- Joined
- Jul 28, 2015
- Location
- New York City
There is a common perception that one of the military advantages that the Confederacy started off with was its ability to use "interior lines" to quickly move and shift armies and resources to threatened regions. Early confederate war strategy focused on using its shorter lines of communication to defend its borders by being able to maneuver and deploy against potential Union attacks. But in reality, did interior lines really benefit the Confederacy to any extent that made a difference? The one good example that comes to mind is the concentration of southern armies at Corinth in April 1862. A.S. Johnston was able to efficiently collect armies from Polk, Ruggles, and Bragg that ranged in a wide arc, and were brought to bear against Grant's AotT at Shiloh. Similarly, Longstreet was able to bring most of his Corps from the Virginia front by rail to bolster Bragg's forces at Chickamauga. But outside of these examples, I'm wondering whether the use of interior lines had much effect on the Confederate war effort. The Confederacy and Joe Johnston was unable to properly utilize its advantage to save Vicksburg and Pemberton's army by moving troops from Bragg's army in Tennessee and Holmes' forces in Arkansas. The disrepair of the southern rail system, the Union breakthrough of the western riverine systems, and the stranglehold that the US Navy was eventually able to place against key southern ports probably negated any advantage that the Confederacy might have had. And once the Union was able to slice the Confederacy into multiple segments by 1863, the use of interior lines by the southland to maneuver and supply its forces seemed to be a lost cause.