Did the Confedecry or Union have the best Engineers?

major bill

Brev. Brig. Gen'l
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Joined
Aug 25, 2012
I have just finished reading two books on Sherman's March to the Sea. His engineers did a unbelievable job of supporting the March to the Sea. I could not help but wonder if the Confederate engineers were as effective as the engineers who aided Sherman. So in your opinion were Confederate engineers as effective as Union engineers?
 
I found this some time ago while reading on Gen. R.E.Lee's career as an engineer, prior to joining the 2nd Texas Cav and saved the pdf file to my PC. This is only a portion of the entire report due to post length but if anyone wants it in it's entirety Ill be glad to upload the pdf. Its 9 pages all together so its not too bad to print if anyone prefers that option. It gives some good insight into military engineers before and during the Civil war on both sides, as well as many pro's and con's of both the US and Confederate army's use of engineers or in some cases lack there of.

On 6 March 1861, after the South seceded from the United States, the provisional Congress of the Confederate States of America passed "an act for the establishment and organization of the (Confederate) Army." Among other provisions, it called for the establishment of the Confederate Corps of Engineers. Since the primary source of men trained in the skills of artillery and engineering for the United States was West Point, those who attended classes together, as well as those who provided the instruction, chose sides when the Civil War began. (For example, in January 1861, the superintendent of West Point was Captain P.G.T. Beauregard. Four months later--as a newly promoted general--his troops opened fire on South Carolina's Fort Sumter a Union fort commanded by Major R. Anderson, who years earlier had been the artillery instructor for cadet Beauregard at West Point.) The Union Army received the greater share of these officers and the experience they brought with them. Of the 65 cadets who had resigned from West Point and accepted commissions in the Confederate Army by May 1861, only seven were in the Corps of Engineers. An additional 13 officers were inherited from the academy faculty, but seven of them were soon detached outside the Corps of Engineers.

The innovations employed by the Confederate engineer units during the Civil War were remarkable. Field fortifications dominated the Confederate defensive operations and were extensively employed in their offensive operations. A zigzag system of trenches, which had never been used in field operations, protected the approach. Such entrenchment methods previously had been used exclusively for siege operations. Field Fortifications Union Captain Orlando Poe, General William T. Sherman's chief engineer, admired one particular innovation he had observed-the "head log," which was invented to cope with the deadly accuracy of sharpshooters. The head log was described as "a stout log, of hardwood if possible, which is cut as long as possible and laid upon blocks placed on the superior slope for a foot or two outside the interior crest. The blocks supporting the head log raise it sufficiently from the parapet to allow the musket to pass through underneath it and steady aim to be taken, while the log covers the head from the enemy's fire. Frequently, the blocks are replaced by skids which rest on the ground in the rear of the trench so that if the head log is knocked off the parapet by artillery fire, it rolls along these skids to the rear without injuring anyone.

The Confederate Army often demonstrated its skill at strategic defenses in the tactics used by General Joseph Johnston. His troops would construct as many as three lines of fieldworks, including one to their rear. Johnston attended, with meticulous detail, to the general organization and detail of the entrenchment, while the engineer officer of each unit was in charge of the entrenchment, selecting the lines and placing each unit in position. The Union Army routinely left this function to the troops themselves. Poe reported, "The constant practice of our troops has made them tolerably good judges of what constitutes a good defensive line and lightened the labors of the engineer staff very materially."


The Union was slow to appreciate the effectiveness of the Confederate defensive tactics. In June 1862, the defense of Vicksburg, Mississippi, under the command of General John Pemberton, was under way. The Confederates threw up two circular fieldworks that were connected by rifle trenches. The Union Army's General Ulysses S. Grant failed to entrench his offensive line or even to entrench his camps. The Union forces staged three assaults, the first on 29 December 1862 with forces commanded by General Sherman. The second and third assaults by Grant's forces were on 19 and 21 May 1863, this time after a six-hour artillery bombardment by land and from the river. Grant captured a few works but could not hold them. On 4 July 1863, Pemberton, who was short of food and ammunition, surrendered after defending for 213 days. Grant had employed 220 artillery pieces, while the defenders hardly used any artillery. Pemberton had defended Vicksburg with a force of 18,500 men and lost about 800 during the siege. Grant had engaged about 30,000 men, and his force was almost decimated.

In June 1864, near the end of Grant's Overland Campaign, the Confederate Army again demonstrated the power of its engineers at a crossroads in Virginia known as Cold Harbor. General Robert E. Lee had lost the crossroads while fighting General Grant's forces during the preceding days. Early on 2 June, Lee's soldiers began to erect a defensive works. Although Grant wanted to attack immediately and roll over Lee's forces before they could complete their efforts, his units were unable to complete necessary preparations in time for the sunrise assault. So Grant rescheduled the attack on Lee for dawn on 3 June. Meanwhile, Lee's men dug frantically throughout the day on 2 June. Confederate engineers from Richmond used long cords marked with small strips of white cloth, expertly laying out the lines to maximize the fields of fire. The earthworks were low-lying and did not look at all impressive. A Union officer recollected, "The country being generally level and only slightly undulating, the sharpest eye could perceive through the woods and fields nothing but faint lines of rifle trenches." A little before 0500 on 3 June, after a brief bombardment, Grant's forces began their assault on the Confederate positions. The mass charge of nearly 60,000 Union soldiers was shattered in less than an hour. Major General Andrew Humphreys, the Union Army's chief of staff, later tallied the Union losses for the day at 4,517 wounded and 1,100 dead. After the war, Grant wrote, "I have always regretted that the last assault on Cold Harbor was ever made."

The Overland Campaign was finished and Grant now focused on taking Petersburg, Virginia, a siege that would last nine and a half months. A new philosophy had emerged within the Union ranks. After Cold Harbor, General William F. Smith said, "It had become an axiom among both officers and men that a well-defended rifle trench could not be carried by a direct attack without the most careful preparation, nor even then without fearful loss." On 18 June 1864, Union forces tried once more to storm an entrenched Confederate line at Petersburg. Within ten minutes, 241 Union soldiers were killed and 371 were wounded. The message at last penetrated to the highest echelons of the Union command. Until 2 April 1865, when the war was almost over, the mere sight of Confederate field entrenchments ahead terminated many offensive operations at Petersburg.

The Confederacy pursued a strategy of waging a defensive war but, in the offense, its engineer forces were both innovative and highly effective. One especially successful technique involved creating a skirmish line that moved increasingly closer to the enemy's works. The line protected itself by digging individual rifle pits. Working parties then joined the chain of pits into an ordinary rifle trench, which they later strengthened. By this means, entire earthworks could end up within 200 feet of each other. A number of items for use in the offense were invented out of necessity. One such innovation was the sap roller, a large cylindrical basket that was closed at both ends and filled with rocks and soil. "Sappers" would roll the basket until they were directly in front of the Union positions. The advantage to this was that troops could move onto enemy defensive works while under fire and prepare a rifle trench almost on top of the enemy and be relatively free of the murderous fire the enemy could deliver.

Confederate engineers were also employed in developing new weapons in hopes of gaining an advantage on the battlefield. Among these was the introduction of a railroad artillery battery. During the Peninsular Campaign of 1862, General Lee suggested that a railroad battery be built for the Confederates. It would be used on the York River Railroad to halt the advance of General George B. McClellan along this line. On 5 June 1862, Lee wrote his chief engineer, Major W. Stevens, and suggested that the Confederate engineers "construct a railroad ... plated and protected with a heavy gun." He also suggested that mortars be used in a similar manner. Lee hoped the gun would be in action by 6 June; however, it was not available until 22 June. The 32-pound gun was rifled and banded and weighed 5,700 pounds. Mounted on a railroad flatcar, it was protected in front by a sloping iron-plated shield through which a porthole had been cut for the muzzle of the gun. The sides of the car were protected with timbered walls that were lined with iron. The basic ammunition load consisted of 200 rounds, including a number of 15-inch solid bolt shot. The gun was first used at Savage's Station, Virginia, on 29 June during the Seven Day's Battles. The gun, under command of Lieutenant James E. Barry, was pushed near a rail bridge near the depot. He was to clear an obstruction emplaced by the Union troops and rake the infantry in the valley below with fire. He accomplished his mission with a terrible effect. The Union infantry's attempted assault on the gun was repulsed, and the Union suffered heavy losses.

Besides field fortifications and trench warfare, engineers were responsible for the rail systems that provided transportation for supplies needed by the armies. Dominance of both the rail and waterway transportation systems would contribute greatly to the ultimate victory of the Union forces, but the Confederate forces often made good use of the rail resources available to them throughout the duration of the war. Like Grant, Lee understood the importance of the rail system during the war and had employed his engineers in the system's maintenance and expansion. Although Lee did not have the use of the waterways that the Union enjoyed, he still needed to move troops and materials. At his disposal, Lee had the Orange, the Alexandria, and the Virginia Central Railroads. The combined system extended from Richmond to within 40 miles of Washington, D.C. However, compared to the Union's Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, the Confederate rail system was very limited in the number of miles of track and the general quality. The Union dominance of rail transportation was actually strengthened by the decisions of the Confederates regarding their existing system. First, the tracks for the southern rail systems were laid in a north-south direction and were not interconnected--a problem that could have been overcome by laying new tracks. But Congress was slow to respond to Lee's requests, and he expressed his concern in a letter written on 27 April 1861 just after assuming field command. In addition, southern railroads were not subordinated to military needs, in contrast to the organization and administration of railroads in the North.

The Confederacy was never able to gain dominance in rail transportation, and the new breed of weapons and tactics introduced by the ill-fated nation's engineers did not provide the edge they needed to win the Civil War. However, the Confederate engineers' battlefield tactics changed the face of warfare, forever allowing commanders to mass and redeploy troops and transport supplies with previously unimagined rapidity and effectiveness. On the battlefield, the engineers demonstrated with gory clarity the contributions they could make. The innovations they introduced were the foundation of warfare of the future.



The Professional Bulletin for Army Engineers, Oct, 2000
 
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I haven't the foggiest notion, overall. I'd say individual engineers on either side probably brought off some amazing feats at one time or another. Can this really even be judged?
Engineers are only as good as the resources, material, and manpower to build their visions. That being said, of course the Union could accomplish more, but the Confederacy was very capable given what they had to work with. There can't be a fair judgement as to whom was "better"--both sides had the brains, but not the same access to the building blocks.
 
I found this some time ago while reading on Gen. R.E.Lee's career as an engineer, prior to joining the 2nd Texas Cav and saved the pdf file to my PC. This is only a portion of the entire report due to post length but if anyone wants it in it's entirety Ill be glad to upload the pdf. Its 9 pages all together so its not too bad to print if anyone prefers that option. It gives some good insight into military engineers before and during the Civil war on both sides, as well as many pro's and con's of both the US and Confederate army's use of engineers or in some cases lack there of.

On 6 March 1861, after the South seceded from the United States, the provisional Congress of the Confederate States of America passed "an act for the establishment and organization of the (Confederate) Army." Among other provisions, it called for the establishment of the Confederate Corps of Engineers. Since the primary source of men trained in the skills of artillery and engineering for the United States was West Point, those who attended classes together, as well as those who provided the instruction, chose sides when the Civil War began. (For example, in January 1861, the superintendent of West Point was Captain P.G.T. Beauregard. Four months later--as a newly promoted general--his troops opened fire on South Carolina's Fort Sumter a Union fort commanded by Major R. Anderson, who years earlier had been the artillery instructor for cadet Beauregard at West Point.) The Union Army received the greater share of these officers and the experience they brought with them. Of the 65 cadets who had resigned from West Point and accepted commissions in the Confederate Army by May 1861, only seven were in the Corps of Engineers. An additional 13 officers were inherited from the academy faculty, but seven of them were soon detached outside the Corps of Engineers.

The innovations employed by the Confederate engineer units during the Civil War were remarkable. Field fortifications dominated the Confederate defensive operations and were extensively employed in their offensive operations. A zigzag system of trenches, which had never been used in field operations, protected the approach. Such entrenchment methods previously had been used exclusively for siege operations. Field Fortifications Union Captain Orlando Poe, General William T. Sherman's chief engineer, admired one particular innovation he had observed-the "head log," which was invented to cope with the deadly accuracy of sharpshooters. The head log was described as "a stout log, of hardwood if possible, which is cut as long as possible and laid upon blocks placed on the superior slope for a foot or two outside the interior crest. The blocks supporting the head log raise it sufficiently from the parapet to allow the musket to pass through underneath it and steady aim to be taken, while the log covers the head from the enemy's fire. Frequently, the blocks are replaced by skids which rest on the ground in the rear of the trench so that if the head log is knocked off the parapet by artillery fire, it rolls along these skids to the rear without injuring anyone.

The Confederate Army often demonstrated its skill at strategic defenses in the tactics used by General Joseph Johnston. His troops would construct as many as three lines of fieldworks, including one to their rear. Johnston attended, with meticulous detail, to the general organization and detail of the entrenchment, while the engineer officer of each unit was in charge of the entrenchment, selecting the lines and placing each unit in position. The Union Army routinely left this function to the troops themselves. Poe reported, "The constant practice of our troops has made them tolerably good judges of what constitutes a good defensive line and lightened the labors of the engineer staff very materially."


The Union was slow to appreciate the effectiveness of the Confederate defensive tactics. In June 1862, the defense of Vicksburg, Mississippi, under the command of General John Pemberton, was under way.In June 1862, the defense of Vicksburg, Mississippi, under the command of General John Pemberton, was under way. The Confederates threw up two circular fieldworks that were connected by rifle trenches. The Union Army's General Ulysses S. Grant failed to entrench his offensive line or even to entrench his camps. The Union forces staged three assaults, the first on 29 December 1862 with forces commanded by General Sherman. The second and third assaults by Grant's forces were on 19 and 21 May 1863, this time after a six-hour artillery bombardment by land and from the river. Grant captured a few works but could not hold them. On 4 July 1863, Pemberton, who was short of food and ammunition, surrendered after defending for 213 days. Grant had employed 220 artillery pieces, while the defenders hardly used any artillery. Pemberton had defended Vicksburg with a force of 18,500 men and lost about 800 during the siege. Grant had engaged about 30,000 men, and his force was almost decimated.

In June 1864, near the end of Grant's Overland Campaign, the Confederate Army again demonstrated the power of its engineers at a crossroads in Virginia known as Cold Harbor. General Robert E. Lee had lost the crossroads while fighting General Grant's forces during the preceding days. Early on 2 June, Lee's soldiers began to erect a defensive works. Although Grant wanted to attack immediately and roll over Lee's forces before they could complete their efforts, his units were unable to complete necessary preparations in time for the sunrise assault. So Grant rescheduled the attack on Lee for dawn on 3 June. Meanwhile, Lee's men dug frantically throughout the day on 2 June. Confederate engineers from Richmond used long cords marked with small strips of white cloth, expertly laying out the lines to maximize the fields of fire. The earthworks were low-lying and did not look at all impressive. A Union officer recollected, "The country being generally level and only slightly undulating, the sharpest eye could perceive through the woods and fields nothing but faint lines of rifle trenches." A little before 0500 on 3 June, after a brief bombardment, Grant's forces began their assault on the Confederate positions. The mass charge of nearly 60,000 Union soldiers was shattered in less than an hour. Major General Andrew Humphreys, the Union Army's chief of staff, later tallied the Union losses for the day at 4,517 wounded and 1,100 dead. After the war, Grant wrote, "I have always regretted that the last assault on Cold Harbor was ever made."

The Overland Campaign was finished and Grant now focused on taking Petersburg, Virginia, a siege that would last nine and a half months. A new philosophy had emerged within the Union ranks. After Cold Harbor, General William F. Smith said, "It had become an axiom among both officers and men that a well-defended rifle trench could not be carried by a direct attack without the most careful preparation, nor even then without fearful loss." On 18 June 1864, Union forces tried once more to storm an entrenched Confederate line at Petersburg. Within ten minutes, 241 Union soldiers were killed and 371 were wounded. The message at last penetrated to the highest echelons of the Union command. Until 2 April 1865, when the war was almost over, the mere sight of Confederate field entrenchments ahead terminated many offensive operations at Petersburg.

The Confederacy pursued a strategy of waging a defensive war but, in the offense, its engineer forces were both innovative and highly effective. One especially successful technique involved creating a skirmish line that moved increasingly closer to the enemy's works. The line protected itself by digging individual rifle pits. Working parties then joined the chain of pits into an ordinary rifle trench, which they later strengthened. By this means, entire earthworks could end up within 200 feet of each other. A number of items for use in the offense were invented out of necessity. One such innovation was the sap roller, a large cylindrical basket that was closed at both ends and filled with rocks and soil. "Sappers" would roll the basket until they were directly in front of the Union positions. The advantage to this was that troops could move onto enemy defensive works while under fire and prepare a rifle trench almost on top of the enemy and be relatively free of the murderous fire the enemy could deliver.

Confederate engineers were also employed in developing new weapons in hopes of gaining an advantage on the battlefield. Among these was the introduction of a railroad artillery battery. During the Peninsular Campaign of 1862, General Lee suggested that a railroad battery be built for the Confederates. It would be used on the York River Railroad to halt the advance of General George B. McClellan along this line. On 5 June 1862, Lee wrote his chief engineer, Major W. Stevens, and suggested that the Confederate engineers "construct a railroad ... plated and protected with a heavy gun." He also suggested that mortars be used in a similar manner. Lee hoped the gun would be in action by 6 June; however, it was not available until 22 June. The 32-pound gun was rifled and banded and weighed 5,700 pounds. Mounted on a railroad flatcar, it was protected in front by a sloping iron-plated shield through which a porthole had been cut for the muzzle of the gun. The sides of the car were protected with timbered walls that were lined with iron. The basic ammunition load consisted of 200 rounds, including a number of 15-inch solid bolt shot. The gun was first used at Savage's Station, Virginia, on 29 June during the Seven Day's Battles. The gun, under command of Lieutenant James E. Barry, was pushed near a rail bridge near the depot. He was to clear an obstruction emplaced by the Union troops and rake the infantry in the valley below with fire. He accomplished his mission with a terrible effect. The Union infantry's attempted assault on the gun was repulsed, and the Union suffered heavy losses.

Besides field fortifications and trench warfare, engineers were responsible for the rail systems that provided transportation for supplies needed by the armies. Dominance of both the rail and waterway transportation systems would contribute greatly to the ultimate victory of the Union forces, but the Confederate forces often made good use of the rail resources available to them throughout the duration of the war. Like Grant, Lee understood the importance of the rail system during the war and had employed his engineers in the system's maintenance and expansion. Although Lee did not have the use of the waterways that the Union enjoyed, he still needed to move troops and materials. At his disposal, Lee had the Orange, the Alexandria, and the Virginia Central Railroads. The combined system extended from Richmond to within 40 miles of Washington, D.C. However, compared to the Union's Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, the Confederate rail system was very limited in the number of miles of track and the general quality. The Union dominance of rail transportation was actually strengthened by the decisions of the Confederates regarding their existing system. First, the tracks for the southern rail systems were laid in a north-south direction and were not interconnected--a problem that could have been overcome by laying new tracks. But Congress was slow to respond to Lee's requests, and he expressed his concern in a letter written on 27 April 1861 just after assuming field command. In addition, southern railroads were not subordinated to military needs, in contrast to the organization and administration of railroads in the North.

The Confederacy was never able to gain dominance in rail transportation, and the new breed of weapons and tactics introduced by the ill-fated nation's engineers did not provide the edge they needed to win the Civil War. However, the Confederate engineers' battlefield tactics changed the face of warfare, forever allowing commanders to mass and redeploy troops and transport supplies with previously unimagined rapidity and effectiveness. On the battlefield, the engineers demonstrated with gory clarity the contributions they could make. The innovations they introduced were the foundation of warfare of the future.



The Professional Bulletin for Army Engineers, Oct, 2000

Gathering all these great pdfs like this here in one place is the reason why I would like to start a virtual bookshelf on CWT!
I have already offered to host that bookshelf, maybe it will be opened one day! Until then, keep all your download links, we might start a great collection of e-publications for everyone to enjoy. And as we would only list the download links, copyright will allow us to do so.
 
IIRC veteran units from both side became battlefield grade engineers by late in the war and needed little direction setting up fairly complex and useful defenses. I agree with the statement that both side had the brains. So terrain and ground selection was probably good on both side with some exceptions.
I have not read, however, of a feat comparable to Sherman's bridge and road building, etc. performed by the south. That building your own roads was NOT because of some better supply by the North. They just used what was there to their advantage.
It does seem to me that one advantage the average veteran Confederate unit had towards the end of the war was quickly building earthen forts that were very defensible with few men. They were forced to learn.

I don't know if the spade and axe work was ever as good for the south as the north except in the mentioned situations. IMO
 
Engineers are only as good as the resources, material, and manpower to build their visions. That being said, of course the Union could accomplish more, but the Confederacy was very capable given what they had to work with. There can't be a fair judgement as to whom was "better"--both sides had the brains, but not the same access to the building blocks.

Valid point sir, but look at it this way for a minute; who accomplished the most with the least? Confederate army, 7 former US engineers, acting as engineers (don't forget Lee was an engineer long before he was Gen. Lee also. So he had a clue), though they ended up with a larger number of engineers than the Union long before the end of the war. Basically 3 rail lines all running North to South, with very little means to quickly move soldiers, less access to materials, very few low quality foundries to craft the items they would need to connect those rail lines even if they had the materials. Less firepower and manpower forcing them to conduct themselves in a defensive manner. Being forced to play defense against superior numbers forced them to be creative with their defenses; zig zag rifle trenches previously only used for siege warfare operations. Multiple lines of fieldworks complicating approach, including rear lines.(remember no mans land? No thank you! I think Grant and the Union soldiers agreed with my feelings on the subject too.) Just think of Vicksburg, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, the amount of time they held out and the number of casualties inflicted on the Union army compared to the number taken even in the face of a vastly superior force. The South lasted as long as they did because of being forced to run defense through the entire war. They never had a chance to win looking back, but who would have thought they'd even last as long as they did against those odds? I wouldn't dare bet on those odds in a Million years. I think sometimes that the South was always destined to lose in the end due to the common soldier knowing deep down from the beginning, that the Norths cause was the right one. I can't help but to feel that way as a Southerner that loves my country and defended her also. That's another subject though.
Then there's the sharpshooters that forced the Union soldiers to keep their heads down or lose them at 600+ yards, that forced the invention of the head log by necessity. (remember the "They couldn't hit an elephant at this distance" crack? Wrong.. Head shot. Que the angel band. Stretcher bearer! Im lucky to hit a 5 gallon bucket with a modern made .58 cal. Springfield, or Enfield at 350 meters and I qualified expert on the rifle range first attempt, with a score of 245, using a beat, 20 year old, army, sh@tcanned M-16, and have made over 700 meter kill shots with multiple civilian weapon systems, consistently without milspec scopes squeeze bags or a spotter and using a folded field jacket as a rest. Using only over pressure vapor trails, impact visuals as my guide, and mil dots to adjust. "Kentucky windage". That's with 40+ years of practice and years of military training. 600m shots with an ACW weapon as a young man with little training is freakin amazingly impressive even using today's standards. Anyone that disagrees with that can grab a weapon and prove they can do better, even though half as good would be impressive to me or anyone else that knows the first thing about marksmanship. We didn't shoot over 500 yards with modern firearms to qualify but I doubt most common everyday people could hit a cow that far away even utilizing a modern weapon with a scope. Both sides had good marksmen without a doubt, but the South arguably had more by the end of the war and dominated skirmish and picket combat. Though to be fair the North did have more in the beginning and were also very effective and deadly in the peninsular campaign. Which, in turn forced the South to adapt and overcome, which they did, again..Against all odds.. Looking back, everything the Southern army excelled in were areas in which the Northern army forced their hand . Quite a feat to say the least, to last as long as they did, even though in the end they lost, and it was best they did in hindsight. I can't help but respect the discipline and always forward attitude of the Southern soldier, in the face of unquestionable odds of defeat, but have equal respect for the discipline and drive of the Union soldier to fight for their country. Our country.
I'm sure I missed Thousands of good points, posted things others will debate, and carried my rant out far too long, as well as this massive wall of text, so Ill end it here with this. No matter what the Souths cause was for war. No matter what political or financial gains were to be had. No matter the cost. Both armies fought bravely and professionally even if held to today's standards and all those soldiers should be remembered and respected for that if nothing else, in my opinion. We wouldn't be the country we are today had the ACW never been sparked. I have no doubt about that. In the end it showed the world we, the United States of America, couldn't even be destroyed from within and made us stronger using hard earned, harsh, ugly, lessons of death and destruction, suffering, sickness and sadness. We should never forget those lessons or the men and women, of all races creed and color, that died so we could understand and teach them today. Hiding from history is a lose, lose situation. It always has been and always will be. Forgotten mistakes are bound to be repeated.
 
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Im lucky to hit a 5 gallon bucket with a modern made .58 cal. Springfield, or Enfield at 350 meters and I qualified expert
I hit a target at around 320 yards with a .22 mag rifle one time. Oh, but it was by accident! I almost forgot that! My actual target was 125 yards away and the tree I hit was downrange and lower by a few feet than my REAL target. Accidental, that's the big difference LOL.
 
Valid point sir, but look at it this way for a minute; who accomplished the most with the least? Confederate army, 7 former US engineers, acting as engineers (don't forget Lee was an engineer long before he was Gen. Lee also. So he had a clue), though they ended up with a larger number of engineers that the Union long before the end of the war. Basically 3 rail lines all running North to South, with very little means to quickly move soldiers, less access to materials, very few low quality foundries to craft the items they would need to connect those rail lines even if they had the materials. Less firepower and manpower forcing them to conduct themselves in a defensive manner. Being forced to play defense against superior numbers forced them to be creative with their defenses; zig zag rifle trenches previously only used for siege warfare operations. Multiple lines of fieldworks complicating approach, including rear lines.(remember no mans land? No thank you! I think Grant and the Union soldiers agreed with my feelings on the subject too.) Just think of Vicksburg, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, the amount of time they held out and the number of casualties inflicted on the Union army compared to the number taken even in the face of a vastly superior force. The South lasted as long as they did because of being forced to run defense through the entire war. They never had a chance to win looking back, but who would have thought they'd even last as long as they did against those odds? I wouldn't dare bet on those odds in a Million years. I think sometimes that the South was always destined to lose in the end due to the common soldier knowing deep down from the beginning, that the Norths cause was the right one. I can't help but to feel that way as a Southerner that loves my country and defended her also. That's another subject though.
Then there's the sharpshooters that forced the Union soldiers to keep their heads down or lose them at 600+ yards, that forced the invention of the head log by necessity. (remember the "They couldn't hit an elephant at this distance" crack? Wrong.. Head shot. Que the angel band. Stretcher bearer! Im lucky to hit a 5 gallon bucket with a modern made .58 cal. Springfield, or Enfield at 350 meters and I qualified expert on the rifle range first attempt, with a score of 245, using a beat, 20 year old, army, sh@tcanned M-16, and have made over 700 meter kill shots with multiple civilian weapon systems, consistently without milspec scopes squeeze bags or a spotter and using a folded field jacket as a rest. Using only over pressure vapor trails, impact visuals as my guide, and mil dots to adjust. "Kentucky windage". That's with 40+ years of practice and years of military training. 600m shots with an ACW weapon as a young man with little training is freakin amazingly impressive even using today's standards. Anyone that disagrees with that can grab a weapon and prove they can do better, even though half as good would be impressive to me or anyone else that knows the first thing about marksmanship. We didn't shoot over 500 yards with modern firearms to qualify but I doubt most common everyday people could hit a cow that far away even utilizing a modern weapon with a scope. Both sides had good marksmen without a doubt, but the South arguably had more by the end of the war and dominated skirmish and picket combat. Though to be fair the North did have more in the beginning and were also very effective and deadly in the peninsular campaign. Which, in turn forced the South to adapt and overcome, which they did, again..Against all odds.. Looking back, everything the Southern army excelled in were areas in which the Northern army forced their hand . Quite a feat to say the least, to last as long as they did, even though in the end they lost, and it was best they did in hindsight. I can't help but respect the discipline and always forward attitude of the Southern soldier, in the face of unquestionable odds of defeat, but have equal respect for the discipline and drive of the Union soldier to fight for their country. Our country.
I'm sure I missed Thousands of good points, posted things others will debate, and carried my rant out far too long, as well as this massive wall of text, so Ill end it here with this. No matter what the Souths cause was for war. No matter what political or financial gains were to be had. No matter the cost. Both armies fought bravely and professionally even if held to today's standards and all those soldiers should be remembered and respected for that if nothing else, in my opinion. We wouldn't be the country we are today had the ACW never been sparked. I have no doubt about that. In the end it showed the world we, the United States of America, couldn't even be destroyed from within and made us stronger using hard earned, harsh, ugly, lessons of death and destruction, suffering, sickness and sadness. We should never forget those lessons or the men and women, of all races creed and color, that died so we could understand and teach them today. Hiding from history is a lose, lose situation. It always has been and always will be. Forgotten mistakes are bound to be repeated.

Wow! One of the best posts I have ever read on CWT!!
Thank you for this, it was most impressive to read.
 
I hit a target at around 320 yards with a .22 mag rifle one time. Oh, but it was by accident! I almost forgot that! My actual target was 125 yards away and the tree I hit was downrange and lower by a few feet than my REAL target. Accidental, that's the big difference LOL.
Thats a realistic shot for a .22 mag with a little practice. Keep it up! You can hammer bean cans at that range every round with that weapon if you stick to it. I've noticed over time that just being used to your weapon is more important than most other rules of marksmanship. If you're comfortable then your breathing will relax along with your heart beat and in turn will help you make those shots which will build your confidence for the next target.
 
Valid point sir, but look at it this way for a minute; who accomplished the most with the least? Confederate army, 7 former US engineers, acting as engineers (don't forget Lee was an engineer long before he was Gen. Lee also. So he had a clue), though they ended up with a larger number of engineers than the Union long before the end of the war. Basically 3 rail lines all running North to South, with very little means to quickly move soldiers, less access to materials, very few low quality foundries to craft the items they would need to connect those rail lines even if they had the materials. Less firepower and manpower forcing them to conduct themselves in a defensive manner. Being forced to play defense against superior numbers forced them to be creative with their defenses; zig zag rifle trenches previously only used for siege warfare operations. Multiple lines of fieldworks complicating approach, including rear lines.(remember no mans land? No thank you! I think Grant and the Union soldiers agreed with my feelings on the subject too.) Just think of Vicksburg, Cold Harbor, Petersburg, the amount of time they held out and the number of casualties inflicted on the Union army compared to the number taken even in the face of a vastly superior force. The South lasted as long as they did because of being forced to run defense through the entire war. They never had a chance to win looking back, but who would have thought they'd even last as long as they did against those odds? I wouldn't dare bet on those odds in a Million years. I think sometimes that the South was always destined to lose in the end due to the common soldier knowing deep down from the beginning, that the Norths cause was the right one. I can't help but to feel that way as a Southerner that loves my country and defended her also. That's another subject though.
Then there's the sharpshooters that forced the Union soldiers to keep their heads down or lose them at 600+ yards, that forced the invention of the head log by necessity. (remember the "They couldn't hit an elephant at this distance" crack? Wrong.. Head shot. Que the angel band. Stretcher bearer! Im lucky to hit a 5 gallon bucket with a modern made .58 cal. Springfield, or Enfield at 350 meters and I qualified expert on the rifle range first attempt, with a score of 245, using a beat, 20 year old, army, sh@tcanned M-16, and have made over 700 meter kill shots with multiple civilian weapon systems, consistently without milspec scopes squeeze bags or a spotter and using a folded field jacket as a rest. Using only over pressure vapor trails, impact visuals as my guide, and mil dots to adjust. "Kentucky windage". That's with 40+ years of practice and years of military training. 600m shots with an ACW weapon as a young man with little training is freakin amazingly impressive even using today's standards. Anyone that disagrees with that can grab a weapon and prove they can do better, even though half as good would be impressive to me or anyone else that knows the first thing about marksmanship. We didn't shoot over 500 yards with modern firearms to qualify but I doubt most common everyday people could hit a cow that far away even utilizing a modern weapon with a scope. Both sides had good marksmen without a doubt, but the South arguably had more by the end of the war and dominated skirmish and picket combat. Though to be fair the North did have more in the beginning and were also very effective and deadly in the peninsular campaign. Which, in turn forced the South to adapt and overcome, which they did, again..Against all odds.. Looking back, everything the Southern army excelled in were areas in which the Northern army forced their hand . Quite a feat to say the least, to last as long as they did, even though in the end they lost, and it was best they did in hindsight. I can't help but respect the discipline and always forward attitude of the Southern soldier, in the face of unquestionable odds of defeat, but have equal respect for the discipline and drive of the Union soldier to fight for their country. Our country.
I'm sure I missed Thousands of good points, posted things others will debate, and carried my rant out far too long, as well as this massive wall of text, so Ill end it here with this. No matter what the Souths cause was for war. No matter what political or financial gains were to be had. No matter the cost. Both armies fought bravely and professionally even if held to today's standards and all those soldiers should be remembered and respected for that if nothing else, in my opinion. We wouldn't be the country we are today had the ACW never been sparked. I have no doubt about that. In the end it showed the world we, the United States of America, couldn't even be destroyed from within and made us stronger using hard earned, harsh, ugly, lessons of death and destruction, suffering, sickness and sadness. We should never forget those lessons or the men and women, of all races creed and color, that died so we could understand and teach them today. Hiding from history is a lose, lose situation. It always has been and always will be. Forgotten mistakes are bound to be repeated.
I am in 100% agreement with you, Mr. Warren, concerning the South's capabilities in engineering; as for the eloquent aspects of the rest--that's for another thread. I would like to see this thread continue regarding engineering, not branch off into a dozen different topics, especially the mind set of the "common" Confederate soldier.
 
I am in 100% agreement with you, Mr. Warren, concerning the South's capabilities in engineering; as for the eloquent aspects of the rest--that's for another thread. I would like to see this thread continue regarding engineering, not branch off into a dozen different topics, especially the mind set of the "common" Confederate soldier.
I'm done. Carry on good sir! :smile: Agreed also. We've got enough of those for sure. I know I got a little carried away but I made the post when I got up this morning while drinking 2 pots of coffee. I'll try not to do that again.
 
I found this some time ago while reading on Gen. R.E.Lee's career as an engineer, prior to joining the 2nd Texas Cav and saved the pdf file to my PC. This is only a portion of the entire report due to post length but if anyone wants it in it's entirety Ill be glad to upload the pdf. Its 9 pages all together so its not too bad to print if anyone prefers that option. It gives some good insight into military engineers before and during the Civil war on both sides, as well as many pro's and con's of both the US and Confederate army's use of engineers or in some cases lack there of.

On 6 March 1861, after the South seceded from the United States, the provisional Congress of the Confederate States of America passed "an act for the establishment and organization of the (Confederate) Army." Among other provisions, it called for the establishment of the Confederate Corps of Engineers. Since the primary source of men trained in the skills of artillery and engineering for the United States was West Point, those who attended classes together, as well as those who provided the instruction, chose sides when the Civil War began. (For example, in January 1861, the superintendent of West Point was Captain P.G.T. Beauregard. Four months later--as a newly promoted general--his troops opened fire on South Carolina's Fort Sumter a Union fort commanded by Major R. Anderson, who years earlier had been the artillery instructor for cadet Beauregard at West Point.) The Union Army received the greater share of these officers and the experience they brought with them. Of the 65 cadets who had resigned from West Point and accepted commissions in the Confederate Army by May 1861, only seven were in the Corps of Engineers. An additional 13 officers were inherited from the academy faculty, but seven of them were soon detached outside the Corps of Engineers.

The innovations employed by the Confederate engineer units during the Civil War were remarkable. Field fortifications dominated the Confederate defensive operations and were extensively employed in their offensive operations. A zigzag system of trenches, which had never been used in field operations, protected the approach. Such entrenchment methods previously had been used exclusively for siege operations. Field Fortifications Union Captain Orlando Poe, General William T. Sherman's chief engineer, admired one particular innovation he had observed-the "head log," which was invented to cope with the deadly accuracy of sharpshooters. The head log was described as "a stout log, of hardwood if possible, which is cut as long as possible and laid upon blocks placed on the superior slope for a foot or two outside the interior crest. The blocks supporting the head log raise it sufficiently from the parapet to allow the musket to pass through underneath it and steady aim to be taken, while the log covers the head from the enemy's fire. Frequently, the blocks are replaced by skids which rest on the ground in the rear of the trench so that if the head log is knocked off the parapet by artillery fire, it rolls along these skids to the rear without injuring anyone.

The Confederate Army often demonstrated its skill at strategic defenses in the tactics used by General Joseph Johnston. His troops would construct as many as three lines of fieldworks, including one to their rear. Johnston attended, with meticulous detail, to the general organization and detail of the entrenchment, while the engineer officer of each unit was in charge of the entrenchment, selecting the lines and placing each unit in position. The Union Army routinely left this function to the troops themselves. Poe reported, "The constant practice of our troops has made them tolerably good judges of what constitutes a good defensive line and lightened the labors of the engineer staff very materially."


The Union was slow to appreciate the effectiveness of the Confederate defensive tactics. In June 1862, the defense of Vicksburg, Mississippi, under the command of General John Pemberton, was under way. The Confederates threw up two circular fieldworks that were connected by rifle trenches. The Union Army's General Ulysses S. Grant failed to entrench his offensive line or even to entrench his camps. The Union forces staged three assaults, the first on 29 December 1862 with forces commanded by General Sherman. The second and third assaults by Grant's forces were on 19 and 21 May 1863, this time after a six-hour artillery bombardment by land and from the river. Grant captured a few works but could not hold them. On 4 July 1863, Pemberton, who was short of food and ammunition, surrendered after defending for 213 days. Grant had employed 220 artillery pieces, while the defenders hardly used any artillery. Pemberton had defended Vicksburg with a force of 18,500 men and lost about 800 during the siege. Grant had engaged about 30,000 men, and his force was almost decimated.

In June 1864, near the end of Grant's Overland Campaign, the Confederate Army again demonstrated the power of its engineers at a crossroads in Virginia known as Cold Harbor. General Robert E. Lee had lost the crossroads while fighting General Grant's forces during the preceding days. Early on 2 June, Lee's soldiers began to erect a defensive works. Although Grant wanted to attack immediately and roll over Lee's forces before they could complete their efforts, his units were unable to complete necessary preparations in time for the sunrise assault. So Grant rescheduled the attack on Lee for dawn on 3 June. Meanwhile, Lee's men dug frantically throughout the day on 2 June. Confederate engineers from Richmond used long cords marked with small strips of white cloth, expertly laying out the lines to maximize the fields of fire. The earthworks were low-lying and did not look at all impressive. A Union officer recollected, "The country being generally level and only slightly undulating, the sharpest eye could perceive through the woods and fields nothing but faint lines of rifle trenches." A little before 0500 on 3 June, after a brief bombardment, Grant's forces began their assault on the Confederate positions. The mass charge of nearly 60,000 Union soldiers was shattered in less than an hour. Major General Andrew Humphreys, the Union Army's chief of staff, later tallied the Union losses for the day at 4,517 wounded and 1,100 dead. After the war, Grant wrote, "I have always regretted that the last assault on Cold Harbor was ever made."

The Overland Campaign was finished and Grant now focused on taking Petersburg, Virginia, a siege that would last nine and a half months. A new philosophy had emerged within the Union ranks. After Cold Harbor, General William F. Smith said, "It had become an axiom among both officers and men that a well-defended rifle trench could not be carried by a direct attack without the most careful preparation, nor even then without fearful loss." On 18 June 1864, Union forces tried once more to storm an entrenched Confederate line at Petersburg. Within ten minutes, 241 Union soldiers were killed and 371 were wounded. The message at last penetrated to the highest echelons of the Union command. Until 2 April 1865, when the war was almost over, the mere sight of Confederate field entrenchments ahead terminated many offensive operations at Petersburg.

The Confederacy pursued a strategy of waging a defensive war but, in the offense, its engineer forces were both innovative and highly effective. One especially successful technique involved creating a skirmish line that moved increasingly closer to the enemy's works. The line protected itself by digging individual rifle pits. Working parties then joined the chain of pits into an ordinary rifle trench, which they later strengthened. By this means, entire earthworks could end up within 200 feet of each other. A number of items for use in the offense were invented out of necessity. One such innovation was the sap roller, a large cylindrical basket that was closed at both ends and filled with rocks and soil. "Sappers" would roll the basket until they were directly in front of the Union positions. The advantage to this was that troops could move onto enemy defensive works while under fire and prepare a rifle trench almost on top of the enemy and be relatively free of the murderous fire the enemy could deliver.

Confederate engineers were also employed in developing new weapons in hopes of gaining an advantage on the battlefield. Among these was the introduction of a railroad artillery battery. During the Peninsular Campaign of 1862, General Lee suggested that a railroad battery be built for the Confederates. It would be used on the York River Railroad to halt the advance of General George B. McClellan along this line. On 5 June 1862, Lee wrote his chief engineer, Major W. Stevens, and suggested that the Confederate engineers "construct a railroad ... plated and protected with a heavy gun." He also suggested that mortars be used in a similar manner. Lee hoped the gun would be in action by 6 June; however, it was not available until 22 June. The 32-pound gun was rifled and banded and weighed 5,700 pounds. Mounted on a railroad flatcar, it was protected in front by a sloping iron-plated shield through which a porthole had been cut for the muzzle of the gun. The sides of the car were protected with timbered walls that were lined with iron. The basic ammunition load consisted of 200 rounds, including a number of 15-inch solid bolt shot. The gun was first used at Savage's Station, Virginia, on 29 June during the Seven Day's Battles. The gun, under command of Lieutenant James E. Barry, was pushed near a rail bridge near the depot. He was to clear an obstruction emplaced by the Union troops and rake the infantry in the valley below with fire. He accomplished his mission with a terrible effect. The Union infantry's attempted assault on the gun was repulsed, and the Union suffered heavy losses.

Besides field fortifications and trench warfare, engineers were responsible for the rail systems that provided transportation for supplies needed by the armies. Dominance of both the rail and waterway transportation systems would contribute greatly to the ultimate victory of the Union forces, but the Confederate forces often made good use of the rail resources available to them throughout the duration of the war. Like Grant, Lee understood the importance of the rail system during the war and had employed his engineers in the system's maintenance and expansion. Although Lee did not have the use of the waterways that the Union enjoyed, he still needed to move troops and materials. At his disposal, Lee had the Orange, the Alexandria, and the Virginia Central Railroads. The combined system extended from Richmond to within 40 miles of Washington, D.C. However, compared to the Union's Baltimore & Ohio Railroad, the Confederate rail system was very limited in the number of miles of track and the general quality. The Union dominance of rail transportation was actually strengthened by the decisions of the Confederates regarding their existing system. First, the tracks for the southern rail systems were laid in a north-south direction and were not interconnected--a problem that could have been overcome by laying new tracks. But Congress was slow to respond to Lee's requests, and he expressed his concern in a letter written on 27 April 1861 just after assuming field command. In addition, southern railroads were not subordinated to military needs, in contrast to the organization and administration of railroads in the North.

The Confederacy was never able to gain dominance in rail transportation, and the new breed of weapons and tactics introduced by the ill-fated nation's engineers did not provide the edge they needed to win the Civil War. However, the Confederate engineers' battlefield tactics changed the face of warfare, forever allowing commanders to mass and redeploy troops and transport supplies with previously unimagined rapidity and effectiveness. On the battlefield, the engineers demonstrated with gory clarity the contributions they could make. The innovations they introduced were the foundation of warfare of the future.



The Professional Bulletin for Army Engineers, Oct, 2000
The design of the armoured battery is often credited to John M Brooke, I have an open mind on this, for two reasons. One ,great minds often think alike when confronted with the same question and two ,because Isambard Kingdom Brunel designed a very similar battery for the British War department. they turned it down, but there is anecdotal evidence that his drawings were known in America, indeed at least one railroad used a version of his original track design the so called "baulk road", so why not his railway gun?
 
I'm done. Carry on good sir! :smile: Agreed also. We've got enough of those for sure. I know I got a little carried away but I made the post when I got up this morning while drinking 2 pots of coffee. I'll try not to do that again.
No problem at all...I get the same way from coffee :wink:.
 
The design of the armoured battery is often credited to John M Brooke, I have an open mind on this, for two reasons. One ,great minds often think alike when confronted with the same question and two ,because Isambard Kingdom Brunel designed a very similar battery for the British War department. they turned it down, but there is anecdotal evidence that his drawings were known in America, indeed at least one railroad used a version of his original track design the so called "baulk road", so why not his railway gun?
Who knows for sure where Gen. Lee got the idea. He may have be introduced to it from another source, possibly foreign. Good question and I have to admit that I don't have a clue to what the answer is. We could guess all day and play with hypothetical's but that really wont get us anywhere. I do think its worth checking into though and just wrote it down on my "things to look into list" I keep on my desk.
 
Although engineers are often discussed in establishing defensive positions, engineers are properly utilized during all phases of military operations. A good commander will use the engineers in their offensive operations as well as during offensive and defensive planning.

I will give an example. A good commander will seek the advice of the engineers of where to build bridges or roads to out flank an enemy's defensive positions. A good defensive commander will seek engineer advice as to where and how fast their opponent can utilize engineering assets to bypass or degrade their defensive preparations.
 
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