HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSOURI, Saint Louis, January 20, 1862.
Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN, General-in-Chief of the Army, Washington:
GENERAL: The cavalry sent to vicinity of Springfield found the enemy in force and were obliged to fall back to Waynesville. The whole force at Rolla was ordered in advance to re-enforce them and attack Price. Additional troops were ordered from here to Rolla, increasing General Curtis’ army to about 12,000. I have just received a dispatch informing me that a council of Generals Curtis, Sigel, and Asboth had decided that they required six regiments in addition to those ordered. I can send no more at present from Saint Louis, and consequently have ordered General Pope to dispatch one division from {p.509} near Sedalia to join General Curtis at Lebanon. This will make his effective force over 15,000.
This winter campaign will be a hard one on account of the weather and roads, but they will either beat Price or drive him from the State. Of the two divisions left at La Mine I purpose sending one across the Missouri at Booneville to march through the secession counties of Howard, Boone, Callaway and Montgomery to Saint Charles and this city for transportation to Cairo. They cannot be brought here by railroad, and the road north of the river is much the best. Moreover, their presence in the counties named is important to break up secession bands and to assist the Union men in organizing as State Militia. The condition of ice in the river is such that I have been able to send only three of the five regiments ordered from here to Cairo. I hope to dispatch some more this week. I hear nothing of the two regiments ordered from North Missouri to Cairo more than a week ago. It is very probable that they cannot cross the river at Hannibal. General Schofield hopes to be able to spare me two regiments from his command on the North Missouri Railroad in a week or two. These will also be sent to Cairo.
I have received no information in respect to the general plan of campaign, and I therefore feel much hesitation in recommending any line of operations for these and other troops which I may be able to withdraw from Missouri. Of course this line must be subordinate to some general plan. I take it for granted, general, that what has heretofore been done has been the result of political policy rather than military strategy, and that the want of success on our part is attributable to the politicians rather than to the generals.
So far it seems to me the war has been conducted upon what may be called pepper-box strategy-scattering our troops so as to render them inferior in numbers in any place where they can meet the enemy. Occupying the circumference of a great circle, with the enemy within that circumference and near the center, we cannot expect to strike any great blow, for he can concentrate his forces on any one point sooner than we can ours. The division of our force upon so many lines and points seems to me a fatal policy. I am aware that you, general, are in no way responsible for this, these movements having been governed by political expediency and in many cases directed by politicians in order to subserve particular interests; but is it not possible with the new Secretary of War to introduce a different policy and to make our future movements in accordance with military principles? On this supposition I venture to make a few suggestions in regard to operations in the West.
The idea of moving down the Mississippi by steam is, in my opinion, impracticable, or at least premature. It is not a proper line of operations, at least now. A much more feasible plan is to move up the Cumberland and Tennessee, making Nashville the first objective point. This would turn Columbus and force the abandonment of Bowling Green, Columbus cannot be taken without an immense siege train and a terrible loss of life. I have thoroughly studied its defenses; they are very strong. But it can be turned, paralyzed, and forced to surrender. This line of the Cumberland or Tennessee is the great central line of the Western theater of war, with the Ohio below the mouth of Green River as the base and two good navigable rivers extending far into the interior of the theater of operations. But the plan should not be attempted without a large force, not less than 60,000 effective men.
In connection with this movement I would move a small column of, say, 10,000 men from from Ironton on Pocahontas and Jacksonport in Arkansas, to cut the armies of Price and McIntosh from their depots of supplies at these places. Price would be thus compelled to fall back on Fort Smith or to advance to the relief of these towns. In either case Southwestern Missouri would be relieved of his presence. The forces I have sent against him will drive him out of this State, but they cannot pursue him into Arkansas on the line of his retreat; that would be folly on our part. I would also take and hold New Madrid, so as to cut off river communication from the South with Columbus. The occupation of New Madrid would entirely relieve Cairo, and almost the whole garrison could be withdrawn from that place. This plan would require the occupation of Green River with only a small force. Johnston and Buckner would not venture to cross that river with a large army in their rear on the Cumberland. If they did, their fate would be sealed.
I am ignorant of General Buell’s forces or plans. If he is strong enough to fight the enemy at Bowling Green or to turn that place and force him to fall back in the direction of Nashville the same object may be accomplished; but to operate both on Green River and on the Cumberland with the enemy at Bowling Green is to move on converging exterior lines with the enemy inside of the angle-always a most hazardous operation, unless each of the exterior forces is superior to the enemy. Under any circumstances it is bad strategy, because it requires a double force to accomplish a single object.
To carry out the plan proposed would make it necessary to suspend all minor operations. I understand troops are being concentrated at Fort Leavenworth to move on Western Arkansas and Texas. Such a project, if it be contemplated, is contrary to every military rule. Troops must be sent to a base hundreds of miles from any enemy at an immense cost of transportation. The line of operation is exterior and beyond relief, and the expense of supplies must be enormous. It can lead to no possible military result, unless made so large as to cripple or paralyze any movement on a truly strategic line. It certainly is not a military operation. It may, however, be intended to gratify some political partisan. If it be intended to check Price’s army, that can be much better accomplished by a line parallel to or near to the main one, viz, on Pocahontas and Jacksonport, the depots of his supplies.
The main central line will also require the withdrawal of all available troops from this State; also those in Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Wisconsin, and Ohio, which are armed and still to be armed, and also the transfer to that route or near it of all the Kentucky troops not required to secure the line of Green River.
The force at Cairo and on the Ohio River below the mouth of Green River is now about 15,000. Seven regiments have just been ordered there from Missouri. By the middle or last of February I hope to send about 15,000 more. If 30,000 or 40,000 can be added from the sources indicated there will be sufficient for holding Cairo, Fort Holt, and Paducah, and to form the column proposed. The troops at Ironton could threaten Pocahontas until a sufficient force could be detached from Curtis’ army at Springfield to take and hold New Madrid and Jacksonport. So long as the enemy controls the Mississippi below Columbus it might not be safe to attempt the occupation of New Madrid before moving up the Cumberland or Tennessee, as otherwise a large force might at any time be thrown across the river from Columbus to retake that place if once captured by us.
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These suggestions are hastily written out, but they are the result of much anxious inquiry and mature deliberation. I am confident that the plan, if properly carried out, would produce important results. I also believe it to be feasible.
I have not designated any particular line or lines of movement. That must be a matter of farther study if the general idea should be approved. Perhaps the main column should move from Smithland, between the rivers, by Dover, &c. Perhaps the line east of the Cumberland or that west of the Tennessee would be preferable. These questions, however, are matters easily determinable.
I have been sick for more than a week with the measles, and several members of my staff are unable to attend to any duty. Under these circumstances some delay must occur in answering the communications from the Adjutant-General of the Army.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
H. W. HALLECK, Major-General.