Did the 20th Maine go it alone to Big Round Top?

gary

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Joined
Feb 20, 2005
I was reading Alice Trulock's "In the Hands of Providence" and she states that the 20th Maine crept up Big Round Top. They were later joined by the Pennsylvania Reserves. Can anybody confirm this?
 
There were elements of Berdans on their left flank there as well & IIRC other units were on their right flank. Though I'll have to dig to see who they were. Gettysburg is not my forte.
 
The Union units involved on BRT on day 2 are discussed in one of my posts in the topic:
"Which unit was driven from Big Round Top"
 
In terms of after action reports, it is the 20th Maine which moved first on the orders of Col. Fisher.. Here's the quote, with some snipping for brevity to get the idea of men in motion, not events:

"We were apprehensive that if the enemy were allowed to strengthen himself in that position, he would have a great advantage in renewing the attack on us at daylight or before. Colonel Rice then directed me to make the movement to seize that crest.
It was now 9 p.m. Without waiting to get ammunition, but trusting in part to the very circumstance of not exposing our movement or our small front by firing, and with bayonets fixed, the little handful of 200 men pressed up the mountain side in very extended order, as the steep and jagged surface of the ground compelled...
... Reaching the crest, and reconnoitering the ground, I placed the men in a strong position among the rocks, and informed Colonel Rice, requesting also ammunition and some support to our right, which was very near the enemy, their movements and words even being now distinctly heard by us.
...
Feeling somewhat insecure in this isolated position, I sent in for the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, which came speedily, followed by the Forty-fourth New York, and, having seen these well posted, I sent a strong picket to the front, with instructions to report to me every half hour during the night, and allowed the rest of my men to sleep on their arms.
... "
--end of snipping, see http://www.civilwarhome.com/chamberl.html --

Colonel Fisher's two brigades reached them for support by the next morning, at which point, as we know, the 20th Maine was moved into reserve... but inadvertently to near where the AofNV artillery barrage began prior to the AofNV charge.
 
Initially, yes, and without firing a shot. After dark on July 2, Chamberlain's exhausted and bloodied 20th Maine was rousted from a well deserved rest to lead the way for two quite fresh and untested Pennsylvania Reserve regiments (5th and 12th), because the latter's brigade commander, Colonel Fisher, made the case to Colonel Rice that his two regiments were unfamiliar with the ground and possessed inferior "buck and ball" weapons. When Chamberlain advanced up the slope as skirmishers, around 9 p.m., the two Pennsylvania Reserve regiments were not ready to follow, and by the time they were ready, the 20th Maine was nowhere to be seen. The 5th and 12th moved out in line formation, which quickly disintegrated due to the rocky terrain and they became lost somewhere on the north slope. The 5th finally made contact with the right of the 20th Maine, but they made so much noise in trying to reverse their line (when fronted they would have faced the wrong way!) that Confederate skirmishers opened fire and sent the 5th and 12th scurrying back down the hill (like "antelopes" as Chamberlain described it) toward the northeast. That's when Chamberlain sent for his fellow 83rd Pennsylvania regiment, which had no trouble moving into position upon the right of the 20th. Meanwhile the 5th and 12th rallied at the base of the hill and by around 11:30 p.m. proceeded cautiously around its eastern base, coming up behind skirmishers of Grant's 5th Vermont, and then moved due west up the steep slope to the summit, which they reached around midnight. The 20th Maine was a bit further down the slope to the northwest and Chamberlain did not even bother to link up with the two Pennsylvania Reserve regiments at the summit.

Meanwhile, as the 5th and 12th were trying to find the way, the Confederates sent out a group to reconnoiter and they were gobbled up by a handful of 20th Maine men on the picket line.

This entire episode reveals Fisher's ineptitude. 1) He had time to reconnoiter the slope of Big Round Top before dark, but failed to do so. 2) His two regiments, although sitting idle for nearly two hours, were not ready to move at the appointed time. 3) They moved out in line formation instead of open order. 4) They were aligned the wrong way. 5) Fisher did not personally lead them.
 
In terms of after action reports, it is the 20th Maine which moved first on the orders of Col. Fisher.. Here's the quote, with some snipping for brevity to get the idea of men in motion, not events:

"We were apprehensive that if the enemy were allowed to strengthen himself in that position, he would have a great advantage in renewing the attack on us at daylight or before. Colonel Rice then directed me to make the movement to seize that crest.
It was now 9 p.m. Without waiting to get ammunition, but trusting in part to the very circumstance of not exposing our movement or our small front by firing, and with bayonets fixed, the little handful of 200 men pressed up the mountain side in very extended order, as the steep and jagged surface of the ground compelled...
... Reaching the crest, and reconnoitering the ground, I placed the men in a strong position among the rocks, and informed Colonel Rice, requesting also ammunition and some support to our right, which was very near the enemy, their movements and words even being now distinctly heard by us.
...
Feeling somewhat insecure in this isolated position, I sent in for the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, which came speedily, followed by the Forty-fourth New York, and, having seen these well posted, I sent a strong picket to the front, with instructions to report to me every half hour during the night, and allowed the rest of my men to sleep on their arms.
... "
--end of snipping, see http://www.civilwarhome.com/chamberl.html --

Colonel Fisher's two brigades reached them for support by the next morning, at which point, as we know, the 20th Maine was moved into reserve... but inadvertently to near where the AofNV artillery barrage began prior to the AofNV charge.

Initially, yes, and without firing a shot. After dark on July 2, Chamberlain's exhausted and bloodied 20th Maine was rousted from a well deserved rest to lead the way for two quite fresh and untested Pennsylvania Reserve regiments (5th and 12th), because the latter's brigade commander, Colonel Fisher, made the case to Colonel Rice that his two regiments were unfamiliar with the ground and possessed inferior "buck and ball" weapons. When Chamberlain advanced up the slope as skirmishers, around 9 p.m., the two Pennsylvania Reserve regiments were not ready to follow, and by the time they were ready, the 20th Maine was nowhere to be seen. The 5th and 12th moved out in line formation, which quickly disintegrated due to the rocky terrain and they became lost somewhere on the north slope. The 5th finally made contact with the right of the 20th Maine, but they made so much noise in trying to reverse their line (when fronted they would have faced the wrong way!) that Confederate skirmishers opened fire and sent the 5th and 12th scurrying back down the hill (like "antelopes" as Chamberlain described it) toward the northeast. That's when Chamberlain sent for his fellow 83rd Pennsylvania regiment, which had no trouble moving into position upon the right of the 20th. Meanwhile the 5th and 12th rallied at the base of the hill and by around 11:30 p.m. proceeded cautiously around its eastern base, coming up behind skirmishers of Grant's 5th Vermont, and then moved due west up the steep slope to the summit, which they reached around midnight. The 20th Maine was a bit further down the slope to the northwest and Chamberlain did not even bother to link up with the two Pennsylvania Reserve regiments at the summit.

Meanwhile, as the 5th and 12th were trying to find the way, the Confederates sent out a group to reconnoiter and they were gobbled up by a handful of 20th Maine men on the picket line.

This entire episode reveals Fisher's ineptitude. 1) He had time to reconnoiter the slope of Big Round Top before dark, but failed to do so. 2) His two regiments, although sitting idle for nearly two hours, were not ready to move at the appointed time. 3) They moved out in line formation instead of open order. 4) They were aligned the wrong way. 5) Fisher did not personally lead them.

The best answers to the question came 14 years after the question was asked. :smile coffee: Now , if the writer of the question is still around to appreciate it.....
 
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