Did Jefferson Davis Just Lose the War?

Well, McClellan's strategy has been called the strategy of overwhelming, but interestingly it didn't envisage more than about a 2:1 advantage.

I would argue that but the time of the AoP victories in Antietam and Gettysburg they were simply to exausted and disorganized to mount an effective pursuit although post Gettysburg some Union Calvery captured Confederate stragglers. McCelllan was facing at best only one to one odds so an offensive victory would of been difficult at best.
It's basically the question of how to achieve a decisive victory and pursuit - you really need to be able to break the enemy (i.e. they're retreating in disorder) and you need to do it while retaining a force for pursuit.
The first bit was hard enough in the ACW!
 
I would argue that but the time of the AoP victories in Antietam and Gettysburg they were simply to exausted and disorganized to mount an effective pursuit although post Gettysburg some Union Calvery captured Confederate stragglers. McCelllan was facing at best only one to one odds so an offensive victory would of been difficult at best.
By the time of the Overland Campaign at least Grant had the manpower superiority ratio. However due to heavy casualties especially at Cold Harbor the AoP was overly cautious at Petersburg and gave the AnV precious time to fortify it did prolonging the war.
Leftyhunter


I will not disagree with that, but it expalins, more or less, why it was that in the CW complete victories were almost impossible during the Civil Wari.e., given the tactics and weapons of the time and the lack of overwhelming nmbers, the battles usually turned into slugging matches, which exhausted and debilitated both sides almost simultaneouslly.

Clauswitz noted the tremendous psychological exhaustion that followed large battles, both in men and the commanders and it was only the very gifted General who could overcome this inervating of will mind to follow up immediately any advantages accuring from the battle.
 
I think part of the issue is the simple lack of long term training. That meant that it was much more the case that battles turned into bickering actions using fire, which wears down both sides; usually what results in a decisive break or collapse is shock action in some sense.

A good example of a near case of decisive victory is probably Second Bull Run, because Lee managed to get Pope's army to break. If the reinforcing column (DH Hill IIRC) coming up from Richmond had been closer to the battlefield then it might perhaps have been able to act as a pursuit corps, especially if 2nd Corps was back around Annadale.
 
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Unfortunately for the historical narrative, little mac never seemed to believe or plan his battles with his numerical advantagein mind, but instead his lack of them.
 
Unfortunately for the historical narrative, little mac never seemed to believe or plan his battles with his numerical advantagein mind, but instead his lack of them.
...I think you're missing a quoted bit there, so I don't know what you mean.
 
My answer to your last post.



Do you not read your own posts?

My post is in answer to your last post to me.
Sorry, there must have been some sort of malformed tag or something - you seemed to have quoted nothing, so I couldn't tell what you were replying to.

What I said was that McClellan's strategy (the strategy of overwhelming) didn't envisage more than about a 2:1 advantage, and this is broadly correct; the problem is that his strategy was not followed at the highest levels. He planned to have a major numerical advantage over all Confederate forces in theatre (when he originally formulated his offensive strategy he planned to have ~250,000 Present for Duty all told in his offensive force, including landings along the coast; he eventually agreed to take it up with about 145,000 PFD all told in his offensive force against Richmond), but he didn't get it.

That's because of the close of Union recruitment and the diversion of troops from the main body of the Army of the Potomac (the offensive force) to defensive roles, to the extent he didn't even get parity with Lee let alone a 2:1 advantage.

Hopefully that clarifies things.
 
Sorry, there must have been some sort of malformed tag or something - you seemed to have quoted nothing, so I couldn't tell what you were replying to.

What I said was that McClellan's strategy (the strategy of overwhelming) didn't envisage more than about a 2:1 advantage, and this is broadly correct; the problem is that his strategy was not followed at the highest levels. He planned to have a major numerical advantage over all Confederate forces in theatre (when he originally formulated his offensive strategy he planned to have ~250,000 Present for Duty all told in his offensive force, including landings along the coast; he eventually agreed to take it up with about 145,000 PFD all told in his offensive force against Richmond), but he didn't get it.
That's because of the close of Union recruitment and the diversion of troops from the main body of the Army of the Potomac (the offensive force) to defensive roles, to the extent he didn't even get parity with Lee let alone a 2:1 advantage.
Hopefully that clarifies things.



My main point concerning McClellan is to question if he ever fought his battles with any conviction that he ever had a 2 to 1 advantage.
 
My main point concerning McClellan is to question if he ever fought his battles with any conviction that he ever had a 2 to 1 advantage.
Well, given that he didn't, if he did have that conviction he'd have been wrong.

There's exactly two days I can find where you can reasonably say that McClellan had a 2:1 advantage in troops available, April 5th*, and on that day he ordered bayonet charges, and April 6th**. For the rest of his tenure in command he didn't have that kind of advantage, unless I've missed one.


* On that day, Magruder 20,744 effectives (undated May strengths by regiment) McClellan approx. 52,000 effectives
** On that day, Magruder 25,026 effectives (undated May strengths by regiment) McClellan approx. 52,000 effectives
 
It seems that as of that date, mid 1864, the writing was on the wall. The Northern industrial machine, along with the blockade, were cutting off the Confederacy's air supply. It was only a matter of time, regardless if J. Johnston remained in command.
 
Well, given that he didn't, if he did have that conviction he'd have been wrong.
There's exactly two days I can find where you can reasonably say that McClellan had a 2:1 advantage in troops available, April 5th*, and on that day he ordered bayonet charges, and April 6th**. For the rest of his tenure in command he didn't have that kind of advantage, unless I've missed one.
* On that day, Magruder 20,744 effectives (undated May strengths by regiment) McClellan approx. 52,000 effectives
** On that day, Magruder 25,026 effectives (undated May strengths by regiment) McClellan approx. 52,000 effectives



According to the military conventions of that time(and today, I believe) 2 to 1 advantage in nmbers was not considered to be an overwhelming force and, if that is the case, then Lincoln with a numerical advantage, but, not an overwhelming one, then the war was Lincolns to lose rathern than Davis to win.

I am just saying that, IMO, in ref. to the OP, it was more a matter of Lincoln winning, rather than Davis losing. It was not simply a matter of the confederacy being overwhelmed by massively superior numbers that they could not withstand as many lost causes try to claim. The Union defeated southern armies with numbers only slightly larger than their opponents, and and the South might have been able to win their war with a little better tactics or strates. So, to me, Lincoln, and the Union, had togo out and bet the South to win, while Davis had only to not lose to win.
 
According to the military conventions of that time(and today, I believe) 2 to 1 advantage in nmbers was not considered to be an overwhelming force and, if that is the case, then Lincoln with a numerical advantage, but, not an overwhelming one, then the war was Lincolns to lose rathern than Davis to win.

I am just saying that, IMO, in ref. to the OP, it was more a matter of Lincoln winning, rather than Davis losing. It was not simply a matter of the confederacy being overwhelmed by massively superior numbers that they could not withstand as many lost causes try to claim. The Union defeated southern armies with numbers only slightly larger than their opponents, and and the South might have been able to win their war with a little better tactics or strates. So, to me, Lincoln, and the Union, had togo out and bet the South to win, while Davis had only to not lose to win.
I agree with most of your post. Not sure about the better tactics part. Conventional wars are won by siezing and holding enemy territory. In the pre air warfare era any army that is outnumbered is going to have a tough time doing so. Not to say it's impossible General Curtis was out numbered at Pea Ridge yet managed to size Helena , Arkansas without any major problems including no logistical support.
The inherent problem for the Confederacy was Union morale. It bended but never broke . That is even after serious defeats in the East the Union war effort continued. Some of our posters will say "well what about the draft riots"?. Even with the draft riots the strategic situation for the Confederacy from the summer of 1863 onwards only got worse.
Leftyhunter
 
According to the military conventions of that time(and today, I believe) 2 to 1 advantage in nmbers was not considered to be an overwhelming force and, if that is the case, then Lincoln with a numerical advantage, but, not an overwhelming one, then the war was Lincolns to lose rathern than Davis to win.
The geographic scale over which you have a 2:1 advantage matters, though. And Clausewitz held that between two forces of fundamentally similar baseline quality it would be very hard indeed to win at 2:1 odds - he can only find a couple of examples in more than a century.

Clausewitz:





Here we find armies much more like one another in equipment, organisation, and practical skill of every kind. There only remains still alternately a difference in the military virtue of armies, and in the talent of generals. If we go through the military history of modern Europe, we find no example of a Marathon.

Frederick the Great beat 80,000 Austrians at Leuthen with about 30,000 men, and at Rosbach with 25,000 some 50,000 allies; these are however the only instances of victories gained against an enemy double, or more than double in numbers. Charles XII., in the battle of Narva, we cannot well quote, the Russians were at that time hardly to be regarded as Europeans, also the principal circumstances even of the battle, are but too little known. Buonaparte had at Dresden 120,000 against 220,000, therefore not the double. At Collin, Frederick the Great did not succeed, with 30,000 against 50,000 Austrians, neither Buonaparte in the desperate battle of Leipsic, where he was 160,000 strong, against 280,000, the superiority therefore considerably less than double.

From this we may infer, that it is very difficult in the present state of Europe, for the most talented general to gain a victory over an enemy double his strength. Now if we see double numbers, such a weight in the scale against the greatest generals, we may be sure, that in ordinary cases, in small as well as great combats, an important superiority of numbers, but which need not be over two to one, will be sufficient to ensure the victory, however disadvantageous other circumstances may be. Certainly, we may imagine a defile which even tenfold would not suffice to force, but in such a case it can be no question of a battle at all.
 
I agree with most of your post. Not sure about the better tactics part. Conventional wars are won by siezing and holding enemy territory. In the pre air warfare era any army that is outnumbered is going to have a tough time doing so. Not to say it's impossible General Curtis was out numbered at Pea Ridge yet managed to size Helena , Arkansas without any major problems including no logistical support.
The inherent problem for the Confederacy was Union morale. It bended but never broke . That is even after serious defeats in the East the Union war effort continued. Some of our posters will say "well what about the draft riots"?. Even with the draft riots the strategic situation for the Confederacy from the summer of 1863 onwards only got worse.
Leftyhunter


I can really argue against thi, but, perhaps I should have added More Luck, to the list.

I agree that the material advantages of the North in comparison with that of the South was overwhelming over a given amount of time.and the confederacy had no real chance of coming even close to matching the Union, by themselves.

Sstill, against the mediocre leadership early in the war, did, I think, present some opportunities to at least extend the war and giving Davis' war weariness more opportunity for success, and if Bragg had decided to fight the Army of the cumberland on its line of retreat, when he invaded Ky in 1862, and had won, it would have changed the strategic outlook in th the West, i.e. givenenough time, Ky would almost certainly have joined the csa and its people rallied to its defense against a Union invasion.

Again, I think, with Lincoln in command, such things might dampen his spirits momentarily, but, he would keep coming and with the Union's best generals in the West, probably would see ultimate confederate defeat, but, such things could, I think, have extended the war indefinitely, with all kinds of unforseens both good and bad, for both sides.
 
I can really argue against thi, but, perhaps I should have added More Luck, to the list.

I agree that the material advantages of the North in comparison with that of the South was overwhelming over a given amount of time.and the confederacy had no real chance of coming even close to matching the Union, by themselves.

Sstill, against the mediocre leadership early in the war, did, I think, present some opportunities to at least extend the war and giving Davis' war weariness more opportunity for success, and if Bragg had decided to fight the Army of the cumberland on its line of retreat, when he invaded Ky in 1862, and had won, it would have changed the strategic outlook in th the West, i.e. givenenough time, Ky would almost certainly have joined the csa and its people rallied to its defense against a Union invasion.

Again, I think, with Lincoln in command, such things might dampen his spirits momentarily, but, he would keep coming and with the Union's best generals in the West, probably would see ultimate confederate defeat, but, such things could, I think, have extended the war indefinitely, with all kinds of unforseens both good and bad, for both sides.
Former Confederate General Porter Alexander argued in his biography the Confederacy blew a chance to "bag McCelllan's entire army during a part of the Peninsula Campaign".
No doubt both sides made tactical blunders but to be fair that happens in every war .
My argument would be that in a civil war where one side is less industrilised, has less population and enslaves forty percent of it's population plus can not get foreign miltary allies is at a huge disadvantage.
Leftyhunter
 
Former Confederate General Porter Alexander argued in his biography the Confederacy blew a chance to "bag McCelllan's entire army during a part of the Peninsula Campaign".
No doubt both sides made tactical blunders but to be fair that happens in every war .
My argument would be that in a civil war where one side is less industrilised, has less population and enslaves forty percent of it's population plus can not get foreign miltary allies is at a huge disadvantage.
Leftyhunter


This, and my last post, says to me, that despite the knowlege of how the war turned out, does not mean that the outcome was was foreordained, Lincoln and the Union had to go out annd do what could be done with the resources they had at any one time during that war to achieve, what they did.

The South would have opportunities to achieve more than they did, even with the resources they did have.
 
This, and my last post, says to me, that despite the knowlege of how the war turned out, does not mean that the outcome was was foreordained, Lincoln and the Union had to go out annd do what could be done with the resources they had at any one time during that war to achieve, what they did.

The South would have opportunities to achieve more than they did, even with the resources they did have.
Perhaps so but my point is the Confederacy started off with huge disadvantages that lead to it's demise.
Leftyhunter
 
Perhaps so but my point is the Confederacy started off with huge disadvantages that lead to it's demise.
Leftyhunter


No doubt about that. It is just that if the South were to win, it would have to be by other means than material resources they did not possess in enough quantity, nor reasonable chance of replacing.

'What they had in resources, both material and men, would have to be regorously employed with logic in rationaliiziing the use of all the resources they did possess. But, in fact, the South fought the war illogically, IMO, depending upon simple morale and dogged determination not to be defeated.
 
No doubt about that. It is just that if the South were to win, it would have to be by other means than material resources they did not possess in enough quantity, nor reasonable chance of replacing.

'What they had in resources, both material and men, would have to be regorously employed with logic in rationaliiziing the use of all the resources they did possess. But, in fact, the South fought the war illogically, IMO, depending upon simple morale and dogged determination not to be defeated.
Not sure about the concept of a major war being fought logically because mistakes are just part of war. Very rare if at all to see a major conventional war fought without mistakes.
I would argue the secessionists grossly underestimated Union resolve and grossly overestimated the importance of King Cotton".
Could the Confederacy had won if they doted all the i'svand crossed all the t's? Maybe but I can't think of a good historical example of that ?
Leftyhunter
 
It has always seemed to me that the problem with evaluating Johnston is that he is always evaluated in comparison with Lee. I would not be surprised if almost anyone on this forum first heard the two names in conjunction with the other. Johnston was falling back on Richmond, was wounded and replaced by Lee who proceeded to furiously assault and assail McClelland until he turned tail and abandoned any attempt to take the city.

The difference between Johnston's falling back on Atlanta and Lee's headlong offenses against McClelland lay in the simple fact that Lee knew without a shadow of a doubt that once McClelland advanced just a few more miles he would have been in a position to begin siege operations after which the fall of Richmond and the end of the Confederacy could have been calculated with mathematical precision.

Johnston on the other hand, knew that the fall of Atlanta did not mean the end of the war. With the AoT still almost entirely intact, what could Sherman have done. His supply line would have remained in constant jeopardy. Head toward Savannah as he in fact did, not likely. With almost no opposition between Atlanta and the sea, he barely made it. His men were starving and in rags when they actually reached the coast and only resupply from the Navy rescued him. Nor could he have spread his army into 3 widely separated columns to pillage and forage.

An intact AoT could have put a force in front of him to block every crossroad and every river crossing/bridge. Sherman would have constantly have had to concentrate his force to break through even if resistance evaporated at the first hint of assault--the object not being to stop but to slow him.

I did not realize this until a few years ago, but Sherman did not simply live of the land as is commonly understood. He left Atlanta with a herd of over 5000 cattle. Even after the disaster of Tupelo, do you think it fairly likely that Johnston probably would have summon even a diminished Forrest to harass Sherman

Say what you will about Johnston as a strategist or tactician, I think almost anyone would allow him to be at least a competent military man. There was a brief reference to his being relieved by Hood after having planned Peachtree Creek, but Hood being the one to carry it out. The contrast is stunning. Hood by all accounts was not even within earshot of the battle and once he gave to order to start had nothing more to do with the affair. Do you really believe Johnston would have been so cavalier. For once Sherman made a palpable blunder. He had one wing of his army separated by water where it could be attacked and either destroyed or forced to surrender. If that had occurred there is no way that the rest of the Atlanta campaign could have proceeded in a similar manner.

But how did Johnston's opponents view him. Grant from the quote offered seemed to think highly of him. But what about Sherman? How do you think he would have evaluated his opponent? How would he have rated the general who gave him such a crushing defeat at Kennesaw Mt. not to mention the same man who came close to duplicating the event at Bentonville six months later. (And then with a rag tag army that shouldn't have been able to frighten a bunch of Girl Scouts.)

Now if you really want a Southerner to point a finger at and blame for the South's defeat. Point it at the midwife who having delivered Braxton Bragg, did not immediately perform the first post-birth abortion.
 
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