Obviously, you got a bad impression of Halleck.Did Halleck have any redeeming qualities?
His book "Military art and science..." is pretty good. First published in 1846, and with editions printed through the 1860s...Did Halleck have any redeeming qualities?
None of that is right.Halleck would have been happy to allow the war to go on until hell froze up. His constant interference with Grants command, his backstabbing of Sherman, his pathetic advance on Corinth, hi interception of and changing of Grants orders to Meade and other generals was over the top, he may as well been on the enemies payroll.
His behavior speaks for itself,
A task that Grant failed at. He had no control over the far west, couldn't or wouldn't see what Thomas was working with, failed in the valley with Sigel and Fremont. Not to mention Butler.Halleck's major failing was his refusal or inability to make command decisions when he served as General-in-Chief from July 1862 to March 1864 (when superceded by Grant). Halleck's belief was that individual field commanders on the spot were the only ones who could or should be responsible for deciding on military actions. While there may be a certain logic to that approach, the position of General-in-Chief was such as to require an overall leader to guide and judge the merits of field operations on a national basis. This is the task that Grant willingly took on and was an important factor in the Union's ultimate victory. Halleck, for all his theoretical knowledge or warfare, was incapable of rising to a level higher than that of chief administrator.
Must disagree. Grant's strategy of concentrating forces in space and time did lead to victory. Sherman was able to hold Johnston at bay and prevent any reinforcement of the ANV. It is true that Grant's subordinates such as Sigel and Butler failed in their particular roles to distract and hold down Confederate forces in their respective fronts, and even Meade's AotP did not succeed in destroying the ANV during the Overland Campaign. But military plans are sure to go awry at the first sound of gunfire, but Grant's ability to adapt to the changing situation on the ground and not throw in the towel, was evidence of his determination and the eventual success of his strategy.A task that Grant failed at. He had no control over the far west, couldn't or wouldn't see what Thomas was working with, failed in the valley with Sigel and Fremont. Not to mention Butler.
Halleck's major failing was his refusal or inability to make command decisions when he served as General-in-Chief from July 1862 to March 1864 (when superceded by Grant). Halleck's belief was that individual field commanders on the spot were the only ones who could or should be responsible for deciding on military actions. While there may be a certain logic to that approach, the position of General-in-Chief was such as to require an overall leader to guide and judge the merits of field operations on a national basis. This is the task that Grant willingly took on and was an important factor in the Union's ultimate victory. Halleck, for all his theoretical knowledge or warfare, was incapable of rising to a level higher than that of chief administrator.
What I said is not right or is what Halleck did not right?None of that is right.
Must disagree. Grant's strategy of concentrating forces in space and time did lead to victory. Sherman was able to hold Johnston at bay and prevent any reinforcement of the ANV. It is true that Grant's subordinates such as Sigel and Butler failed in their particular roles to distract and hold down Confederate forces in their respective fronts, and even Meade's AotP did not succeed in destroying the ANV during the Overland Campaign. But military plans are sure to go awry at the first sound of gunfire, but Grant's ability to adapt to the changing situation on the ground and not throw in the towel, was evidence of his determination and the eventual success of his strategy.
Gutter rats. Got it. I assume you mean the ones that halleck wrote to Sheridan in response to Sheridan's?What I said is not right or is what Halleck did not right?
What I described was taken from Grants Memoirs, and is backed up by letters and copies of the orders that Halleck had fiddled with, an activity which required Grant to stop routing ordered through Washington and rely solely on orders delivered directly to field commanders to avoid meddling from the brass hats ( Staton and Halleck, both useless gutter rats imo) .