Did Vicksburg live up to its "Gibraltar of the Confedercy" hype?

Vicksburg held out for about 40 days of open trenches, not bad. The city held out longer than Lille, Cuidad Rodrigo, the citadel of Antwerp, Badajoz, Masstricht and quite a few other cities and fortresses besieged in the days of black powder warfare. Of course the defenders were helped by the difficult terrain and Army of the Tennessee lacking a large number of engineers, professional sappers and proper mortars. But what the Midwesterners lacked in eqipment and professionalism they often made up for in common sense, enthusiasm and enterprise.

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I like Will Carry's observation that Vicksburg was in deed, in the final sense, a "paper lion". But I think we may all agree that the lion did have teeth, and if handled better (Johnston not being prompt, and Pemberton using his forces to better advantage, come to mind) the outcome could have been a lot better for the Confederacy.
How long did it take for Grant and Sherman to take Vicksburg
I have often wondered if Vicksburg was not "over hyped" as an impregnable bastion of the Confederacy along the Mississippi River? Notwithstanding the fact that Vicksburg's line of defenses were never seriously breached, it only took Grant a little over a month to starve the city into submission once he had his forces in place encircling the city. To me, Vicksburg is like the unit that advances too far from their lines and finds itself surrounded with little or no chance of escape. Grant had sealed off escape to the east, and Porter's control of the river both north and south closed escape to the west. In your opinion just how "impregnable" do you thing Vicksburg was?
Any fortified position when time is on the one siegeing side ,when they are recieving supplies to continue or is not force to end the siege will be able to wear down inhabitiants .With Vicksburg the end came with Sherman moving his force though that low land and thus shuting off any hope of retreat.The only way that the city could have been saved is if there could have been a force equal or superior to the siegeing forces.The wisest thing was for the army to either go out and attach or to vacate the city and join forces with other Confederate armies.The lost of that army will cost the Western front more than just the lost of the city.Question; why did Pemberton stay knowing what he was risking.?Could there have been a force to relieve Vicksburg ? What part did the public play in his decesion to stay? To be known as the general to have left Vickburg defenseless would be court martial or just humiliation worse than Longstreet joining the Republicans.As to being the GILBATAR that was before Grant ,Sherman,and Foote{ naval commder}
 
How long did it take for Grant and Sherman to take Vicksburg
The siege lasted from May 18 til July 4.

As soon as Pemberton entered the city any question of escape, with Grant surrounding the city, and the Navy controlling the river both north and south, was pretty much a foregone conclusion.
 
Vicksburg could only be usefully compared to Gibraltar had the rebels controlled the Mississippi and Yazoo the way the British controlled the sea; during the Great Siege of Gibraltar the Royal Navy brought supplies and reinforcements to the garrison.
 
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Some CW "impregnable" positions:

Drewry's Bluff...

From the Richmond Sentinel, 7/29/1863, p. 2, c. 4

"Drewry's Bluff. This Gibraltar is growing rapidly to be quite a village. In addition to the soldiers' quarters, neat log-houses have been erected for their families and the refugee ladies and children from Norfolk and Portsmouth. A hotel has been established and is doing a good business; a post-office is also in operation, with mail facilities with Richmond twice a day. It also contains a very neat chapel, the pulpit of which is filled by the ministers from the city on the Sabbath. Another attractive feature is the splendid market garden, cultivated by the soldiers, which furnishes them with an abundance of excellent vegetables."

The phrase "The Gibraltar of the..." can have a couple different audiences and reasons for it's use.

Both Singapore and Truk Island had that label.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
Interesting thought. You could look up various sieges to see how they began. In medieval times the enemy would arrive and attempt to negotiate surrender. If that failed, they would fire arrows into the castle to officially announce the siege.

During the CW, at Yorktown, the Union began with siege lines (didn't attack first), so the siege began at that point. It's true that Grant tried to break through first, as he did not want a lengthy siege, so you have a point.
 
During the CW, at Yorktown, the Union began with siege lines (didn't attack first), so the siege began at that point. It's true that Grant tried to break through first, as he did not want a lengthy siege, so you have a point.

I don't consider the affair at Yorktown a siege as such but an attack on a fortified line to be preceded by a bombardment, like during the Great War. Now during the Revolution, when Cornwallis was invested and cut off, that was a proper siege.

As an interesting aside the "British" fortifications at Yorktown are actually Confederate ones, some of which were built atop the ruins of the British ones. And so much restoration and reconstruction work was done in the 1930s that it's hard to tell exactly what is and what isn't real, so to speak. But it's still cool, at Yorktown, Ninety Six and Vicksburg you get a pretty good idea of what a black powder warfare siege was about.

Regards
 
I'm pretty sure that that was the primary reason Pemberton surrendered when he did (the timing of the 4th of July being somewhat fortuitous-- I doubt that, his later remarks aside, that really made a huge difference in the decision). He saw the writing on the wall and realized at last that Johnston could not get to town before Grant could.
Did Pemberton have a chance to leave before Grant /Sherman closed the gates.and if he did have time why risk all of those men that could have been used else where? He had performed his duty.Why place the citizens into a siege that would cost do mush destruction and starvation.He could have used that force latter again with Johnston.
 
Did Pemberton have a chance to leave before Grant /Sherman closed the gates.and if he did have time why risk all of those men that could have been used else where? He had performed his duty.Why place the citizens into a siege that would cost do mush destruction and starvation.He could have used that force latter again with Johnston.
He was told to hold Vicksburg at all hazards by Davis and if the city was besieged reenforcements would be sent. That never happened. Regardless, Pemberton did his duty.

"After the siege, Confederate President Jefferson Davis wrote to Pemberton, "I thought and still think you did right to risk an army for the purpose of keeping command of even a section of the Mississippi River. Had you succeeded, none would have blamed, had you not made the attempt few would have defended your course."
https://www.nps.gov/vick/planyourvisit/pembgrant.htm
 
Did Pemberton have a chance to leave before Grant /Sherman closed the gates.and if he did have time why risk all of those men that could have been used else where?

Yes, the Mechanicsburg Corridor. Huskerblitz explained above why he did not.
 
Yes, the Mechanicsburg Corridor. Huskerblitz explained above why he did not.
To anyone who is still perplexed by Pemberton's actions at Vicksburg, I recommend reading the various correspondence of his, Johnston's, and President Davis' in the OR volumes. It's all online and indexed. This is cumbersome, but important if you are serious about understanding this topic. The opinions and theories of others are often tainted by 'north vs south' prejudices and are only as valid as the research they have done prior to posting.

I have read all of it, and it was well worth the effort.
 
He was told to hold Vicksburg at all hazards by Davis and if the city was besieged reenforcements would be sent. That never happened. Regardless, Pemberton did his duty.

"After the siege, Confederate President Jefferson Davis wrote to Pemberton, "I thought and still think you did right to risk an army for the purpose of keeping command of even a section of the Mississippi River. Had you succeeded, none would have blamed, had you not made the attempt few would have defended your course."
https://www.nps.gov/vick/planyourvisit/pembgrant.htm
Question; Did Jefferson Davis want to be in charge of the army.? Does this sound a rational man or does this sound like a man who has loss all sense of reality? This is he who would do the same thing at Atlanta.HOLD even if your army is destroyed and the popualtion is starving.Read the accounts of what was occuring in both cities. How many troops surrendered at Vickburg? I do wonder what Davis looked line in a woman's wrape.Who had him carved next to Lee and Jackson on Stone Mountain? That turncoat Longstreet would have been a better choise
 
The opinions and theories of others are often tainted by 'north vs south' prejudices and are only as valid as the research they have done prior to posting.

This is one reason my reading Grabau was such an eye-opener. His MO of approaching each situation from each side's perspective, with what they knew or could have known at the time, rather than the all-seeing eye of history, is utterly fascinating.
 
This is one reason my reading Grabau was such an eye-opener. His MO of approaching each situation from each side's perspective, with what they knew or could have known at the time, rather than the all-seeing eye of history, is utterly fascinating.
I agree. I can't believe it is now out of print. Nonetheless, his work is simply monumental and a "must have" for those interested in the campaign!
 
This is one reason my reading Grabau was such an eye-opener. His MO of approaching each situation from each side's perspective, with what they knew or could have known at the time, rather than the all-seeing eye of history, is utterly fascinating.

Mark, I almost mentioned that reading Grabau would probably suffice; however, there is good correspondence available for the period prior to that which Grabau's work covers. Also, although Bearss work covering the 1862 siege and Grabau's covering 1863, both relying heavily on the OR's, I think it's always valuable to go directly to the source, simply because of human interpretations.

I have a very different feeling about Pemberton since reading the correspondence in the OR's. From the OR's it is obvious that it was very important to him to follow Davis' directive to protect Vicksburg at all costs - both men considered this a priority for the Confederacy's survival. But there were other issues involved: the antagonism of Johnston toward the other two, the military sense of Pemberton and his generals as opposed to directives (conflicting) from Johnston and Davis, the overhanging shadow of the fact that Pemberton was a Northerner, and the fact that he was actually in Vicksburg having to deal with reality, while the other two were elsewhere.

More than anything, I think Johnston wanted to avoid any responsibility for what he saw as a no-win situation, fearing that any direction he gave might be viewed in the future as causing a defeat, and hoping that Pemberton would figure everything out on his own and miraculously save Vicksburg. In Pemberton's place (or Johnston's), I think a general like Grant might have figured something out. Grant realized that his superiors would forgive him as long as his actions resulted in victory. Pemberton, not so much. I wonder what Grant would have done? Maybe I'll start a thread.
 
This is one reason my reading Grabau was such an eye-opener. His MO of approaching each situation from each side's perspective, with what they knew or could have known at the time, rather than the all-seeing eye of history, is utterly fascinating.
I started reading Grabau and got about 75 pages into it and stopped, simply because I had not yet digested the 1862 siege and my Bearss' book arrived. I'm still re-reading Bearss' work on 1862, as well as various journals and diaries and the OR's. It is all interesting, but dry at times and a lot of facts to digest. Once I feel comfortable with 1862 I'll go back to Grabau. I really can't wait - his book is easily my favorite every written about Vicksburg.

You miss out on a lot if you limit yourself to 1863 Vicksburg - a lot went on in 1862 that people forget about. For instance, Farragut ran the batteries in 1862 and then, as a result realized that a city-front invasion would not work, so planned instead to assault the river defenses while the army attacked and took the town from the rear (Grant's plan a year later). Farragut was then told that his plan was a waste of time (I think it was Butler, but might have been Welles), as the Union could cut a canal through Desoto point, diverting the Mississippi and making Vicksburg worthless. It didn't work in 1862, and again in 1863. It took the river making its own mind up in 1876 (a Centennial present to the U.S.A and a fu to the town of Vicksburg).
 
I started reading Grabau and got about 75 pages into it and stopped, simply because I had not yet digested the 1862 siege and my Bearss' book arrived. I'm still re-reading Bearss' work on 1862, as well as various journals and diaries and the OR's.

I have Bearss' Rebel Victory at Vicksburg and the trilogy (I think of Rebel Victory as a sort of prelude to the latter, although of course it was written years earlier). Loved them both, although discussion on this site has indicated that Bearss, while to be taken seriously, is not necessarily the last word on the topic. How do you feel?
 
I have Bearss' Rebel Victory at Vicksburg and the trilogy (I think of Rebel Victory as a sort of prelude to the latter, although of course it was written years earlier). Loved them both, although discussion on this site has indicated that Bearss, while to be taken seriously, is not necessarily the last word on the topic. How do you feel?

That's a tough question as I have not read the Bearss trilogy - it's expensive to acquire and I'm still studying 1862. Is the trilogy written in the same style as 'Rebel Victory'? i.e-painful amount of detail and loads of references to the 'Official Records' books? Does it cover 1862 as well? I had heard that it was a subset of the trilogy, but it sounds like that might be an erroneous assumption that I invented.

I do consider 'Rebel Victory' as the best single volume reference for the 1862 siege and events leading up to it Some of the 1863 siege books talk about 1862, but not in near as much detail.
 
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