I counted 5 paragraphs based on the edition I had in my copy of Grant's memoirs, which contain a copy of the report.
And I never said Grant lost his aggressiveness. On the contrary, I believe wholeheartedly that he was one of, if not the single most aggressive commander the North had, and certainly up there with Jackson and Lee in terms of aggressiveness.
What I said was that the Siege of Petersburg was a campaign of attrition. Look at the underlined bold part in your quote, Grant says he wants to concentrate forces against the enemy to deprive them of reinforcing each other through their inner lines of communications.
That is what he did by having Sherman attack Johnston, while he attacked Lee in Virginia. And It Worked.
However, his first plan in Virginia was to "find Lee's army and destroy it." Those orders are famous and I deem need no citation. Those were his orders to Meade.
That failing, as it did in the Overland Campaign, he shifted to plan 2, which you quoted in light blue font. That second plan was attrition, which is what the Siege of Petersburg was, being that Petersburg itself was a supply depot, and was never part of the original campaign plan. Grant chose it later, on crossing the James, in order to rob the Confederates of their base of supplies, forcing Lee to evacuate Richmond and come out into the open, without supplies.
The Siege itself, if you call it a "siege," was directed at cutting Lee's rail communications from Petersburg, so that no new supplies could arrive. That he also conducted offensive operations, for the purpose of wearing the Confederates out, and perhaps crushing them if he managed a breakthrough, is also attrition warfare.
In short, the entire Siege of Petersburg, from Grant's motives for attacking it, to its execution and final fruition, were all based on his desire to fight a war of attrition.
In fact, his aggressiveness is what made it work. A less aggressive commander could not have sustained that offensive for 9 consecutive months, including in the winter.
Grant's plan was always to find the enemy and destroy him. That is universal in his work from 1861-65. He thought of maneuver as a way to close with the enemy and fight him, hopefully at an advantage. This is completely different than Sherman, for example -- Sherman understood that he was not a very good offensive tactician (he is actually a particularly bad one). He mistrusts his own tactical ability, which is why he concentrates on other things. Sherman sees maneuver as a way to avoid large tactical battles that he might lose -- which is why he never seems willing to go for the kill in 1864-65. Sherman does a marvelous job of advancing by maneuver, but he misses chances at major victories because he will not risk enough or commit enough. Sherman was not trying to destroy the enemy army in battle (even after Grant's message from Petersburg). Sherman is aiming for geographic, industrial and transportation targets. Sherman wants to disrupt the interior of the Confederacy and the morale of the Rebel people -- not destroy the enemy army. Sherman wants to prioritize attrition on the will and capacity of the enemy to resist, not smash the enemy army in battle.
Grant, OTOH, is always looking for the battle that will be decisive. He does not care about appearances. He will win with a lot of small battles or one big one or any combination of those. His orders constantly reflect this throughout the war. His plan for Sherman in the Spring of 1864 is much more aggressive than what Sherman actually did. His plan for Sherman in June of 1864 is much more aggressive than what Sherman actually did. His plan was always for his commanders to fight and beat the enemy if they possibly could -- and to engage the enemy and keep them tied up if they could not.
Grant absolutely does not switch over to a war of attrition in June of 1864. This was never his plan. He sees the overall war, not just tiny pieces of it as you insist on.
You are also, BTW, completely wrong in your thinking about Grant's reason for moving on Petersburg. You do not seem to include the very real situation existed and how the rail net/logistic/industrial constraints ruled what the armies could do. Lee was tied to Richmond-Petersburg from the start. This is what is behind Grant's initial instructions to Butler. This is a big factor in Grant's sending of Sheridan to raid down to join Butler from Spotsylvania. If that RR link is cut, Lee will be unable to stay in northern VA. He will have to withdraw as fast as he can with Grant on his heels -- or try to detach from Spotsylvania while heavily engaged by Grant.
The same is true when Grant crosses the James. If Grant takes Petersburg, Lee cannot stand in Richmond. Lee will have to attack and beat Grant, or retreat (on Lynchburg or on Raleigh). Let Grant take Petersburg in June 1864 and you will be looking at the Appomattox Campaign nine months earlier.
All you want to see is "attrition". Grant saw "attrition" as something that would work in the Union's favor, but he always wanted to win by other means.