That sounds good but that was not Lee's intention which was to engage the AoP on ground of his choosing the fact that Lee ended up fighting a battle at all is a fluke and pure fate , He did not want to engage at all.I think the problem here is that it fails to engage with the concept of Bewegungskrieg. The whole idea is to be able to generate engagements which you then win decisively on account of your numerical and positional superiority at the point of contact - for example, Day One of Gettysburg pretty much aligns with this in concept. Lee catches some of the AotP with most of his army and largely destroys two corps, and then on Day Two he has a real opportunity to bring on the decisive engagment while large chunks of the AotP have not yet arrived on the field.
Certainly operating on the defensive offers advantages, but so does operating on the offensive; the point of operations is to create situations where you can come off the winner overall. If the whole AoNV got to isolate, engulf, attack and overwhelm one Union corps at a time, it would do much better than if it had to fight the whole AotP concentrated in one place.
Lee had no knowledge of where the Union corps were and its testament to the fighting ability of Union troops on the first day that they managed to hold him up for so long again myth busting that the CSA soldier was better , Lee by rights should have carried the high ground on that first day having 2 much larger corps than the two fielded by the Union but poor decision making at brigade and division level meant it wasn't to be.
I don't think enough credit is given to the XI corp they always seem to be the scape goats for that first day but from what i have read they performed the best they could under extreme pressure and poor command choices.