until after the whole fighting was over, except the simple order on the march to move towards Gettysburg, the previous orders being to concentrate at Cashtown. General Longstreet says, in this connection: “General Hays told me ten years after the battle that he could have seized the heights without the loss of ten men.” How mistaken General Hays was in making such a remark will abundantly appear from the facts I have already given in my “Review,” and the statement of Bates in regard to the precautions taken by Steinwehr, whose division, of 4,000 men, occupied the heights immediately confronting Hays, whose brigade was considerably less than 1,400 strong at the close of the fight.

General Longstreet further says, after giving his evidence to prove that no order was given for an attack at sunrise:

Having thus disproved the assertions of Messrs. Pendleton and Early in regard to this rumored order for a sunrise attack, it appears that they are worthy of no further recognition; but it is difficult to pass beyond without noting the manner in which, by their ignorance, they marred the plans of their chief on the field of battle.

After referring to the removal of some seven pieces of artillery from one part of the field to another, as the manner in which General Pendleton, by his “ignorance,” “marred the plans” of General Lee, General Longstreet is made to say: “General Early broke up General Lee's line of battle on the 2d of July, by detaching part of his division on some uncalled for service, in violation of General Lee's orders, and thus prevented the cooperative attack of Ewell ordered by General Lee.”

This statement must have been compiled by General Longstreet's annalist from the copy of his assault on me which was furnished, for General Longstreet himself would hardly have reiterated it after I had so effectually exploded it in our controversy. My official report, as well as the very full statement contained in my “Review,” show that two of my brigades were placed, on the afternoon of the 1st, before General Lee came to oar part of the line, on the York road, to guard against a flank movement apprehended in that direction. They never were in the line on the 2nd at all, but Gordon's brigade was sent for on the 2nd, Stuart's cavalry having arrived, and got back just as Hays' and Hoke's brigades were moving to the assault of Cemetery Hill. The repetition of this statement is simply ridiculous, and shows how hard General Longstreet and his apologists are pressed. General Longstreet has not disproved the assertion made by General Pendleton that an order was given for the attack at sunrise. That assertion made by General Pendleton, and not by myself, was contained in an address delivered by him one year after mine had been delivered. General Longstreet has merely shown that four of General Lee's staff officers knew of no such order, but neither did they know what order was given, nor when any order was given for the attack. He omits to give a very significant part of General Long's letter, which tends to show that some order must have been given for an attack early on the morning of the 2nd. The question, therefore, rests on an issue of veracity between General Longstreet and General Pendleton. The latter was General Lee's chief of artillery, who had very important duties to perform in regard to posting the artillery for the impending battle, and it was very natural that General Lee should communicate to him the time when the battle was to open, and what orders had been given in regard thereto. It was not necessary to communicate the same facts to the staff officers, whose statements are given. General Pendleton professes to have obtained the information as to the order from General Lee himself, and I am disposed to side with him on the question of veracity, just as I am disposed to side with Colonel Taylor on the direct issue of veracity raised by General Longstreet with him in regard to the order for the use of Hood's and McLaws' divisions in the attack made on the 3d.

General Lee's statement of his orders in regard to this latter attack would imply that the orders originally given in regard to it were to make it with Longstreet's whole corps, and is therefore corroborative of Colonel Taylor's statement.

It is to be observed here that General Longstreet has heretofore denied the authenticity of General Lee's detailed report, first published in the Historical Magazine, New York, then in the Southern Magazine, Baltimore, and lastly among the Southern Historical Society Papers from another copy, which confirms the genuineness of the first. This article now given under the sanction of his name quotes partly from the preliminary report given in the Appendix to Bates' History of the Battle of Gettysburg and partly from the detailed report; but it appears that he thinks the latter was written in a different spirit from that in which the preliminary report was written, and being a “somewhat critical account of that battle,” from it his “critics get all their points against him.” In speaking of “Ewell's inaction,” he says:

Having failed to move at 4 o'clock, while the enemy was in his front, it was still more surprising that he did not advance at 5 o'clock with vigor and promptness, when the trenches in front of him were vacated, or rather held by one single brigade, as General Meade's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War states."

By this statement General Longstreet or his vicarious chronicler has endeavored to show that while the fighting was progressing on the enemy's left, our right, Ewell's corps, was confronted by only one brigade. This attempt to pervert Meade's testimony shows how little credit any of the statements or arguments contained in the article are entitled to.

Here is what Meade says in his testimony, page 333:

During these operations upon the left flank, a division and two brigades of the Twelfth corps, which held the right flank, were ordered over for the purpose reinforcing the left. Only one brigade, however, arrived in time to take any part in the action, the enemy having been repulsed before the rest of the force came up. The absence of this large proportion of the Twelfth corps caused my extreme right flank to be held by one single brigade of the Twelfth corps, commanded by General Greene. The enemy, perceiving this, made a vigorous attack upon General Greene, but were held at bay by him for some time. until he was reinforced by portions of the First and Eleventh corps, which were adjacent to him, when he succeeded in repulsing them.

In his official report, Bates' Battle of Gettysburg, page 240, Meade says:

An assault was, however, made about eight P.M. on the Eleventh corps, from the left of the town, which was repelled by the assistance of troops from the Second and First corps. During the heavy assault upon our extreme left, portions of the Twelfth corps were sent as reinforcements. During their absence the line on the extreme right was held by a very much reduced force. This was taken advantage of by the enemy, who, during the absence of Gracy's division of the Twelfth corps, advanced and occupied part of the line. 1

It was then on the extreme right from which troops were taken, so as to leave Only one brigade there. This was at Culp's Hill and on the right of it (the enemy's), where the sides of the hill were wooded and exceedingly rugged. This part of the line confronted Johnson's division, while Cemetery Hill itself was held by the First and Eleventh corps, which Butterfield shows in his testimony numbered more than 10,000 men on the 4th of July, after all the fighting on the 2nd and 3rd. In addition, the Second corps, Hancock's, was on the left of the Eleventh corps, connecting with it. That corps had three divisions, only one of which was sent to the enemy's left daring Longstreet's attack. The attack mentioned by Meade as having been made on the Eleventh corps, when troops from the Second and First corps came to its assistance, was the attack made by my two brigades described in my “Review.”

That attack began sooner than Meade states. It began about sunset (see Bates), and my brigades were compelled to retire probably about or a little after 8 P.M. It will be seen that there is a very gross perversion, in the article of Meade's testimony. Instead of there being only one brigade to hold the trenches in front of Ewell, there was a force fully equal to the entire strength of Ewell's corps at that time, with two divisions of Hancock's corps in easy supporting distance. This attempt of General Longstreet or his apologist to misrepresent the facts for the purpose of casting censure on General Ewell, is wholly unjustified by any criticisms of the latter on him, and demonstrates how utterly unreliable the whole article is for historical purposes. 2

The statement by General Alexander, who was only a colonel of artillery at Gettysburg. that the responsibility of ordering Pickett when to begin the charge on the third day was devolved on him, with permission even to abstain from giving the order or “advise,” as it is called, while General Longstreet himself shrank from the responsibility properly attached to him, has excited profound astonishment. That statement is now confirmed by General Longstreet's own version of the matter, and it becomes abundantly apparent that the orders and plans of General Lee did not receive from him that hearty support which was absolutely necessary to success.

I desire to say in conclusion, that I do not wish to be understood as in any manner reflecting upon the conduct of that superb body of men who constituted the First corps of the Army of Northern Virginia. Their part on this occasion, so far as devolved on them, was performed in a manner becoming soldiers battling for the righteous cause in which they were enlisted.

I must add that I have never at any time entertained the feeling that would exalt the soldiers from one state at the expense of those from another. It was my fortune to command at some time or other during the war soldiers from every Confederate state, including Kentucky and Missouri, except the state of Texas, and I also commanded the Maryland troops. I could cite instances in which the troops who fought under me from each of those states, respectively, performed the most brilliant and daring feats. As the soldiers from North Carolina, especially, have taken exception to the remarks and statements of others, I will take occasion to say, that every infantry organization from that state belonging to the Army of Northern Virginia, prior to my departure from it on my Valley campaign, had at some time been under my command, and there was but a very brief interval when I did not have North Carolina soldiers under me. I can say in all sincerity, that there were no better troops from any state in all that grand army than the North Carolina soldiers, and of all that bright galaxy of heroes who yielded their lives for their country's cause while serving with that army, the names of Anderson, Branch, Pender, Daniel, Ramseur, and Gordon of the cavalry, will stand among the foremost.

There was enough glory won by the Army of Northern Virginia for each state to have its full share and be content with it, and there is no occasion to wrangle over the distribution of the honors.

J.A. Early


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1 - It will be seen by this statement of General Meade's, the witness adduced by General Longstreet to show that all the troops from Ewell's front except one brigade had been allowed, by “Ewell's inaction,” to be thrown against him, that only one brigade from that point arrived in time to take part in the action on the enemy's left, Meade adding: “The enemy having been repulsed before the rest of the force came up.” [back]

2 - The following is another instance of a perversion of the testimony by General Longstreet or his compiler. In referring to Colonel Taylor's account of the delay in the attack from our right on the 2d, the article proceeds:

He (Colonel Taylor) says: General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected; (it appears that he was delayed by apprehensions that his troops would be taken in reverse as they advanced). General Ewell, who had orders to cooperate with General Longstreet, and who was, of course, not aware of any impediment to the main attack, having reinforced General Johnson during the night of the 2d, ordered him forward early the next morning. In obedience to these instructions, General Johnson became hotly engaged before General Ewell could be informed of the halt that had been called on.

Let us look at the facts of this. Instead of 'making this attack at daylight,' General Ewell says: 'Just before the time fixed for General Johnson's advance the enemy attacked him to regain the works captured by Stuart the evening before.

This is all that is given of Ewell's statement, and then follows an extract from Meade's testimony, The part of Colonel Taylor's statement, put in brackets above, was omitted in the article. Here is Ewell's whole statement as contained in his report:

I was ordered to renew my attack at daylight Friday morning, and as Johnson's position was the only one affording hopes of doing this to advantage, he was reinforced by Smith's brigade of Early's division, and Daniel's and Rodes' (old) brigades of Rodes' division.

Half an hour after Johnson attacked (on Friday morning), and when too late to recall him, I received notice that General Longstreet would not attack until 10 o'clock, but, as it turned out, his attack was delayed till after 2 o'clock. Just before the time fixed for Johnson's advance the enemy attacked him to regain the works captured by Stuart the evening before. They were repulsed with very heavy loss, and he attacked in turn, pushing the enemy almost to the top of the mountain, when the precipitous nature of the hill and an abattis of logs and stones, with a very heavy work on the crest of the hill, stopped his further advance. In Johnson's attack the enemy abandoned a portion of their works in disorder, and as they ran across an open space to another work. were exposed to the fire of Daniel's brigade at sixty or seventy yards. Our men were at this time under no fire of consequence, their aim was accurate, and General Daniel thinks that he killed there, in half an hour, more than in all the rest of the fighting.

Repeated reports from the cavalry on our left that the enemy was moving heavy columns of infantry to turn General Johnson's left, at last caused him. about 1 P.M. to evacuate the works already gained. These reports reached me, also, and I sent Captain Brown, of my staff, with a party of cavalry to the left, to investigate them, who found them to be without foundation; and General Johnson finally took up a position about three hundred yards in rear of the works he had abandoned, which he held under a sharp fire of artillery and exposed to the enemy's sharpshooters until dark.

Meade's testimony is not at all inconsistent with this statement of facts; but by wresting our short statement of Ewell's from the context and adding Meade's, the false impression is sought to be made that Johnson did not attack at all. General Longstreet complains of “Ewell's inaction” on the 2d. What must be thought of his inaction from daylight to 2 P.M on the 3rd?
 
James Longstreet's 2nd Article
about the Gettysburg Campaign for
the Philadelphia Times

Longstreet attempted to address the criticisms of his first article for the Philadelphia Times about the Gettysburg made by certain “ill natured and splenetic attacks provoked by that paper from certain wordy soldiers” (Jubal Early and others) through this second article which also appeared in the Times. It was subsequently reprinted in the Southern Historical Society Papers.


Southern Historical Society Papers
Vol. V. Richmond, Virginia, June, 1878 No. 6.
Leading Confederates On The Battle Of Gettysburg.

General Longstreet's Second Paper On Gettysburg.

(We again depart from our general rule against copying articles which are published in other periodicals, in order that we may give General Longstreet the fullest opportunity of putting on record his views concerning Gettysburg. We published for the first time his official report; we have published a number of the reports of gallant officers belonging to his corps; and we have published letters from his division commander, General Hood, and his artillery commanders, General H.P. Alexander and Colonel J.B. Walton, besides his own narrative in the Philadelphia Times. We now copy from the Times his second paper).


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I am induced to prepare an article on the campaign of Gettysburg, supplementary to the one that appeared in the columns of your paper some weeks ago, that I may correct some slight errors of print or transcription that occurred in that paper; that I may make some additional statements, forbidden in my first paper by reason of its length; that I may correct an apparent injustice to a very worthy officer; and, last and least, to make some allusion to the ill natured and splenetic attacks provoked by that paper from certain wordy soldiers. I prepared my first paper with genuine reluctance. It was brought into existence by the request of the editor of the Times and the petition of the Comte de Paris, in which he publicly announced his inability to settle definitely certain points of that campaign, and urged the surviving Confederate officers to give the theory and the detail of the invasion from their point of view. It was justified, in my own mind, by the redaction that I was, perhaps, the only person living who could explain the motif of that campaign and the true reasons of its failure. It was made necessary by the fact that our amateur historians, through misapprehension or malice, had nearly all gone wrong, and utterly misconstrued the plan and purpose of that invasion, misused and misstated its facts, and dislocated its responsibilities. The Comte de Paris and the general historian, had they relied upon these statements, instead of finding the true solution of this, the great problem of the war, would have had it involved in more profound obscurity.

In my first article I declared that the invasion of Pennsylvania was a movement that General Lee and his council agreed should be defensive in tactics, while, of course, it was offensive in strategy; that the campaign was conducted on this plan until we had left Chambersburg, when, owing to the absence of our cavalry, and our consequent ignorance of the enemy's whereabouts, we collided with them unexpectedly, and that General Lee had lost the matchless equipoise that usually characterized him, and through excitement and the doubt that enveloped the enemy's movements, changed the whole plan of the campaign, and delivered a battle under ominous circumstances. I declared that the battle of the 2d was not lost through the tardiness of the First corps, but through the failure of the troops ordered to cooperate to do so; that there was no order ever issued for a sunrise attack; that no such order could have been issued, and that the First corps could not possibly have attacked at that time; that when it did attack its movement was weakened by the derangement of the directing brigade of support under General Wilcox, and was rendered hopeless by the failure of Ewell's corps to co operate, its line of battle having been broken through the advice of General Early, and that in this attack Hood's and McLaws' divisions did the best fighting ever done on any field, and encountered and drove back virtually the whole of the Army of the Potomac. I held that the mistakes of the Gettysburg campaign were:

First, the change of the original plan of the campaign, which was to so maneuver as to force the Federals to attack us; second, that if the plan was to have been changed at all it should have been done at Brandy Station, near Culpeper Courthouse, when we could have caught Hooker in detail and probably have crushed his army; third, that Stuart should never have been permitted to leave the main route of march, and thus send our army into the enemy's country without cavalry for reconnoissance or foraging purposes; fourth, that the crushing defeat inflicted on the advance of the Federal army in the casual encounter of the 1st at Willoughby's Run, should have been pushed to extremities, that occasion furnishing one of the few opportunities ever furnished for “pursuit pell-mell”; fifth, the army should have been carried around to Meade's right and rear on the night of the 1st, and placed between him and his capital, and thus forced him to attack us, as he certainly intended doing; sixth, when I attacked the enemy's left, on the 2d, Ewell should have moved at once against his right and Hill should have threatened his centre, and thus prevented a concentration of the whole Federal army at the point I was assaulting; seventh, on the morning of the 3d we should still have moved to the right, and manoeuvred the Federals into attacking us; eighth, the assault by Pickett, on the 3d, should never have been made, as it could not have succeeded by any possible prodigy of courage or tactics, being absolutely a hopeless assault. These points I supported with the most particular proof. Not a single one of them has been controverted. The truth of a single fact, or the correctness of a single opinion laid down in that article, has not been disproved. Very few of them have been questioned - none of them overthrown. I have been subjected to a loud and incoherent assault, led by certain gentlemen whose steady purpose of misrepresenting my record has become notorious, and seconded by a few others who follow through ignorance or innocence. Without proceeding directly against the essential parts of my narrative, they raise a clamor of objection and denial. One of the chief elements of this tom-tom warfare is found in the fact that, owing to wounds received in the honorable service of my country, which have virtually paralyzed my right arm and made it impossible for me to write, save under pain and constraint, I have been compelled in the preparation of my articles to accept the service of a professional writer, generously tendered me by the editor of the Times. Upon such trifling casuals as this do my enemies purpose to build their histories and amend mine. The attempt is at once pitiful and disgraceful.

The first point that demands attention is the number of forces on each side engaged in the Gettysburg campaign. In my first article I claimed that we had 52,000 infantry and the Federals 95,000 men; stating, further, that those were the highest figures of our forces and the lowest of theirs. General B.B. Dawes, in commenting on this estimate, disagrees with it quite widely. The main point that he makes is to quote from Swinton's “Army of the Potomac” the following paragraph (page 310): “The number of infantry present for duty in Lee's army on the 31st of May, 1863, was precisely 68,352. I learn from General Longstreet that when the three corps were concentrated at Chambersburg, the morning report showed 67,000 bayonets, or above 70,000 of all arms.” This statement is certainly explicit, but there are discrepancies on the face of it that should have warned a cautious and capable writer not to accept it: First, any one at all familiar with the history of the campaign, or even the leading points of it, must have known that the three corps of the army were never “concentrated at Chambersburg” at all; second, it is well known that any organization upon 67,000 bayonets would have involved an infantry force alone of “over 70,000,” and thus have left no margin in the estimate that Mr. Swinton ascribes to me for the other arms of the service.

If General Dawes had followed Swinton's narrative closely he must have discovered that (page 365) he says: “General Lee's aggregate force present for duty on the 31st of May, 1863, was 68,352.” These are the precise figures that he gives on page 310 as the aggregate of the infantry alone. My information upon this subject was taken from General Lee's own lips. He estimated his force to be, including the detachments that would join him on the march, a trifle over 70,000. On the 30th of June, or the 1st of July, he estimated his infantry at 52,000 bayonets. If Mr. Swinton received any information from me upon the subject he received this, for it was all that I had. Since I have read the report of the Adjutant General of the Army of Northern Virginia, lately published, I am inclined to believe that General Lee included in his estimate two brigades of Pickett's division (Jenkins' and Corse's) which were left in Virginia, or some other detachments made during the march. If this surmise is correct, it would make the total figures considerably less than I gave them. I am certain the real strength of his army cannot go above the number given in my first article. As to the strength of General Meade's army, I take his own statement for that. In his evidence taken before the Committee on the Conduct of the War (page 337 of their report) he says: “My strength was a little under 100,000 - probably 95,000 men.” I used in my narrative the lowest figures that he gave. In printing the article it is made to appear that Meade had 95,000 infantry. It should have been 95,000 men. This much as to the comparative strength of the two armies. It is the truth, and will stand as history that Meade's army was nearly double that of Lee.

In my first article I claimed that my troops fought an extraordinary battle on the 2d. I asserted that my 13,000 men virtually charged against the whole Federal army, encountered nearly 65,000 of the enemy, and broke line after line of fresh troops, until at length, after three hours of the best fighting ever done, they found themselves in a single line of battle charging 50,000 Federals intrenched, massed on Cemetery Ridge. Then, when one third of their number lay in their bloody track, dead or wounded, and they were exposed in front and flank to an overwhelming fire, and their supporting brigades had gone astray, and there was no sign of positive or strategic cooperation from their comrades, I ordered them to withdraw to the peach orchard that they had wrested from the Third corps early in the engagement. This claim has been severely criticised. It can be established by the testimony of every honest and well informed man who was in that battle. But I relied for my proof upon the official report of General Meade himself. He made this report, it will be remembered, thinking that the whole or greater part of Lee's army had charged his position in the afternoon of the 2d. He says:

The Third corps received the shock most heroically. Troops from the Second were sent by Major General Hancock to cover the right flank of the Third corps, and soon after the assault commenced. ... The Fifth corps most fortunately arrived and took position on the left of the Third, Major General Sykes commanding, immediately sending a force to occupy Round Top Ridge, where a most furious contest was maintained, the enemy making desperate but unsuccessful attempts to secure it. Notwithstanding the stubborn resistance of the Third corps, under Major General Birney (Major General Sickles having been wounded early in the action), superiority of number of corps of the enemy enabling him to outflank its advanced position, General Birney was compelled to fall back and reform behind the line originally desired to be held. In the meantime, perceiving the great exertions of the enemy, the Sixth corps (Major General Sedgwick) and part of the First corps, to which I had assigned Major General Newton, particularly Lockwood's Maryland brigade, together with detachments from the Second corps were brought up at different periods, and succeeded, together with the gallant resistance of the Fifth corps, in checking and finally repulsing the assault of the enemy. ... During the heavy assault upon our extreme left, portions of the Twelfth corps were sent as reinforcements.

To make this specific and positive proof still more conclusive, I may add the testimony of General Meade, given before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, in which he says (speaking of this battle of the 2d): “My extreme right flank was then held by a single brigade of the Twelfth corps, commanded by General Green.” Then the troops opposing my 13,000 men (two divisions of my corps) were as follows: Third corps, 11,898; Fifth corps, 10,136; Sixth corps, 15,408; Pennsylvania reserves, 4,500; Lockwood's Maryland brigade, 2,500; total, 44,442. The above figures are taken from the Congressional Report, page 428. To these figures must be added the detachments from the other corps enumerated by General Meade. As he is not minute in his statements, I have no accurate data by which I can tell precisely what these “detachments” were. As General Meade states, however, that he left but a single brigade to guard his extreme right, and as he had no use for troops elsewhere, it is reasonable to suppose that the other corps may have sent as many as 20,000 men, other than those enumerated above. Indeed, this estimate is quite low in all probability; because General Meade believed, and his counselors all believed, as is shown by their concurrent testimony, that the assault made by my handful of heroes was really the onset of the whole of Lee's army. It is fair to presume then, that, under this belief, he massed everything that he could get his hands on in front of the direct attack. He says as much as this when he says he left “only a single brigade” on his right. My former estimate, therefore, “that my 13,000 men met 65,000 men during the three hours' fighting that afternoon,” will not be abandoned until the report of General Meade and the figures of the Congressional Report shall have been overthrown; conceding, of course, to the technical demand of historical statement that the “detachments” of other corps sent forward may not have been exactly 20,000 men.

It has never been claimed that we met this immense force of 65,000 men at one time; nor has it been claimed that each and every one of them burnt powder in our faces. But they were drawn off from other parts of the field to meet us, and were hurried to our front and massed there, meaning to do all the mischief they could. If some of them did not shoot us, or stick us with their bayonets, it was simply because they could not shoot through the solid blocks of their own troops or reach us with their bayonets over the heads of their comrades. But they were in position and eager for battle - ready to rush down upon us the moment the line next in front of them was broken. The morale of their presence in reinforcing the position and threatening our flanks as we pressed on, was about as effective as their actual bloody work could have been. As to the accounts of the Cincinnati Gazette and the New York World, they were not given as documents of historical record, but simply as confirmatory of General Meade's statements, which are, of course, historical. It was not too much to assume that the representatives of these papers would know what Federal corps were actively engaged in the battle of the 2d. They both confirmed the account given by General Meade in the belief that the whole of the Confederate army was engaged in the assault, and in the statement that very nearly the whole of the Federal army was engaged in repelling it. After a review, therefore, of the whole situation, and a careful reading of everything that has been published since the appearance of my first article, I am confirmed in the opinion then expressed that my troops did, on that afternoon, “the best three hours' fighting ever done by any troops on any field.”

In my general narrative I did not give a detailed criticism or account of the tactical movements of the 2d for two reasons: First, my newspaper friends admonished me that my article had grown quite long, and that it was already clear enough to satisfy the most skeptical mind; second, I thought that my allusions to time, cause, and effect, would arrest the attention of those who had misconceived and therefore misrepresented them, and that they would hasten to make proper explanation and corrections. I find their minds, however, so filled with prejudice and preconceived opinions, that it seems imperative I should explain the relations of our tactical moves on the 2d, and force a confession from even their reluctant mouths. Having demonstrated beyond cavil in my first article that General Lee never ordered a sunrise attack, that he never expected one, and that it was physically impossible to have made one, I shall now show that even if one had been made it could not have bettered the result that was achieved by the afternoon attack. It will be proved that the battle made by my men could not have been so improved, in plan or execution, as to have won the day. The only amendment that would have ensued, or even promised victory, was for Ewell to have marched in upon the enemy's right when it was guarded by a single brigade, run over their works, and fall upon their rear while I engaged them in front, and while Hill lay in a threatening position in their centre. Had this cooperative movement been made, the battle would, in all probability, have been ours. As it was, no disposition of the men under my charge, no change in the time or method or spirit of the assault, could have changed the result for the better.

Let us briefly review the situation on the morning of the 2d. During the night of the 1st General Sickles rested with the Third corps upon the ground lying between General Hancock's left and Round Top, General Geary's division of the Twelfth corps occupying part of the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupy Round Top if it were practicable; and in reply to his question as to what sort of position it was, General Sickles had answered, “There is no position there.” At the first signs of activity in our ranks on the 2d General Sickles became apprehensive that we were about to attack him, and so reported to General Meade. As our move progressed his apprehensions were confirmed, and being uneasy at the position in which his troops had been left, and certain that he was about to receive battle, he determined to seize the vantage ground in front of the peach orchard. Without awaiting for orders, he pushed forward and took the position desired. Meanwhile the reports made to General Meade drew his attention to our part of the field, and finally he rode out just in time to see the battle open. It will be seen, therefore, that General Sickles' move, and all the movements of the Federal left, were simply sequents of mine. They would have followed my movements inevitably, no matter when they had been made. Had the attack been made earlier or later, we should have seen the Federals move just as they did, and with the same results - except that if I had attacked earlier I should have had Geary's division of the Twelfth corps in my immediate front in addition to the Third corps. This would certainly have been the effect of “a sunrise attack.”

Colonel Taylor, in referring to the hour of my battle on the 2d, says: “Round Top, the key of their position, which was not occupied in the morning, was now held in force.” The answer to this statement, direct and authoritative, is at hand. General Meade says, in Congressional Report, page 332: “Immediately upon the opening of the batteries (which began the battle), I sent several staff officers to hurry up the column under General Sykes, of the Fifth corps, then on its way, and which I expected would have reached there at that time. The column advanced rapidly, reached the ground in a short time, and General Sykes was fortunately enabled by throwing a strong force upon Round Top mountain, where a most desperate and bloody struggle ensued, to drive the enemy from it and secure our foothold upon that most important position.” Even the muses were invoked to speed this helter skelter march toward the knob of ground now suddenly grown into importance.

“On to the Round Top!” hailed Sykes to his men;

“On to the Round Top!” echoed the glen.

“On To The Round Top!”

In my former narrative I showed that General Meade did not appreciate the importance of this position until the battle had finally opened. He had ordered Sickles to occupy it “if practicable”; but it was not occupied in force when my battle opened, and was made strong as the fight progressed, as much by the fragments of the enemy's broken lines that took shelter behind its boulders as by any definite plan to seize it. It is needless to say that the same thing would have happened had the battle taken place either earlier or later. The force stationed there when the battle opened had been there all day, and was wholly inadequate to hold it; hence General Meade's anxiety to hurry up additional troops after the battle had opened, and his congratulation that Sykes, by throwing forward “a strong force,” was enabled to drive us from it and secure it to the Federals. But why go further with these details? It is impossible that any sane man should believe that two of my divisions, attacking at any hour or in any manner, could have succeeded in dislodging the Army of the Potomac. We had wrestled with it in too many struggles, army against army, to prefer, in sincerity, any such claim. From daylight until dark not a single Confederate soldier, outside of my two divisions and the three supporting brigades, was advanced to battle, or made to even threaten battle. The work was left entirely with my men. General Ewell dates his cooperative move at dusk. General Meade says it was at 8 o'clock. In any event, it was after my battle had closed, and too late to do any good hence there seems to be no place for honesty in the speculation that my command could have won the field by different battle. It is equally out of sense to say that if my attack had been made “at sunrise,” Ewell would have given me the cooperation that he failed to give in the afternoon when the attack really did come off. His orders, given in the morning after it was decided that I should lead the attack, were to remain in line of battle, ready to cooperate with my attack whenever it should be made. If he was not ready in the afternoon, it is folly to say that he would have been ready at sunrise.

My opinion of the cause of the failure of the battle of the 2d, as given at the time, is very succinctly stated by Colonel Freemantle, on page 138 of his “ Three Months in the South”. He says, quoting me: “He said the mistake they made was in not concentrating the army more and making the attack on the 2d with 30,000 men instead of 15,000.” I doubt now if 30,000 men could have made a successful attack, if Colonel Taylor is correct in his idea as to the manner in which General Lee would have fought them. He says that General Lee ordered that the column should go to the attack with its right flank exposed to the enveloping forces on the Federal left. Under this disposition I do not think 30,000 men could have successfully made the attack. The battle should not have been made under the circumstances. We should have drawn everything up on the night of the 1st and made a quick move by our right flank on the morning of the 2d so as to seize the Emmettsburg road.

Had we done this we should either have been attacked - the very thing we had been hoping and mourning for - or we should have dislodged Meade from his position without striking a blow. If we had been attacked we should have certainly repulsed it. Had Meade deserted his position without striking a blow in its defence, the moral effect in our favor would have been tremendous. To show that one of these results would certainly have followed, I quote a dispatch sent in cipher from General Meade to General Halleck, just before my battle on the 2d. The dispatch reads: “If not attacked, and I can get any positive information of the enemy which will justify me in doing so, I will attack. If I find it hazardous to do so and am satisfied that the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back on my supplies at Westminster.” If, however, no decisive result had followed immediately upon the flank movement that should have been made on the night of the 1st or the morning of the 2d, the thirteen days that elapsed between our first reconnoitre and our recrossing of the Potomac would have surely given time and opportunity for different work and greater results than were had at Gettysburg.

It is conceded by almost, if not quite, all authority on the subject that Pickett's charge on the 3d was almost hopeless. We had tested the enemy's position thoroughly on the day before, and with a much larger force than was given to Pickett. We had every reason to believe that the position was much stronger on the 3d than it was on the 2d. The troops that had fought with me the day before were in no condition to support Pickett, and beside they were confronted by a force that required their utmost attention. The men of Generals Pickett, Pettigrew, and Trimble, however, received and executed their orders with cool and desperate courage. When the utmost measure of sacrifice demanded by honor was full they fell back, and the contest was ended. The charge was disastrous, and had the Federal army been thrown right upon the heels of Pickett's retreating column, the results might have been much more serious. General Wilcox, the volunteer witness on Gettysburg, attempts to controvert my criticism on his wild leadership during the battle of the 2d. I charged that, as commander of the directing brigade of support to my left, he went astray early in the fight, lost my flank, and of course threw the brigades that were looking to him for direction out of line. In reply, he refers me to certain maps published by the War Department for the correct position of his brigade on the 2d. I much prefer the evidence that I used in my first article, and think it will be generally accepted as much better authority than the maps. I quoted from General Lee's report as follows:

“But having become separated from McLaws,” etc., “were compelled to retire.” This is certainly sufficient authority; but I quote further. General Anderson, General Wilcox's division commander, says: “A strong fire was poured upon our right flank, which had become detached from McLaws' left.” This testimony is corroborated by General McLaws, the division commander on his right, and by General Humphries, the brigade commander on his right. It is a plain case. General Wilcox was given the directing brigade and ordered to cover McLaws' left flank. He failed to do this. There is no doubt that he and his troops fought gallantly, as did those of Wright's and Perry's brigades. Their courage was splendid; but, misguided by the brigade of direction, under General Wilcox, their work was not as effective as it should have been.

In this connection it may be noted that the Federal line in front of these troops was not broken so much by direct assault as by crushing in the lines on their left. General Humphreys was forced to change front partially two or three times to meet threatened flank movements against him, and he was in that way drawn off from immediate connection with his right. The skillful handling of these troops, commanded by General A.A. Humphreys, was noted at the time, and has been particularly noted since by General Humphries, of Mississippi. At this late day the official relations of General Lee and myself are brought into question. He is credited with having used uncomely remarks concerning me, in the presence of a number of subordinate officers, just on the eve of battle. It is hardly possible that any one acquainted with General Lee's exalted character will accept such statements as true. It is hardly possible that any general could have been so indiscreet as to have used such expressions under such circumstances. There certainly never was in the relations between General Lee and myself anything to admit the possibility of his having used the expression attributed. Our relations were affectionate, intimate, and tender during the whole war. That his confidence in me was never shaken there is the most abundant proof; but I cannot be tempted, even by direct misrepresentations, into a discussion of this subject. I will advert to one point that will go to show the relations that existed between us. It is an incident of the second battle of Manassas.

When the head of my column reached that field it was about 12 o'clock on the 29th. As we approached the field we heard sounds of a heavy battle, which proved to be General Jackson very severely engaged with the enemy. As my column deployed on the field, the enemy at once withdrew, in good order, however, and took up a strong position a little in the rear of where the heaviest fighting had been going on. During the lull that succeeded, General Lee rode up to where I was and told me that he had determined to attack the position taken by the enemy and indicated his purpose to have me open the fight. My men were then arranged for battle, but 1 asked General Lee to withhold the order for attack until I had made a careful reconnoissance and determined exactly how the troops had best be handled. He consented, of course, to this, and I went forward to make the reconnoisance. After a careful examination of the ground I rode back to General Lee, and reported that the position was very strong and the prospects hardly such as to warrant the heavy sacrifice of life that a serious attack would involve. General Lee was not satisfied, however, but seemed disposed to insist upon an attack. He began to suggest moves by which an advantageous assault might be made. Before the question was at all decided a dispatch was received from General Stuart, giving us notice that a very strong column was moving up against my right. General Lee ordered me at once to reinforce that part of my line and be ready to repel the attack. I ordered the reinforcing column to the march and rode out rapidly in advance, that I might see precisely what was needed. The threatening column proved to be General Fitz John Porter's command. After seeing it, I reported back to General Lee that it was too light a column in my opinion to mean a real attack. This presumption was correct, and the advance soon halted and then withdrew.

General Lee then recalled the question of an immediate attack upon the main position of the Federals. I was thoroughly convinced that the position was too strong to be taken without very severe loss, and I suggested to General Lee that the attack be postponed, and that we make a forced reconnoissance just at night fall, and that we could then prepare to attack at daylight, if it seemed advisable after thorough investigation to make the attack at all. He consented very readily to this, and I left him to prepare for the forced reconnoissance. The reconnoissance was successfully made at nightfall. During the night several of my brigadiers came in and they all agreed in reporting the position very strong. At about midnight Generals Hood and Evans, and possibly one or two others, came to my headquarters and made similar reports, expressing apprehensions as to the result of the attack. Everything developed by this closer reconnoissance went to confirm the impression made upon me by my reconnoissance during the day. I therefore determined not to make the attack, and ordered my troops back to the original line of battle.

The next day the Federals advanced against General Jackson in very heavy force. They soon made the battle so severe for him that he was obliged to call for reinforcements. At about 3 P.M., while the battle was raging fiercely, I was riding to my front when I received a note from Generals Hood and Evans, asking me to ride to a part of the field where they were standing. I changed my course and hurried to the point indicated. I found them standing upon a high piece of ground, from which they had full view of the battle being made against Jackson. We could see the solid masses of the Federals forming for a charge against Jackson's weakening lines. They were gathered in immense force, and it seemed impossible that Jackson's thin lines could withstand the onset. The Federals moved forward steadily, surging on in solid blocks, headed directly for Jackson's lines. Just then a courier arrived in great haste with orders from General Lee for me to hurry to the assistance of Jackson. It was in the very crisis of the battle. I had very serious doubts about being able to reach General Jackson in time to be of any service to him. I had no doubt, however, that I could impede or paralyze the immense mass of men that was pressing steadily to his overthrow. We were standing on the flank of the advancing columns. They swept on at right angles to our line of vision.

They were within easy artillery range, and I felt certain that a heavy enfilading fire poured unexpectedly into their charging columns would disconcert and check it. Instead of moving to reinforce Jackson, therefore, I sent dispatches for batteries to hurry to where I was. In an exceedingly short time Captain Wiley's six gun batteries came dashing up at full gallop, the horses covered with foam, and the men urging them forward. They were wheeled into position and directed against the moving flank of the enemy. The range was fair, and as the six guns dashed the heavy shot went ploughing through the solid flank of the Federals, doing terrible damage.

The result was anticipated. The line faltered for an instant, started again, hesitated, reformed and pressed forward, and then as a rear broadside was poured into them, broke ranks and retired, slowly, sullenly and doggedly. General Jackson did not pursue, and the Federals halted after moving back a short distance, and arranged to reform their ranks and renew the charge. As soon as they started, however, they were obliged to face against General Jackson. This exposed them, of course, to our enfilading fire. We now had several batteries in position, and as soon as the lines had taken shape and started on their second assault we poured a perfect hail of balls into their flanks and scattered them again. Although discomfited they were not broken, but retired with their slow, angry, sullen step. When they had gone beyond the fair range of our batteries they halted and tried to form again for the third assault. I now determined to end the matter, feeling that I had an easy victory in my grasp. I therefore ordered every battery to be in readiness, and drew my men up for a charge, designing to throw them into the broken ranks of the enemy as soon as my artillery had dispersed them. The Federals moved forward once more. When they were fairly in range every gun was opened upon them, and before they had recovered from the stunning effect, I sprung every man that I had to the charge, and swept down upon them like an avalanche. The effect was simply magical. The enemy broke all to pieces. I pushed my men forward in a pell mell pursuit, hoping to reach the main Federal lines at the same time with their retreating forces. We succeeded in this and drove the enemy back, pursuing them until fully 10 o'clock at night. In the meanwhile I received a note from General Lee. He had heard my guns, and at once supposed I had thought it best to relieve Jackson in a different manner from that indicated by his orders. He therefore wrote that if I had “found anything better than reinforcing Jackson, to pursue it.” I mention this incident simply to show the official relations that existed between General Lee and myself. As to our personal relations I present two letters throwing light upon that subject. One is from Colonel W.B. Taylor, assistant adjutant general, and the other is from General Lee himself:

Headquarters Army of Norther Virginia April 26, 1864.

My Dear General:

I have received your note of yesterday, and have consulted the General about reviewing your command. He directs me to say that he has written to the President to know if he can visit and review the army this week, and until his reply is received the General cannot say when he can visit you. He is anxious to see you, and it will give him much pleasure to meet you and your corps once more. He hopes soon to be able to do this, and I will give you due notice when he can come. I really am beside myself, General, with joy of having you back. It is like the reunion of a family.

Truly and respectfully yours

W.B. Taylor, A.A.G.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Lexington, Va., March 9, 1866.

My Dear General:

Your son Garland handed me, a few days since, your letter of the 15th of January, with the copies of your reports of operations in East Tennessee, the Wilderness, etc., and of some of my official letters to you. I hope you will be able to send me a report of your operations around Suffolk and Richmond previous to the evacuation of that city, and of any of my general orders which you may be able to collect. Can you not occupy your leisure time in preparing memoirs of the war? Every officer whose position and character would give weight to his statements ought to do so. It is the only way in which we can hope that fragments of truth will reach posterity. Mrs. Longstreet will act as your amanuensis. I am very sorry that your arm improves so slowly. I trust that it will eventually be restored to you. You must present my kindest regards to Mrs. Longstreet. I hope your home in New Orleans will be happy, and that your life, which is dear to me, will be long and prosperous.

Most truly yours, R.E. Lee.

There is one point to which I call especial attention. The friends of Colonel J.B. Walton, Chief of Artillery of the First corps, think that in my first an inferential injustice was done to that gentleman. Colonel Walton was an officer of greal worth, and at all times had the confidence of his commanding officers; and it is with pleasure that I correct what certainly was an unintentional derogation of his quality. It is true that in part of my first narrative there were sentences subject to the erroneous impression that Colonel Walton was not in full command of the artillery of the First corps at the battle of Gettysburg. My orders, however, as well as my instructions, quoted in another part of the narrative, were addressed to Colonel J.B. Walton as Chief of Artillery, and show conclusively that he was in command on that day. Colonel Alexander figured more prominently in the correspondence that passed between myself and the artillery simply because I had consulted personally with Colonel Alexander on these points before the battle opened, and because he was most directly interested in the handling of the artillery massed at the peach orchard, and under cover of which Pickett was to make his charge. Colonel Walton was a brave and capable officer, and I regret that my narrative was so construed as to reflect upon his fair and spotless record

There were two or three trifling inaccuracies in my first account of this battle which need correction: The scout, upon whose information the head of our column was turned to the right, reported at Chambersburg on the night of the 28th of June. It is printed the 29th. Several orders that I issued on the 1st of July, and so dated, appear under the date of the 18th. The real strength of Pickett's division was 4,500 bayonets. It was printed at 5,500. In the paragraph where I stated that General Meade anticipated my attack of the 3d, and told General Hancock that he intended to throw the Fifth and Sixth corps against its flanks when it was made, it is printed that he gave this information in the “evening,” when, of course, it should have been “morning.” With these trifling exceptions, the article, as printed, was correct.

I have now done for the present, with the campaign of Gettysburg. What I have written about it has been compelled from me by a desire on the one hand to have future historians properly informed upon the most important movement of the war, and a necessity on the other hand of correcting important misstatements made ignorantly or maliciously concerning it. I have written nothing that was not supported by abundant proof, advanced no opinions not clearly justified by the facts. As disastrous as the results of that battle were, and as innocent as I was of bringing them upon my people, I accepted my share of the disaster without a murmur, and cheerfully bore the responsibility of it as long as there was a possibility of injuring the cause we were engaged in by a discussion of the points involved. I should probably have never written a line concerning the battle had it not been for the attempt of the wordy soldiers to specifically fix upon me the whole burden of that battle - their rashness carrying them so far as to lead them to put false orders in the mouth of our great captain, and charge me with having broken them. To disprove these untrue assertions, and to give tbe world the truth concerning the battle, then became what I considered an imperative duty. I repeat that I regret most deeply that this discussion was not opened before the death of General Lee. If the charges so vehemently urged against me after his death had been preferred, or even suggested, in his lifetime, I do not believe they would have needed any reply from me. General Lee would have answered them himself, and have set history right. But, even as the matter is, I do not fear the verdict of history on Gettysburg. Time sets all things right. Error lives but a day - truth is eternal.

There is an incidental matter to which I shall refer in this connection. It is in regard to a statement made by Mr. Swinton. In his "Ultimo Suspiro" he gives the history of a meeting which he says took place on the 7th of April, 1865, between General Lee and his leading officers. He says that this meeting was a private council, and that the officers united in advising General Lee to surrender on that day - two days before the surrender took place at Appomattox. In describing that meeting he does me the grave injustice of putting my name among the officers who gave General Lee this advice. The truth of the matter is, I never attended any such meeting. I had no time to have done so. I was kept incessantly busy in the field during the days preceding the surrender at Appomattox. All night long of the 1st we marched with Field's division from Richmond to Petersburg, reaching that point at early dawn on the 2d. I at once went to General Lee's headquarters. I found him in bed in his tent. While I was sitting upon the side of his couch, discussing my line of march and receiving my orders for the future - this involving a march on the Five Forks - a courier came in and announced that our line was being broken in front of the house in which General Lee had slept. I hurried to the front, and as fast as my troops came up they were thrown into action to check the advance of the Federals until night had come to cover our withdrawal. We fought all day, and at night again took up our march, and from that time forward until the surrender we marched and fought and hungered, staggering through cold and rain and mud to Appomattox - contesting every foot of the way, beset by overwhelming odds on all sides. It was one constant fight for days and days, the nights even giving us no rest. When at length the order came to surrender, on the 9th, I ordered my men to stack their arms, and surrendered four thousand bayonets of Field's division - the only troops that General Lee had left me. I also turned over to General Grant 1,300 prisoners taken by the cavalry and by my troops while on the retreat. As to the conference of officers on the 7th I never attended, and of course did not join in the advice it gave to General Lee. Mr. Swinton has been clearly misinformed upon this point.
 
Jubal Early's reply to Longstreet's
Second Philadelphia Times Article about
the Gettysburg Campaign

In this article for the Southern Historical Society Papers, Jubal Early replies to Longstreet's second article for the Philadelpha Times.

Southern Historical Society Papers
Vol. V. Richmond, Virginia, June, 1878 No. 6.

Reply to General Longstreet's Second Paper.
By General J.A. Early.

General Longstreet is of the opinion that he is a very deeply aggrieved man, because he has not been permitted, without question, to pronounce that General Lee's strategy in the Gettysburg campaign was very defective; that General Lee had lost his mind when he determined to deliver battle at Gettysburg, or, to use the language in which the idea is conveyed, that he had “during the crisis of the campaign lost the matchless equipoise that usually characterized him”, and that whatever mistakes were made were not so much matters of deliberate judgment as the impulses of a great mind disturbed by unparallelled conditions; that he, himself, alone understood the requirements of the occasion, and if he had been allowed to control the operations of the army, a brilliant victory would have ensued; and that every other officer in any responsible position, outside of his own immediate command, was grossly derelict, or terribly blundered. All this he claims the right to do, for the benefit of “the Comte de Paris and the general historian,” because he is “the only living person who could explain the motif of that campaign and the true reasons of its failure.”

He laid the foundation for enlightening the “general historian” in regard to the demerits and deficiencies of General Lee, and his own superior claims to the leadership of the Army of Northern Virginia, by a letter written to his uncle, on the 24th day of July, 1863, which letter would have never seen the light of day if he had not, himself, given it to the public. In that letter he said:

The battle was not made as I would have made it. My idea was to throw ourselves between the enemy and Washington, select a strong position, and force the enemy to attack us. So far as is given to man the ability to judge, we may say with confidence that we should have destroyed the Federal army, marched into Washington, and dictated our terms, or, at least held Washington and marched over so much of Pennsvlvania as we cared to, had we drawn the enemy into attack upon our carefully chosen position in his rear.

General Lee chose the plans adopted, and he is the person to choose and to order. I consider it a part of my duty to express my views to the Commanding General. If he approves and adopts them, it is well; if he does not, it is my duty to adopt his views, and to execute them as faithtully as if they were my own. I cannot help but think that great results would have been obtained had my views been thought better of; yet I am much inclined to accept the present condition as for the best.

The arrogance and egotism of all this might be to some extent pardonable when confined to a private confidential letter to a near relative; but when that letter is given to the public by its author, they become insufferable. The part of the letter published concludes as follows:

As General Lee is our commander, he should have all the support and influence we can give him. If the blame (if there is any) can be shifted from him to me, I shall help him and our cause by taking it. I desire, therefore, that all the responsibility that can be put upon me shall go there and remain there. The truth will be known in time, and I leave that to show how much of the responsibility of Gettysburg shall rest on my shoulders.

The spirit of the first part of this latter passage is very self sacrificing and commendable indeed, but the declaration of it is confined to the ear of his uncle, until the letter is made public for the purpose of showing that General Lee made an inexcusable blunder in framing his own plans, and rejecting the wiser counsels of the writer of that letter; and, when the attempt is made to show that the latter was really at fault in not cordially, promptly, and vigorously seconding the plans of the Commanding General, he cries out most lustily that he is the victim of “the ill natured and splenetic attacks” of “certain wordy soldiers,” in a “tom-tom warfare.” These figures of rhetoric are, doubtless, very brilliant in the dress given them by “the professional writer ” of the Philadelphia Times; but when General Longstreet undertakes to blow his own trumpet, at the expense of others, he must not complain if its discordant notes are drowned by the sound of the tom-tom, nor, when he decks himself in stolen feathers, if he shares the fate of the jackdaw.

He very evidently does not agree with the poet, that -

Truth crushed to earth shall rise again:
The eternal years of God are hers.

He has no confidence in her unaided efforts to make herself known, and hence he applies himself to the work of helping her out of the dirt and mud most manfully; and after tugging at her skirts for some time, he presents to the public gaze a brazen faced image, in which are to be recognized none of the lineaments of the diffident and modest goddess.

Very soon after the war, in what Swinton designates as “a full and free conversation” with him, General Longstreet made the statements upon which were based the very severe criticisms of that writer on General Lee's conduct of the Gettysburg campaign; and when General Lee's letter to President Davis, written a short time after the close of that campaign, was made public, a little more than two years ago, General Longstreet hastened to publish the above mentioned letter to his uncle. In General Lee's very self abnegating letter to the President. there occurs this passage:

Everything therefore points to the advantages to be derived from a new commander, and I the more anxiously urge the matter upon your Excellency, from my belief that a younger and abler man than myself can readily be obtained. I know that he will have as gallant and brave an army as ever existed to second his efforts, and it would be the happiest day of my life to see at its head a worthy leader; one that would accomplish more than I could perform, and all that I have wlshed.

In a communication, over his signature, in the New Orleans Republican of the 27th of February, 1876, General Longstreet, referring to his letter to his uncle, said:

His Longstreet's letter was published owing to its corroborative and sympathetic relations to one of General R.E. Lee written two weeks later. The publication was made following the publication of General F. Lee's, so that the facts might be known and noted in their proper connection, not in attack or defence of any one.

The letter of General Lee here referred to is the one to the President from which the foregoing extract is made, and the only part of it to which Longstreet's could bear the remotest “corroborative and sympathetic relations” is the passage given - that is, Longstrect's letter was corrohorative of the opinion that a younger and abler leader for the army could have been obtained, and sympathetic with it in pointing out who that leader should have been - to wit: General James Longstreet.

Accompanying the publication of the letter to his uncle, General Longstreet gave the following extract from a letter to him from General Lee, dated, as alleged, in January, 1864:

Had I taken your advice at Gettysburg instead of pursuing the course I did, how different all things might have been.

A letter from General Fitz Lee appeared in the public prints very shortly thereafter, and, in that letter, he spoke in very complimentary terms of General Longstreet, but expressed a desire that the whole of General Lee's letter, from which the brief extract was given, should be published.

This was the occasion of the publication of the communication in the New Orleans Republican, from General Longstreet, which has been referred to. That communication contained a bitter tirade of denunciation against General Fitz Lee, General William N. Pendleton, the Rev. J. William Jones, and myself, the greater part of it being directed against me. Thus originated the “tom-tom warfare,” in which the leading part on our side was borne by me, and two long articles were published on both sides. It implies no immoderate degree of vanity on my part to say that General Longstreet came out of the first campaign badly worsted. The only ground for his complaint against me has been already shown in my reply to his first article in the PhiladelphiaTimes; and I will take occasion here to say, that I did not suspect him of having employed another to write the two articles then published over his own name.

It was very apparent to me, however, when I read the first article in the Times, professing to be from him, that the diction was not his, and that he had manifestly been curbed in the expression of his comments on General Lee's character as a commander, and I accordingly said in my reply that the article was evidently not written by him. I mentioned this fact, not because I thought the article, though exhibiting some improvement on his style, contained any better logic than his own productions had shown, but to prevent the lucubrations of a mere newspaper writer from being taken for the criticisms of a soldier of, at least, some experience.

In the last paper on “The Mistakes of Gettysburg,” published in the Philadelphia Times of the 23d of February, General Longstreet is made to say:

One of the chief elements of this tom-tom warfare is found in the fact that, owing to wounds received in the honorable service of my country, which have virtually paralyzed my right arm, and made it impossible for me to write save under pain and constraint, I have been compelled, in the preparation of my articles, to accept the service of a professional writer generously tendered me by the editor of the Times. Upon such trifling casuals as this do my enemies propose to build their histories and amend mine. The attempt is at once pitiful and disgraceful.

I cannot but believe that this passage, in thought as well as diction, is wholly the production of the “professional writer” for the Times. I cannot believe that General Longstreet has yet arrived at such a stage as to be the prompter of so unmanly an appeal. He knows very well that there are a number of officers and men who entirely lost their right arms in the war, and are yet able to write with great facility; and it is hardly to be presumed that he suggested that appeal of the “old soldier” for sympathy. My suggestion had no reference to the mere mechanical task of writing, or the employment of another as his amanuensis, for if he had but done the latter he would only have followed the example of many very able writers, and among them Homer and Milton, whose blindness rendered it necessary for them to use the services of others in transferring the grandest productions of their brains to paper. So if General Longstreet had merely employed another to commit to paper his own ideas, or to correct and render more perspicuous their expression, there would have been no impropriety in that. The objection is that the views, speculations, and criticisms of a professional newspaper writer, without military experience, should be palmed on the public as historical matter, to solve the disputed points as to the battle of Gettysburg. The fact is, that it would be better for General Longstreet if he would get some competent person to do his thinking as well as his writing. He would then avoid the difficulties into which he has been floundering, deeper and deeper, not only with his own productions, but through the instrumentality of those written for him by his friend, the professional writer for the Times.

Though professing to be on “The mistakes of Gettysburg,” one of the prime objects of the last article in the Times seems to have been to claim for General Longstreet the principal credit for the victory gained at the second battle of Manassas, at the expense of both General Lee and General Jackson. The pretence for advancing this new claim is found in the following passage:

At this late date the official relations of General Lee and myself are brought in question. He is credited with having used uncomely remarks concerning me, in the presence of a number of subordinate officers, just on the eve of battle. It is hardly possible that any one acquainted with General Lee's exalted character will accept such statements as true.

It is evident that allusion is here made to the language used by General Lee, as given by me, in the conference had with Generals Ewell, Rodes, and myself, after the close of the first day's fight, when he said: “Longstreet is a very good fighter when he gets in position and gets everything ready, but he is so slow.” It will be seen, from a letter given by General Fitz Lee, in his article in the April number of the Papers, from a distinguished gentleman to himself, that General Lee made a similar remark to that gentleman after the war; and, if the fact was that General Longstreet was slow in his movements, there could be no possible impropriety in mentioning it under the circumstances attending General Lee's remark. It is a little curious, though, that while General Lee's exalted character is cited as being inconsistent with such a remark, General Longstreet himself wrote a letter to the editor of the Times, of which the latter gives the substance, as follows:

The letter from General Longstreet, which accompanies these extracts, dwells particularly upon a point which he wishes to have his readers understand as the justification of his present narrative. It is that while General Lee on the battlefield assumed all the responsibility for the result, he afterwards published a report that differs from the report he made at the time while under that generous spirit. General Longstreet and other officers made their official reports upon the battle shortly after its occurrence, and while they were impressed with General Lee's noble assumption of all the blame; but General Lee having since written a detailed and somewhat critical account of the battle - and the account from which General Longstreet's critics get all their points against him - Longstreet feels justified in discussing the battle on its merits.

It seems, then, that General Longstreet's appreciation of General Lee's exalted character did not prevent him from making the false charge, that General Lee had, when time enough had elapsed for the generous feelings, which prompted him on the field to assume all the responsibility, to subside, written a report differing from his first report, and from the facts of the case, after General Longstreet and other officers had been entrapped into making the reports which they sent in. For that is the real purport of the charge against General Lee, as the editor of the Times gives it, and it is very probable that the letter itself, which is withheld, made it in more emphatic language.

If there was any doubt before of a fact well known to the whole army, that General Longstreet was very slow in his movements on all occasions, be has now furnished very conclusive evidence of its truth, in his narrative of incidents connected with the second battle of Manassas. He says:

When the head of my column reached that field it was about 12 o'clock on the 29th. As we approached the field we heard sounds of a heavy battle, which proved to be General Jackson very heavily engaged with the enemy.

As soon as his troops were deployed into line, General Lee wanted him to open the attack, but Longstreet insisted on taking time to make a reconnoissance, which was delayed for a time by a report of an advance on his right, and the reconnoissance was not made until about nightfall. This is according to his own showing, and in the meantime General Jackson's command had sustained and repulsed seven different attacks in heavy force during the afternoon. So little evidence had General Longstreet given to the enemy of the presence of his command on the field, that General Fitz John Porter, of the Federal army, was afterwards court-martialed and cashiered for failing to carry out an order sent to him by Pope, at half past four o'clock of that very afternoon, to attack Jackson's right flank - the very one on which Longstreet was. It was not until after sunset that any part of Longstreet's command became engaged, when there was a conflict between Hood's division and King's division of McDowell's corps, which was moving along the Warrenton Pike to cut off Jackson's troops, erroneously supposed to be retreating. On the next day, though there was skirmishing and fighting in Jackson's front all day, General Longstreet was not ready to go into action until after 3 P.M. What caused this delay he does not pretend to explain, but gives his operations on that day as follows:

The next day the Federals advanced against General Jackson in very heavy force. They soon made the battle so severe for him that he was obliged to call for reinforcements. At about 3 P.M., while the battle was raging fiercely, I was riding to my front when I received a note from Generals Hood and Evans, asking me to ride to a part of the field where they were standing. I changed my course and hurried to the point indicated. I found them standing upon a high piece of ground, from which they had full view of the battle being made against Jackson. We could see the solid masses of the Federals forming for a charge against Jackson's weakening lines. They were gathered in immense force, and it seemed impossible that Jackson's thin lines could withstand the onset. The Federals moved forward steadily, surging on in solid blocks, headed directly for Jackson's lines. Just then a courier arrived in great haste with orders from General Lee for me to hurry to the assistance of Jackson. It was in the very crisis of the battle. I had very serious doubts about being able to reach General Jackson in time to be of any service to him. I had no doubt, however, that I could impede or paralyze the immense mass of men that was pressing steadily to his overthrow. We were standing on the flank of the advancing columns. They swept oll at right angles to our line of vision. They were within easy artillery range, and I felt certain that a heavy enfilading fire poured unexpectedly into their charging column would disconcert and check it. Instead of moving to reinforce Jackson, therefore, I sent dispatches for batteries to hurry to where I was. In an exceedingly short time Captain Wiley's six gun batteries came dashing up at full gallop, the horses covered with foam, and the men urging them forward. They were wheeled into position and directed against the moving flank of the enemy. The range was fair, and as the six guns flashed the heavy shot went ploughing through the solid flank of the Federals, doing terrible damage.

The result was as anticipated. The line faltered for an instant, started again, hesitated, reformed and pressed forward, and then as a rear broadside was poured into them, broke ranks and retired, slowly, sullenly and doggedly. General Jackson did not pursue, and the Federals halted after moving back a short distance, and arranged to reform their ranks and renew the charge. As soon as they started, however, they were obliged to face against General Jackson. This exposed them, of course, to our enfilading fire. We now had several batteries in position, and as soon as the lines had taken shape and started on their second assault we poured a perfect hail of balls into their flanks and scattered them again. Although discomfited they were not broken, but retired with their slow, angry, sullen step. When they had gone beyond the fair range of our batteries they halted and tried to form again for the third assault. I now determined to end the matter, feeling that I had an easy victory in my grasp. I therefore ordered every battery to be in readiness, and drew my men up for a charge, designing to throw them into the broken ranks of the enemy as soon as my artillery had dispersed them. The Federals moved forward once more. When they were fairly in range every gun was opened upon them, and before they had recovered from the stunning effect, I sprung every man that I had to the charge, and swept down upon them like an avalanche. The effect was simply magical. The enemy broke all to pieces. I pushed my men forward in a pell mell pursuit, hoping to reach the main Federal lines at the same time with their retreating forces. We suceeded in this and drove the enemy back, pursuing them until fully 10 o'clock at night. In the meanwhile I received a note from General Lee. He had heard my guns, and at once supposed I had thought it best to relieve Jackson in a different manner from that indicated by his orders. He therefore wrote me that if I had found anything better than reinforcing Jackson, to pursue it. I mention this incident simply to show the official relations that existed between General Lee and myself.

According to this account the whole credit for that battle was due to General Longstreet, and General Lee had very little to do with it. General Jackson merely withstood the enemy's attacks, while Longstreet was getting ready; and the question comes in here very naturally: What would have been the result, if Jackson and his men had not been of the stuff to withstand the shock of more than three times their numbers, for the long hours it took Longstreet to get ready? It must be borne in mind that General Lee wanted to make the attack on the enemy the day before, according to Longstreet's own statement, and wanted him to begin it, but he demurred and asked permission to take time to reconnoitre. It was twenty seven hours after his arrival on the field before he was ready to begin, and if the troops of McClellan, the junction of which with Pope's army Jackson's movement had heen intended to prevent, had been hurried to the front, what a different result might have taken place!

Is it to be credited that, when General Lee was anxious for Longstreet to begin the attack as soon as his troops arrived on the 29th, he said nothing to him, nor gave him any orders on the 30th, until, as Longstreet says, after 3 P.M. a courier arrived in great haste with orders from General Lee for him to hurry to the assistance of Jackson; and that the only other part General Lee took in the battle that ensued, was to write him a note saying that if he had “found anything better than reinforcing Jackson, to pursue it”? Let us see what General Longstreet says in his official report, intended for General Lee's own eye. In that report, after describing his riding to the front, and his determination to direct an artillery fire on the attacking column, he says:

Two batteries were ordered for the purpose, and one placed in position immediately and opened. Just as this fire began, I received a message from the Commanding General, informing me of General Jackson's condition and his wants. As it was evident that the attack against General Jackson could not be continued ten minutes under the fire of these batteries I made no movement with my troops. Before the second battery could be placed in position. the enemy began to retire, and in less than ten minutes the ranks were broken and that portion of his army put to flight. A fair opportunity was offered me, and the intended diversion was changed into an attack. My whole line was rushed forward at a charge. The troops sprung to their work, and moved forward with all the steadiness and firmness that characterize war worn veterans. The batteries, continuing their play upon the confused masses, completed the work of this portion of the enemy's line, and my attack was, therefore, made against the forces in my front. The order for the advance had scarcely been given, when I received a message from the Commanding General, anticipating some such emergency, and ordering the move which was then going on, at the same time offering me Major General Anderson's division. The Commanding General soon reinforced me, and, a few minutes after, Major General Anderson arrived with his division. The attack was led by Hood's brigades closely supported by Evans. These were rapidly reinforced by Anderson's division from the rear, Keller's three brigades and D.R. James' division from the right and Wilcox's brigade from the left. The brigade of Brigadier Generals Featherston and Prior became detached, and operated with a portion of General Jackson's Command. The attacking columns moved steadily forward, driving the enemy from his different positions as rapidly as he took them.

The claims here made are exorbitant enough in all conscience, but there is a little room left for a suspicion that Jackson's men had something to do with the repulse of the enemy from their front, and that it was not all the work of Longstreet's two batteries, and that they also took some part in the pursuit of the enemy. The relations which General Lee is made to bear to Longstreet's operations and the battle, are very different from those indicated in the extract from the article in the Times.

General Lee's report puts quite a different face on the whole proceeding, and his account is as follows:

About 3 P.M., the enemy having massed his troops in front of General Jackson, advanced against his position in strong force. His front line pushed forward until engaged at close quarters by Jackson's troops, when its progress was checked, and a fierce and bloody struggle ensued. A second and third line, of great strength, moved up to support the first, but, in doing so, came within easy range of a position a little in advance of Longstreet's left. He immediately ordered up two batteries, and two others being thrown forward about the same time by Colonel S.D. Lee, under their well directed fire the supporting lines were broken and fell back in confusion Their repeated efforts to rally were unavailing, and Jackson's troops, being thus relieved from the pressure of overwhelming numbers, began to press steadily forward, driving the enemy before them. He retreated in confusion suffering severely from our artillery, which advanced as he retired. General Longstreet, anticipating the order for a general advance, now threw his whole command against the Federal centre and left. Hood's two brigades, followed by Evans, headed the attack. R.H. Anderson's division came gallantly to the support of Hood, while the three brigades of Wilcox moved forward on his left, and those of Kemper on his right. D.R. Jones advanced on the extreme right, and the whole line swept steadily on, driving the enemy, with great carnage, from each successive position, until 10 P.M., when darkness put an end to the battle and the pursuit.

It was not all Longstreet's battle then, and Jackson and his men had something to do with it. That Longstreet's troops, when once turned loose, fought with all the dash and gallantry possible, no one will pretend to deny; but it seemed an almost interminable period before they were brought into action, and often was uttered the anxious enquiry, by those who for four days had been confronting and fighting Pope's accumulating columns, “Will Longstreet never begin”? Is it to be wondered that General Lee had come to the conclusion that Longstreet was very slow, however well he fought when once in action?

It is to be observed that General Longstreet, in his account of this battle in the article in the Times, says that “General Jackson did not pursue,” while General Lee says: “Their repeated efforts to rally were unavailing, and Jackson's troops, being thus relieved from the pressure of overwhelming numbers, began to press steadily forward, driving the enemy before them.” The inference to be gathered from Longstreet's statement is that Jackson took no further part in the battle after the troops were repulsed from his front, but he (Longstreet) won the victory. The fact is that General Longstreet always proved himself incapable of doing justice to the troops of others who fought in conjunction with his own. To show how different it was with a truly great soldier, who could afford to accord to his comrades their due share of the glery won in battle, the following extract is given from General Jackson's report in regard to tbe same battle. He says;

After some desultory skirmishing and heavy cannonading during the day, the Federal infantry, about 4 o'clock in the evening, moved from under cover of the wood and advanced in several lines, first engaging the right, but soon extending its attack to the centre and left. In a few moments our line was engaged in a fierce and sanguinary struggle with the enemy. As one line was repulsed, another took its place and pressed forward as if determined, by force of numbers and fury of assault, to drive us from our positions. So impetuous and well sustained were these onsets as to indlme me to send to the Commanding General for reinforcements but the timely and gallant advance of General Longstreet, on the right, relieved my troops from the pressure of overwhelming numbers and gave to those brave men the chances of a more equal conflict. As Longstreet pressed upon the right, the Federal advance was checked, and soon a general advance of my whole line was ordered. Eagerly and fiercely did each brigade press forward, exhibiting in parts of tbe field scenes of close encounter and murderous strife not witnessed often in the turmoil of battle. The Federals gave way before our troops, fell back in disorder, and fled precipitately, leaving their dead and wounded on the field. During their retreat the artillery opened with destructive power upon the fugitive masses. The infantry followed until darkness put an end to the pursuit.

After giving his statement of the operations at Second Manassas, to show the official relations between General Lee and himself, General Longstreet gives two letters, one from Colonel Taylor and the other from General Lee, to show the kindly personal relations that existed between himself and General Lee and his staff, a matter which no one will pretend to controvert, but which all will say ought to have prevented General Longstreet's insidious efforts to undermine the military fame of one who had been so kind, so indulgent, so magnanimous to him under all circumstances.

It may be observed here, that, while General Longstreet has given a letter from General Lee to him, written since the war, to show their kindly personal relations, he has never yet given the full text of that letter of January, 1864, from which the brief extract before alluded to was taken, though the extract is repeated in the first article in the Times.

Referring to the points made in the last named article, General Longstreet says in the second article:

Continued
 
Jubal Early's reply to Longstreet's
Second Philadelphia Times Article about
the Gettysburg Campaign Continued:



These points I supported with the most particular proof. Not a single one of them has been controverted. The truth of a single fact, or the correctness of a single opinion laid down in that article, has not been disproved. Very few of them have been questioned - none of them overthrown.

If it be true that very few of his facts and opinions have been questioned, and none of them overthrown, then why the necessity for another article to sustain them, and whence the cause of al1 this complaint of attacks on himself?

If he has sustained by proof a solitary fact or opinion that has been in dispute, I am not aware of it. Take, for instance, the question as to the order for the attack on the second day of the battle. Besides his own declaration, he has adduced the letters of four gentlemen as his proof on that question. Three of these gentlemen know nothing of an order to attack at sunrise, or at any particular time, but one of them, in a part of his letter which was suppressed, says he was of the impression, from certain circumstances, that an order was given for an attack at as early an hour as practicable on the second; and the fourth says he knows of no order to attack at sunrise, and does not think such an order was given, for reasons which he states, and which I have shown to be entirely unsatisfactory. This is his whole proof on the question as to the order. On the other side, we have General Pendleton's statement that General Lee told him, on the night of the first, that he had given the order for Longstreet to attack at sunrise next morning. General Lee also said to the gentleman referred to by General Fitz Lee, “that the battle would have been gained if General Longstreet had obeyed the orders given him, and had made the attack early instead of late.” General Hood says that Longstreet said to him on the morning of the second: “The General is a little nervous this morning; he wishes me to attack; I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into battle with one boot off.” Hood got up before sunrise, and he gives several circumstances tending to show that General Lee was anxious to make the attack at once. General Longstreet, in his first article, has stated that General Lee, at 5 P.M. of the 1st, announced his purpose of attacking the enemy the next day, that he persisted in that purpose late at night against his own repeated remonstrances, and that he reiterated it at daylight next morning. All the presumptions from these statements and circumstances are in favor of the correctness of General Pendleton's statement, and when connected with General Lee's declaration to Ewell, Rodes, and myself, at the close of the first, it becomes absurd for General Longstreet to say that he has sustained all his facts and opinions by the most particular proofs. It is very evident, beyond all reasonable doubt, that General Lee indicated to him the desire for him to attack at a very early hour on the 2d. It is possible, and in fact probable, that no peremptory order was given to make the attack at any specified time, but the purpose must have been indicated in a manner that should have had the force and effect of a peremptory order with one whose duty it was to second promptly and cordially all the Commanding General's plans.

It is beyond all dispute that General Longstreet thwarted General Lee's purpose of attacking the enemy at as early an hour - as practicable, by his reluctance and procrastination.

When he asserts that his troops fought on the 2d with heroic courage and devotion, all Confederates will admit the fact; and even when he asserts that they “did the best three hours' fighting ever done by any troops in any field,” the claim will be allowed to pass without challenge, that much being conceded to the admissable pride of a commander in his troops; but when he asserts that his troops “virtually charged against the whole Federal army,” the idea at once suggests itself, that, if those troops, who came so near success under such circumstances, had had a leader competent to the occasion, and had been led to battle in the early morning or at any time in the forenoon, when all of the Federal army had not arrived and the bulk of it that was up was massed on its right, in front of our left, victory must inevitably have ensued. We can but lament that the heroic courage and dash of such troops were rendered powerless by the tardiness of their leader, and that when they were given occasion for the display of their prowess, it was but to be sacrificed to his incompetency. It is pitiable to think that Hood's gallant men were doomed to slaughter in a desperate struggle for the heights of Round Top, against troops that had been on the extreme right of the Federal army until 2 o'clock P.M., about which time they were ordered to the left, and who were barely able to reach the Round Top in time to save it from the assaulting column. Had the movement begun even two hours sooner, that point, which Meade says was the key point to his whole position, and the possession of which by us would have prevented him from holding any of the ground, would have fallen into the possession of Hood's men with little or no contest; for Sykes' troops, that saved that point from capture, had not then started from the enemy's right. Even the muses, which it is presumed General Longstreet did not cite, could not have speeded them enough to secure their arrival at the Round Top in time, if the assault on it had begun when they were two or three miles away.

The attempt to show that the same result that did happen would have followed an attack at sunrise or at any other hour in the forenoon, is an utter failure. It is sought to sustain it by the testimony of Federal officers, by detaching scraps of their testimony from the context, in order to give them a different meaning from that intended by the parties testifying. Here is what is said on that head in the article:

Let us briefly review the situation on the morning of the 2d. During the night of the 1st General Sickles rested with the Third corps upon the ground lying between General Hancock's left and Round Top, General Geary's division of the Twelfth corps occupying part of the same line. General Meade had given General Sickles orders to occupy Round Top if it were practicable; and in reply to his question as to what sort of position it was, General Sickles had answered, “There is no position there.” At the first signs of activity in our ranks on the 2d, General Sickles became apprehensive that we were about to attack him and so reported to General Meade. As our move progressed his apprehensions were confirmed, and being uneasy at the position in which his troops had been left, and certain that he was about to receive battle, he determined to seize the vantage ground in front of the peach orchard. Without awaiting for orders, he pushed forward and took the position desired.

Meanwhile the reports made to General Meade drew his attention to our part of the field, and finally he rode out just in time to see the battle open. It will be seen, therefore, that General Sickles' move, and all the movements of the Federal left were simply sequents of mine. They would have followed my movements inevitably, no matter when they had been made. Had the attack been made earlier, or later, we should have seen the Federals move just as they did, and with the same results - except that if I had attacked earlier I should have had Geary's division of the Twelfth corps in my immediate front in addition to the Third corps. This would certainly have been the effect of a sunrise attack.

In his testimony, General Sickles says:

At a very early hour on Thursday morning I received a notification that General Meade's headquarters had been established at Gettysburg, and I was directed by him to relieve a division of the Twelfth corps, (General Geary's division, I think,) which was massed a little to my left, and which had taken position there during the night, I did so, reporting, however to General Meade that that division was not in position, but was merely massed in my vicinity - the tenor of his order seemed to indicate a supposition on his part that the division was in position. ...

Not having received any orders in reference to my position, and observing from the enemy's movements on the left, what l thought to be conclusive indications of a design on their part to attack there, and that seeming to be our most assailable point, I went in person to headquarters and reported the facts and circumstances which led me to believe that an attack would be made there, and asked for orders. I did not receive any orders, and I found that my impression as to the intention of the enemy to attack in that direction was not concurred in at headquarters; and I was satisfied, from information which I received, that it was intended to retreat from Gettysburg. I asked General Meade to go over the ground on the left and examine it. He said his arrangements did not permit him to do that.

Geary's division was removed very early in the morning, and Sickles' corps remained on that flank, alone, until late in the afternoon. It was in the morning that he reported to Meade his apprehension of an attack on that flank, as shown by Meade's testimony, and yet no arrangements were made for transferring troops to meet such an attack, and Sickles did not go into position until near 4 o'clock. In fact Meade had been projecting an attack from his right flank on our left until the afternoon, when it was reported impracticable. He then ordered the Fifth corps (Sykes') over to the left about 2 o'clock P.M. In his testimony he says:

About half past three o'clock in the afternoon - it having been reported to me about two o'clock that the Sixth corps had arrived - I proceeded from headquarters, which were about the centre of the line and in rear of the cemetery, to the extreme left, in order to see as to the posting of the Fifth corps, and also to inspect the position of the Third corps, about which I was in doubt. .... When I arrived on the ground, which I did a few minutes before four o'clock in the afternoon, I found General Sickles had taken a position very much in advance of what it had been my intention that he should do.

General Warren, after saying he had reconnoitred in front of their right and advised against an attack there, adds:

Soon afterwards I rode out with General Meade to examine the left of our line, where General Sickles was. His troops could hardly be said to be in position.

He then says that he went to Round Top, by Meade's direction, and from there sent word to Meade that that point would have to be occupied very strongly. Meade then ordered a division of Sykes' corps, which was coming up, to the position, and Warren says:

The troops under General Sykes arrived barely in time to save Round Top hill, and they had a very desperate fight to hold it.

The assumption, under these circumstances, that, “had the attack been made earlier or later, we should have seen the Federals move just as they did, and with the same results,” argues a degree of obtuseness on the part of the writer of the above passage, or of reliance upon the credulity of his readers, which is marvellous. The idea is, that, if Longstreet's columns had gone to the attack at sunrise, or at any time in the morning, when Meade apprehended no attack in that quarter, and Round Top was not occupied and he knew nothing of the character of the ground, he would have been able to make precisely the same dispositions before the enemy was reached by Longstreet's columns that he was enabled to make in the afternoon, after he had gone to that flank, and Sykes had had two hours for his movement from the right to the left, before Longstreet's advance began; and it is wholly untenable. It is very apparent that General Longstreet has not the remotest conception of the importance of celerity in preparing for and conducting an attack. According to his own admission, he received at 11 o'clock in the forenoon the positive order to make the attack, and yet it took him until 4 o'clock in the afternoon to get ready for that attack. Imagine Stonewall Jackson taking five hours to reconnoitre the enemy's position and get his own troops in position before beginning his advance, after making the circuit to get on Hooker's right flank at Chancellorsville, thus giving the latter time to be informed of the movement and to prepare for receiving the projected blow, and what, can it be supposed, would have been the result? Is it not manifest that instead of the brilliant victory which crowned the career of that immortal hero, there would have been a disastrous repulse?

General Longstreet's repugnance to making the attack, and his foreboding of failure, were very potent causes of the want of success when the attack was made. It was his duty to have accepted the plans of the Commanding General without question, and undertaken their execution at once, with the determination to do all in his power to insure their success. That he did not do so, but presumed to question the wisdom of General Lee's decision, and oppose to it his own judgment, is abundantly established by his own repeated declarations. He went into the fight, from the beginning, with the expectation of losing, and hence he lost. One who determines to achieve success at all hazards, has won half the battle, while he who goes to the performance of any undertaking with no hope of success is not likely to succeed under the most favorable circumstances. This is alike applicable to the case of the sluggard school boy who thinks his task too heavy, and therefore will not try to learn his lesson, and that of the reluctant Corps Commander who goes to the performance of the duty assigned him with the belief that he is charged with a hopeless undertaking.

General Longstreet's complaint, now, that he was not promptly supported, and therefore failed, is a little singular, as he insists that there was no chance of success from the beginning. The uncertainty with which all his movements were attended, and his almost interminable delay, rendered it impossible for any one to know when he was ready or had actually begun, and the complaint therefore comes from him with a very bad grace. He who is at fault is very generally apt to lay the blame on others for what is due to his own shortcomings.

There is again in this second article an allusion to “our line of battle having been broken through the advice of General Early.” By this is meant the posting of two of my brigades in a position to protect our left flank, which was very much exposed before the arrival of Stuart's cavalry. This has been fully explained heretofore, and the fact shown that these two brigades never constituted any part of our line; so that it was not broken by their being assigned the position they occupied. If General Longstreet found it necessary to take two of his divisions, which were intended to support the attacking column on the 3d, in order to protect his right flank against two brigades of Pleasanton's cavalry, it was certainly not unreasonable to take two brigades to protect a flank that was very much more exposed. This objection is really too insignificant to discuss.

In the second article there is this passage:

In my first article I declared that the invasion of Pennsylvania was a movement that General Lee and his council agreed should be defensive in tactics, while of course it was offensive in strategy.

I have italicized the words “his council” to fix attention upon them, and the question very naturally arises: who constituted this “council” that exercised or claimed to exercise powers co equal with those of the Commanding General? Was General Lee really Commander in Chief, or was it a divided responsibility which he shared with a “council”? It is a novel proposition that there existed any such body or person. On turning to the first article, there will be found the following remarkable passage, a portion of which I have also italicized:

I recall these points simply because I desire to have it distinctly under stood that, while I first suggested to General Lee the idea of an offensive campaign, I was never persuaded to yield my argument against the Gettysburg campaign except with the understanding that we were not to deliver an offensive battle, but so to manoeuvre that the enemy should be forced to attack us - or, to repeat, that our campaign should be one of offensive strategy but defensive tactics. Upon this understanding my assent was given, and General Lee, who had been kind enough to discuss the matter with me patiently, gave the order of march.

This passage bears very strong “corroborative and sympathetic relations” to the one taken from the second article, and it seems very apparent that it was General Longstreet himself who was the self constituted “council” of General Lee, and claimed the right to dictate and control the policy of the Gettysburg campaign.

The impudence, arrogance, and presumptuous self conceit which characterize both passages, are intolerable; and the only response that is necessary, is simply a reference to the story of that obtuse though useful animal, who, not content with the subordinate station assigned him, essayed to play the part of the monarch of the beasts, by wearing his skin, and succeeded tolerably well in palming himself, in his assumed character, upon the more foolish animals, but when he had the folly to open his mouth, betrayed himself by his voice.

I will not again undertake to discuss the propriety of the attack on the third day of the battle of Gettysburg, but will merely say that the officer who was entrusted with the conduct of the attack from our right, and who failed to begin it at the designated time, but shifted the responsibility for the final order for his charge, that properly attached to himself, to the shoulders of a colonel of artillery - and then withheld two divisions intended and directed to so operate in the charge, has no right to complain that that charge was hopeless from the beginning. It was his own conduct that contributed to make it so.

It is evidently assumed by the writer of both articles that there is some magic charm in the phrase “offensive in strategy but defensive in tactics,” which settles the whole question as to the propriety of the attack on Meade at Gettysburg, and hence it is given with a “damnable iteration” that may serve to confuse and delude those unskilled in warfare, but when applied to the Pennsylvania campaign, which was a campaign of invasion by the weaker against the stronger power, the phrase becomes the veriest nonsense. The only chance for success in such a campaign was, when the opportunity occurred, to strike blows on the enemy quick and fast, so that he should not have the opportunity of concentrating his superior forces to overwhelm his weaker assailant.

That General Longstreet's idea, “to throw ourselves between the enemy and Washington, select a strong position, and force the enemy to attack us” was entirely impracticable, as well as unsustained by sound logic or wisdom, I hold to be fully demonstrable:

1st. Because General Lee, a consummate master of the art of war, to whom the proposition was submitted, so thought and decided.

2nd. Because, to get between Meade's army and Washington, we would have had to make a wide circuit, and Meade, having the inner and shorter line, would have been able to thwart the attempt, while our trains would have been exposed to destruction, during the movement, by the enemy's cavalry and French's force at Frederick, in the absence of our own cavalry.

3rd. Because we were entirely dependent upon the enemy's country for food and forage for our men, horses, and mules, and when it became necessary for our army to concentrate in the presence of the enemy, it became impossible to send out foraging parties to obtain sufficient supplies of provisions and forage. The consequence, therefore, must have been, if Meade had pursued what would have been his very obvious policy, to wit: to assume a position sufficiently near us to render necessary the continued concentration of our army, that we would have been compelled to attack him after his army had been considerably reinforced and strengthened, to retreat for the purpose of getting supplies, or to be reduced to a state of starvation, and thus become an easy prey to the enemy.

The idea that popular clamor, through the newspapers, would have compelled Meade to attack us at once, is absurd. It presupposes that he was wholly incompetent to the command of the large army under him, or that he was weak enough to yield to a senseless clamor in opposition to his own judgment. He would have had to wait but a very few days, if he had pursued his true policy, to vindicate its wisdom and put to shame the clamorers for immediate attack. French had 8,000 men at Frederick, with 4,000 more somewhere on the way between Harper's Ferry and Washington; Pennsylvania had put into the field, under a call of President Lincoln for the emergency, 82,104 well equipped militia; and New York had sent forward 13,971 men, under the same call, as shown by the final report of the Provost Marshal General, page 53, (Documents 1865-'6). Other troops were on their way from North Carolina and the Virginia Peninsula. The greater part of all these troops, and probably a considerable portion of the troops still in the defenses of Washington, especially south of the Potomac, would have been added to Meade's army, before he would have attacked us, and in the meantime troops would probably have been brought from the West, over the Baltimore and Ohio railroad, to cut off our retreat across the Potomac; and then, with our army weakened and demoralized by starvation, what would have been the result? If we had attempted a retreat on the eve of starvation, it would have been a disorderly one, and our army would have become thoroughly demoralized in the search for food to stay the cravings of hunger. The consequence would have been total and inevitable destruction, unless we began the retreat before the crisis arrived. Such considerations as these, doubtless, presented themselves to General Lee, but they seem never to have penetrated General Longstreet's brain.

He thinks Meade would certainly have attacked us at once, if we had awaited his attack, or, by abandoning his position, given us the moral effect of a victory, because, in a telegram to Halleck he said:

If not attacked and I can get any positive information of the enemy which will justify me in doing so, I will attack. If I find it hazardous to do so, and am satisfied that the enemy is endeavoring to move to my rear and interpose between me and Washington, I shall fall back on my supplies at Westminster.

Longstreet's deduction from this is most illogical. All the inferences from his telegram are that Meade would not have attacked us in our then position, unless he could do so to great advantage, and the fact is that, after a reconnoissance, he abandoned the only project of attack which he formed, to wit: from his right against our left flank. If we had abandoned our position after the success of the first day, the moral effect upon our own men would have been that of a defeat. If we had moved to Meade's left to get between him and Washington, and he had made a corresponding movement to protect his supplies and his communications, it is impossible to conceive how that could have given us the moral effect of a victory. That he would not have followed us at once to attack us in any new position we may have taken to threaten his communications with Washington, is shown by his own declared purpose in this telegram. His policy, doubtless, would have been, after securing his depot and rendering his own supplies certain, to take and fortify some position near us, and then the results already indicated would, unquestionably, have ensued.

There is no reason to suppose that Meade would have been more prompt to attack us in position on the heights of Gettysburg, if we had gained that position on the 1st, than he showed himself to attack us in the position on Seminary Ridge, with our left extended in a curve through Gettysburg. He did not attack us on the 4th in our then position on Seminary Ridge, after the disastrous repulse of the day before; nor did he dare attack us, afterwards, in the vicinity of Hagerstown, when he had been reinforced by 8,000 men under French, and a considerable part of Couch's force from Harrisonburg, besides having at hand (at Harper's Ferry) a portion of the troops from North Carolina and the Peninsula, with all the prestige of victory in his favor, though General Lee had not been reinforced to the extent of a solitary man, unless the cavalry brigades of Robertson and Jones, which reached the vicinity of Gettysburg on the 3d, too late to participate in the battle, be counted as reinforcements.

These facts should satisfy General Longstreet and his adherents that Meade would not have been in a hurry to attack us, if we had awaited his attack on Seminary Ridge, or had moved past his left and assumed another position; and they should equally convince those who think the taking possession of the Gettysburg heights, on the afternoon of the 1st, would in itself have been a great advantage to us, that he would not have attacked us in that position. His whole subsequent career proved him to be an excessively cautious commander in all aggressive movements.

The question which really presented itself to General Lee at Gettysburg was, whether he should attack the enemy in that position, or retreat. Between these alternatives he had to choose, and, if he decided to attack, it was necessary to attack as promptly as possible. Whether or not he chose wisely as between those alternatives, is the proper question for discussion.

Had General Longstreet been content to let that question be settled before the tribunal of history, on the facts as presented in General Lee's report and other authentic forms, I know of no one who would have been disposed to assail his war record, or submit his own operations at Gettysburg to a crucial test. But when his overweening vanity and egotism caused him to enter the arena, as a contestant for the highest honors of that and all other campaigns of the Army of Northern Virginia, by depreciating its commander, his pretensions could not be allowed to pass unquestioned. But for his own folly, and his exorbitant demands for historic honors, there would have been a general disposition to remember to his credit his meritorious deeds, while the mantle of charity would have been allowed to fall upon his shortcomings.

If he has now suffered in the controversy which he has provoked, he has but met the fate of all who, not content with receiving the credit justly due them, aspire to honors to which they are not entitled.

In all that I have written in this controversy, my sole purpose has been to vindicate the fame of the great commander of the Army of Northern Virginia and the truth of history.

J.A. Early
 
All that work and I step back and look at it and see that I spelled feud wrong....sigh....hangs head and walks away...
 
In this article, which first appeared in the Richmond Dispatch in 1899 (20 years or more after Early's or Longstreet's), and subsequently printed in the Southern Historical Society Papers, Henry Alexander White attempts to settle the Early/Longstreet Gettysburg controversy once and for all.




Southern Historical Society Papers
Vol. XXVII. Richmond, Va, January-December. 1899.

Gettysburg Battle.

Some Literary Facts Connected Therewith.
A QUESTION OF GREAT INTEREST.
Discussed in the Light of Some Late Revelations
General Early's Theory - Many Writers Passed in Review - A Myth.
[From the Richmond, Va., Dispatch, March 5, 1899 ]

By HENRY ALEXANDER WHITE,
Washington and Lee University.

At what hour on the morning of July 2, 1863, did General Longstreet's troops present themselves, in readiness for battle, on the Seminary Ridge in front of Gettysburg? Strange to relate, it has required a period of thirty-three years to question, and yet this question bears upon the point that is most essential, perhaps, in the entire discussion of Longstreet's part in that great struggle. The chief facts in the case are as follows:

So long as General R. E. Lee remained alive, no utterance in public fell from any Confederate officer's lips concerning the loss of the field of Gettysburg. On January 19, 1872, at the Washington and Lee University, General J. A. Early felt impelled to make reply to William Swinton's published criticism of General Lee's management of the battle. Swinton's strictures were based upon alleged private statements by Longstreet. Early's reply involved the charge that Longstreet himself was responsible for the repulse of the Confederate army at Gettysburg. In support of this charge, Early referred to a conference held by Lee, Ewell, Rodes and Early, late in the afternoon of July 1, 1863, and declared that Lee left that conference “for the purpose of ordering up Longstreet's corps in time to begin the attack at dawn next morning. That corps was not in readiness to make the attack until 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day.” (Southern Historical Society Papers, December, 1877, page 284.) Early's statements were repeated in the Southern Magazine, September-October, 1872. One year after Early's address - January 19, 1873 - Dr. William N. Pendleton substantiated the charge against Longstreet by reciting Lee's personal statement, made in the evening of July 1, 1863, that he had ordered Longstreet to attack “at sunrise the next morning.” Dr. Pendleton's address was published in the Southern Magazine, December, 1874.

In November, 1877, Longstreet made answer by publishing in the Philadelphia Times a detailed account of the campaign and battle of Gettysburg. This article was reprinted in Southern Historical Society Papers ( January-February, 1878). In this he denied that Lee gave him the order to attack at sunrise on July 2, 1863. To sustain his assertion, Longstreet published extracts from letters written by members of Lee's staff and members of his own staff, declaring that they had no knowledge of Lee's order. Among these extracts there was one from a letter written to Longstreet by Hood, who commanded the rear division in Longstreet's marching column as the First corps drew nigh to Gettysburg. As the quotation from Hood's letter plays an important part in the later stages of the discussion, we may pause here long enough to say that this letter itself, as cited by Longstreet, bore no date. The extract ran thus:

I arrived with my staff in front of the heights of Gettysburg shortly after daybreak, as I have already stated, on the morning of the 2d of July. My division soon commenced filing into an open field near me, when the troops were allowed to stack arms and wait until further orders. A short distance in advance of this point, and during the early part of the same morning, we (Longstreet and Hood) were both engaged, in company with Generals A. P. Hill and Lee, in observing the position of the Federals. ... General Lee was seemingly anxious that you should attack that morning. He remarked to me: 'The enemy is here, and if we do not whip him he will whip us.' You thought it better to await the arrival of Pickett's division, at that time still in the rear, in order to make the attack, and you said to me subsequently, while we were seated together near the trunk of a tree: 'General Lee is a little nervous this morning. He wishes me to attack. I do not wish to do so without Pickett. I never like to go into a battle with one boot off.' (Southern Historical Society Papers, January-February, 1878, page 79.)

Upon its face this note is rather indefinite as to the time of the conversation among the officers, the time proposed for the attack, and the time of the arrival of Hood's infantrymen. It is interesting to mark the significance attached to Hood's statement by Longstreet himself. He held that it completed his chain of evidence to disprove the assertions in regard to the “rumored order for a sunrise attack.” (Southern Historical Society Papers, January-February, 1878, page 79.)

Hood's statement, however, in Early's mind, was given a different interpretation. Early re-entered the lists, in the pages of the Southern Historical Society Papers, and cited Hood's letter as the last link in his chain of evidence to prove that Longstreet was ordered to make an attack in the early morning of July 2d. Hood's letter, said Early, indicated the partial execution of Lee's order in the actual arrival of Longstreet's troops upon Seminary Ridge between dawn and sunrise. “If there had before remained any doubt,” wrote Early, “as to who was responsible for the failure to strike the blow at the proper time, the very clear and explicit statement by General Hood, which is a most valuable contribution to the history of the battle, would settle that doubt beyond dispute, I think. General Hood's statement furnishes information not before given in regard to the time of the arrival on the ground of Longstreet's troops, and renders it very certain that the orders for the attack to begin were given very early in the morning, if not the night before.” (Southern Historical Society Papers, December, 1877, page 269.) “Hood got up before sunrise, and he gives several circumstances tending to show that General Lee was anxious to make the attack at once.” ( Idem, June, 1878, page 580.) At the same time, Early set forth a detailed statement of the conference held after the close of the battle of July 1st; he expressed the opinion that Stuart and Ewell were not responsible for the loss of the field, and reiterated, as his final conclusion, the charge that Longstreet was responsible for the failure, because he was “so persistently averse to the attack and so loth to take the steps necessary to begin it.” ( Idem, December, 1877, page 291.) Early's conclusion is based apparently upon the following interpretation of Hood's note: That Hood's division, bringing up the rear of Longstreet's marching column, in obedience to Lee's previous command, actually arrived at Lee's headquarters in readiness for battle before sunrise; that Lee wished to make the attack upon the instant; that Longstreet's opposition to the plan of attack was made while the troops were thus at hand and ready for orders, and that in view of this opposition by Longstreet, General Lee delayed, and did not give peremptory orders to advance into battle until a much later hour - about 11 o'clock. ( Idem, December, 1877, pages 291-292.)

At this point in his line of reasoning the thought evidently arose in Early's mind that his conclusions were calculated to place General Lee's reputation in great jeopardy. If the reason for a disastrous delay of several hours duration was merely General Lee's deference to Longstreet's opposing opinion, what shall be said of Lee's capacity to carry out his own carefully-arranged plan of battle? Early's mind was too clear not to see this issue, and he faced it as follows:

There is one thing very certain, and that is that either General Lee or General Longstreet was responsible for the remarkable delay that took place in making the attack. I choose to believe that it was not General Lee, for if any one knew the value of promptness and celerity in military movements, he did. It is equally certain that the delay which occurred in making the attack lost us the victory. ( Idem, December, 1877, page 293.)

This statement shows us that in the last analysis the gallant old soldier, General Early, was compelled to fall back upon his personal loyalty to General Lee and his personal knowledge of Lee's conduct upon other battle-fields to find vindication for Lee's management of the Confederate troops at Gettysburg.

The central truth, however, of the whole matter is that Early misinterpreted the fragment of Hood's letter. Early's chief premise was wrong and his conclusion was, therefore, entirely wrong. Early set forth his views in 1877-'88. Since that time additional facts have come to the light to show that Longstreet's troops did not arrive on Seminary Ridge until long after sunrise on the morning of July 2d; that the difference of opinion between Lee and Longstreet was not matter for discussion one moment after the coming of the infantry of the First corps, and that Longstreet's subsequent delay on the right was perpetrated during Lee's tour of observation to the Confederate left wing.

The first installment of fresh evidence concerning the time of the arrival of Longstreet's troops was published in the Southern Historical Society Papers for February, 1879, in the form of an address by General Lafayette McLaws. He had delivered a similar address as early as 1873. McLaws was in command of the advance division of Longstreet's men as they approached Gettysburg. By Longstreet's order McLaws went into camp on the western side of Willoughby Run after 12 o'clock in the night that followed July 1st. The head of his column was more than two miles from Lee's headquarters, on Seminary Ridge. McLaws wrote these words: “Some time after my arrival I received orders from General Longstreet to continue the march at 4 A. M., but the order was afterwards countermanded, with directions not to leave until sunrise. The march was continued at a very early hour, and my command reached the hill overlooking Gettysburg early in the morning. Just after I arrived General Lee sent for me, as the head of my column was halted within a hundred yards of where he was, and I went at once and reported. General Lee was sitting on a fallen tree with a map beside him. After the usual salutation, General Lee remarked: 'General, I wish you to place your division across this road,' pointing on the map to about the place I afterward went to” (the Peach Orchard).

McLaws said further that “if the corps had moved boldly in position by 8 or 9 o'clock in the morning, as it could have done,” the attack would probably have succeeded. (Southern Historical Society Papers, February, 1879, pages 68 and 76.)

Another fragment of testimony was added in the following year - 1880 - when Hood's volume, entitled “Advance and Retreat,” was issued from the press. This volume contained the entire letter from Hood, of which Longstreet had printed only an extract, and it now appeared that Hood made his statement concerning the time of the arrival of his troops “from memory,” on June 28, 1875, twelve years after the morning of July 2, 1863. It may, at this point, be noted further that Hood's phrase concerning the time of the conversation held by Lee, Longstreet, Hill and Hood is this: “During the early part of the same morning;” presumably before the arrival of Hood's troops.

In 1883 the Century Magazine began to publish an extended series of articles written by both Federal and Confederate actors in the great tragedy of Gettysburg. E. P. Alexander set forth the movements of the Confederate artillery on July 2d and July 3d, in such complete detail that all subsequent writers from that time forward could do nothing else than adopt his statements. Kershaw likewise told how he led a brigade of McLaw's division at the very head of Longstreet's column on the morning of July 2, 1863. (Battles and Leaders of the Civil War, Vol. III, page 331.) These articles in the Century anticipated by a few years the publication of the official reports of the participants in the battle, in Volume XXVII of the official records.

Kershaw's report concerning the movements of his brigade on July 1st and afterwards, was thus set forth: “We marched to a point on the Gettysburg road, some two miles from that place, going into camp at 12 P. M. The command was ordered to move at 4 o'clock on the morning of the 2d, but did not leave camp until about sunrise. We reached the hill overlooking Gettysburg with only a slight detention from trains in the way, and moved to the right of the Third corps, and were halted until about noon.” (Official Records, Volume XXVII, Part II, page 366.)

E. P. Alexander's report states that his battalion of artillery “marched with the First corps, and accompanied it .... to Gettysburg, Pa., where we arrived at 9 A. M. on July 2d.” (Official Records, XXVII, Part II, page 429.) Captain O. B. Taylor, commanding a battery in Alexander's battalion, reports thus: “We arrived there (Gettysburg) about 10 A. M. July 2d.” (Idem, page 432.) It may be remarked in explanation that Alexander's battalion marched at the rear of Longstreet's column, and that it took a leading part in the battle of the 2d day of July. The Washington Artillery marched with Longstreet's troops. In 1885 appeared W. M. Owens's volume, entitled “In Camp and Battle with the Washington Artillery.” On pages 243-4 we find this statement concerning the journey made on the morning of July 2, 1863: “After waiting until 2:30 A. M. for a clear road, began our march, and at 8 A. M. reported, ready for action, to General Longstreet on the field.”

An important word remained even yet unspoken. This came at last from the lips of General McLaws on April 27, 1896. He revised his former Gettysburg address and read it before the Confederate Veterans' Association of Savannah on the date named. From that address I quote: “My division arrived at Willoughby Run, about four miles from Gettysburg, at 12 o'clock at night and camped there. During the night I received orders to march on at 4 A. M., but this was countermanded, and I was directed to be ready to move early in the morning. The sun rises about half-past 4 in the first days of July. .... Not long after sunrise I moved forward, and before 8 A. M. the head of my division reached Seminary Ridge, where General Lee was in person. I was notified that General Lee wished to see me, and my command was halted and I reported to the General. .... General Longstreet was walking up and down a little way off, apparently in an impatient humor. .... General Longstreet joined us and said, pointing to the map and speaking to me, 'General, I want you to place your division there,' drawing his finger along a line parallel to the Emmitsburg road. 'No, General,' said General Lee, 'I want his division perpendicular to the Emmitsburg road.'” (Addresses Savannah Veterans' Association, 1896, pages 68, 69.)

Further light is thrown upon the matter by the reports of Wilcox, and Anderson, of Hill's corps. It was part of Lee's plan that this corps should occupy the Confederate centre on July 2d, and that Longstreet should bring his divisions upon the field immediately to the right of Hill. Anderson's division, however, was a mile and a half west of Gettysburg on the morning of July 2d (O. R., XXVII, Part II, page 613.) The brigade of Wilcox, Anderson's division, did not begin the advance movement until 7 A. M., and it was 9 A. M. when the brigade took its position in line of battle on Seminary Ridge. (Idem, page 617.)

These quotations furnish us a full explanation of Hood's indefinite letter, and show that Longstreet was delinquent in not hastening up his troops to Seminary Ridge as Lee had ordered; that those troops set forth from camp only after sunrise, were detained to some extent by Ewell's wagon train, and the head of the column reached Seminary Ridge when the sun was three or three and a half hours above the horizon. We learn, further, that the quasi-debate between Lee and Longstreet, as described in Hood's letter, took place before the troops stood in Lee's presence; that when the First corps arrived, about 8 A. M., Lee at once gave specific orders to the leading division commander, over Longstreet's head, as it were, and bade McLaws lead his men into battle along the Emmittsburg road, from the Peach Orchard towards Gettysburg.

There is further evidence from Long, Venable and others, to show that Lee then rode away through the town of Gettysburg to consult with Ewell about the co-operation of the left wing with the right wing, which he had just ordered forward to the attack. At Ewell's headquarters Lee waited to hear Longstreet's guns. At noon he rode from beyond Gettysburg to Seminary Ridge to seek Longstreet, only to find that the latter had assumed authority to await the arrival of Law's brigade. This brigade came up about half-past 12 or 1 o'clock. Three hours were then consumed in finding a covered route to the Peach Orchard, where Longstreet's guns opened the battle about 4 P. M.

The above are the actual facts. On the other hand, however, General Early's untenable theory, set forth twenty years ago, has become the basis of a modern myth. Early's narrative with reference to that which he heard and saw on the evening of July 1st is of course accurate beyond all question. But when Early took the fragments of Hood's letter and fastened an erroneous interpretation upon it, due to his own lack of information, he laid the foundation of the myth which many recent writers have asked us to accept. General Longstreet himself seems to have adopted the myth, for in his Memoir of the War, published in 1896, he asserts that the troops of McLaws and Hood reached Lee's headquarters at sunrise on the morning of July 2d (page 362). Newspaper and magazine articles have invited us to consider a supposed dramatic spectacle, alleged to have taken place on the morning of July 2d. The time contemplated by those who have developed this view is the hour between dawn and sunrise; the place, Seminary Ridge, with Cemetery Hill in full view. The mythical spectators, the troops of McLaws and Hood, stained with mud of an alleged night march. The chief actors, Lee and Longstreet. Lee's alleged opinion is that the troops ought to deliver battle at once; Longstreet remonstrates against the attack, and his argumentative opposition, we are told, leads to delay and consequently disaster. So runs this erroneous theory.

Reference must here be made to one writer, who published his views before Hood's letter became a part of the discussion. The Comte de Paris, as long ago as 1875, gathered into his bulky volumes all obtainable facts bearing upon the most minute movements of the Federal and Confederate troops in this entire campaign and battle. Some of his statements are wide of the truth, but upon the point here under discussion he bore this testimony: “Longstreet virtually disobeyed General Lee's wishes in not bringing his corps to Seminary Ridge until 8 o'clock on the morning of July 2d.”

The whole myth vanishes in the light of the statements made by McLaws, Kershaw, and the rest. The alleged spectacle of Lee's vacillation did not take place. The supposed spectators, the troops, were not present. In fact, they were just breaking camp beyond Willoughby Run after the hour of sunrise. The discussion between Lee and Longstreet was only a brief exchange of views, and it took place while those riflemen were still at a distance. Lee did not vacillate. He did not yield his judgment to Longstreet. The latter's fault was not argumentative opposition, but practical disobedience of orders. There were two separate acts in this disobedience. Neither of these was committed in Lee's presence. Both were perpetrated when Lee and Longstreet were far apart. Longstreet countermanded the Order for the early march before he reached Lee's headquarters; later in the day he bade his divisions pause and wait for Laws' brigade, after Lee's departure to another post upon the field. In both cases Longstreet could advance the nominal excuse that he was only exercising the discretion usually accorded to a corps commander in the absence of the general-in-chief. His use of that alleged discretion, together with the improvident use of the same prerogative on the part of Stuart, A. P. Hill and Ewell, combined together to inscribe Gettysburg in the annals of the Southern Confederacy as a lost field.
 
Wow! There's certainly a lot of information here. I wouldn't know where to begin to make a comment.

Mental Nomad, you might want to offer this to Mike as an entry for the Contributed Articles section of the website.
 
Good Lord Mental Nomad! That was quite a thread.Read part of it will try to finish it later tonight.Good posts though.
 
I am glad ya'll liked this thread...I feel I probally should have posted what Lee himself had to say Officially on the subject, so here it is.

June 3-August 1, 1863. - The Gettysburg Campaign.
Report of General Robert E. Lee, C. S. Army,
commanding Army of Northern Virginia.
O.R. - SERIES I - VOLUME XXVII/1 [S# 44] - Gettysburg Campaign


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------



Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia,
January 20, 1864

General S. Cooper,
Adjutant and Inspector General, Richmond, Va.:

General:

I forward to-day my report of the late campaign of this army in Maryland and Pennsylvania, together with those of the corps and other commanders, as far as they have been received. General Longstreet's list of casualties, and the reports of his subordinate officers, shall be sent as soon as they can be obtained from him.

I also forward the report of the medical director, and some other documents mentioned in the accompanying schedule. With reference to the former, I would remark that it is necessarily imperfect, for reasons stated in my report. The actual casualties and the number of missing can only be learned from the reports of the commanding officers, and it should be borne in mind that they usually embrace all the slightly wounded, even such as remain on duty, under the impression, commonly entertained, that the loss sustained is a measure of the service performed and the danger incurred.

I also inclose a map of the routes of the army, and one of the lines at Hagerstown and Williamsport. That of the battle-field of Gettysburg shall be forwarded as soon as completed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. Lee
General.
[Inclosure.]
Headquarters Army of Northern Virginia,
January --, 1864
General:
I have the honor to submit a detailed report of the operations of this army from the time it left the vicinity of Fredericksburg, early in June, to its occupation of the line of the Rapidan, in August.
Upon the retreat of the Federal Army, commanded by Major-General Hooker, from Chancellorsville, it reoccupied the ground north of the Rappahannock, opposite Fredericksburg, where it could not be attacked excepting at a disadvantage. It was determined to draw it from this position, and, if practicable, to transfer the scene of hostilities beyond the Potomac. The execution of this purpose also embraced the expulsion of the force under General Milroy, which had infested the lower Shenandoah Valley during the preceding winter and spring. If unable to attain the valuable results which might be expected to follow a decided advantage gained over the enemy in Maryland or Pennsylvania, it was hoped that we should at least so far disturb his plan for the summer campaign as to prevent its execution during the season of active operations.

The commands of Longstreet and Ewell were put in motion, and encamped around Culpeper Court-House June 7. As soon as their march was discovered by the enemy, he threw a force across the Rappahannock, about 2 miles below Fredericksburg, apparently for the purpose of observation. Hill's corps was left to watch these troops, with instructions to follow the movements of the army as soon as they should retire.

The cavalry, under General Stuart, which had been concentrated near Culpeper Court-House, was attacked on June 9 by a large force of Federal cavalry, supported by infantry, which crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly and Kelly's Fords. After a severe engagement, which continued from early in the morning until late in the afternoon, the enemy was compelled to recross the river with heavy loss, leaving about 500 prisoners, 3 pieces of artillery, and several colors in our hands.

General Imboden and General Jenkins had been ordered to cooperate in the projected expedition into the Valley, General Imboden by moving toward Romney with his command, to prevent the troops guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad from re-enforcing those at Winchester, while General Jenkins advanced directly toward the latter place with his cavalry brigade, supported by a battalion of infantry and a battery of the Maryland Line.

General Ewell left Culpeper Court-House on June 10. He crossed the branches of the Shenandoah near Front Royal, and reached Cedarville on the 12th, where he was joined by General Jenkins. Detaching General Rodes with his division, and the greater part of Jenkins' brigade, to dislodge a force of the enemy stationed at Berryville, General Ewell, with the rest of his command, moved upon Winchester. Johnson's division advancing by the Front Royal road, Early's by the Valley turnpike, which it entered at Newtown, where it was joined by the Maryland troops.

BATTLE OF WINCHESTER.
The enemy was driven in on both roads, and our troops halted in line of battle near the town on the evening of the 13th. The same day the force which had occupied Berryville retreated to Winchester on the approach of General Rodes. The following morning, General Ewell ordered General Early to carry an intrenched position northwest of Winchester, near the Pughtown road, which the latter officer, upon examining the ground, discovered would command the principal fortifications.

To cover the movement of General Early, General Johnson took position between the road to Millwood and that to Berryville, and advanced his skirmishers toward the town. General Early, leaving a portion of his command to engage the enemy's attention, with the remainder gained a favorable position without being perceived, and, about 5 p.m., twenty pieces of artillery, under Lieut. Col. H. P. Jones, opened suddenly upon the intrenchments. The enemy's guns were soon silenced. Hays' brigade then advanced to the assault, and carried the works by storm, capturing six rifled pieces, two of which were turned upon and dispersed a column which was forming to retake the position. The enemy immediately abandoned the works on the left of those taken by Hays, and retired into his main fortifications, which General Early prepared to assail in the morning. The loss of the advanced works, however, rendered the others untenable, and the enemy retreated in the night, abandoning his sick and wounded, together with his artillery, wagons, and stores. Anticipating such a movement, as soon as he heard of Early's success, General Ewell directed General Johnson to occupy, with part of his command, a point on the Martinsburg road, about 2½ miles from Winchester, where he could either intercept the enemy's retreat, or aid in an attack should further resistance be offered in the morning'. General Johnson marched with Nicholls' and part of Steuart's brigades, accompanied by Lieutenant-Colonel [R. S.] Andrews with a detachment of his artillery, the Stonewall Brigade being ordered to follow. Finding the road to the place indicated by General Ewell difficult of passage in the darkness, General Johnson pursued that leading by Jordan Springs to Stephenson's Depot, where he took a favorable position on the Martinsburg road, about 5 miles from Winchester. Just as his line was formed, the retreating column, consisting of the main body of General Milroy's army, arrived, and immediately attacked him. The enemy, though in superior force, consisting of both infantry and cavalry, was gallantly repulsed, and, finding all efforts to cut his way unavailing, he sent strong flanking parties simultaneously to the right and left, still keeping up a heavy fire in front. The party on the right was driven back and pursued by the Stonewall Brigade, which opportunely arrived. That on the left was broken and dispersed by the Second and Tenth Louisiana Regiments, aided by the artillery, and in a short time nearly the whole infantry force, amounting to more than 2,300 men, with eleven stand of colors, surrendered, the cavalry alone escaping. General Milroy, with a small party of fugitives, fled to Harper's Ferry. The number of prisoners taken in this action exceeded the force engaged under General Johnson, who speaks in terms of well-deserved praise of the conduct of the officers and men of his command.

In the meantime, General Rodes marched from Berryville to Martinsburg, reaching the latter place in the afternoon of the 14th. The enemy made a show of resistance, but soon gave way, the cavalry and artillery retreating toward Williamsport, the infantry toward Shepherdstown, under cover of night. The route taken by the latter was not known until it was too late to follow; but the former were pursued so rapidly, Jenkins' troops leading, that they were forced to abandon five of their six pieces of artillery. About 200 prisoners were taken, but the enemy destroyed most of his stores.

These operations resulted in the expulsion of the enemy from the Valley; the capture of 4,000 prisoners, with a corresponding number of small-arms; 28 pieces of superior artillery, including those taken by Generals Rodes and Hays; about 300 wagons and as many horses, together with a considerable quantity of ordnance, commissary, and quartermaster's stores.

Our entire loss was 47 killed, 219 wounded, and 3 missing.

MARCH INTO PENNSYLVANIA.
On the night of Ewell's appearance at Winchester, the enemy in front of A. P. Hill, at Fredericksburg, recrossed the Rappahannock, and the whole army of General Hooker withdrew from the north side of the river. In order to mislead him as to our intentions, and at the same time protect Hill's corps in its march up the Rappahannock, Longstreet left Culpeper Court-House on the 15th, and, advancing along the eastern side of the Blue Ridge, occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. He had been joined, while at Culpeper, by General Pickett, with three brigades of his division. General Stuart, with three brigades of cavalry, moved on Longstreet's right, and took position in front of the Gaps. Hampton's and [W. E.]Jones' brigades remained along the Rappahannock and Hazel Rivers, in front of Culpeper Court-House, with instructions to follow the main body as soon as Hill's corps had passed that point.

On the 17th, Fitz. Lee's brigade, under Colonel Munford, which was on the road to Snicker's Gap, was attacked near Aldie by the Federal cavalry. The attack was repulsed with loss, and the brigade held its ground until ordered to fall back, its right being threatened by another body, coming from Hopewell toward Middleburg. The latter force was driven from Middleburg, and pursued toward Hopewell by Robertson's brigade, which arrived about dark. Its retreat was intercepted by W. H. F. Lee's brigade, under Colonel Chambliss, jr., and the greater part of a regiment captured.

During the three succeeding days there was much skirmishing, General Stuart taking a position west of Middleburg, where he awaited the rest of his command.

General Jones arrived on the 19th, and General Hampton in the afternoon of the following day, having repulsed, on his march, a cavalry force sent to reconnoiter in the direction of Warrenton.

On the 21st, the enemy attacked with infantry and cavalry, and obliged General Stuart, after a brave resistance, to fall back to the gaps of the mountains. The enemy retired the next day, having advanced only a short distance beyond Upperville.

In these engagements, the cavalry sustained a loss of 510 killed, wounded, and missing. Among them were several valuable officers, whose names are mentioned in General Stuart's report. One piece of artillery was disabled and left on the field. The enemy's loss was heavy. About 400 prisoners were taken and several stand of colors.

The Federal Army was apparently guarding the approaches to Washington, and manifested no disposition to assume the offensive.

In the meantime, the progress of Ewell, who was already in Maryland, with Jenkins' cavalry advanced into Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg, rendered it necessary that the rest of the army should be within supporting distance, and Hill having reached the Valley, Longstreet was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, and the two corps encamped near Berryville.

General Stuart was directed to hold the mountain passes with part of his command as long as the enemy remained south of the Potomac, and, with the remainder, to cross into Maryland, and place himself on the right of General Ewell. Upon the suggestion of the former officer that he could damage the enemy and delay his passage of the river by getting in his rear, he was authorized to do so, and it was left to his discretion whether to enter Maryland east or west of the Blue Ridge; but he was instructed to lose no time in placing his command on the right of our column as soon as he should perceive the enemy moving northward.

On the 22d, General Ewell marched into Pennsylvania with Rodes' and Johnson's divisions, preceded by Jenkins' cavalry, taking the road from Hagerstown, through Chambersburg, to Carlisle, where he arrived on the 27th. Early's division, which had occupied Boonsborough, moved by a parallel road to Greenwood, and, in pursuance of instructions previously given to General Ewell, marched toward York.

On the 24th, Longstreet and Hill were put in motion to follow Ewell, and, on the 27th, encamped near Chambersburg.

General Imboden, under the orders before referred to, had been operating on Ewell's left while the latter was advancing into Maryland. He drove off the troops guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, and destroyed all the important bridges on that route from Martinsburg to Cumberland, besides inflicting serious damage upon the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. He was at Hancock when Longstreet and Hill reached Chambersburg, and was directed to proceed to the latter place by way of McConnellsburg, collecting supplies for the army on his route.

The cavalry force at this time with the army, consisting of Jenkins' brigade and [E. V.]White's battalion, was not greater than was required to accompany the advance of General Ewell and General Early, with whom it performed valuable service, as appears from their reports. It was expected that as soon as the Federal Army should cross the Potomac, General Stuart would give notice of its movements, and nothing having been heard from him since our entrance into Maryland, it was inferred that the enemy had not yet left Virginia. Orders were, therefore, issued to move upon Harrisburg. The expedition of General Early to York was designed in part to prepare for this undertaking by breaking the railroad between Baltimore and Harrisburg, and seizing the bridge over the Susquehanna at Wrightsville. General Early succeeded in the first object, destroying a number of bridges above and below York, but on the approach of the troops sent by him to Wrightsville, a body of militia stationed at that place fled across the river and burned the bridge in their retreat. General Early then marched to rejoin his corps.

The advance against Harrisburg was arrested by intelligence received from a scout on the night of the 28th, to the effect that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and was approaching the South Mountain. In the absence of the cavalry, it was impossible to ascertain his intentions; but to deter him from advancing farther west, and intercepting our communication with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains.

BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG.
Hill's corps was accordingly ordered to move toward Cashtown on the 29th, and Longstreet to follow the next day, leaving Pickett's division at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by Imboden. General Ewell was recalled from Carlisle, and directed to join the army at Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might require. The advance of the enemy to the latter place was unknown, and the weather being inclement, the march was conducted with a view to the comfort of the troops. Heth's division reached Cashtown on the 29th, and the following morning Pettigrew's brigade, sent by General Heth to procure supplies at Gettysburg, found it occupied by the enemy. Being ignorant of the extent of his force, General Pettigrew was unwilling to hazard an attack with his single brigade, and returned to Cashtown.

General Hill arrived with Pender's division in the evening, and the following morning (July 1) advanced with these two divisions, accompanied by Pegram's and McIntosh's battalions of artillery, to ascertain the strength of the enemy, whose force was supposed to consist chiefly of cavalry. The leading division, under General Heth, found the enemy's vedettes about 3 miles west of Gettysburg, and continued to advance until within a mile of the town, when two brigades were sent forward to reconnoiter. They drove in the advance of the enemy very gallantly, but subsequently encountered largely superior numbers, and were compelled to retire with loss, Brigadier-General Archer, commanding one of the brigades, being taken prisoner. General Heth then prepared for action, and as soon as Pender arrived to support him, was ordered by General Hill to advance. The artillery was placed in position, and the engagement opened with vigor. General Heth pressed the enemy steadily back, breaking his first and second lines, and attacking his third with great resolution. About 2.30 p.m. the advance of Ewell's corps, consisting of Rodes' division, with Carter's battalion of artillery, arrived by the Middletown road, and, forming on Heth's left, nearly at right angles with his line, became warmly engaged with fresh numbers of the enemy. Heth's troops, having suffered heavily in their protracted contest with a superior force, were relieved by Pender's, and Early, coming up by the Heidlersburg road soon afterward, took position on the left of Rodes, when a general advance was made.

The enemy gave way on all sides, and was driven through Gettysburg with great loss. Major-General Reynolds, who was in command, was killed. More than 5,000 prisoners, exclusive of a large number of wounded, three pieces of artillery, and several colors were captured. Among the prisoners were two brigadier-generals, one of whom was badly wounded. Our own loss was heavy, including a number of officers, among whom were Major-General Heth, slightly, and Brigadier-General Scales, of Pender's division, severely, wounded. The enemy retired to a range of hills south of Gettysburg, where he displayed a strong force of infantry and artillery.

It was ascertained from the prisoners that we had been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the remainder of that army, under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg. Without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and exhausted by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill occupied by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward. He decided to await Johnson's division, which had marched from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains to guard the trains of his corps, and consequently did not reach Gettysburg until a late hour.

In the meantime the enemy occupied the point which General Ewell designed to seize, but in what force could not be ascertained, owing to the darkness. An intercepted dispatch showed that another corps had halted that afternoon 4 miles from Gettysburg. Under these circumstances, it was decided not to attack until the arrival of Longstreet, two of whose divisions (those of Hood and McLaws) encamped about 4 miles in the rear during the night. Anderson's division of Hill's corps came up after the engagement.

It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked, but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal Army, to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous. At the same time we were unable to await an attack, as the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could restrain our foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops. A battle had, therefore, become in a measure unavoidable, and the success already gained gave hope of a favorable issue.

The enemy occupied a strong position, with his right upon two commanding elevations adjacent to each other, one southeast and the other, known as Cemetery Hill, immediately south of the town, which lay at its base. His line extended thence upon the high ground along the Emmitsburg road, with a steep ridge in rear, which was also occupied. This ridge was difficult of ascent, particularly the two hills above mentioned as forming its northern extremity, and a third at the other end, on which the enemy's left rested. Numerous stone and rail fences along the slope served to afford protection to his troops and impede our advance. In his front, the ground was undulating and generally open for about three-quarters of a mile.

General Ewell's corps constituted our left, Johnson's division being opposite the height adjoining Cemetery Hill, Early's in the center, in front of the north face of the latter, and Rodes upon his right. Hill's corps faced the west side of Cemetery Hill, and extended nearly parallel to the Emmitsburg road, making an angle with Ewell's, Pender's division formed his left, Anderson's his right, Heth's, under Brigadier-General Pettigrew, being in reserve. His artillery, under Colonel [R. L.] Walker, was posted in eligible positions along his line.

It was determined to make the principal attack upon the enemy's left, and endeavor to gain a position from which it was thought that our artillery could be brought to bear with effect. Longstreet was directed to place the divisions of McLaws and Hood on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the enemy's left, which he was to drive in.

General Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy's center, to prevent reinforcements being drawn to either wing, and co-operate with his right division in Longstreet's attack.

General Ewell was instructed to make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer.

About 4 p.m. Longstreet's batteries opened, and soon afterward Hood's division, on the extreme right, moved to the attack. McLaws followed somewhat later, four of Anderson's brigades, those of Wilcox, Perry, [A. R.] Wright, and Posey supporting him on the left, in the order named. The enemy was soon driven from his position on the Emmitsburg road to the cover of a ravine and a line of stone fences at the foot of the ridge in his rear. He was dislodged from these after a severe struggle, and retired up the ridge, leaving a number of his batteries in our possession. Wilcox's and Wright's brigades advanced with great gallantry, breaking successive lines of the enemy's infantry, and compelling him to abandon much of his artillery. Wilcox reached the foot and Wright gained the crest of the ridge itself, driving the enemy down the opposite side; but having become separated from McLaws and gone beyond the other two brigades of the division, they were attacked in front and on both flanks, and compelled to retire, being unable to bring off any of the captured artillery. McLaws' left also fell back, and, it being now nearly dark, General Longstreet determined to await the arrival of General Pickett. He disposed his command to hold the ground gained on the right, withdrawing his left to the first position from which the enemy had been driven.

Four pieces of artillery, several hundred prisoners, and two regimental flags were taken. As soon as the engagement began on our right, General Johnson opened with his artillery, and about two hours later advanced up the hill next to Cemetery Hill with three brigades, the fourth being detained by a demonstration on his left. Soon afterward, General Early attacked Cemetery Hill with two brigades, supported by a third, the fourth having been previously detached. The enemy had greatly increased by earthworks the strength of the positions assailed by Johnson and Early.

The troops of the former moved steadily up the steep and rugged ascent, under a heavy fire, driving the enemy into his intrenchments, part of which was carried by Steuart's brigade, and a number of prisoners taken. The contest was continued to a late hour, but without further advantage. On Cemetery Hill, the attack by Early's leading brigades--those of Hays and Hoke, under Colonel [I. E.] Avery--was made with vigor. Two lines of the enemy's infantry were dislodged from the cover of some stone and board fences on the side of the ascent, and driven back into the works on the crest, into which our troops forced their way, and seized several pieces of artillery.

A heavy force advanced against their right, which was without support, and they were compelled to retire, bringing with them about 100 prisoners and four stand of colors. General Ewell had directed General Rodes to attack in concert with Early, covering his right, and had requested Brigadier-General Lane, then commanding Pender's division, to co-operate on the right of Rodes. When the time to attack arrived, General Rodes, not having his troops in position, was unprepared to co-operate with General Early, and before he could get in readiness the latter had been obliged to retire for want of the expected support on his right. General Lane was prepared to give the assistance required of him, and so informed General Rodes, but the latter deemed it useless to advance after the failure of Early's attack.

In this engagement our loss in men and officers was large. Major-Generals Hood and Pender, Brigadier-Generals [J. M.] Jones, Semmes, G. T. Anderson, and Barksdale, and Colonel Avery, commanding Hoke's brigade, were wounded, the last two mortally. Generals Pender and Semmes died after their removal to Virginia.

The result of this day's operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, reinforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle-field during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail the enemy's right at the same time. The latter, during the night, re-enforced General Johnson with two brigades from Rodes' and one from Early's division.

General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to General Ewell, General Johnson had already become engaged, and it was too late to recall him. The enemy attempted to recover the works taken the preceding evening, but was repulsed, and General Johnson attacked in turn.

After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon part of his intrenchments, General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly fortified crest of the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force largely superior to that of General Johnson, and finally to threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position about l p.m.

General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high, rocky hills on the enemy's extreme left, from which his troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His operations had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now deemed it necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws. He was, therefore, reinforced by Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's, to the command of which Major-General Trimble was assigned. General Hill was directed to hold his line with the rest of his command, afford General Longstreet further assistance, if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained.

A careful examination was made of the ground secured by Longstreet, and his batteries placed in positions, which, it was believed, would enable them to silence those of the enemy. Hill's artillery and part of Ewell's was ordered to open simultaneously, and the assaulting column to advance under cover of the combined fire of the three. The batteries were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and support their attacks closely.

About 1 p.m., at a given signal, a heavy cannonade was opened, and continued for about two hours with marked effect upon the enemy. His batteries replied vigorously at first, but toward the close their fire slackened perceptibly, and General Longstreet ordered forward the column of attack, consisting of Pickett's and Heth's divisions, in two lines, Pickett on the right. Wilcox's brigade marched in rear of Pickett's right, to guard that flank, and Heth's was supported by Lane's and Scales' brigades, under General Trimble.

The troops moved steadily on, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, the main attack being directed against the enemy's left center.

His batteries reopened as soon as they appeared. Our own having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were unable to reply, or render the necessary support to the attacking party. Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault took place, the enemy was enabled to throw a strong force of infantry against our left, already wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in front, and from Cemetery Hill, on the left. It finally gave way, and the right, after penetrating the enemy's lines, entering his advance works, and capturing some of his artillery, was attacked simultaneously in front and on both flanks, and driven back with heavy loss.

The troops were rallied and reformed, but the enemy did not pursue.

A large number of brave officers and men fell or were captured on this occasion. Of Pickett's three brigade commanders, Generals Armistead and [R. B.] Garnett were killed, and General Kemper dangerously wounded.

Major-General Trimble and Brigadier-General Pettigrew were also wounded, the former severely.

The movements of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry. As soon as it was known that the enemy had crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of [B. H.] Robertson and [William E.] Jones, which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, to rejoin the army without delay, and it was expected that General Stuart, with the remainder of his command, would soon arrive. In the exercise of the discretion given him when Longstreet and Hill marched into Maryland, General Stuart determined to pass around the rear of the Federal Army with three brigades and cross the Potomac between it and Washington, believing that he would be able, by that route, to place himself on our right flank in time to keep us properly advised of the enemy's movements. He marched from Salem on the night of June 24, intending to pass west of Centreville, but found the enemy's forces so distributed as to render that route impracticable. Adhering to his original plan, he was forced to make a wide detour through Buckland and Brentsville, and crossed the Occoquan at Wolf Run Shoals on the morning of the 27th. Continuing his march through Fairfax Court-House and Dranesville, he arrived at the Potomac, below the mouth of Seneca Creek, in the evening.

He found the river much swollen by the recent rains, but, after great exertion, gained the Maryland shore before midnight with his whole command.

He now ascertained that the Federal Army, which he had discovered to be drawing toward the Potomac, had crossed the day before, and was moving toward Frederick, thus interposing itself between him and our forces.

He accordingly marched northward, through Rockville and Westminster, to Hanover, Pa., where he arrived on the 30th; but the enemy advanced with equal rapidity on his left, and continued to obstruct communication with our main body.

Supposing, from such information as he could obtain, that part of the army was at Carlisle, he left Hanover that night, and proceeded thither by way of Dover.

He reached Carlisle on July 1, where he received orders to proceed to Gettysburg. He arrived in the afternoon of the following day, and took position on General Ewell's left. His leading brigade, under General Hampton, encountered and repulsed a body of the enemy's cavalry at Hunterstown, endeavoring to reach our rear.

General Stuart had several skirmishes during his march, and at Hanover quite a severe engagement took place with a strong force of cavalry, which was finally compelled to withdraw from the town. The prisoners taken by the cavalry and paroled at various places amounted to about 800, and at Rockville a large train of wagons coming from Washington was intercepted and captured. Many of them were destroyed, but 125, with all the animals of the train, were secured.

The ranks of the cavalry were much reduced by its long and arduous march, repeated conflicts, and insufficient supplies of food and forage, but the day after its arrival at Gettysburg it engaged the enemy's cavalry with unabated spirit, and effectually protected our left.

In this action, Brigadier-General Hampton was seriously wounded, while acting with his accustomed gallantry.

Robertson's and Jones' brigades arrived on July 3, and were stationed upon our right flank. The severe loss sustained by the army and the reduction of its ammunition, rendered another attempt to dislodge the enemy inadvisable, and it was, therefore, determined to withdraw.

The trains, with such of the wounded as could bear removal, were ordered to Williamsport on July 4, part moving through Cashtown and Greencastle, escorted by General Imboden, and the remainder by the Fairfield road.

The army retained its position until dark, when it was put in motion for the Potomac by the last-named route.

A heavy rain continued throughout the night, and so much impeded its progress that Ewell's corps, which brought up the rear, did not leave Gettysburg until late in the forenoon of the following day. The enemy offered no serious interruption, and, after an arduous march, we arrived at Hagerstown in the afternoon of the 6th and morning of July 7.

The great length of our trains made it difficult to guard them effectually in passing through the mountains, and a number of wagons and ambulances were captured. They succeeded in reaching Williamsport on the 6th, but were unable to cross the Potomac on account of the high stage of water. Here they were attacked by a strong force of cavalry and artillery, which was gallantly repulsed by General Imboden, whose command had been strengthened by several batteries and by two regiments of infantry, which had been detached at Winchester to guard prisoners, and were returning to the army.

While the enemy was being held in check, General Stuart arrived with the cavalry, which had performed valuable service in guarding the flanks of the army during the retrograde movement, and, after a short engagement, drove him from the field. The rains that had prevailed almost without intermission since our entrance into Maryland, and greatly interfered with our movements, had made the Potomac unfordable, and the pontoon bridge left at Falling Waters had been partially destroyed by the enemy. The wounded and prisoners were sent over the river as rapidly as possible in a few ferry-boats, while the trains awaited the subsiding of the waters and the construction of a new pontoon bridge.

On July 8, the enemy's cavalry advanced toward Hagerstown, but was repulsed by General Stuart, and pursued as far as Boonsborough.

With this exception, nothing but occasional skirmishing occurred until the 12th, when the main body of the enemy arrived. The army then took a position previously selected, covering the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, where it remained for two days, with the enemy immediately in front, manifesting no disposition to attack, but throwing up intrenchments along his whole line.

By the 13th, the river at Williamsport, though still deep, was ford-able, and a good bridge was completed at Falling Waters, new boats having being constructed and some of the old recovered. As further delay would enable the enemy to obtain re-enforcements, and as it was found difficult to procure a sufficient supply of flour for the troops, the working of the mills being interrupted by high water, it was determined to await an attack no longer.

Orders were accordingly given to cross the Potomac that night, Ewell's corps by the ford at Williamsport, and those of Longstreet and Hill on the bridge.

The cavalry was directed to relieve the infantry skirmishers, and bring up the rear.

The movement was much retarded by a severe rain storm and the darkness of the night. Ewell's corps, having the advantage of a turnpike road, marched with less difficulty, and crossed the river by 8 o'clock the following morning. The condition of the road to the bridge and the time consumed in the passage of the artillery, ammunition wagons, and ambulances, which could not ford the river, so much delayed the progress of Longstreet and Hill, that it was daylight before their troops began to cross. Heth's division was halted about a mile and a half from the bridge, to protect the passage of the column. No interruption was offered by the enemy until about 11 a.m., when his cavalry, supported by artillery, appeared in front of General Heth.

A small number in advance of the main body was mistaken for our own cavalry retiring, no notice having been given of the withdrawal of the latter, and was suffered to approach our lines. They were immediately destroyed or captured, with the exception of two or three, but Brigadier-General Pettigrew, an officer of great merit and promise, was mortally wounded in the encounter. He survived his removal to Virginia only a few days.

The bridge being clear, General Heth began to withdraw. The enemy advanced, but his efforts to break our lines were repulsed, and the passage of the river was completed by 1 p.m. Owing to the extent of General Heth's line, some of his men most remote from the bridge were cut off before they could reach it, but the greater part of those taken by the enemy during the movement (supposed to amount in all to about 500) consisted of men from various commands who lingered behind, overcome by previous labors and hardships, and the fatigue of a most trying night march. There was no loss of materiel excepting a few broken wagons and two pieces of artillery, which the horses were unable to draw through the deep mud. Other horses were sent back for them, but the rear of the column had passed before their arrival.

The army proceeded to the vicinity of Bunker Hill and Darkesville, where it halted to afford the troops repose. The enemy made no effort to follow excepting with his cavalry, which crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, and advanced toward Martinsburg on July 16.

They were attacked by General Fitz. Lee, with his own and Chambliss' brigades, and driven back with loss. When the army returned to Virginia, it was intended to move into Loudoun, but the Shenandoah was found to be impassable. While waiting for it to subside, the enemy crossed the Potomac east of the Blue Ridge, and seized the passes we designed to use. As he continued to advance along the eastern slope, apparently with the purpose of cutting us off from the railroad to Richmond, General Longstreet was ordered, on July 19, to proceed to Culpeper Court-House, by way of Front Royal. He succeeded in passing part of his command over the Shenandoah in time to prevent the occupation of Manassas and Chester Gaps by the enemy, whose cavalry had already made its appearance.

As soon as a pontoon bridge could be laid down, the rest of his corps crossed the river, and marched through Chester Gap to Culpeper Court-House, where it arrived on the 24th. He was followed without serious opposition by General A. P. Hill.

General Ewell having been detained in the Valley by an effort to capture a force of the enemy guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad west of Martinsburg, Wright's brigade was left to hold Manassas Gap until his arrival. He reached Front Royal on the 23d, with Johnson's and Rodes' divisions, Early's being near Winchester, and found General Wright skirmishing with the enemy's infantry, which had already appeared in Manassas Gap. General Ewell supported Wright with Rodes' division and some artillery, and the enemy was held in check.

Finding that the Federal force Greatly exceeded his own, General Ewell marched through Thornton's Gap, and ordered Early to move up the Valley by Strasburg and New Market. He encamped near Madison Court-House on July 29.

The enemy massed his army in the vicinity of Warrenton, and, on the night of July 31, his cavalry, with a large supporting force of infantry, crossed the Rappahannock at Rappahannock Station and Kelly's Ford.

The next day they advanced toward Brandy Station, their progress being gallantly resisted by General Stuart with Hampton's brigade, commanded by Colonel [L. S.] Baker, who fell back gradually to our lines, about 2 miles south of Brandy. Our infantry skirmishers advanced, and drove the enemy beyond Brandy Station. It was now determined to place the army in a position to enable it more readily to oppose the enemy should he attempt to move southward, that near Culpeper Court-House being one that he could easily avoid. Longstreet and Hill were put in motion August 3, leaving the cavalry at Culpeper. Ewell had been previously ordered from Madison, and, by the 4th, the army occupied the line of the Rapidan.

The highest praise is due to both officers and men for their conduct during the campaign. The privations and hardships of the march and camp were cheerfully encountered, and borne with a fortitude unsurpassed by our ancestors in their struggle for independence, while their courage in battle entitles them to rank with the soldiers of any army and of any time. Their forbearance and discipline, under strong provocation to retaliate for the cruelty of the enemy to our own citizens, is not their least claim to the respect and admiration of their countrymen and of the world.

I forward returns of our loss in killed, wounded, and missing. Many of the latter were killed or wounded in the several assaults at Gettysburg, and necessarily left in the hands of the enemy. I cannot speak of these brave men as their merits and exploits deserve. Some of them are appropriately mentioned in the accompanying reports, and the memory of all will be gratefully and affectionately cherished by the people in whose defense they fell.

The loss of Major-General-Pender is severely felt by the army and the country. He served with this army from the beginning of the war, and took a distinguished part in all its engagements. Wounded on several occasions, he never left his command in action until he received the injury that resulted in his death. His promise and usefulness as an officer were only equaled by the purity and excellence of his private life.

Brigadier-Generals Armistead, Barksdale, Garnett, and Semmes died as they had lived, discharging the highest duty of patriots with devotion that never faltered and courage that shrank from no danger.

I earnestly commend to the attention of the Government those gallant officers and men whose conduct merited the special commendation of their superiors, but whose names I am unable to mention in this report.

The officers of the general staff of the army were unremittingly engaged in the duties of their respective departments. Much depended on their management and exertion. The labors of the quartermaster's, commissary, and medical departments were more than usually severe. The inspectors-general were also laboriously occupied in their attention to the troops, both on the march and in camp, and the officers of engineers showed skill and judgment in expediting the passage of rivers and streams, the swollen condition of which, by almost continuous rains, called for extraordinary exertion.

The chief of ordnance and his assistants are entitled to praise for the care and watchfulness given to the ordnance trains and ammunition of the army, which, in a long march and in many conflicts, were always at hand and accessible to the troops.

My thanks are due to my personal staff for their constant aid afforded me at all times, on the march and in the field, and their willing discharge of every duty.

There were captured at Gettysburg nearly 7,000 prisoners, of whom about 1,500 were paroled, and the remainder brought to Virginia. Seven pieces of artillery were also secured.

I forward herewith the reports of the corps, division, and other commanders mentioned in the accompanying schedule, together with maps of the scene of operations, and one showing the routes pursued by the army.

Respectfully submitted.
R. E. Lee
General.
 
I don't know how this very old and VERY long thread (in words, not in number of posts) came up as the first choice in an Early/Longstreet search, but I will add to it just one short, but not so-sweet assessment of Ol' Jube by Ol' Pete. It comes from the Idaho Statesman of March 4, 1894:
idsttsmn94.jpeg
So, there!

P.S. I would also advise this very informative thread be moved to the Longstreet Forum.
 
I don't know how this very old and VERY long thread (in words, not in number of posts) came up as the first choice in an Early/Longstreet search, but I will add to it just one short, but not so-sweet assessment of Ol' Jube by Ol' Pete. It comes from the Idaho Statesman of March 4, 1894:
So, there!

P.S. I would also advise this very informative thread be moved to the Longstreet Forum.
I would observe that Longstreet's opinion was likely influenced heavily by the drubbing he had been receiving regularly from Early and other members of the Lost Cause school for his own political transgressions and use by them as a scapegoat. Considering the successes he had before Sheridan arrived on the scene with his overwhelming force, Early seems to have done as well or even much better than might've been expected. Consider his accomplishments: He chased Hunter completely out of the theater and war for at least six weeks; crossed the Potomac, defeating Lew Wallace's scratch force at Monocacy; threatened Washington and "scared Abe Lincoln like Hell"; trounced Crook at Cold Spring and again at Second Kernstown, killing Mulligan in the process; forced Sheridan back into his Harper's Ferry works; sent McCausland to burn Chambersburg; ransomed several other towns and cities in Maryland including Frederick; and most importantly and Stonewall-like, tied up approximately three times his own number so they couldn't be employed against Lee at Petersburg. Of course, when he fell he fell spectacularly, but only after almost four months of success.
 
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