Clausewitz, I believe, has some things to say about the terrible inertia that afflicts leaders and their armies in battle.
AND the "fog of war." You never have a perfectly clear picture of what your opponent is doing, nor necessarily what your own forces are actually doing vice what they've been ordered to do. Sometimes, that picture is murky 0r down right opaque. Decisions are made on bad intelligence, half-truths, poor analysis, unlucky guesswork etc. And after a big battle, the fog of war can be very thick.
Take Bragg, for instance, at Stones River/Murfreesboro. After he folded back the Union right on 31DEC1862, he thought Rosecrans would retire from the field. Bragg heard wagons going up the pike towards Nashville all night and figured it was a retreat; instead, it was the wounded being sent north. Lo and behold, on the morning of 01JAN1863, the Union forces were still in place. He had already sent a telegram to Davis implying he had won a victory. Now, after his defeated attack on 02JAN and subsequent withdrawal south, he looked a bit foolish.
Conversely, look at Bragg after Chickamauga. On the 20th, his forces drove the Union right off the field and came close to overrunning the left (under Thomas) at Snodgrass Hill. That, evening, Thomas pulled the remaining Union forces off the field and went north into Chattanooga. Bragg, however, was under the impression that Union forces were still at his front and took some time to be convinced that he had taken the field.
I think you might be able to make the argument that Bragg "choked" after Chickamauga. I don't think the same could be said of Lee in any of his victories.