Grant Did Grant Really Pursue a "Strategy of Attrition"?

I suspect the best way to explain it is simply that Lincoln demanded a strategy of attrition, at least in the East. In the West he was fairly happy with a focus on taking places and strategic manoeuvre, but in the East he wanted bloody attrition.
Not sure or unaware if Lincoln actually articulated a policy of attrition. Perhaps he did but I never ran across it. Lincoln did insist upon the AoP always being in front of Washington DC vs Grant waning to enter Virginia via the back door from North Carolina.
Leftyhunter
 
Not sure or unaware if Lincoln actually articulated a policy of attrition. Perhaps he did but I never ran across it. Lincoln did insist upon the AoP always being in front of Washington DC vs Grant waning to enter Virginia via the back door from North Carolina.
Leftyhunter

He was quite explicit on at least one occasion:


".. if the same battle were to be fought over again, every day, through a week of days, with the same relative results, the army under Lee would be wiped out to the last man, the Army of the Potomac would still be a mighty host, the war would be over, the Confederacy gone, and peace would be won at a smaller cost of life than it will be if the week of lost battles must be dragged out through yet another year of camps and marches, and of deaths in hospitals rather than upon the field."
- Lincoln after Fredericksburg.

This is explicitly and definitively a call for an attritional strategy - he wants to fight Fredericksburg over and over again until the Army of Northern Virginia is destroyed to the last man by attrition. There is no other interpretation of this argument.

As for his insistence on the defence of Washington DC, this policy was certainly carried through... oddly. In June 1862 Lincoln was unwilling to send troops south that would reduce the troops between Lee and Washington to less than about 70,000 men PFD, but in June 1864 Lincoln was willing to send troops south that reduced the troops between Lee and Washington to less than about 20,000 men PFD.

If what Lincoln wanted in 1864 was for the Army of the Potomac to be able to defend Washington DC, then the North Carolina Raid approach is actually better because the NC Raid option only entailed sending about 60,000 men PFD. This would leave the force between Lee and DC as somewhere not far off 140,000 men PFD, which is higher than any other possible option allows except not attacking at all.
 
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Not sure or unaware if Lincoln actually articulated a policy of attrition. Perhaps he did but I never ran across it. Lincoln did insist upon the AoP always being in front of Washington DC vs Grant waning to enter Virginia via the back door from North Carolina.
Leftyhunter

On this forum, there is a constant if often innocent misattribution to the definition of the word attrition.

You are correct.
 
On this forum, there is a constant if often innocent misattribution to the definition of the word attrition.
Attrition warfare: the strategy consisting of belligerent attempts to win a war by wearing the enemy down to the point of collapse through continuous losses in men or materiel. The term comes from the Latin for "rub against", the idea being that the enemy is being abraded.

Examples of this include the WW1 fighting at Verdun (which was explicitly intended to "bleed the French white") and the Entente plan for victory in WW2 pre-Fall of France.

The trick with making attrition warfare work (which it absolutely can) is to ensure that the attrition is favouring you, not the enemy.


It's one of the ways in which a manpower or materiel rich state can leverage their advantages (note that the best way to win war on the strategic level tends to be at least one of "emphasize your own advantages" and "minimize the enemy's opportunity to emphasize their own advantages") but it has a tendency to produce highly costly results unless handled carefully.


Lincoln's post-Fredericksburg comments are explicitly based on the idea of causing continuous losses to the Army of Northern Virginia to the point that the Confederate army in question collapses. He is advocating a definitional conflict of attrition.
 
True although in the post above @Saphroneth does make a good point concerning Lincoln's remarks on Fredericksburg arguably if not the worst Union defeat certainly in the top three.
As it happens, Lincoln's remarks on Fredericksburg are also factually wrong (quite apart from anything else...) because even if the same relative results could be sustained for "a week of days" - that is, if the Union army's quality didn't decline from losing so many thousands of casualties - the Union army suffered over 10% casualties at Fredericksburg and the Confederate army suffered about 7% casualties.

Thus if Fredericksburg was repeated over and over again with the same relative results until one army evaporated then it would be the Union army having become casualties to the last man, with about 21,000 Confederates still fit for battle.

This is an example of unfavourable attrition, because the attrition is working such that the Union army is going to be destroyed first.

The Overland campaign of 1864 is an example of a campaign which initially had favourable attrition but which ultimately dropped to unfavourable attrition as the Union army got tired out faster. This illustrates a possible weakness of an attritional campaign - the force that's doing the attrition has to be able to sustain it for the whole of the campaign, not just for a couple of engagements.

Verdun is an example of an attritional campaign which was unsuccessful because the German estimates of the casualties they could inflict were much greater than the reality (even while the campaign was going on) and ultimately a German attempt to bleed the Allies resulted in roughly equal casualties on both sides - not something the Germans could afford when they were on the side of the war that was numerically inferior.
Normandy 1944 is an example of an attritional campaign which was successful because the Allies were inflicting roughly equal casualties in manpower on the Germans but were the side that could afford those casualties to a greater extent.

Also from WW1, the Somme is an example of a campaign where the attrition was positive partly because the German casualties were in their well-trained prewar troops, while the British losses were in their new but quickly improving New Army troops.
 
On this forum, there is a constant if often innocent misattribution to the definition of the word attrition.

You are correct.
I would argue Grant certainly didn't try to pursue a strategy especially because he tried to convince Lincoln to use North Carolina as a back door. Certainly I could name some more modern military forces that definitely used a strategy of attrition.
Leftyhunter
 
I would argue Grant certainly didn't try to pursue a strategy especially because he tried to convince Lincoln to use North Carolina as a back door. Certainly I could name some more modern military forces that definitely used a strategy of attrition.
There are two questions tangled up in your argument and I think it's worth disentangling them.

The question of whether Grant advocated a strategy of attrition is easier, because his preference seems to have been to avoid it; Lincoln was the one who we can demonstrate positively was enamoured of attrition.

The question of whether Grant pursued such a strategy is more difficult because it turns on what he actually did. If the argument that "Grant's target was Lee's army" is true, then Grant could be said to have pursued a strategy of attrition (unless he thought he could beat Lee in one battle); if the argument that "Grant's target was Richmond" is true, then perhaps not.
 
As it happens, Lincoln's remarks on Fredericksburg are also factually wrong (quite apart from anything else...) because even if the same relative results could be sustained for "a week of days" - that is, if the Union army's quality didn't decline from losing so many thousands of casualties - the Union army suffered over 10% casualties at Fredericksburg and the Confederate army suffered about 7% casualties.

Thus if Fredericksburg was repeated over and over again with the same relative results until one army evaporated then it would be the Union army having become casualties to the last man, with about 21,000 Confederates still fit for battle.

This is an example of unfavourable attrition, because the attrition is working such that the Union army is going to be destroyed first.

The Overland campaign of 1864 is an example of a campaign which initially had favourable attrition but which ultimately dropped to unfavourable attrition as the Union army got tired out faster. This illustrates a possible weakness of an attritional campaign - the force that's doing the attrition has to be able to sustain it for the whole of the campaign, not just for a couple of engagements.

Verdun is an example of an attritional campaign which was unsuccessful because the German estimates of the casualties they could inflict were much greater than the reality (even while the campaign was going on) and ultimately a German attempt to bleed the Allies resulted in roughly equal casualties on both sides - not something the Germans could afford when they were on the side of the war that was numerically inferior.
Normandy 1944 is an example of an attritional campaign which was successful because the Allies were inflicting roughly equal casualties in manpower on the Germans but were the side that could afford those casualties to a greater extent.

Also from WW1, the Somme is an example of a campaign where the attrition was positive partly because the German casualties were in their well-trained prewar troops, while the British losses were in their new but quickly improving New Army troops.
Attrition warfare works even better in guerrilla warfare but that gets into modern politics. Anyone can PM me for examples.
Leftyhunter
 
There are two questions tangled up in your argument and I think it's worth disentangling them.

The question of whether Grant advocated a strategy of attrition is easier, because his preference seems to have been to avoid it; Lincoln was the one who we can demonstrate positively was enamoured of attrition.

The question of whether Grant pursued such a strategy is more difficult because it turns on what he actually did. If the argument that "Grant's target was Lee's army" is true, then Grant could be said to have pursued a strategy of attrition (unless he thought he could beat Lee in one battle); if the argument that "Grant's target was Richmond" is true, then perhaps not.
That's certainly an interesting debate about Grant's objective being the destruction of the AnV vs seizing Richmond. Not sure if it hasn't been debated on a previous thread.
Leftyhunter
 
That's certainly an interesting debate about Grant's objective being the destruction of the AnV vs seizing Richmond. Not sure if it hasn't been debated on a previous thread.

It's come up more than once.

My suspicion is that Grant wanted to either take Richmond or outmanoeuvre Lee and compel Lee to fight at a disadvantage (thus all the manoeuvres) but that he also felt that if he didn't manage to "humbug" Lee and there was no fighting then Lincoln would just replace him. So he conducted a series of battles, partly to try to overcome Lee in one battle (which is to say, that aspect was not attritional) and partly to "show" he was willing to go for attrition if that was what it took to prove he was "a fighter".

Then he went for another flanking manoeuvre.
 
That's certainly an interesting debate about Grant's objective being the destruction of the AnV vs seizing Richmond. Not sure if it hasn't been debated on a previous thread.
Leftyhunter
Here's a recent thread on the topic:

 
He was quite explicit on at least one occasion:


".. if the same battle were to be fought over again, every day, through a week of days, with the same relative results, the army under Lee would be wiped out to the last man, the Army of the Potomac would still be a mighty host, the war would be over, the Confederacy gone, and peace would be won at a smaller cost of life than it will be if the week of lost battles must be dragged out through yet another year of camps and marches, and of deaths in hospitals rather than upon the field."
- Lincoln after Fredericksburg.

This is explicitly and definitively a call for an attritional strategy - he wants to fight Fredericksburg over and over again until the Army of Northern Virginia is destroyed to the last man by attrition. There is no other interpretation of this argument.

As for his insistence on the defence of Washington DC, this policy was certainly carried through... oddly. In June 1862 Lincoln was unwilling to send troops south that would reduce the troops between Lee and Washington to less than about 70,000 men PFD, but in June 1864 Lincoln was willing to send troops south that reduced the troops between Lee and Washington to less than about 20,000 men PFD.

If what Lincoln wanted in 1864 was for the Army of the Potomac to be able to defend Washington DC, then the North Carolina Raid approach is actually better because the NC Raid option only entailed sending about 60,000 men PFD. This would leave the force between Lee and DC as somewhere not far off 140,000 men PFD, which is higher than any other possible option allows except not attacking at all.
Actually no, this quote was not Lincoln being explicit about attrition. The quote was written years later by William Stoddard, a former secretary, who some people felt had exaggerated his closeness to Lincoln.

Even if it were 100% accurate, Lincoln's point seems to be that fewer lives would be lost by a week of hard fighting now than in dragging the same week of fighting out into a year or more. And considering the numbers of lives lost by disease, he's probably right.
 
Actually no, this quote was not Lincoln being explicit about attrition. The quote was written years later by William Stoddard, a former secretary, who some people felt had exaggerated his closeness to Lincoln.
Oddly it's not the only time Lincoln says something along those lines. There's the argument for "hard fighting" as opposed to "strategy" (made after Antietam, which was the bloodiest day of combat in US history, so it's clearly not "strategy and fighting" as opposed to "strategy and no fighting" - it's "fighting and no strategy" as opposed to "fighting and strategy"). In the specific quote Lincoln refers to the idea of conquering the South by strategy as "a delusion".



Even if it were 100% accurate, Lincoln's point seems to be that fewer lives would be lost by a week of hard fighting now than in dragging the same week of fighting out into a year or more. And considering the numbers of lives lost by disease, he's probably right.
It's still an explicit argument for attrition:

if the same battle were to be fought over again, every day, through a week of days, with the same relative results, the army under Lee would be wiped out to the last man, the Army of the Potomac would still be a mighty host

This is an argument that fighting Fredericksburg over and over again would wipe out the AoNV to the last man through accumulation of casualties. That Lincoln thinks this would be quicker is the second half of the quote, and it is worth remembering that any quick solution would do the same thing - the fact Lincoln defaults to the "massive bloody battle" approach is indicative.

As it happens, the average deaths by disease in the whole Union army (counting white troops) was about 2,590 per month; the same number of people (monthly average 431,237 men) would in civilian life on average see 400 casualties by disease per month. So the "excess" casualties caused by the Union army being in the field would be about 2,200 per month.

Fredericksburg saw 1,284 Union killed plus an unknown number of died of wounds, and it inflicted 5,377 casualties on the Confederate AoNV (counting wounded and missing). Given that Lee could muster approximately enough troops to do Fredericksburg 14-15 times at the same absolute results before running out, that's about 19,000 Union deaths at a lowball resulting directly from battle casualties to destroy the AoNV down to the last man, assuming the AotP can be reinforced to avoid it being destroyed first.
That's about 8-9 months' worth of Average Union Disease Casualties, and for it to amount to a year's worth of Average Union Disease Casualties we'd need the died-of-wounds per Fredericksburg to amount to about 475.

That's also assuming Lee gets no reinforcements of any kind, naturally.

(The numbers line up much the same way for the Overland.)
 
Oddly it's not the only time Lincoln says something along those lines. There's the argument for "hard fighting" as opposed to "strategy" (made after Antietam, which was the bloodiest day of combat in US history, so it's clearly not "strategy and fighting" as opposed to "strategy and no fighting" - it's "fighting and no strategy" as opposed to "fighting and strategy"). In the specific quote Lincoln refers to the idea of conquering the South by strategy as "a delusion".

The problem is that from May - October, Union arms had suffered first a humiliating reversal under McClellan, a humiliating defeat under Pope, and then McClellan had failed to inflict a significant defeat on Lee's army which had gotten away, while in exchange the Union had lost over 28,000 killed wounded or captured during the Maryland Campaign alone. For all the strategizing of the generals they were no closer to Richmond and Lee's army remained as much of a threat as it had been at the beginning of the year.

Put in proper context Lincoln's correct in saying that the attempts at strategy were getting nowhere, and even as 1862 is ending in blood at Fredericksburg, Lincoln continues to be correct in this assessment. That strategy once again fails to crush Lee in 1863 at Chancellorsville puts Lincoln's frustrations with the idea in a pretty positive light.
 
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See page xvii. https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/decennial/1860/population/1860a-02.pdf?# Starting in 1864, there was starting to be serious thinking about how strapped the Confederates were for manpower.
If there was a strategy of attrition, it would have the biggest effect at sea, and in the western theater, were the population differentials were the most obvious.
Attrition was going to have a negative impact in New York and Pennsylvania, and in a democracy. The Confederates did not have Presidential election scheduled until 1867.
Thus, it may have been the Confederates who hoped that attrition would cause a political crisis in the US.
 
Reducing the Confederate military manpower was one possible strategy. However it may have been more effective to attack the Confederate railroad system, and to reduce and eliminate the Confederate economy's ability to supply the very bulky forage necessary to maintain mobility. Also, as Confederate territory shrank, their ability to replace mules and horses shrinks too.. A good deal of what happens starting in May of 1864 is designed to make the Confederate cavalry fight, while rapidly shrinking the Confederate territory. Eventually the Confederates have armies that have to march every where. The cannot operate effectively far from Atlanta or Richmond, and the mobility of their artillery is not noticeable.
 
I would argue Grant certainly didn't try to pursue a strategy especially because he tried to convince Lincoln to use North Carolina as a back door. Certainly I could name some more modern military forces that definitely used a strategy of attrition.
Leftyhunter

Yes.

I've seen this type of misuse all the time over the decades. Always online. Almost not worth addressing anymore.

(sigh) but, one more time ...

Folks sometimes (intentionally or unintentionally) misuse the term in order to apply it as a pejorative.

All warfare is attrition. All warfare. You seek to reduce the enemy's ability to fight, either through the physical reduction of his forces, the supply for his forces, or the moral will of his forces. Period. Full stop.

Calling any particular warfare a 'War of Attrition' is commonly a veiled (or not so veiled) pejorative, attempting to belittle the skillful and (typically) successful persecution of that warfare.

It is often a subtextual attempt to suggest a lack of skill in maneuver, interdiction planning, adaptation and execution.

Such misapplication is common in many 'sour grapes' type arguments found in non-professional venues. Very common. Countless times over the decades on history boards by less precise posters. And believe me, every successful historic commander has had it done to them by someone, somewhere on the internet - from spears to tanks.

Accepting that all warfare seeks to 'attrit' the enemy as noted above, a true 'war of attrition' is a non-clever exchange of soldier for soldier - pure reduction of force - without the other skills mentioned.

Verdun is a classic example of that correct definition. No maneuver, no adaptation, no interdiction.

The Overland campaign as a whole is nothing of the sort. Once forced to go overland, the goal was to 1.) bring the ANV into open combat, 2.) get the AoP between the ANV and Richmond, forcing either a battle or the loss of the capital (either of which wins the election and advances the end of the war), or 3.) trap the ANV in an unwinnable and inescapable siege, removing them as a field force and (albeit much more slowly) establishing the inevitable End Game for the war. All while employing major flanking movements, interdicting supply, adapting to a resilient and resourceful enemy on his home turf, and pressuring everywhere and destroying morale, through the extensions of the complete campaign. All while making certain that Lee could not regain the initiative, as he so regularly did against other less skillful opponents. The strategy and execution of this campaign is taught at West Point to this day. And not as a pejorative.

Again - misuse of the term.

Attrition itself - in one of the forms noted above - is always a goal in every military campaign. Always.

Enough of this already. I've seen it too many times before. On to more fruitful threads for me. Have fun, folks!
 
All warfare is attrition. All warfare. You seek to reduce the enemy's ability to fight, either through the physical reduction of his forces, the supply for his forces, or the moral will of his forces. Period. Full stop.
This is an oversimplification, and the reason I say that is that it is possible to clearly identify styles of warfare which seek to engage in a war of material (whether that material is men, equipment or explosives) and styles of warfare which seek to avoid it. The best way to get a handle on this is to consider the traditional Prussian/German way of war (where they outlined clearly that there was "the war of manoeuvre" and "the war of material" and clearly preferred the former, as per Robert M. Citino's studies on the matter).

To declare all war to be attritional is to be overly broad in the definition because it simplifies these two approaches down to one category. Nevertheless, I would be willing to state that the possible ways to wage war in the 19th century were "materialschlacht" (material war) with an emphasis on manpower, "materialsalacht" with an emphasis on artillery and positional warfare, and "bewegungskrieg" (the war of manoeuvre, where the emphasis is on defeating even a materially superior enemy by putting them in a situation where they must fight at a disadvantage.

In this model, Lee was a practitioner of bewegungskrieg, while the common portrayal of Grant (both positive and negative, "focusing on the enemy army" vs. "the butcher") is as a practitioner of materialsalacht - largely with manpower.

The fact that Citino's trilogy about the German army in WW2 highlights how for them bewegungskrieg did not work and that their opponents beat them with a materialschlacht indicates that it is a perfectly viable way of conducting warfare, and indeed the superior one if you can manage it properly because less is left to chance.

This would then allow us to examine how well Grant was actually doing it.
 
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